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PREFACE
This dissertation is the culmination of a long path. As a child, I enjoyed reading
the classics in philosophy, history, and religion, but it was works of literature,
contemporary and classical, that challenged my thought the most. Because of this, I was
never able to sympathize with the Platonic suspicion of the fine arts. Such concern made
as much sense to me as arguing that we ought to keep a wary eye on reason because it can
be used as a tool to manipulate, subjugate, and deceive. As an undergraduate, I majored in
English Literature, studio art, and philosophy. It was in this liberal arts context, and under
the guidance of many truly exceptional professors, that I stepped foot on the path that has
culminated in this dissertation. I unadvisedly wrote one of my three senior theses on the
necessity of the arts for reason, a topic I was rightly told could not be adequately handled
(for lack of space and research). The product of that experience left me deeply
dissatisfied with my ability to articulate what seemed to be a necessary, internal core of
reason.
Following graduation, I enrolled in an M.A. program in the humanities, where I
pursued such questions through the study of literary theory and the aesthetics, including
an M.A. Thesis on the intersection of aesthetics and ethics in Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina.
Although most of my courses were outside philosophy, it was during that time that I first
encountered the thought of the German Idealists and Romantics. From Schelling to
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Schiller, from Fichte to Schlegel, from Kant to Goethe, I finally found a community of
thinkers who were engaged with precisely the set of questions driving my inquiry. But it
was not until I was introduced to Hegel’s Aesthetics that I found a particularly weighty
variation of that fundamental interest whose investigation had compelled me forward.
Following the M.A. I taught Kant, Fichte, Hegel at several colleges in Chicago while also
teaching English and studio art at an inner-city high school. When I returned to graduate
school for the second time, it was with a clear sense of the path my M.A. and Ph.D. in
philosophy would take.
In part for the sake of being near extended family, and in part for the chance to
work with Konstantin Pollok, my wife and I and our newborn daughter returned to
graduate school life in 2013. I am grateful to have many individuals, communities,
institutions, and fellowships to thank for contributing to and making possible the M.A.
and Ph.D. work. From the support of extended family to the budding intellectual
community in Columbia and those who maintained contact from Chicago, Washington,
New York, Georgia, California, Colorado, China, Turkey, and Germany, I am deeply
indebted. My deepest personal thanks to those I have the pleasure of counting as friends
and who have been involved along the way in various respects: Nathan Cornwell, Josiah
Nunziato, Ben Stanford, Gary Baxter, Scott Stogner, Ben and Susan Lipscomb, Nathan
Cartagena, Chip and Beth Edgar, Ben and Leslie Roth, Ralph Wood, the late Fr. Bob
Struzynski, Sevgül and Metin Cilingir, Cinzia Ciccarello and Sebastiano Barbagallo,
Chris Culy, and particularly Amy and Kyle Vitale. Special thanks to my extended family,
particularly Stephen, Jan, Katie and Adrien, Aaron and Alexandra, Cindy and Bill, and
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Angela and Keith, as well as to my parents, Glenn and Michelle, siblings, Brittany and
Kevin, Dianna and David, and James for their loving support.
I am thankful for the many opportunities I have had to present various parts of
this dissertation along the way. I am grateful to the American Philosophical Association
for the nine occasions to present my work over the course of the past three years, as well
as to the North American Kant Society, and the North American Fichte Society. My
special thanks to the many individuals in attendance over the years whose critical
feedback was tremendously helpful. Particular thanks go to Jessica Williams for
exceptionally thorough, critical comments on a version of Ch.1, to Meghant Sudan for
critical comments on a paper on Fichte that sits in the background of Ch.8, and to Lydia
Moland for critical comments on a very early version of Ch.7. Among critical comments
from audience members, special thanks to Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Pablo Muchnik,
Jennifer Mensch, Daniel Breazeale, Dalia Nassar, Janum Sethi, Nabeel Hamid, Richard
Eldridge, Frederick Neuhouser, Keren Ng, and Karl Ameriks. My sincerest thanks to
those who have given critical feedback on portions of the dissertation along the way,
particularly, Brian Tracz, Rachel Zuckert, Kristin Gjesdal, and Keren Gorodeisky.
I am also grateful to the community of scholars and lively discussion taking place
through the Society for German Idealism and Romanticism, which was born out of the
many wonderful scholarly conversations and communities already mentioned.
I wrote this dissertation in three locations and so wish to express my thanks to
those whose space I occupied. First, my gratitude and fond memories of the wonderful
little café in Friedrichshain, Berlin called Frau Honig for the wonderful drinks and space
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in which to do my work (as well as the surrounding beer gardens). Second, my thanks to
Stagecoach Coffee in Cooperstown, NY for my favorite fresh roasted coffee, the
aesthetically inviting atmosphere, and to the owners, staff, and regulars who have become
a special part of this process. Finally, my sincerest thanks to Christ Episcopal Church of
Cooperstown, NY for so generously giving me an office space during the 2017-18
academic year. Without this unasked-for-kindness, I would not have been able to finish
the dissertation on time. My particular thanks to Laurie Kearns, and Dane and Debby
Boston for their welcoming generosity and friendship.
This dissertation would not have been possible without the generous support of
the USC Presidential Fellowship, Walker Fellowship, SPARC grant, numerous
department travel grants and three years of a 5-year stipend, and the backing of the
department, including a 2016 USC Department of Philosophy Research Grant (special
thanks to the department chair, Michael Dickson, who has been exceptionally supportive
and department secretary, Barbara Delaney). My heartfelt thanks to the Lilly Endowment
for the Lilly Fellowship and for making possible the 4 years of close communion with the
other Lilly Fellows.
I am continuously grateful for the generosity of the U.S. Department of State for
the Fulbright Fellowship that made possible a 2016-17 year in Berlin, Germany. I
treasure the opportunity I was granted, through the Fulbright, to be a cultural ambassador
serving with the refugee crisis in a city as fully engaged as Berlin. It was an honor to see
the spirit of the Berliners in the twenty-first century leading the world in the extremely
hard call to love and care for every human being, particularly those whose need is the
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most pressing. That time conducting research at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin with
Tobias Rosefeldt and his colloquium and at the Universität Potsdam with Johannes Haag,
as well as the chance to grow to know and love the beautiful people, culture, and
landscape of Germany is a gift for which I will always be thankful. I am grateful for the
Bilinski Dissertation Completion Fellowship which has allowed me to spend this final
year at Yale University as a doctoral research visitor working with Paul Franks.
To my incredible dissertation committee: thank you. From the very beginning, I
have been honored and blessed to have a deeply caring, engaged, thoughtful, and
supportive committee. Special thanks to Paul Franks for both hosting me at Yale during
this final year and for serving on the committee. The philosophical clarity, integrity, and
humility represented in his seminal All or Nothing, and equally in his person, is an
example that I hope to emulate. I am particularly grateful to George Khushf for his
sincerity, acumen, and philosophical nuance both in class and as an active member of the
committee. In those times that I most felt that the academic climate was having a DorianGray-effect on my spirit, I thought of George Khushf (as well as my undergraduate Art
advisor and ceramics professor Gary Baxter) for reassurance that it is possible to be the
kind of person that I hope to be despite the toll of the process. My deepest thanks to Anne
Pollok –whose knowledge of and love for aesthetics and the history of philosophical
investigations in the arts was a major influence– for complete and unreserved investment
in and care for me, my work, and my family, and for so much more support than one
could ask for. Konstantin Pollok’s interpretation of Kant has been more influential on my
work than any other scholar in this field. I came to the M.A. and P.h.D with a love for
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Hegel, but my love of Kant came only through the discussion and debates with him. His
tireless support, invaluable feedback, advice, and countless hours that he has put in to
helping me and this work over the past five years has been invaluable. I am deeply
grateful for the wonderful experience it has been pursuing a Ph.D. under him. This
dissertation and my time as a doctoral student have Anne and Konstantin Pollok to thank
above all.
Finally, my greatest appreciation and love for our three precious children, Eliana
(4), August (2), and Little One (in gestation), for the beaming little smiles, fullheartedness in all things, whether joyful or sorrowful, for their daily offers to come to
work with me and taste-test my coffee, and the pure simplicity in their little voices, big
hopes, and full hearts; and to Megan, my best friend of twelve years, spouse, artist, critic,
love, support, and devoted mother to our kids. Yours is a truly beautiful soul. Thank you
for walking this journey together.
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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I argue that the point of transition between Kant and the
Idealists is most aptly identified and comprehended when we bring into view a careful
understanding of Kant’s principle of the free lawfulness of the Imagination. I argue that
for Hegel, it was this principle that constituted Kant’s “greatest service to philosophy.” I
contend that we are right to agree with Hegel that this principle is fundamental to Kant’s
critical Idealism and is an important theoretical principle in its own right. More than this,
though, Hegel adopts, modifies, and expands this notion and thereby turns it into the
bedrock of his own system program. In defense of this thesis, I show that Hegel employs
Kant’s principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination explicitly and implicitly as the
bedrock of the method of reason developed most clearly in The Science of Logic,
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, as well as in his Berlin lectures on Aesthetics
and Philosophy of Right. The result is that I defend a theoretical notion of reason in Hegel
that brings him interpretively much closer to Kant’s critical Idealism than is typically
held, and more originally still, I defend an interpretation of Kant that not only solves
many of the interpretive challenges of the third Critique’s unity and significance but also
shows that Kant’s critical philosophy is more suggestive of central developments in
Hegel’s absolute idealism than many Kantians may be comfortable admitting.

x

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication ..........................................................................................................................iii
Preface ...............................................................................................................................iv
Abstract ...............................................................................................................................x
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................xii
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1
Chapter 1: Prelude – Two Critiques of German Idealism: Reframing the Point of
Transition from Kant to Hegel .........................................................................14
Part One: Kant...................................................................................................................43
Chapter 2: Threefold Significance of the Imagination in the Critique of
Pure Reason .....................................................................................................44
Chapter 3: Free Lawfulness of the Imagination: The Synthetic Principle A Priori .........108
Chapter 4: Free Lawfulness in Judgments of the Beautiful and the Sublime .................151
Chapter 5: Free Lawfulness in Judgments of Art and Natural Ends ................................192
Part Two: Hegel ...............................................................................................................253
Chapter 6: The Ground of Hegel’s Logic of Life and the Unity of Reason:
Free Lawfulness of the Imagination ..........................................................254
Chapter 7: The Artistic Imagination and the Free Lawfulness of Absolute Reason ........ 311
Chapter 8: Conclusion – The Free Productive Power and Lawfulness of Reason ..........364
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................373

x! i

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Fichte
EW ..................................................................................................................Early Writings
W ...............................................................The Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre)
Hegel
Aesthetics .........................................................Hegel’s Aesthetic Lectures on the Fine Arts
EG ...................................................................Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences
Part III: Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit
GW .................................................................Faith and Knowledge (Glauben und Wissen)
N ......................................................................Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences
Part II: Philosophy of Nature
PhG ...............................................................................................Phenomenology of Spirit
PR ..........................................................................................................Philosophy of Right
R .............................................................................. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion
WL ............................................................... The Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik)
Kant
Aside from the A and B paginations for the corresponding editions of the Critique of Pure
Reason, citations refer to Kant's Gesammelte Schriften. 29 vols., ed. BerlinBrandenburgische Akademie Der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Walter De Grunter, 1920–. For
english, I have consulted Paul Guyer’s Cambridge UP translations.
! i
xi

KPV ..........................................................................Critique of Pure Practical Reason
KrV ...........................................................................................Critique of Pure Reason
KU ............................................................................Critique of the Power of Judgment
Schelling
System ......................................................................System of Transcendental Idealism

! i
xii

INTRODUCTION
It is no accident that Kant, the German Idealists, and the fore-runners of German
Romanticism, notably Goethe and Hölderlin, were mutual influences, acquaintances, and
friends. At first blush, it seems strange that a period in philosophy known for systematic
accounts of reason’s necessity could be so closely connected with one of the apexes of
the fine arts. These correlations, however, look less surprising, less a matter of
happenstance, if we recognize a quality at the core of these systematic accounts that has
long sat in the periphery: the imagination.
In this dissertation, I reframe the systematic core of Kant and Hegel’s idealism. I
argue that the imagination is a fundamental productive power of the mind and is central
to a unified account of the three synthetic a priori principles of Kant’s three Critiques.
Through this systematic core, I defend a unified account of Kant’s tripartite critical
idealism by displaying a deep thread of internal unity and necessity to his synthetic
judgments a priori in the theoretical, practical, and aesthetic functions of pure reason.
More than an original defense of the underlying unity of Kant’s three Critiques, I show
that Hegel recognized the significance of the underlying principle of the imagination in
Kant’s critical idealism and adopts Kant’s notion not only of the imagination as a
fundamental productive power of the mind but also as a “free lawful” principle of reason.
Hegel adopts Kant’s “free lawfulness of the imagination” as the final transition in the
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Science of Logic, whereby he grounds the transition in his own system from critical
idealism to an absolute idealism.
A careful understanding of the imagination as a fundamental principle of both
systems is key to recognizing not only the internal structure of both forms of idealism but
also a key relationship between the two.
As such, I do not undertake a survey of the uses of the imagination in Kant and
Hegel. There are works that take such an approach to the topic.1 My interest is the
transcendental and absolute role that the imagination plays as a systematic core of critical
and absolute idealism. In particular, I argue that the point of transition between Kant and
the Idealists is most aptly identified and understood when we bring into view a careful
understanding of Kant’s principle of the free lawfulness of the Imagination. I argue that
for Hegel it was this principle that constitutes one of Kant’s “greatest service to
philosophy,” since it is this principle that makes possible the unity of reason. This unity
of reason is often confused with a kind of pre-critical, holistic monism. If my
reconstruction of the role of the imagination in reason is correct, then this interpretation is
wrong. Rather than a pre-critical holistic monism, Hegel’s absolute idealism is a kind of
Kantian rational holism.
I contend that we are right to agree with Hegel that this principle is fundamental
to Kant’s critical Idealism and is an important theoretical principle in its own right. While
my focus is on the imagination as the systematic core of Kant and Hegel’s Idealism, it
was equally influential for Fichte and Schelling. Although I do not address the Idealism
1

e.g. Jane Kneller, Kant and the Power of Imagination, 2007; and Jennifer Bates, Hegel's Theory of
Imagination, 2004.
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of Fichte or Schelling in-depth, I gesture toward the centrality of Kant’s notion of the
imagination for both of their systems in the final chapter.
The reason for focussing on Hegel’s reception of this principle is that Hegel’s use
of it reveals a deep continuity between critical idealism and absolute idealism, which is
less present in the idealism of Fichte and Schelling. While Kant’s notion of the
imagination is highly formative for Fichte and Schelling, they take it in directions that
bear slightly less resemblance to a thoroughgoing Kantian idealism. I recognize that the
claim that Hegel’s idealism is a necessary outworking of Kant’s (and internal to a critique
of discursive reason) is a view that will strike many critics as odd at the outset. I believe,
however, that this reframing allows for the strongest possible read of Kant and Hegel
independently from one another and as sharing a fundamental systematic core. This
interpretation helps to underscore the theoretical importance and pertinence of Idealism
to philosophy as a whole.
My dissertation implicitly yields a theoretical defense of reason in general as
fundamentally artistic (broadly construed) in many of the ways that Hegel makes explicit.
Inferring from the conclusion of the dissertation as a whole, we have ground for thinking
that reason is fundamentally irreducible to forms of ratiocination and depends inevitably
on a two-fold purposive relation of freedom and lawfulness through the productive power
of the mind and its internally necessitated form.
The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I focusses on Kant, while part II
focuses on Hegel. To motivate the argument of both Part I and II, I begin with a prelude
chapter. Likewise, to motivate the application of a similar conclusion as that reached
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through Part I and II, I end with a chapter that identifies what would be involved in a
similar reframing of the systematic cores of both Fichte and Schelling’s Idealism. What
follows now are introductory overviews of each chapter.
In Chapter 1: Prelude– Two Critiques of German Idealism, I take up (§1) two
critiques commonly leveled against German Idealism –as a “family of philosophical
programs:” (1) its supposed totalizing systematicity, which results in closed systems, and
(2) its reversion to pre-critical forms of monism, which are irreconcilable with the
discursivity of reason fundamental to Kant’s critical philosophy as well as to much in
contemporary analytic philosophy. I reject these two critiques through a postulation of a
fundamental principle in Kant’s critical thought, which, I argue, should be understood as
the key point of transition between the critical philosophy of Kant and that of the
Idealists. The point of transition that I postulate is the principle of the free lawfulness of
the imagination. To motivate this, (§2) I frame the notion of (i) a closed system, which
features in the first major critique (handling interpretations of Karl Ameriks and Paul
Franks). I then bring into view (ii) conceptions of the intuitive understanding, which
features in the second major critique (here I explore interpretive alternatives given by
Eckart Förster and David Wellbery among others). The third section (§3) contains my
central argument of this chapter, wherein I forward my postulate that there is reason to
think that the free lawfulness of the imagination could successfully ground a refutation of
the two common critiques of German Idealism, while also forging a closer conceptual
link between the Idealists and Kant.
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By bringing (i) this principle from the KU into view as well as (ii) Hegel’s
inheritance of it, we have the tools necessary for seeing (a) how and why the system
programs of the Idealists are not subject to the first major critique, and (b) why it is that
the notion of intuitive understanding employed by several figures, including Hegel,
cannot be viewed as either pre-critical or as an amendment to Kant’s notion of the
discursivity of human reason. Rather, on the reading I propose, intuitive understanding is
an internal specification of discursive reason itself. This refutation of the second major
critique also thereby identifies the central point of transition between Kant and the
Idealists. Because the first major critique is predominately leveled at German Idealism by
contemporary analytic philosophers, and the second major critique is typically leveled by
contemporary Kantians, my refutation of these critiques is particularly relevant to those
who stand outside German Idealism.
At the same time, my resolution to these two critiques identifies in the “point of
transition between Kant and Hegel” precisely that central notion that is at the heart of this
dissertation: the principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination. This prelude, thereby,
serves to introduce and motivate the investigation of the central idea of this dissertation
as a whole. Chapter 6 stands as the corollary to this prelude chapter, since it is there that I
take up the same passages, but from the standpoint of Hegel’s thought.
Part One: Kant
Chapter 2: Threefold Significance of the Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason
In this chapter, I argue for a threefold significance of the Imagination whereby the
imagination in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) is shown to be both central to every
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layer of his transcendental account (1-Pure Understanding, 2-Schematism of the
Understanding, and 3-the empirical intuitions in the Receptivity of Sensibility) while also
being identifiable under a single conception of the imagination as the fundamental
productive power of synthesis whereby any representation is possible. I argue that Kant’s
claim that the “unity of apperception in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the
imagination is the pure understanding” is not unique to the A-deduction, but actually
identifies the very method by which the productive source of the categories are grounded
in the synthetic unity of apperception as the source of their validity.
After (§1) the introduction, I take up (§2) several challenging passages from the A
and B-editions of the KrV that motivate the kind of argument I make. I then (§3) turn to a
brief description of Kant’s use of terms such as “lawfulness” “synthetic principles a
priori,” before taking up (§4) key passages on the “pure productive synthesis of the
understanding.” With the groundwork laid in the first four sections, I turn to (§5) my
account of the first-layer significance of the imagination in terms of pure representations
and the intellectual synthesis of the imagination. (Section 5 depends on the passages of
section 4 and should be seen as a continuation of 4.) I then consider (§6) challenges to my
first-layer account from contemporary scholars, looking notably at concerns stemming
from Jessica Williams, Michael Friedman, Beatrice Longuenesse, and the Conceptualist/
Non-conceptualist debate. Following this, I offer my account of (§7) the second-layer
significance of the imagination in terms of the figurative synthesis of pure intuitions and
the production of schemata. I, then provide (§8) my account of the third-layer
significance of the imagination in terms of the empirical synthesis of the imagination
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whereby it yields empirical intuitions. Lastly, (§9) I draw the conclusion from the
previous sections that without the threefold significance of the imagination as the
productive source of synthesis, no part of the first Critique is possible.
Chapter 3: Free Lawfulness of the Imagination: The Synthetic A Priori Principle
In this chapter, I again defend a three-layer significance of the imagination (as in
the Determining Judgments of the Understanding). This chapter will focus on the firstlayer significance of the “free lawfulness of the imagination” as the supreme principle of
all reflecting judgments (aesthetic and teleological). I thereby defend, against the norm,
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment not only as a coherent whole but as a
thoroughly consonant and essential part of his broader tripartite architectonic of pure
reason. The three-layer conception of the imagination gives us the tools for recognizing
the three primary uses of the term “purposiveness”
[Zweckmäßigkeit], which characterizes the KU.
My argument will proceed from the (§1) introduction to (§2) an account of the
architectonic of the KU. I then turn to (§3) the first-layer significance: the free lawfulness
of the imagination as the supreme principle of purposiveness; after which, I take up (§4)
opposing accounts of the supreme principle of purposiveness. Here I draw on alternative
conceptions given by Henry Allison, Ernst Cassirer, Béatrice Longuenesse, Konstantin
Pollok, and, more briefly, the accounts of Keren Gorodeisky, Paul Guyer, and Rachel
Zuckert. Beginning to look forward toward a complete account, I defend (§5) the second
and third-layer significance of the imagination in relation to the first as the structure of
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reflecting judgments. Finally, I end with (§6) some concluding remarks on the result of
such a principle of free lawfulness.
Chapter 4: Free Lawfulness in Judgments of the Beautiful and Sublime
Contrary to the norm in contemporary Kant scholarship, in this chapter, I defend
Kant’s claim that judgments of the beautiful and judgments of the sublime must be held
together in a formal conception of aesthetic judgment. Building on Chapter 3’s analysis
of the first-layer significance of the imagination as the supreme principle of reflecting
judgment (i.e. the free lawfulness of the imagination), I now turn to the specific judgment
forms, which concern the second and third-layer significance of the imagination. I argue
that these judgments take as their form the very principle on which they are grounded,
namely, the free lawfulness of the imagination. In this chapter, I provide an account of the
first two of the four kinds of synthetic a priori reflecting judgment.
After (§1) the introduction, I begin by (§2) contextualizing the kinds of
“purposiveness” employed as well as the unique forms of aesthetic judgment. I then (§3)
draw on the results of Chapter 3 by emphasizing the second-layer conception of
purposiveness, which serves as the form of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and the
sublime. I then turn (§4) to an analysis of the form and application of aesthetic judgments
of the beautiful. Here, I look to both the analytic of the four moments of aesthetic
judgment as well as to its deduction. Following this, I take up (§5) the corresponding
analysis of the form and application of aesthetic judgments of the sublime. In each case,
my aim is to make explicit the three-layer significance of the imagination whereby the
structure, coherence, and significances of these judgments in Kant’s critical system come
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further into view. An upshot of this argument is that I reframe the discussion in a manner
that evidences the cohesion of the Critique of the Power of Judgment and Kant’s broader
critical account of synthetic a priori judgments.
The division of content in Chapter 4 from Chapter 5 pertains to the specification
of the supreme principle of purposiveness in question.2 Namely, while both concern the
subjective principle of purposiveness, Chapter 4 looks to the further subjective
application of that principle in judgment, whereas Chapter 5 looks to the objective
application of that principle in judgment.
Chapter 5: Free Lawfulness of the imagination in Judgments of Art and Natural Ends
Chapter 5 builds on Chapters 2-4 to the culmination of the way in which the free
lawfulness of the imagination grounds the synthetic a priori validity of aesthetic
judgments of art and teleological judgments of natural ends. I will argue that these two
judgment forms are identical. That which distinguishes them is accidental or
“occasioned” and so external. Both judgments represent the manner in which reflecting
judgment bridges the supersensible and sensible divide through the supreme principle of
the free lawfulness of the imagination.
I begin by (§2) setting the stage for recognizing the nature of the analog between
(2.2) aesthetic ideas and natural ends, through (2.1) a three layer significance of the
imagination and the corresponding layers of purposiveness. I then turn to an account of
(§3) aesthetic judgments of art, where I take up the question of (3.1) a deduction and
2

Where “specification” just identifies the derived law that reflecting judgment gives itself from its own
supreme principle for the sake of its own unique forms of judgment: “The reflecting power of judgment,
therefore, can only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law, and cannot derive it from anywhere
else (for then it would be the determining power of judgment)” (KU 5:179-80).
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analytic of aesthetic judgments of art. From this, I argue that (3.2) aesthetic judgments of
art contain a two-fold productive/reflecting activity corresponding with a two-fold
causality, displayed on the one hand through (3.3) spirit and (3.4) genius. I then identify
(3.5) an analytic of aesthetic judgments of art, if we must have one (though I argue that
such an analytic is already contained in the deduction). From this we see the product of
such judgments, namely (3.6) aesthetic ideas and works of art, as well as the necessary
role of (3.7) symbols and the foundations for (3.8) bridging the supersensible and
sensible (which I return to at the end of §4). In (§4) I turn to my account of teleological
judgments of natural ends. Here as well, I proceed by (4.1) reconsidering the three-layer
significance of the imagination and corresponding layers of purposiveness as the the free
lawful structure of teleological judgments; and also (4.2) reconsider the nature of
aesthetic ideas and natural ends according to a (4.3) two-fold causality from the
standpoint of teleological judgments, which results in the (4.4) free lawful unity of the
supersensible and sensible. Finally, I introduce (4.5) why the free lawfulness of the
imagination as the transcendental structure of reason that grounds this unity is what
Hegel calls “Kant’s greatest service to Philosophy,” which is the subject of Chapter 6.
Part Two: Hegel
Chapter 6: The Ground of Hegel’s Logic of Life and the Unity of Reason:
Free Lawfulness of the Imagination
In this chapter, I aim to cast doubt on standard readings of Hegel’s logic of life. I
begin by (§2) drawing attention to what Hegel calls Kant’s “Greatest service to
Philosophy.” I then (§3) identify James Kreines’ account as symptomatic of the
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problematic norm of interpolating Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature into the Logic when
dealing with these chapters on Mechanism, Teleology, Life, etc. I suggest (§4) a new
interpretation of the status of Hegel’s logic of life that rejects the dichotomy between
non-metaphysical and metaphysical, readings such as Pippin’s and Houlgate’s. While I
open this discussion of the status of Hegel’s logic of life with several standard
interpretations, my aim is not to analyze or evaluate the adequacy of those accounts, but
rather to show that through the interpretive difficulties they face, we are lead to a reevaluation of the Hegel’s text starting with (§5) Mechanism. Then, proceeding to (§6)
Teleology, we find a conception of purposiveness as the transition to the logic of life that
is at the heart of the relationship between Kant’s critical Idealism and Hegel’s absolute
Idealism, and correspondingly to Hegel’s account of the unity of reason. I suggest that
Hegel’s notion of purposiveness in the Science of Logic cannot be understood to pertain
to a real, inner purposiveness such as Aristotelian conception of the soul in De Anima or
the Kantian idea of a teleological “natural end” as is commonly held, but is a direct
inheritance of Kant’s a priori principle of purposiveness qua the “free lawfulness of the
imagination.”
I then defend (§7) the significance that Hegel identifies in the logic of
purposiveness as the final transition to the Idea, before taking up (§8) a likely worry. Not
only does this interpretation have greater textual support in the Logic and the
Encyclopedic system than those standard readings, it also avoids the major pitfalls of the
standard interpolations. Such interpolations of Hegel’s logic of teleology and the idea of
life result in a collapsed distinction between the Philosophy of Nature and the Logic and
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more importantly, undermine (§9) the very ground on which Hegel’s Logic displays the
necessity internal to Kant’s critical idealism for the transition to his own Absolute
Idealism. Put positively, the status of the logic of life is precisely the ground on which
Hegel shows the necessary unity of reason.
Chapter 7: The Artistic Imagination and the Free Lawfulness of Absolute Reason
Transitioning from the role of the free lawfulness of the imagination in the science
of Hegel’s system, which was the subject of Chapter 6, I take up the significance of this
notion of free lawfulness in what Hegel calls the life of that system. In particular, I will
argue that through Hegel’s account of art in his Aesthetics, he shows the necessity by
which the historical life of rationality requires the recognition of a fundamental power of
artistic imagination as partially and fundamentally constitutive of speculative thought. I
will show that for Hegel, the artistic imagination is the essence of art that is sublated into
absolute reason through a necessary and harmonious, free lawful unity with
“philosophical thought.” Through this unity, Hegel shows the emergences of absolute
reason as fundamentally dependent on an artistic free lawfulness, whereby art maintains
its significance precisely through the moment commonly, though mistakenly, termed the
“end of art.”
After (§1) contextualizing the investigation of this chapter, I begin with (§2) a
brief transitional account from the Logic to the life of the Spirit. In the context of the
latter, we encounter Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and philosophy of art (Aesthetics). In
order to recognize the significance of the free lawfulness of the imagination in the latter, I
sketch (2.1) the significance of the free lawfulness of the method of absolute reason in
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ethical life through Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (considering briefly Allen Wood’s
interpretation), before sketching the transition (2.2) toward Hegel’s philosophy of art. I
then distinguish between a two-fold significance of art concerning (§3) the structure of
rationality and its historical life. Following this, I turn to a direct account of Hegel’s
aesthetics where I offer (§4) an alternative account to several interpreters, including
Robert Pippin and Martin Donougho, concerning the shapes, moments, and pastness of
art, in order to identify both what Hegel means by these historical moments of art, but
more importantly the way in which (§5) the “artistic imagination” becomes the
significance of art that is sublated into the structure of absolute reason. After which point,
we have the tools necessary to take up the essence of my argument which concerns the
nature and significance of what Hegel calls (§6) the “reconciliation” of philosophical
thinking and artistic imagination in speculative thought, wherein reason is displayed an
absolute unity in life. This unity is the same that was given grounding in the final
transition of the Logic. Having seen this, I return to a final analysis of (§7) the
significance of art for absolute reason. Sections six and seven constitute the heart of my
argument in this chapter.
Chapter 8: Conclusion – The Free Productive Power and Lawfulness of Reason
In this concluding chapter, I situate my reframing of the systematic core of Kant’s
critical idealism and its reception in Hegel’s absolute idealism through a sketch of the
corresponding cores of Fichte and Schelling’s variations of Idealism.
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CHAPTER 1

PRELUDE
TWO CRITIQUES OF GERMAN IDEALISM:
REFRAMING THE POINT OF TRANSITION FROM KANT TO HEGEL
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§1) Introduction
Two major critiques commonly leveled at German Idealism, as a “family of
philosophical programs,” 1 are (C1) its overbearing systematicity that results in a closed
system visible through problematic and often totalizing claims to completeness,2 and (C2)
that it is an unwarranted reversion to pre-critical forms of metaphysical monism,
particularly via a denial of the limits of the discursivity of reason.3 Although there are
strong defenses against these two charges, these defenses do not gain significant traction
among those who already stand outside the “traditions” of the Idealists.4
In this chapter, I suggest that Kant’s a priori principle of the “free lawfulness of
the imagination”5 serves as the ground for viable refutations of both common critiques,
while also, perhaps more importantly, turning out to be (T) the key point of transition
between Kant and the Idealists.6 In this piece, however, I have the very limited aim of
showing that there is reason to think that at least some of the Idealists recognized (a) this
principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination as a fundamental Kantian contribution
to their own systems, and (b) as holding the possibility of interestingly determining the

1

This is a term that Paul Franks helpfully employs for speaking of the diversities in German Idealism as
nevertheless forming a significant whole: 2005, p.13.
2

For both an example of (C1) and a helpful mapping of alternatives, see Ameriks, 2014, p.49, 52-4
Examples of (C2) include Pollok (2017), p. 306, and Friedman (1996), p. 464. Variations of (C2) stretch
back to the German Idealists themselves and their immediate followers. In many ways, Schelling’s late
criticism of Hegel and responses by the “Left Hegelians” (notably Bauer) can be seen as early articulations
of this debate. See Toews (2003), esp. pp. 289-93, for an extensive handling of these early developments.
3

4

Examples of notable recent accounts of Idealism that nevertheless seem to speak past (C1) and (C2)
include, Förster (2012), Zambrana (2015), and Rockmore (2016); notable past accounts include Kroner
(1921), and Henrich (1991).
5 KU 5:240, C.f. 5:286-7, 5:385
6

If this is right, it serves as a variant interpretive account to Robert Pippin and Eckart Förster’s conceptions
of the relation between Hegel and Kant and their responses to (C2) as well as a kind of middle-way
between Karl Ameriks and Paul Franks’ accounts of systematicity and, thereby, the possibility of refuting
(C1).
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answer to the relation between (i) intuitive understanding and the discursivity of reason,
on the one hand, and (ii) systematicity and contingency on the other. As such, my aim is
to bring into view the quite unique notion that the free lawfulness of the imagination
might reasonably be both the core of a systematicity responsive to contingency, contra
(C1), and, just as importantly, the principle by which an intuitive understanding can be
shown to be a constitutive quality of discursive reason, contra (C2), and, as such a core
principle, turns out to be (T) the key point of transition between Kant’s idealism and the
Idealist family of system programs (most notably of absolute idealism).7
§2) Systematicity, Intuitive Understanding, and the Two Major Critiques
Although (C1) and (C2) are so widespread as to be almost cliche, it is worth
briefly bringing into view two informed variants of these critiques.
Karl Ameriks recently articulated a version of (C1) against Hegel and implicitly
against other idealists like Fichte (Ameriks 2014). In “History, Succession, and German
Romanticism,” Ameriks describes four general models for conceiving of the relation
between (a) the contingent particulars of life and (b) the systematic, structural necessity
of reason. These are (i) a linear system of progression,8 (ii) a chaotic view,9 (iii) a
circular, closed system, 10 and (iv) an elliptical, open system, which combines the best of
7

While my account is more sympathetic to the broadly Kantian and post-Kantian interpretations like those
given by Hartmann, Pippin, Pinkard, Kroner, Zambrana, Förster, Brandon, McDowell, etc, than those
interpretations that situate Hegel in light of a more “traditional,” form of metaphysical-monism (from
Schelling to Beiser, 2010, pp.155-7), (T) is nevertheless ground for reframing the point of transition in such
a way that a refutation of (C2) involves an even closer return to Kantian critical idealism, particularly forms
of discursive thought, than these interpretations are wont to defend, while at the same time going beyond
Hartmann’s categorial view of Hegel (1972) by necessitating the fulfillment of those commitments entailed
by Franks’ conception of “holism” and “monism.”
8 Ameriks,
9

2014, p.50

Ibid. 51

10

Ibid, 52-4
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(i) and (ii). Ameriks argues that what makes Hegel’s absolute idealism a closed circle is
that the system of reason, which displays absolute necessity, is neither fundamentally nor
significantly open to contingency. 11 That is, the contingent in life has no place in the
constitution of the “true,” where the true is the absolute necessity of rationality.12
Among contemporary Kant scholars, we often find (C2) expressed in variations of
the kind given by Michael Friedman. On Friedman’s view, the intuitive understanding in
Idealism collapses the very quality at the heart of discursive reason, namely the
distinction between concept and intuition. According to Friedman, the “idealist doctrine”
is that “the world to which our thought relates is a creature of our own
conceptualization.”13 Whether proponents of (C2) reduce Idealism to pre-critical forms of
monism, such as Spinozistic thought, or some radical form of systematic solipsism, the
message is clear: such a “doctrine” has no place in critical philosophy’s revolution,14
which is dependent on the transcendental structure of a finite, discursive reason.15 We
should now bring into view plausible meanings of (i) systematicity and (ii) intuitive
understanding.

11

Ibid, 49. By contrast, he argues that the fourth is the form of German Romanticism generally, but
particularly that displayed in the thought of Hölderlin. The significance of the systematic form of the
German romantics is that it is a highly complex model of the nature of human reason that adopts and
enhances the Kantian critical framework to a robust vision of life (Ameriks, 2014, p.48). Accordingly, the
idea that “we need to see ourselves as an ongoing historical ‘Gespräch,’ is the guiding ‘form’ for
Hölderlin’s thought as a whole” (61) In short, Hölderlin’s view of human reason and history is importantly
systematic, yet “open.”
12 In Ameriks’ words, “The ‘absolute knowledge’ of Hegel’s system can be taken, in its content, as just a
reflective formulation of what is implicit from the start within reason’s ‘idea’ of a reconciled harmony of
object and subject, and so, despite the dramatic reality of an extensive sequence of quests and necessary
changes within the world of appearance, there remains an underlying and unchanging philosophical order,
one without any fundamental incompleteness” (2014, p.49).
13
14
15

Friedman,1996, p.464.
For a helpful response to Friedman’s version of (C2), see Pippin, 2015, p.161-2.
e.g. Pollok, 2017, pp.305-7.
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(i) Systematicity
In what follows we need only a plausible account of what systematicity entails for
the Idealists. To this end, let us bring into view Paul Franks account of systematicity in
All or Nothing. According to Franks, we should understand the role of systematicity in
Idealism as arising from a twofold commitment. On the one hand, that of overcoming the
Agrippan trilemma, or in other words, the problem that investigation into the justificatory
ground of premises reveals either (a) an arbitrary assumption, (b) a vicious circle, or (c)
an infinite regress.16 It seems right to say that Kant’s response to the Agrippan trilemma is
his dualism whereby the transcendental and the empirical are distinguished such that the
former becomes an explanatory ground of the latter.17
While Franks suggests that Kant is committed to a kind of monadic individualism
in which the transcendental is essentially metaphysically real, such a reading is not
necessary. For example, according to Franks:
If a naturalist is someone who believes that the only possible entities are the
empirical objects studied in natural science, then, according to the argument of
this book, the German idealists are naturalists but Kant is not. For, in light of his
Monadic Individualism in metaphysics and his Newtonian holism in physics,
Kant is committed to the existence of supersensible entities or things in
themselves, which are not subject to the laws of nature. In contrast, as Holistic
Monists, German idealists deny the existence of any such entities. The Absolute
first principle in which they ground empirical objects is not sensible, but it is also
not an entity.18

16

Franks, 2005, p.8
my account, H.S. Harris offers a similar interpretation to Franks in his footnote on this passage
(GW pp.82-3, f.36).
17 Against
18

Franks, 2008, p.389; and elsewhere: “Holistic monism is plainly incompatible with Kant’s fully
articulated version of Kantian dualism since that involves Monadic Individualism. But Holistic Monism is
nevertheless compatible with the fundamental idea of two structures of grounding, such that one is subject
to the Agrippan Trilemma which the other escapes, and such that the former is dependent on the latter for
its fundamental concepts” (Franks, 2005, p.107).
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On my account, by contrast, both the Idealists and Kant are (qualified) naturalists
in Franks’ sense of the term. I say qualified because they do not have a strong positive
thesis about what cannot be known. In other words, in light of absolute idealism, there is
not good reason to think that there is a thing-in-itself that might not correspond with
reason. But this is a critique of a kind of unfounded skepticism in light of absolute
idealism, it is not the stronger thesis that there is not an unknowable thing-in-itself which
stands over and against the empirical world. In other words, for the Idealists, after
absolute idealism, there cannot be good reason to maintain the thing-in-itself as anything
more than the mere limits of reason. 19
It seems to me that it is possible to understand Kant’s dualism in terms of the twoaspects view that Franks attributes to the Idealists. Namely,
one may regard Holistic Monism as part of a response to the very problems
that motivate Kantian dualism. The resulting view is a two-aspect view:
there is one world, the empirical world, but this single set of things may be
viewed either from the empirical standpoint, as situated within a structure
of grounding subject to the Agrippan trilemma, or from the philosophical
standpoint, as situated within a structure of grounding that terminates in an
absolute first principle.20

And, I think, Hegel reads Kant the way I do. Consider, for example, the following
passage from Hegel’s analysis of “Kantian Philosophy” in Glauben und Wissen: “The ‘I
think’ is to be transformed into an absolute noumenal point–not a real existing monad in
the form of substance, but a noumenal monad, as a fixed noumenal unit conditioned by

19 A claim

to the limits of reason is quite different than a claim that the way things are may not match with
our cognition of them.
20

Franks, 2008, p.108; cf. p.145
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infinite opposition, and absolute in this finitude.”21 This, and in general Hegel’s entire
account of Kant in Glauben und Wissen, sounds a lot like what Franks calls the twoaspect view of the Idealists, but which he denies of Kant. However, to justifiably attribute
such a two-aspect view to Kant would require a solid response to Franks’ compelling
account of the status of, for example, the will in Kant’s thought, but since aligning Kant
with Frank’s two-aspect view is not necessary for this chapter, I leave it to the side.
What is important is that Franks argues, I think rightly, that the Idealists maintain
something of the Kantian dualistic demand in their answer to the Agrippan trilemma.22
For the Idealists, all empirical grounds are subject to the Agrippan Trilemma, whereas the
non-empirical (transcendental or speculative) can provide a standpoint that is capable of
escaping the Agrippan Trilemma, and can serve as an ideal ground of the possibility of
the empirically real.23
On the other hand, the Idealists are committed to meeting what they take to be an
equally fundamental problem and demand as the Agrippan Trilemma and the
corresponding dualism, namely, the twofold (a) holistic and (b) monistic conditions. The
holistic condition is the requirement that in the resolution to the Agrippan Trilemma
“every particular (object, fact, or judgment) be determined through its role within the

21

GW, 83
I think it fair to say that Klaus Hartmann’s non-metaphysical, “categorial” interpretation of Hegel is in
agreement to this point, but not with what follows. That is, for Hartmann’s Hegel, there necessarily remains
a kind of Kantian dualism between the transcendental and empirical, that is not present, for example, in my
account, nor I think in Franks’, Pippin’s, Pinkard’s, and Zambrana’s (Hartmann, 1972, p. 117; 1978, pp.
65-8; C.f. Pinkard, 1992, p.602).
22

23

Pinkard notes, it was partially Schulze’s “Aenesidemus” charge of infinite regress (failing to escape the
Agrippan Trilemma) to Reinhold’s view of the self-conscious subject’s representation of itself, which
resulted in the quick decline of Reinhold’s philosophical influence; 2002, pp.106-7.
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whole and not through any intrinsic properties.”24 The monistic condition is the
requirement that “the whole be grounded in an absolute principle that is immanent and
not transcendent.”25 These two conditions form the basis, on this view, for identifying
Idealist’s response to the Agrippan Trilemma as a holistic monism. As Franks notes, these
two conditions seem opposed to the dualistic demand, yet the Idealists employ precisely
the dualistic distinction between the real and the ideal as their method of escaping the
Agrippan Trilemma.26
(ii) Intuitive Understanding (and Discursive Reason)
For Hegel, according to Eckart Förster,27 the intuitive understanding is a dialectic
process between particular and universal that results in the method of transition between
concepts in response to the relevant particulars, such that the form of such judgments is a

24

Franks, 2005, p.10; since, although a transcendental ground escapes the Agrippan trilemma, by nature of
its solution, it cannot (on its own) meet the monistic condition, but rather retains a necessary dualism. cf.
Pinkard, 2010, p.570. That this is a fair reading is evidenced to my mind most clearly by the primary thesis
of Fichte’s “Third Lecture Concerning the Difference between the Spirit and the Letter within Philosophy;”
here, pp.213-5 are noteworthy.
25

Franks, 2005, p.10. For an answer to why these at least seem to be opposed, see the preceding footnote
concerning the monistic demand. As concerns the holistic demand, the opposition rests in taking what for
Kant is merely regulative for cognition (the whole) and employing it constitutively, which, on the face of it
seems incompatible with the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic (KrV A642-702/B670-730) and the
Appendix to the Teleological Power of Judgment (KU 5:425-36).
26 Franks attributes the holistic and monistic commitments to the influence of Spinoza on the Idealists via
the Jacobi-Mendelssohn controversy (Franks, 2005, pp.86, 144-5). However, there is a non-Spinozistic
theoretical ground for such commitments that is suggested by, and internal to, Kant’s critical philosophy.
These two commitments are arguably already present and theoretically necessitated by Kant himself. If we
interpret Kant’s notion of unity as the highest principle of reason (KrV, A645-8/B673-6, A651/B679,
A686-7/B714-6), in light of his development of the free lawfulness of the imagination as a bridging
principle between the faculties of the mind (KU 5:195-6; KU, first introduction, 20:243, 20:202, 20:207-8,
5:175-6), as I suggest that we should, it is conceivable that the idealists, who placed so much emphasis on
Kant’s notion of the imagination in the third Critique were actually working out precisely those
commitments that the mature Kant was already nascently committed to. Such a reading would save Kant
from the Leibnizian metaphysical, monadic individualism that Franks charges him with (Franks, 2015, p.
107), while also recognizing that the Idealists (notably Hegel, but also Fichte) are actually correct in seeing
themselves as completing Kant’s Critical philosophy without denying the discursivity framework of reason.
27

Cf. Reed Winegar’s (2017) handling of Section 76 of the KU, and the possibility that it entails something
like a Spinosistic intuitive understanding, pp.312-4. See also John Zammito (1992), p.257.
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“development.” 28 It is not a mechanically prescribed law, but rather an organic,29
responsive, lawful activity. On Förster's account,30 the method of intuitive understanding
involves discursive thought by which “properties of the relevant phenomenon” are found
and unified, but from this unified whole, the mind must yield an idea that is neither
previously present nor merely regulative.31 For example, suppose we are watching
Christopher Nolan’s experimental film Memento. In this context, we might find Förster’s
account (not about this film) insightful:

28

I agree with Pippin when he suggests that Hegel’s account of reflecting judgment, purposiveness, and
nature emphasize not teleology but aesthetic judgments and aesthetic ideas in terms of the imagination
(Pippin, 1997, p.141). As Pippin notes, Hegel’s discussion of sections 76 and 77 of the KU results in his
conclusion that the “transcendental imagination is itself intuitive intellect” (138). However, Pippin’s
interpretation takes a turn that, while I think important in its own right, misses the heart of what Hegel saw
in this Kantian notion of transcendental imagination. In his handling of this topic, Pippin does not have in
view the a priori principle of free lawfulness when he emphasizes the “imagination;” (138). Pippin quickly
identifies what he takes this intuitive thought to involve: namely, a shifted “orientation” (147) in which we
recognize the significance internal to reason, “esteeming life”, and being receptive to nature in terms of an
“aesthetic experience”. In this aesthetic experience, we hold “expectations about another’s feeling” (144)
toward nature and this feeling is a kind of rational orientation, a kind of reflective openness or “common
sense” (149). As a result, Pippin misses that what is really of interest for Hegel in Kant’s notion of the
imagination has much more to do with the synthetic unity of apperception than Pippin realizes. Pippin’s
account of Hegel’s inheritance of the synthetic unity of apperception has nothing of the imagination in it,
but as I show in the course of the next six chapters, the imagination is the central feature of Hegel’s
inheritance of Kant’s synthetic principles a priori and the productive lawfulness of reason that the latter
ground.
Pippin’s interpretation of Hegel’s account in Glauben und Wissen, accords with some recent Kantian
interpretations of the KU like that expressed by Konstantin Pollok (2017), pp.112, 278, but which, like
Pippin’s shift misses the significance of the imagination as a fundamental productive power of reason in
general (e.g. “Absence of Aesthetics” f.415) and so mischaracterizes the significance of aesthetic and
teleological judgment in Kant. Cf. Keren Gorodeisky, “Schematizing without a Concept?”, which
importantly emphasizes the free lawfulness of the imagination, but offers an alternative interpretive account
that does not distinguish the a priori principle of purposiveness from that same principle “given as law to
[the reflecting judgment]” i.e. formal purposiveness, as I am doing here. Cf. Kroner (1921), pp.448-77.
29

I use organic to mean a synthetic, a priori method evidenced in the non-empirical, necessity of thought.
Förster’s argument in his forthcoming “From Transcendental Logic to Speculative Logic” accords, as far
as I am aware, with my own since he defends a logic of internal purposiveness as the non-metaphysical,
logic of metaphysics that I am here suggesting stems from Kant’s a priori principle of Zweckmäßigkeit.
Rocío Zambrana’s Hegel’s Theory of Intelligibility, like Förster’s 25 Years of Philosophy, makes a case for
Hegel’s thought as intimately bound to Kant’s critical idealism, yet problematically also a “post-critical”
and “post Kantian philosophy of Geist” (though Zambrana’s framing of this differs from Förster’s);
Zambrana (2015), pp.12, 37-42, 51. C.f. Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, pp.581-91. Tom Rockmore also
defends an interpretation of Hegel as developing from Kant into a “post-Kantian,” constructivist emphasis
on phenomenology (2016), pp.105-22. While I am sympathetic to these, I think they misconceive of Hegel
as stepping away from Kant in a way that obscures the very heart of Hegel’s absolute idealism.
30

31

Förster, 2012, p.255.
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…scenes follow each other in a seemingly random, unconnected way: Times,
places, and actors are constantly changing with no indication of how they are
connected. It seems as if every scene constituted an independent and selfcontained episode. Then comes the final scene, and suddenly everything that
came before is illuminated in a flash. This final scene provides the key to
understanding the film and allows us to recognize the idea that the director
wanted to present. Now we might perhaps wish to see the film for a second time,
and then something decisive occurs: Although we see exactly the same scenes
again, this time we see every scene differently. When we watch the film again,
the last scene or rather our knowledge of the film’s underlying idea is now
present in every single scene. And it now makes clear how the scenes which
formerly appeared to be unconnected are in fact internally linked.32

Whether working from the transitions, the parts, or the idea, the intuitive
understanding is forming, active,33 dialectically responsive in a way that alters the
standard hylomorphic model of conceptual form and sensible matter. 34 The “alteration” or
transition on this model is meant to identify a more adequate form of thought that, while
not given in Kant, does not thereby necessarily stand in opposition to a discursive model
of reason. Consider two further helpful examples by Förster, the first on mathematics, the
second drawn from Goethe’s reflections:
As in the case of the mathematical series, so too in the case of the succession of
phenomena: I must simulate the transitions in thought; in imagination, I must reproduce the manner in which each part has emerged from the previous state and
how it passes over into the succeeding state. And then I have to make all the
transitions present to my mind at once–and with this the discursive understanding
becomes intuitive and intuition becomes a single intuition–like the idea (or
formula), I must be present at all points simultaneously in order to recognize its
causality.35
And further,
As Goethe writes in a posthumously published remark: ‘When I see an object
before me which has come into existence, wonder about its genesis, and measure
out the course of its becoming as far as I can follow it, I becomes aware of a
32

Ibid. p.259

33

For a similar account in Goethe, whose view of the intuitive understanding was influential on Hegel’s
thought, see Wellbery, 1996, ch. 9.
34 Ibid. p.260
35

Förster (2012), p.261
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series of stages [the individual parts] which I cannot perceive next to each other,
but which I must make present to myself in memory as a certain ideal whole. At
first I am inclined to imagine distinct steps, but since nature makes no leaps, I am
finally compelled to intuit a sequence of uninterrupted activity as a whole by
negating [aufheben] the individual parts [qua individuals], but without
destroying the impression.’36

While I take Förster’s description of intuitive understanding to be helpful, I do not
see it as an advance beyond Kant’s discursive reason, as he does.37 What is of concern for
my purpose here is not that Hegel had such a view of the intuitive understanding, but how
he sees it as fundamental to the transcendental framework whereby absolute reason (his
version of synthetic a priori judgments) is valid. I suggest that Hegel’s notion of intuitive
understanding as a quality of human reason38 is dependent on (T) Kant’s own
introduction of the very principle (and Hegel recognized this) that grounds intuitive
understanding as a form of discursive reason: namely, the principle of free lawfulness of
the imagination. To see this requires recognizing Hegel’s notion of Zweckmäßigkeit in the
WL39 as the same subjective, a priori principle of reflecting judgment that Kant terms
“free lawfulness of the imagination.”40 Of this, Kant later (Section 35 of the KU)
confirms that it is precisely this principle of purposiveness that is the a priori “subjective

36

Ibid.
Two things happen on Förster’s view that are unnecessary. The view that intuitive understanding amends
Kant’s thought (1) obscures the way in which Kant grounds a more complex, if undeveloped, notion of
discursive reason; and it (2) obscures the Kantian method whereby Hegel escapes the “Agrippan trilemma”
and meets the holistic and monistic conditions.
37

38

For example, Hegel offers the following concluding summary of the method of reason: “the method…
goes through a content, as through a seeming other of itself, back to its beginning, in such a way that it
does not merely restore that beginning, albeit as determinate, but that the result is equally the sublated
determinateness, and hence also the restoration of the first immediacy in which it began. This it
accomplishes as a system of totality” (WL 12.250).
39 WL 12.157
40

KU 5:240
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principle of the power of judgment in general” 41 and the ground whereby the
understanding and reason are lawfully in the “service of the imagination and not vice
versa.”42
§3) The A Priori Principle of “Free Lawfulness of the Imagination”
As early as his 1802 critique of Kant in Glauben und Wissen (GW),43 Hegel
begins voicing a view that will culminate in the final transition of the 1816/17 Logic and
Encyclopedia as well as the revised versions of these as late as 1831. Of interest here, is
what Hegel calls Kant’s introduction of (a) the “germ of speculation” in GW and (b) his
“greatest service to philosophy” in the Logic.
Of (a), Hegel says in GW: “we must not place Kant’s merit in this, that he puts the
forms, as expressed in the categories, into the human cognitive faculty… We must find it,
rather in his having put the Idea of authentic a priority in the form of transcendental
imagination,”44 and further that the “germ of speculation lies in this triplicity alone. For
the root judgment, or duality, is in it as well, and hence the very possibility of a

41

KU 5:286

42

KU 5:242; This picture is further complicated by Kant’s account of the three “original sources” or
faculties of the mind within the domain of theoretical reason: “sense,” “imagination,” and
“apperception” (KrV B127). These are the “original sources” of the conditions for the possibility of
experience. Kant’s account of the original sources is further confirmed by his account of the understanding
in A119, not as an original source, but rather the “unity” of “imagination" and “apperception” or more
fully: “The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding,
and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is the pure
understanding” (KrV A119). For an extensive handling of the three original sources in the KrV, see Haag
(2007), according to whom, “We need, then, the understanding in order to bring the synthesis of the
imagination to the necessity of experience: the unified representation of a manifold. The transcendental
apperception is responsible for forming the synthesis that Kant, in A78/B103, clearly ascribes to the effect
of the imagination; in such a manner that Kant is able to speak of this synthesis simply as an act of the
understanding (at the beginning of the second section of the B-Deduction)” (my translation, Erfahrung und
Gegenstand, pp.183-4).
43 I prefer the untranslated title, since it avoids some of the ambiguities of the translation: Faith and
Knowledge.
44

GW, p.80
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posteriority.”45 Note that Hegel speaks of the merit of Kant’s transcendental imagination
in KrV in terms of the “possibility” and “germ of speculation.”46
The transcendental Imagination is the seed of speculative thought, for Hegel,
because it somehow contains within itself the “duality” of necessity and contingency, the
a priori and the a posteriori; and, thereby, internal to the productive imagination is the
possibility of a bridge, a unity, and of absolute knowledge. However, this possibility is
merely “negative,” not yet the positive actuality of speculative thought.
Importantly, it is in his chapter on Teleology near the end of the Logic, that
Hegel’s system shows the final transition by which he grounds the absolute idea and so
concludes the Logic. It is this final transition that opens up the stages of the Idea, first
“Life,” then theoretical and practical cognition, and finally the absolute idea. Early in this
chapter on Teleology, Hegel introduces purposiveness with the striking declaration:
One of Kant’s greatest services to philosophy was in drawing the distinction
between relative or external purposiveness and internal purposiveness [äußerer
und innerer Zweckmäßigkeit]; in the latter he opened up [aufgeschlossen] the
concept of life, the idea [den Begriff des Lebens, die Idee], and with that he
positively raised [erhoben] philosophy above the determinations of reflection and
the relative world of metaphysics, something the Critique of Reason does only
imperfectly, ambiguously, and only negatively.47

My suggestion is that the reason Hegel views Kant’s “greatest service to
philosophy” as his notion of “purposiveness” in the KU (Hegel, 12.157) 48 is that he is
holding in view Kant’s fundamental insight in the KU that purposiveness is a principle of
free lawfulness by which, in Kant’s terms, the faculties of reason and the understanding
45

GW, p.80

46

GW, p.73
WL 12.157

47
48

Hegel, WL, 12.157
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are “in the service of the imagination and not vice versa.”49 For now, we should note that
Hegel’s notion of purposiveness in the chapter on Teleology in the Science of Logic, are
often glossed as either a Kantian idea of a natural end or, more typically, a kind of
Aristotelian teleology. 50 Of course, Hegel was no stranger to Aristotle’s thought and is not
hesitant to show his indebtedness to Aristotle. In fact, Aristotelian teleology, particularly
the principle of the soul, plays a significant role in the Philosophy of Nature and
Philosophy of Spirit. So much so that, regarding Aristotle’s writings on the hylomorphic
form of the soul, Hegel says, “The main aim of a philosophy of spirit can only be to
reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the theory of mind, and so reinterpret the
lesson of those Aristotelian books.”51 For Aristotle, the soul is a principle of “life;” where
to have a principle of life is to have an internal, unified structure according to which X
grows, sustains itself, and in light of which it is susceptible to various kinds of decay (De
Anima II.4, 415b26-8). To this degree, Aristotle’s influence in Hegel’s absolute Idealism
is clear. Not only is it clear, it is substantial. Hegel, in the third book of the Encyclopaedia
of the Philosophy of Spirit, is saying that the main aim of such a work is a reintroduction
of Aristotle’s notion of soul (albeit to “absolute” purposes).
It should give us pause, then, when Hegel says in both his early writings and
mature thought, specifically here in the greater Logic that it was Kant (not Aristotle) who
gave philosophy the supreme notion of purposiveness in the Critique of the Power of

49

KU 5:242
For an expansive account on this subject see ch. 6-8 of Ferrarin, 2007. C.f. Kreines 2008 (p. 346), in
whose account, this passage is speaking of the real teleology of organism; his interpolation does not
withstand its own contextualization in the WL.
50

51

EG, p. 3
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Judgment. Through which, Hegel claims in the passage above, Kant “opened up the
concept of life, the idea, and with that he positively raised philosophy above the
determinations of reflection and the relative world of metaphysics, something that the
Critique of Reason does only imperfectly, ambiguously, and only negatively.”52 In other
words, Hegel is here crediting Kant with giving to philosophy precisely that which serves
as the final transition of the concept to the absolute idea. Aristotelian teleology is without
a doubt significant for Hegel, but Hegel here identifies in Kant precisely that theoretical
ground for the transition from the external hylomorphism of concept and intuition to the
complete internal unity of the two in judgment. However this notion of purposiveness
plays out in Hegel, he clearly does not take himself to be speaking of a kind of
Aristotelian teleology. Nor, as we will see, does an organic unity of concept and intuition
necessitate a rejection of the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept that
defines discursive thought.
The KU is so significant for Hegel53 because it displays, takes up as a science,54
the “imagination in its freedom.”55 And it is the imagination in its freedom,56 or what is
the same thing, the “free lawfulness of the imagination” that allows for a unique relation
between concept and intuition within discursive reason as a whole. Accordingly, Hegel
says, “Kant sets up the Idea of an imagination lawful by itself, of lawfulness without law
52
53

Hegel, WL, p. 654 (12.157)
Cf. Fichte, EW, pp.213, 209, 203; Schelling, System, pp.13, 226.

54 According

to Kant, “it is science if it derives the possibility of such a judging from the nature of this
faculty as a faculty of cognition in general. It is with the latter, as transcendental critique, that we are here
alone concerned. It should develop and justify the subjective principle of taste as an a priori principle of the
power of judgment” (KU 5:286).
55 KU 5:287
56

KU 5:240
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and of free concord of imagination and intellect.”57 Much has been written on
purposiveness in Kant. 58 It is important that we recognize the level of which I am
speaking.59 I am not speaking of (i) the form of purposiveness in the intuition of an
empirical object, (ii) the purposiveness of form in aesthetic or teleological judgments, nor
(iii) do I have in view what Kant refers to by way of “such a transcendental principle as a
law.”60 At present, I am only bringing into view the a priori principle of purposiveness
itself, which makes lawful the form of a unique kind of synthetic, a priori judgment. By a
priori principle,61 I mean that by which a given kind of synthetic a priori judgment
derives its lawfulness and thereby “lays claim to necessity.”62
(i) Kant’s a priori principle of reflecting judgment in general
The real question for us is this: what exactly is the free lawfulness of the
imagination in the KU. In his 1787 letter to Reinhold, Kant famously announces his
“discovery” of a new a priori principle,63 which he terms “purposiveness”. This principle
is, in Allison’s words, “the condition under which” synthetic, a priori reflecting judgment

57

GW, p.86; Cf. GW, pp.87-8; Aesthetics, pp.1, 5, 610.

58

Rachel Zuckert’s extensive handling of the subject emphasizes purposiveness in terms of the faculty for
feeling pleasure and displeasure and in terms of the properties of an object. Since she does not recognize
the status of a priori principles as logically hylomorphic principles that make possible the transcendental
necessity of synthetic a priori judgments, her account is a helpful contrast to my own (though it is not
thereby necessarily incompatible). See Zuckert (2006), pp. 605, 614, 599; (2002), pp. 245-6, and (2007) pp.
182, 203, 298-306, 344-5, 361-3. Cf. Ginsborg (1997) and (2015), pp.57-9.
59

Kant uses the term “purposiveness” to identify various kinds of specific relations between concept and
intuition, properties of an object, concept and subject, form of judgment, and as an a priori principle of a
unique kind of synthetic, a priori judgment.
60 KU 5:180
61

For helpful and thorough discussion of the status of a priori principles for kinds of synthetic a priori
judgments, see Cassirer, (1983), p.334, 311; Pollok, (2010) and (2017), pp.101-14, 200, 212, 218;
Longuenesse, (1998), 148-9, and (2003), 145-50; Pippin, (1996), p. 552; and Allison, (2001), pp.32-3, 169.
62 KU 5:288
63

Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, pp.127-128.
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is “capable of a critique in the first place.”64 When Kant turns to the aesthetic deduction
in the KU,65 he reminds the reader that the central problem of the KrV was to answer the
question, “‘How are synthetic a priori judgments of cognition possible?’” and “this
problem thus concerned the a priori principles of pure understanding and its theoretical
judgments.”66 So, when Kant begins to speak of the free lawfulness of the imagination as
an a priori principle grounding synthetic, a priori reflecting judgment, we must be
careful to identify precisely what this means qua principle, since without this problem of
the quid juris, the quid facti of the forms of aesthetic and teleological judgments have no
lawfulness and so could not warrant a critique.67 What might it mean, then, on this
highest level of abstraction, for the a priori “principle of the power of judgment in
general”68 to be a “free lawfulness of the imagination:”69
(1) There are not two new domains of reason introduced in the third Critique (such that
the total domains of reason are somehow four). Rather, there is one domain of
reflecting judgment, which includes within it two forms of reflecting judgment:
aesthetic and teleological. As such, I suggest that we conceive of the a priori power
of reflecting judgment in general as having two specifications of the principle of
purposiveness: (a) subjective, and (b) objective.

64 Allison,
65
66

2001, p.13

See Kant’s account in Section 34 of what is in view in his inquiry as a “science” (KU 5:286).
KU 5:288

67

For more on the distinction between the quid facti established in the analytic and the quid juris of the
deduction, see Allison’s chapters on the distinction (2001), pp.67-118.
68 KU 5:286
69

KU 5:240, for my response to Hannah Ginsborg’s handling of this principle (1997), see Gentry (2016),
pp.115-117.
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(2) Although Kant introduces the a priori principle of purposiveness 70 in a way that
sounds to some as if the principle of reflecting judgment in general is identifiable
with the objective specification of this principle (namely, a “purposiveness of
nature”),71 that turns out to be an incorrect assumption. As we see in the next point.
(3) Kant identifies the subjective specification of the a priori principle as the principle in
general in section 35 of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, where he says, “the
principle of [aesthetic judgment] is the subjective principle of the power of judgment
in general.”72 So minimally, Kant is not collapsing the two specifications into the
objective form of a “purposiveness of nature.”
(4) So, if the subjective, a priori principle of reflecting judgment just is the aesthetic a
priori principle of purposiveness, what is the origin and status of the objective
specification of the a priori principle of purposiveness? Kant’s answer is that the
objective specification of the principle of purposiveness, which grounds teleological
judgments, is “occasioned” by the subjective specification of the principle of
purposiveness,73 which governs aesthetic judgments, when the latter is brought to
bear on objects of experience. 74

70

KU, first introduction, 20:216, KU 5:180
On the “purposiveness of nature” as the principle of reflecting judgment in general, see Pollok (2017)
and Haag (2016).
71

72

KU 5:286; C.f. 5:287, 20:232-3, 20:243, 5:181, 5:197, 5:226-7, 20:249-50
KU 5:197: “The power of judgment’s concept of a purposiveness of nature still belongs among the
concepts of nature, but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of cognition, although the aesthetic
judgment on certain objects (of nature or of art) that occasions it is a constitutive principle with regard to
the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The spontaneity in the play of the faculties of cognition, the
agreement of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes that concept suitable for mediating the
connection of the domain of the concept of nature with the concept of freedom in its consequences.”
73

74

KU 5:376
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(5) In other words, the objective specification (i.e. a purposiveness of nature) arises or is
“occasioned” when the subjective principle of purposiveness, which grounds
synthetic a priori aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and the sublime,75 is brought to
bear on objects of nature. 76
(6) But this suggests that the lawfulness by which teleological judgments lay claim to
necessity is occasioned by a fundamentally aesthetic principle. To this end, Kant says,
“the concept of the purposiveness of nature in its products is a concept that is
necessary for the human power of judgment in regard to nature but does not pertain to
the determination of the objects themselves, thus a subjective principle of reason for
the power of judgment which, as regulative (not constitutive), is just as necessarily
valid for our human power of judgment as if it were an objective principle.”77
(7) This means that the objective specification of the principle of purposiveness (i.e. a
purposiveness of nature) is nevertheless not an objective principle, but fundamentally
an a priori subjective principle. And Kant has argued, as we’ve seen, that this
subjective principle of reflecting judgment just is the a priori principle of
purposiveness spelled out variably in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment as
“purposiveness without purpose/end,”78 “lawfulness without law,”79 “free lawfulness
of the imagination,”80 and “the imagination in its freedom.”81 That, in turn, suggests
75

KU 5:286

76

KU 5:376, 5:197

77

KU 5:403-4
KU 5:220, 5:226, 5:228, 5:241, 5:247, 5:301, 5:306, 5:364

78
79
80
81

KU 5:240-1
Ibid.
KU 5:295-6, 5:319-20, 5:350-1
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that we should understand teleological judgments concerning organic wholes or
natural ends as lawfully analogous to aesthetic ideas.82 The difference is that the
natural ends or organic objects refer to manifolds in nature, instead of an aesthetic
idea that refers to a manifold of the free productive imagination.
(8) Given this, it should not be surprising to find that Kant indeed identifies teleological
judgments as having only a regulative validity while their aesthetic counterparts are
both regulative83 and constitutive.84 Neither should we be surprised to find that an
idea of a natural end should be viewed in some respects analogously to an aesthetic
idea: namely, “as if designed.”85 If the judgment had constitutive validity, then this
could be determinative for cognition. However, since the ground for the judgment is
the free lawfulness of the imagination [freie Gesetzmäßigkeit der Einbildungskraft],86
whereby the adequate idea of the whole is analogous to an aesthetic idea, the notion
of an organic whole is to be regarded as a regulative means of recognizing objects. In
teleological judgments, the imagination discovers/yields nature (undetermined) as
standing in conformity with the laws of the understanding and of reason. It is

82

In teleological judgments, the imagination discovers/yields nature (undetermined) as standing in
conformity with the laws of the understanding and of reason. It is precisely this lawful “display” of nature
through the imagination (KU 5:352, 5:366, 20:232), though “without law” (KU 5:240-1), that becomes a
demand for the understanding and reason to yield adequate concepts or ideas (KU 5:378, 5:431). This
demand on the latter is of course what makes the judgment reflecting, i.e. the manifold is given for which
an adequate unifying idea or concept is sought (KU 5:179-80, 20:211, 5:314).
83 i.e. valid for restricting the scope of such synthetic a priori judgments (KU 5:360-1).
84

i.e. valid for the determination not of an object but of the judging subject, such that the judging subject is
determined as standing in a specific relation to an indeterminate concept or idea of an object. This
determination of the subject is a constitutive synthetic a priori judgment (KU 5:197). C.f. KU, first
introduction, 20:239.
85 KU, first introduction, 20:216, KU 5:359
86

KU 5:240
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precisely this lawful “display” of nature through the imagination,87 though “without
law,”88 that becomes a demand for the understanding and reason to yield adequate
concepts or ideas. 89 This demand on the latter is what makes the judgment reflecting,
i.e. the manifold is given for which an adequate unifying idea or concept is sought.90
The true analogy, then, is that in both teleological and aesthetic judgments, the
understanding and reason are in some sense distinguished as being “in the service of
the imagination and not vice versa.”91 This relationship is still a discursive
relationship, but Kant thereby fundamentally changes the larger picture of what
discursive reason in general is.
(9) Now if the organic object is to be judged as if it were designed, i.e. a work of art, it
might seem that there must be a designer.92 But such a conclusion is not warranted.
Here it is key to remember that the judgment only has regulative validity qua “as
if.”93 Judging nature according to this internal purposiveness as possessing natural
ends must (if it is to remain regulatively valid for the judging subject and in accord
with the demands of theoretical reason) be attributed to the object itself in terms of a

87

KU 5:352, 5:366, KU, first introduction, 20:232

88

KU 5:240-1

89

KU 5:378, 5:431
KU 5:179-80, KU, first introduction, 20:211, 5:314, 5:244

90
91

KU 5:242

92 Agreement

with the details of 9 is not necessary for my argument. 9 is helpful merely to suggest how my
argument might match up with the form of synthetic, a priori teleological judgments.
93

Of course, the result is likewise not cognition, but is nevertheless, according to Kant, “productive for
expanding cognition” (my paraphrase, KU 5:316-7); Kant actually says, that its unique result is the
“animation of the cognitive powers, and thus also indirectly [contributes] to cognitions”
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“formative power” [Bildungskraft]. 94 So we judge natural ends as if the inner
purposiveness, organic life, or formative force were a “design.”95 This design we
attribute, not to something external to the organic object (as we might attribute the
design of a work of art to the genius of the artist), rather, in the case of organic
objects, we attribute the formative force, the “self organized” design to the object
itself as a product of its own nature. 96 As such, to judge teleologically is to judge
nature as if it were “art and artist of itself.”97
(10) This is further why Kant says, “…consequently all our judgments, in accordance
with the order of the higher cognitive faculties, can be divided into theoretical,
aesthetic, and practical, whereby aesthetic judgments are understood only the
judgments of reflection, which alone are related to a principle of the power of
judgment, as a higher faculty of cognition.”98 This is not to reduce the significance of
teleological judgments but rather confirms further that the real ground of their
(regulative) lawfulness, as synthetic a priori judgments, is the subjective a priori
principle of purposiveness: i.e. the free lawfulness of the imagination.99

94

KU 5:374; I take Kant to be saying that the attribution of "design" to an organic object is regulatively
valid because we take this to be a causal "property" of the object itself for the sake of the judging subject.
By contrast, if that purposive design were attributed to some "designer/artist/God" (as we attribute a work
of art to an artist), then it would be constitutive of the object (but invalidly so). So the regulative attribution
is that the organic object just is its own artist. I.e. the "formative power" [Bildungskraft] is internal to it.
This is the idea of a natural end or purposiveness in organic wholes.
95
96

KU, first introduction, 20:216
KU 5:374

97

My paraphrase of KU 5:360-1: “hence we conceive of nature as technical through its own capacity;
whereas if we did not ascribe such an agency to it, we would have to represent its causality as a blind
mechanism.” Cf. KU 5:374, 5:383.
98 KU, first introduction, 20:226
99

There is not space to address the status/relation of the faculty for feeling pleasure and displeasure. See
KU, first introduction, 20:208, 20:229.
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(11) Now, since (a) the a priori principle of purposiveness makes reflecting judgments
lawful (aesthetically regulative and constitutive, and teleologically regulative); and
(b) this a priori principle is the subjective principle of purposiveness (in the aesthetic
case it is such simpliciter, in the teleological case it “occasions” the latter); and (c)
aesthetic judgment “as a subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of
subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or
presentations (i.e., of the imagination) under the faculty of concepts (i.e., the
understanding), insofar as the former in its freedom is in harmony with the latter in
its lawfulness;”100 then (d) the a priori principle of aesthetic judgments is a principle
of “subsumption” whereby the Einbildungskraft “in its freedom” is brought under
(qua harmony) the understanding. It is a principle of harmony between the
“imagination…in its freedom” with the “understanding…in its lawfulness.”101 In
other words, the a priori principle of purposiveness, which just is the principle of free
lawfulness whereby understanding and reason102 stand in “the service of the
imagination and not vice versa,”103 grounds the synthetic a priori validity of a form of
discursive reason in which the faculties themselves are in play to form a harmony of
subsumption. Vitally, this principle of subsumption of the faculties is not one directed
by the understanding or reason, but rather by the imagination in its freedom.

100

KU 5:286-7

101

Ibid.
KU 5:256. In judgments of the sublime, this principle grounds the relation between the imagination and
reason. See 5:316, 5:315 on the form in judgments of art; and 5:370-1, 5:373-4, 5:249 on the form in
judgments of natural ends.
102

103

KU 5:242
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(12) It should come as no surprise, then, when Kant concludes the First Book of the KU,
Analytic of the Beautiful, with the succinct general remarks: “If one draws the
conclusion from the above analyses, it turns out that everything flows from the
concept of [the faculty of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful]104 as a faculty for
judging an object in relation to the free lawfulness of the imagination.”105 Where free
lawfulness of the imagination is “a lawfulness without law and a subjective
correspondence of the imagination to the understanding without an objective one –
where the representation is related to a determinate concept of an object – are
consistent with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which is also called
purposiveness without an end) and with the peculiarity of an [aesthetic judgment].”106
(13) Now we are in a position to see how it is that this principle suggests to Hegel a vital
development internal to discursive reason, in which reason is operative as guided not
by the determinations of the understanding, but by the productivity of the
imagination, i.e. what might be called an “intuitive understanding.”107 After all, Kant
draws a strikingly Hegelian conclusion when he introduces the term “free lawfulness
of the imagination.” Of this principle, he says,
But if in the [aesthetic judgment] the imagination must be considered in its
freedom, then it is in the first instance taken not as reproductive, as subjected to
the laws of association, but as productive and self-active (as the authoress of
104

I use “aesthetic judgment" because it is the broader term including (a) the beautiful, (b) the sublime, and
(c) aesthetic ideas. Since “taste” is the “faculty for judging [beauty]” (KU, first introduction, 20:249),
substituting judgments of taste with “aesthetic judgments of the beautiful” is the equivalent, but retains
terminological uniformity.
105
106

KU 5:240
KU 5:241

107

Cf. KU, Section 77, “On the special character of human understanding, by means of which the concept
of a natural end is possible for us,” 5:406-7. And elsewhere that the imagination’s activity in aesthetic
judgments is “purposive for the whole vocation of the mind” (5:259)
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voluntary forms of possible intuitions); and although in the apprehension of a
given object of the senses it is of course bound to a determinate form of this
object and to this extent has no free play (as in invention), nevertheless it is still
quite conceivable that the object can provide it with a form that contains
precisely such a composition of the manifold as the imagination would design in
harmony with the lawfulness of the understanding in general if it were left free
by itself…a lawfulness without law and a subjective correspondence of the
imagination to the understanding without an objective one – where the
representation is related to a determinate concept of an object – are consistent
with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which is also called purposiveness
without an end) and with the peculiarity of an [aesthetic judgment]. 108

In short, the free lawfulness of the imagination is the principle whereby the
imagination is lawfully called productive and “self-active,” the “heautonomy" of the
mind: a free lawful “authoress.” 109
(ii) Hegel’s inheritance of this principle
The mistake, leading to the second major critique (above), is thinking that a
domain of reason in which the understanding and reason are in the service of the
imagination110 must somehow either conform to the specific discursivity described in the
KrV or else be a non-discursive form of reason. There is a middle way. Namely, it is
possible that Kant is identifying a quality of discursive reason in which the imagination
“schematizes without a concept,”111 but nevertheless, requires (qua the a priori principle
of the free lawfulness of the imagination) the understanding and reason as the faculties of
form to serve the imagination by yielding the lawful conceptual forms for the

108

KU 5:240-1

109

For Kant, the imagination in its freedom is the power of free lawful, self-legislation of reason in general
(KU 5:286-7, 5:355). And this free lawful legislation is heautonomy (KU, first introduction, 20:225,
5:185-6), as distinguished from practical lawful legislation (autonomy), and theoretical lawful legislation
(spontaneity). For the most helpful, extended analysis of heautonomy, autonomy, and spontaneity, see
Pollok, Kant’s Theory of Normativity, pp. 279-85.
110 KU 5:242
111

KU 5:287
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imagination’s work as “authoress of possible forms of intuition.”112 Such is the complex
hylomorphic model of Kant’s transcendental account of discursive reason.
Whatever interpretation we want to give of Kant’s text on this matter, what
contemporary Kantians often ignore, but which Hegel makes so much of, is precisely
Kant’s own insistence on the self-legislative power of this free lawfulness in reflective
judgments,113 which displays itself most prominently through the “feeling of spirit”114 in
the production of “aesthetic ideas”115 and objectively in the ability of the mind to judge
natural ends “as if” the organic whole were both art and artist of itself.116 Where this “as
if” is not pseudo-knowledge, but the recognition of a necessary and vital alteration to
what we mean by knowledge.117 It is a knowledge that is both lawful and free, that is both
structurally determined, yet historically formed and open. It is a knowledge without
which, given, real experiences could not come into view. There is no need to deny the
regulative role of this free lawfulness in judging objects of nature. Hegel’s appropriation
112

KU 5:240

113

Ibid.
KU, first introduction, 20:250, cf. KU 5:192

114
115

KU 5:313-7; see Kroner on aesthetic ideas, imagination, and genius (1921), pp.257-64. My account
contrasts with the standard interpretation expressed by Kroner that “die äesthetish reflektierende
Urteilskraft hat ja gar keine logische Funktion; die Einheit des Gegensätzlichen… ist keine theoretische
[Einheit]…sie ist eine äesthetische Synthesis, in der es zu einem logischen Widerspruche gar nicht kommt
und kommen kann” (Kroner, 1921, p.273). By contrast, aesthetic judgments have an indeterminate (but
nevertheless, vital) logical function by which the aesthetic determines (regulative and constitutively in
some cases) something of the domains (and so, indirectly, the judgments) of cognition and of practical
reason.
116 KU 5:359–61. This is further affirmed in Kant’s late writings, presented by Eckart Förster (2004), in
which Kant argues that the body of the self is simultaneously judged as an organism (regulatively), but also
as an a priori condition of my experience (constitutively), since sensibility necessitates a body: “Obwohl
die Möglichkeit eines solchen Gegenstandes als meines eigenen Körpers für Kant letztlich unbegreiflich
bleibt, so kann an seiner Zweckmäßigkeit doch kein Zweifel aufkommen: „der Begriff eines organischen
Körpers ist also a priori d. i. vor der Erfahrung aber zum Behuf der Moglichkeit der Erfahrung an meinem
eigenen Subjecte gegeben und kann in der Eintheilung der Physik nach Principien nicht fehlen wo sie was
das Formale der Verbundenen Krafte der Materie betrift die Oberste ist” (p.27).
117

For a helpful contrast to this view, but which still emphasizes the significance of Kant’s use of “as if” for
knowledge, see Zuckert (2007), pp.3-4, 81-2. Cf. Pollok (2017), p.276.
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of this significance in terms of the method of reason or an intuitive understanding is one
in which the “truth” of the object is precisely displayed in its being taken up into, and
unified with, the whole of thought.
If this is right, it would make sense of Hegel’s placement of this principle at the
highest and final transition in the Science of Logic. In this way, there may be a “complete
standpoint” in a Kantian sense of a necessary structure or lawfulness to reason, without
thereby laying claim to some kind of total determination of knowledge of life and
thought.
Again, if this is right, Kant’s introduction of purposiveness as a subjective
principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination becomes that structural core to Hegel’s
account of absolute reason precisely in that it allows for a “complete account” of the
necessary structure of reason,118 i.e. the absolute standpoint. Far from Hegel diving off
into a non-Kantian framework, or distorting Kant, Hegel’s Logic places the point of
transition to the absolute idea squarely on Kant’s a priori principle of purposiveness. As
such, Hegel is far more faithful to Kant’s actual philosophical advance than many
Kantians are. Indeed, if this is right, then Hegel is accurate in portraying his own work as
advancing from both the productive imagination as Kant’s “germ of speculation”119 in the

118

In both his early and late writings, Hegel calls the free lawfulness of the imagination Kant’s truly
speculative idea (GW, p.92, p. WL 12.157) and the ground of the unity of freedom and nature (GW, p. 91).
The free lawfulness of the imagination in terms of the principle of purposiveness is, in Hegel’s system, the
point of transition from teleology to the concept of life and the Idea (12.157), which in turn serves as the
transition to the Philosophy of Nature where he introduces the pure forms of intuition (space and time). It is
at this final point of transition to the absolute idea (in the WL) that he speaks of Kant’s “greatest service to
Philosophy” (ibid). Cf. EG, pp.208, 210.
119

GW, p.80
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first Critique and more so from his “greatest service to philosophy” in the third Critique:
120

namely, from (T) the free lawfulness of the imagination.
So, when we conceive of Hegel as defending an “intuitive” form of thought, we

have reason to think that he means that this “way of conceiving the mind-world issue is
most visible in Kant’s doctrine of the productive imagination, Kant’s ‘truly speculative
idea.’”121 (T) serves then to ground the refutation of (C2), since it is precisely the ground
on which a synthetic a priori judgment, that proceeds from intuition toward an adequate
conceptual form, is maintained as a valid form of discursive reason. Further, given (T)
and already visible in the refutation of (C2)’s claims to a non-discursive, pre-critical form
of reason, we can see the source of the refutation of (C1). Indeed, if this is what Hegel
means by intuitive thought, then it makes sense of the necessary unity of reason whereby
he sees reason’s movements (historically and immediately) as one in which it is
dialectically infinite. Such that, the structure itself displays the necessity of reason, but
the content of both the particular and universal mutually constitute each other. 122 In other
words, (T) is not merely the identification of a discursively valid form of intuitive
thought, it is also, thereby, the precise ground on which contingency is made a valid
constitutive quality of the necessary structure of reason.
In short, if (T) is true of X-system program, then (C1) cannot apply. This is the
case because the free lawfulness of the imagination just is a principle of systematic

120
121

WL p. 12.157
Pippin (1997), p.141

122

C.f. Sally Sedgwick sees Hegel as having been inspired by Kant’s notion of organic unity but does not
see this Hegelian core as originating internally to Kant via the free lawfulness of the imagination (2012),
pp.46-8.
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contingency. That is, the free lawfulness of the imagination is the ground on which
contingency is maintained as a necessary constitutive quality of a complete, systematic
standpoint of reason.
As a byproduct of investigating (T), we have shed light on the way in which
Hegel conceives of the absolute standpoint as bridging Kant’s dualism in a manner that
meets both the dualistic demand, thereby escaping the Agrippan Trilemma, yet also meets
the holistic demand that Kant himself notes in the KrV is the supreme principle of
reason,123 and which the KU was supposed to make possible.124 This chapter has thereby
served as a defense of the plausibility that (T) is the free lawfulness of the imagination,
the key point of transition between Kant and Hegel’s idealism, and makes possible a
refutation of the two most common critiques [(C1) and (C2)] leveled against the various
system programs of Idealism.

123

KrV A645-8/B673-6, A686-7/B714-6. Cf. “For the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since
without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding, and, lacking
that, no sufficient mark of empirical truth” (A651/B679).
124

KU 5:195-6; KU, first introduction, 20:243, 20:202, 20:207-8, 5:175-6
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PART ONE

KANT

!43

CHAPTER 2

THREEFOLD SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMAGINATION
IN THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON
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§1) Introduction
In the first Critique alone, Kant credits the imagination [Einbildungskraft] with an
astonishing range of roles. In the Analytic of Concepts, it shows up in both Chapter I, on
the “clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding” and in Chapter II on
the transcendental “deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding,” where it seems
at times to be connected with an explanation of the intellectual synthesis of the pure concepts of the understanding.1 In the Analytic of Principles, it appears in the “schematism of
the pure concepts of the understanding” and seems to be the power by which the understanding yields schematized concepts,2 i.e. its “first application.”3 Additionally, it is referenced throughout in terms of an “empirical faculty of the productive imagination” in an
“empirical consciousness” through which it has “empirical laws” and yields “empirical
intuitions.”4 It is not immediately clear how one and the same concept is supposed to
helpfully explain all of its potential functions at very different levels of transcendental
thought. Moreover, the KrV seem to some to be perfectly explainable in terms of the dualism of the understanding and sensibility without reference to the imagination at all. And
why not, Kant begins his Analytic of Concepts with this dualistic framework:
Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the rest of which
is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the
faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of
concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is
thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind). 5

1 A118-9,

B151

2 A141/B181
3

B151, A140-158/B179-197
B181, A122-3, B162f
5 A50/B74
4
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This dualism of sensibility and understanding looks to be a simpler and more auspicious framing. For these, and other reasons, despite Kant’s use of the term “imagination” in every layer of his first Critique, scholars have typically forgone a critical analysis
or unified explanation of the imagination.
If I begin by suggesting that the imagination is one of the central features of
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), you are likely to raise a skeptical brow. If I argue
that it is somehow involved with the receptivity of sensibility, by, for example taking up
some raw, sensible given, and through some process involving something called the synopsis and empirical synthesis, yields empirical intuitions as the matter for determining
judgments of the understanding, this might be acceptable, though you would want to
know the breakdown of such a role in sensibility. If I argued that the imagination is operative as that which yields schemata through the figurative synthesis –the bridging function of the mind between the pure concepts of the understanding and the empirical intuition– then you are likely to think: this is the work of the understanding and is its “first
application,” but that just is the understanding operative in a specific way and so although
Kant talks of the imagination there, it is somewhat superfluous if not an obtuse synonym
for the understanding. But if I were to argue that there is a non-sensible, significance of
the imagination that is required for Kant’s deduction of the categories and grounding of
the pure understanding on the synthetic unity of apperception –which alone makes a Critique of Cognition possible– then you will say: impossible. Nothing of such a view is
present in the Critique of Pure Reason nor would such a view be compatible with the
transcendental framework of the first Critique.

!46

Instead of suggesting any one of these three options and so raising eyebrows and
rejoinders of superfluidity, or impossibility, I want to suggest that without the imagination
in all three significances, no aspect of the Critique of Pure Reason is possible. But here is
the rub: while I am simultaneously suggesting that Kant’s critical account of the threefold
(1) pure understanding (2) schematism of the understanding, and (3) empirical intuitions
of sensibility as the matter of determining judgments of the understanding, all depend on
a threefold conception of the imagination, my account fundamentally denies that we
should somehow elevate the imagination in something like the way Fichte is perceived as
doing. On the contrary, for Kant, the imagination should disappear into the framework of
the pure understanding, the schematism of the understanding and the empirical intuitions.
However, if we aim to understand both what the understanding and sensibility are and the
validity of the understanding’s claim to synthetic a priori judgments of cognition, we
must not merely assert its grounding in the a priori principle of the synthetic unity of apperception. We must see the stages of the critique by which such a claim to a priori validity is possible. And if this is our goal, then we find that the imagination is indispensable
for Kant in a threefold way. 6

6

To be clear: a complete account of the imagination in the KrV is not my objective. For instance, I leave off
an account of the psychological use of the imaginations, as well as its role in yielding examples for the sake
of “training the power of judgment”, since these do not concern the transcendental ground for the lawfulness of synthetic a priori judgments of the understanding. The threefold function refers to the transcendental role (which includes its transcendental function as yielding empirical intuitions according to the laws of
the understanding). Some of the many passages that do fall under my current investigation include the following: “the schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination” (A140/B179); “synthesis of the
imagination” (A158/B197); the “concept of the imagination contains an a priori manifold of inner
sense” (A140/B179) and this a priori manifold is the “one totality in which all of our representations are
contained” and this synthetic totality “rests on the imagination” (A155/B194). Relatedly, the “transcendental synthesis of imagination comes down to nothing other than the unity of all the manifold of intuition in
inner sense, and thus directly to the unity of apperception” (A145/B185).
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Now, I aim to show that not only is the imagination fundamental to the lawful validity of both sensibility and the pure understanding in judgments of cognition, it also
turns out to be the ground of an internal unity to Kant’s duality. One upshot of my argument is that the significances of many of the contemporary debates, such as that found
between the conceptualists and non-conceptualists about whether empirical intuitions
presuppose the unity of the understanding, are obviated because those debates depend on
a conception of a strict dualism between understanding and sensibility that simply does
not exist for Kant (I will return to this in §6). That is, I am here suggesting a revisioning
of what Kant’s dualism entails. His dualism, I argue is shot through with the imagination,
in such a way that the imagination is a vital source of recognizing a fundamental internal,
lawful unity of the experience of a discursive reasoner. So, for example, if the interpretation of Kant’s notion of the imagination that I give is correct, it makes the surprising fit
between sensibility and the understanding, not at all surprising. As we will see, on my
reading, there is no need for an argument that the formal intuitions of space and time are
or are not subject to the categories in order to guarantee that the pure forms of cognitive
unity condition all sensible intuitions and that the latter necessarily match the former.
That is, nothing could be more expected than that sensibility and the understanding align
since internal to both is a lawful, productive synthesis of pure reason: the imagination.
Where such a conception of the imagination will turn out to be constitutive of the pure
understanding. To be clear, Kant’s dualism remains, but such a view of the imagination
quite alters the nature and significance of such a dualism.
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The most controversial of my threefold interpretation of the imagination is the
first: namely that there is a layer of significance of the imagination that is necessary for
the pure understanding, which includes the categories. You will likely object: it cannot be
the pure understanding if it contains anything of sensibility. I agree. Let us proceed carefully. My account will in no way suggest that the pure understanding has anything of sensibility. So if it turns out that the imagination is involved it cannot be a sensible function
of the imagination. There is no sensible matter at work in the pure understanding. You
will now likely object for the opposite reason: there is, likewise, not some pure noumenal
subject in which we might find a non-sensible, transcendental imagination (here you
might point to the resolution of the Paralogisms). Again, that is correct. The pure understanding is not an understanding of some pure noumenal subject but is rather the pure
conditions for the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments of cognition.7 So, if there is
some significance of the imagination, it can only be as a pure condition for the possibility
of the synthetic a priori validity of the pure understanding for judgments of cognition.
Since this first layer significance of the imagination is the most original in contemporary
scholarship and is also the most controversial, I will focus on it and only outline what I
take the other two layers of significance to involve. While the specifics of the second two
deserve a great deal of attention, I will have to be brief. All I need to show is that there
are such significances necessary in Kant’s critique. As such, I focus chiefly on the firstlayer significance.

7

For more on this, see Kant’s account of the same: B428-30.
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§2) Challenging Passages
First, then, what passages in the KrV give us some reason to take seriously a firstlayer claim to the significance of the imagination for the pure understanding? In the ADeduction, Kant has this to say of the pure understanding:
The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the
understanding, and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is the pure understanding. In the understanding there are
therefore pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of the pure
synthesis of the imagination in regard to all possible appearances. These, however, are the categories, i.e., the pure concepts of the understanding.8

At the very least, this passage poses a challenge. Kant is explicit that the imagination is
not just significant for the understanding but for the pure understanding. What is more,
we find that the imagination’s significance is not identified as something external to the
pure understanding. Instead, the passage suggests that it is intimately bound up with what
the pure understanding is. Again, the unity of apperception “in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is the pure understanding” (my emphasis). Before we
ask what this might mean, you may say, “but this is the A-deduction. Kant changes his
view of the pure understanding by the time of the B-deduction and scraps this passage.”
While Kant does remove this passage, the assumption that the removal signifies the removal of the significance of the imagination for and proper conception of the pure understanding is not warranted.
Before turning to an account of the first-layer significance, I wish to draw attention to a few passages from the B-edition that suggest Kant’s view of the pure under8 A119:

“Die Einheit der Apperzeption in Beziehung auf die Synthesis der Einbildungskraft ist der Verstand,
und eben dieselbe Einheit, beziehungsweise auf die transzendentale Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, der
reine Verstand.”
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standing has not changed in a way that reflects a discarding of the imagination.9 On the
contrary, he speaks of the pure understanding exactly as if the significance of the imagination noted in the passage from the A-deduction above were now an internal component
of the pure understanding. Let us look to some passages from the B-deduction to see this:
This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, can be called figurative (synthesis speciosa), as distinct from that
which would be thought in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is called combination of the understanding (synthesis intellectualis); both are transcendental, not merely because they themselves
proceed a priori but also because they ground the possibility of other cognition a
priori.
Yet the figurative synthesis, if it pertains merely to the original synthetic unity of
apperception, i.e., this transcendental unity, which is thought in the categories,
must be called, as distinct from the merely intellectual combination, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition. Now since all of our
intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs to sensibility;10

At this point, we might be tempted to think his view has changed since this passage (so far) only references what I call the second-layer (schematic) function of the
imagination. However, in the same sentence, he follows this with a reference to a nonsensible conception of the imagination that seems to reflect something of the A-deduction:
but insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining
and not, like sense, merely determinable, and can thus determine the form of
sense a priori in accordance with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to
this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of
intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility
and its first application (and at the same time the ground of all others) to objects
9

Although our accounts differ, Henry Allison similarly argues that the B-deduction cannot fairly be read as
doing away with the A-deduction conception of the imagination although some of the passages remove
explicit use of the term, 1998, p. 171.
10 B151
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of the intuition that is possible for us. As figurative, it is distinct from the intellectual synthesis without any imagination merely through the understanding.
Now insofar as the imagination is spontaneity, I also occasionally call it the productive imagination, and thereby distinguish it from the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws.11

In fact, this passage is challenging to parse because, minimally, Kant is referencing what I call the second-layer significance of the imagination, which pertains to the
schemata. But, what is of note for my purposes here, is that he is also, minimally identifying a conception of the imagination as “an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining
… and can thus determine the form of sense a priori in accordance with the unity of apperception.” This is almost word-for-word reflective of the passage from the A-deduction.
We do not yet have a clear sense of what it might mean for the imagination to
have non-sensible, significance for the pure understanding. We will take that question up
in §4. For now, consider one last passage, where Kant references each of what I am calling the threefold significance of the imagination:
[1.] the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination,
[2.] the schema of sensible concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as
it were a monogram of pure a priori imagination, through which and in accordance with which the images first become possible, but which must be connected
with the concept, to which they are in themselves never fully congruent, always
only by means of the schema that they designate. [3.] The schema of a pure concept of the understanding, on the contrary, is something that can never be brought
to an image at all, but is rather only the pure synthesis, in accord with a rule of
unity according to concepts in general, which the category expresses, and is a
transcendental product of the imagination, which concerns the determinations of
the inner sense in general, in accordance with conditions of its form (time) in regard to all representations, insofar as these are to be connected together a priori
in one concept in accord with the unity of apperception. 12

11

B151; my suggestion is that in the B-deduction, the imagination is used almost exclusively for the second
and third-layer significances (i.e. pure and empirical sensibility), but the first-layer conception is still
present, though now referenced predominantly by terms such as the “pure intellectual synthesis.”
12 my numbering; A142/B181
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Again, this passage does not clarify for us what that significance is. Notice
though, Kant is speaking of the intellectual synthesis when he says, “the schema of a pure
concept of the understanding…is something that can never be brought to an image at all,
but is rather only the pure synthesis, in accord with a rule of unity according to concepts
in general.” What is bizarre, from the perspective of standard readings, is that in this very
sentence Kant calls this “pure synthesis” “in accord with a rule of unity according to concepts in general,” or in other words, in accordance with the unity of apperception, “is a
transcendental product of the imagination.” This brings up a real question, what could
this reference to imagination possibly signify for the pure understanding. It would not be
a warranted move to say, that because Kant continues the passage by saying that this pure
synthesis of the understanding which “is a transcendental product of the imagination”
“concerns the determinations of inner sense in general, in accordance with conditions of
its form (time) in regard to all representations” that somehow what Kant really has in
mind by imagination just is a kind of schematic significance whereby it yields intuition of
the inner sense. Certainly, that is at work, but to reduce this passage to that would require
consistency. And I take it that no one is willing to interpret this passage’s reference to
“pure concepts of the understanding” as merely “schematized concepts” according to inner sense. In other words, just because Kant is here intimately linking the intellectual synthesis to a schematized synthesis, does not justify the reduction of one part to the schematism while allowing the other part to have the two-fold significance of “condition” or
“pure categories” as well as “schematized concepts.” There is real textual difficulty here

!53

for those who view the imagination as having only a sensible significance since Kant
seems to be referencing some non-sensible significance for an intellectual synthesis.
In the B Deduction, Kant says, “There are, however three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely
sense, imagination, and apperception.”13 Where is the understanding? This exclusion of
the understanding in the B-deduction makes sense in light of Kant’s earlier (A-deduction)
explanation: “The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental
synthesis of the imagination, is the pure understanding.”14 So, those who try to suggest
that the productive activity necessary for the understanding to yield conceptual representations somehow reveals a capacity of the understanding to produce or yield for itself
apart from the imagination, miss that the understanding is not an “original source” and so
does not in itself (as if separable from the imagination) “contain the conditions of the
possibility of all experience.” Rather, the pure understanding just is the “unity” of “apperception” and the “transcendental syntheses of the imagination.” Although Kant details this last point here, it is evidenced in other passages such as that on the “original
sources,” and again in the passage from B151 cited above.
Let us step back for a moment from these textual worries, to the real problem: the
theoretical necessity of a productive power of the mind. Leave to the side, for a moment,
the imagination. It is still necessary for Kant to show the validity of the pure understand13 A94
14 A119
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ing not merely as a lawful unity, but also as a productive source of valid, pure representations (i.e. pure concepts).
There must be a source posited as internal to the understanding from which it
gains this productive capacity to yield conceptual representations (i.e. its own content).
That is, the “unity of apperception” or mere “lawfulness” is insufficient. The pure understanding must be capable of giving itself pure representations as the content of its own
synthesis.15
Consider now Allison and Longueness discussion of the “original acquisition” of
the categories of the understanding through reflection on the synthetic activity of the

15

We should recall that there is no valid claim to a noumenon as an object of the pure understanding. When
I reference “pure representations” these should be understood as “logical objects of thought” or of the pure
understanding. For more on this distinction, see Kant’s Refutation of Idealism (B288-94) and in the chapter
on the distinction between “Phenomena and Noumena <B>” (A246-58/B303-14). Of note, Kant says, “The
senses represent objects to us as they appear, but the understanding, as they are, then the latter is not to be
taken in a transcendental but in a merely empirical way, signifying, namely, how they must be represented
as objects of experience, in the thoroughgoing connection of appearances, and not how they might be outside of the relation to possible experience and consequently to sense in general, thus as objects of pure understanding” (A258/B314). Noumena (in the negative sense) are possible precisely because of pure intuitions, but these noumena are not things-in-themselves, but rather the transcendental cognition that is only a
cognition insofar as it gains its relevant significance through empirical intuitions. The concept of a
noumenon must not be taken as the thing-in-itself, but rather is that intellectual object (via a pure intuition)
that serves the purpose of not being “thought of as an object of the sense but rather as a thing in
itself” (B310), but can never be taken as the thing-in-itself, which is entirely beyond the possibility of the
mind to think as more than a merely negative postulate marking that discursive reasoning is limited by its
own capacity.
At its core, Kant’s Copernican revolution is a refutation of the possibility of our having knowledge of the
thing-in-itself and thus amounts to a shift from transcendental realism to transcendental idealism. For more
on this, see Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, pp. 34-42.
For a contrasting view of Kant’s thing-in-itself, see Paul Franks account, according to which Kant is committed to things in themselves as a result of his “Monadic Individualism in metaphysics and his Newtonian
holism in physics” (All or Nothing, 389). I think this is a challenging question to sort out and is not immediately clear in part because the answer is intimately related to the question of the divide between the transcendental and empirical, a divide that I argue Hegel closes on Kantian grounds and thereby obviates any
sense in which we might take the thing-in-itself as anything but a purely negative postulate of the purely
logical use of transcendental reflection. While Kant’s texts support my interpretation, I acknowledge that it
is never definitively and consistently addressed by Kant and so it is a massive exegetical project in its own
right. C.f. Rosefeldt, 2006: ”Kants Ich Als Gegenstand;” Horstmann, 1993: “Kants Paralogismen;” and
Ginsborg, 2015, pp. 203-8.
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imagination, via the logical functions of judgments.16 Here, they are speaking of reflection on the imagination’s second-layer, transcendental function by which schemata arise,
etc.17 However, when they speak of the “reflecting” by which the categories are acquired,
that reflection itself (apart from the schemata as the object of reflection) involves a presupposing of a productive power (as the condition) by which the logical functions can
become rules (form) in the assessment of the synthesizing work of the imagination (matter).18 As such, the first-layer significance of the imagination as the productive source
must first stand, even on their accounts, as the posited condition for such a relation of reflection to occur at all (logically prior to the categories or pure concepts). 19
This lawful, yet productive power of intellectual synthesis to yield conceptual representations is what Kant terms spontaneity of the intellect.
16

Namely, the idea that the categories are, as Kant says, “original acquisitions” arising from “a reflection
on the product of the synthetic activity of the imagination under the direction of the logical functions of
judgment (which are alone original)” (Allison, 2001, p. 17). See also, Longuenesse, 2003, pp. 163-6. Consider also, Cassirer’s interpretation that “the pure concepts of the understanding are in themselves nothing
but logical function of judgments” (Cassirer, 1970, p. 95), through which transcendental reflection acquires
the laws or categories (Pollok, 2017, 225) through abstraction from the product of the synthetic work of the
imagination. To this end, we might consider Karin de Boer’s useful phrasing: “It would be more apt to
think of categories as deschematized pure concepts” (458). For a related and helpful discussion of logical
and transcendental reflection, see Longuenesse, 2003, pp. 123-7.
17 I take Karin de Boer to be speaking of this second-layer function of the imagination in terms of the pure
imagination as an aspect of spontaneity: “Kant regards the pure understanding and the pure imagination as
two forms of spontaneity that give rise to valid a priori cognition only insofar as they cooperate: whereas
the understanding posits the rules, the imagination, by relating them to pure intuition, presents them in such
a way that the mind knows how to carry them out (cf. B162)” (p. f458). However, because de Boer is not
careful to distinguish the first-layer function of the imagination from the second, she concludes that “a pure
concept contains its schema” (457). Her argument for this, however, shows that she is conflating the first
and second-layer uses of both the imagination and the understanding.
18 This need for an account of the productive power of the mind does not necessitate agreement or dis agreement with accounts like Longuenesse’s, expressed again in the following: ‘laws of the mind’ from
which the pure concepts of the understanding emerge are none other than the laws from which its logical
use itself emerges” 1998, p. 27. My interest in a fundamental productive power of the mind is a slightly
different worry. Namely, I am concerned to show the deductive validity of the pure synthesis of the understanding. Whatever we say of Longuenesse, the productive source, what Kant calls the “pure intellectual
synthesis” must be shown to be presupposed in the synthetic unity of apperception, otherwise, whatever
supposed relation to the forms of judgment, that relation can be nothing more than “supposed” or
“asserted,” which, left as such, transforms the critique into a transcendental dogma. As with Longuenesse,
my particular concern is likewise not taken up by Allison, 2004, pp. 133-6, 170-8.
19 A267/B323
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On Spontaneity
Kant defines spontaneity in the third Antinomy (there used as an idea of causal
spontaneity) as an original causal source.20 Then, in his “Resolution of the cosmological
idea,”21 and in light of the regulative principle of reason’s systematicity,22 Kant says,
“reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which could start to act from itself, without
needing to be preceded by any other cause that in turn determines it to action according to
the law of causal connection. It is especially noteworthy that it is this transcendental
idea of freedom on which the practical concept of freedom is grounded.”23 Although in
the two passages above, Kant is talking about an “idea of spontaneity” for cognition, he
nevertheless employs “spontaneity” as the principle of theoretical freedom for a self-legislation, theoretical reason. This lawful freedom of reason necessitates a productive power of the mind whereby the intellect can “start to act from itself.” That is, he uses the term
spontaneity to identify the source of the pure intellectual representations such as the categories. What is the source of the categories? Kant’s answer: spontaneity of the intellect.
To this end, he says,
Now I do not have yet another self-intuition, which would give the determining
in me, of the spontaneity of which alone I am conscious, even before the act of
determination, in the same way as time gives that which is to be determined, thus
I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being, rather I merely
represent the spontaneity of my thought, i.e., of the determining, and my existence always remains only sensibly determinable, i.e., determinable as the existence of an appearance. Yet this spontaneity is the reason I call myself an intelligence.24

20 A445-6/B473-4
21

“Resolution of the cosmological idea of the totality of the derivation of occurrences in the world from
their causes.”
22 KrV A680-1/B708-9, A664-5/B692-3, A700/B728
23 A533/B561
24 B158
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This source of the mind or productive power is thereby attributed to the understanding in general. Namely, the “faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the
spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding.” 25 And further, Kant contrasts this spontaneity of the understanding as the productive power of the mind, from the “receptivity”
of sensibility: “We have above explained the understanding in various ways - through a
spontaneity of cognition (in contrast to the receptivity of the sensibility).”26 And similarly
in the B-edition:
Consciousness of itself (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, and if
all of the manifold in the subject were given self-actively through that alone, then
the inner intuition would be intellectual. In human beings this consciousness requires inner perception of the manifold that is antecedently given in the subject,
and the manner in which this is given in the mind without spontaneity must be
called sensibility on account of this difference.27

In short, spontaneity is the productive lawfulness of the mind whereby both pure
conceptual representations (the categories) as well as concepts of the understanding are
synthesized or “given”: “Concepts are therefore grounded on the spontaneity of thinking,
as sensible intuitions are grounded on the receptivity of impressions. Now the understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of
them.”28
So even if we ignore the term “imagination” we must posit the very same “productive power” in the pure understanding that Kant identifies in the passages above as the
imagination. At this stage, the term “imagination” does not really matter. What my reader

25 A51/B75
26 A126
27

B68

28 A68/B93
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must see is that the pure understanding must be posited as having more than the mere
lawfulness or unity of apperception, it must have a productive power whereby synthesis
of pure conceptual representations is possible. That it has this productive power is undeniable. Kant everywhere credits it with giving to itself “pure concepts” or “pure representations.” Indeed the possibility of having the categories in the first place and synthesizing
them as the pure understanding of a transcendental “I” according to the synthetic unity of
apperception, all require some conceptual content as what each of these is. As concerns
sensibility, form precedes matter, but when we abstract from sensibility to the pure transcendental conditions of cognition, then “matter precedes form.” 29 So, the pure concepts
of the understanding are productively yielded pure representations (not sensible) and this
“logical matter of thought” necessarily precedes their unity.30 Whatever that productive
power is, which yields these pure representations, that is what I preliminarily identify as
this first layer conception of the imagination.
29

A266-7/B322-3. To this end, Béatrice Longuenesse says of matter: “It is significant, in this regard, that in
Kant’s Logic distinctions of matter and form recur at each level of increasing complexity in the exposition
of the activity of thinking…Objects are the matter for concepts…Concepts are the matter for judgment…
Judgments are the matter for syllogisms… Finally, combined and connected cognitions are the matter for
the whole of cognition, system its form” (149-50).
30 ibid: In On the amphiboly of concepts of reflection, Kant says, “Matter and form…ground all other re flection, so inseparably are they bound up with every use of the understanding. The former signifies the
determinable in general, the latter its determination (both in the transcendental sense, since one abstracts
from all differences in what is given and from the way in which that is determined)…In every judgment
one can call the given concepts logical matter (for judgment), their relation (by means of the copula) the
form of the judgment…Also, in respect to things in general, unbounded reality is regarded as the matter of
all possibility, but its limitation (negation) as that form through which one thing is distinguished from another in accordance with transcendental concepts. The understanding, namely, demands first that something
be given (at least in the concept) in order to be able to determine it in a certain way. Hence in the concept of
pure understanding matter precedes form, and on this account Leibniz first assumes things (monads) and an
internal power of representation in them…And so would it, in fact, have to be if the pure understanding
could be related to objects immediately and if space and time were determinations of the things in themselves. But if it is only sensible intuitions in which we determine all objects merely as appearances, then the
form of intuition (as a subjective constitution of sensibility) precedes all matter (the sensations), thus space
and time precede all appearances and all data of appearances, and instead first make the latter
possible” (A266-7/B322-3). So as concerns the pure understanding, matter necessarily precedes form, but
as concerns “all appearances and all data of appearances” the pure forms of intuition (space and time) precedes the matter.
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Here we arrive at a serious problem. Kant is well aware that the very validity of
synthetic a priori judgments of the understanding depends on showing that the synthetic
unity of apperception validates not merely the lawful unity of the categories but also their
productive source. This was necessary because without showing the lawfulness of the
spontaneity of the understanding, there can be no a priori claim to the validity of the productive source of the categories, only to the unity of the categories. The productive source
of these pure representations must itself be grounded in the synthetic unity of apperception. Without the lawfulness of that productive source by which they are given as pure
concepts of the understanding, there can be no valid pure concepts and hence no critique
of judgments of cognition. It is not sufficient merely to posit that the pure understanding
gives itself lawful representations. This must be shown if Kant’s Critique is to resist descending into Transcendental dogma. Fortunately, Kant both knows this and adequately
grounds this productive source of the intellect. The question is: how?
Since the synthetic unity of apperception just is that principle by which this lawfulness is given, a deduction must show the lawfulness of the source of the categories in
the principle itself. It cannot simply show their lawful unity since a unity without a lawful
source is still transcendental dogma (i.e. not a complete deduction). Kant, I suggest, does
this via the first-layer conception of the conditions of the imagination. It is not surprising,
on my account, that we find the first-layer conception of the imagination, right where a
deduction of the productive power of the pure understanding is needed: namely, in the
third section of “on a Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding”
as well as in the “Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.”
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Before turning to Kant’s account of the pure productive synthesis of the (pure)
understanding, let us bring into view an interpretive context for the terms “lawfulness”
and “synthetic a priori principles.”
§3) Lawfulness and Synthetic Principles A Priori
There have recently been several helpful accounts of the significance of “lawfulness” in the Critiques of practical, theoretical, and aesthetic synthetic a priori
judgments.31 There are also excellent accounts which treat Kant’s work as relying on a
strongly judicial sense of lawfulness that is most visible in the relationship between his
synthetic a priori principles of each critique and the corresponding deductions. There is
no need to repeat such accounts. My account should be read as intentionally employing
such a notion of the “lawful validity grounding synthetic a priori theoretical, practical,
and reflecting judgments,” as the kind found in Konstantin Pollok’s Kant’s Theory of
Normativity.32 However, I think that such discussions of lawfulness, often leave aside the
equally central and necessary notion of “productivity” or “freedom” inherent in the fundamental forms of lawfulness such as “spontaneity, autonomy, and heautonomy.” 33 At the
heart Kant’s conception of lawfulness is a concomitant and inseparable productivity, that
allows the lawfulness to take the form of self-legislation or legislation in general. My account of the imagination can be seen as drawing out precisely those features whereby
31

These accounts are wide-ranging, from Allison to Ginsborg, from Longuenesse to Pollok.
Pollok, 2017, 197-204, 212-25.
33 I am in agreement with Pollok’s account of the lawfulness of the spontaneity of the understanding
grounded in the synthetic unity of apperception. But, while Pollok emphasizes the “lawfulness,” “form,”
and “unity” in the idea of spontaneity, he does not draw attention to the other half: the productive source of
synthesis (Pollok, 2017, 63-4; C.f. 279-84). There is no spontaneity of the pure understanding without this
pure, productive, intellectual synthesis. An analysis of this fundamental productive power of synthesis necessitates the account of the first-layer imagination that I give: spontaneity is not just the lawful legislation
of theoretical reason, but rather the productive lawfulness of theoretical reason.
32
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Kant’s Critiques depend on a kind of free productivity that is necessarily present in all
stages of lawfulness, and conditionally contained in the a priori principles themselves.
That connection to the other critiques is in the background, but unfortunately cannot be
discussed more here
By a priori principle, I mean that from which a given kind of synthetic a priori
judgment derives its lawfulness and thereby “lays claim to necessity.”34 It is only in light
of the existence of such an a priori principle that a critique of a domain of reason is possible since a critique depends on the lawfulness (quid juris)35 of that domain. The three
synthetic a priori principles of the three Critiques are as follows: In the domain of theoretical reason, we find the theoretically productive lawfulness of spontaneity given in the
(1) synthetic unity of apperception as the a priori principle of theoretical domain of
reason in general. In practical reason we find the practically productive lawfulness of autonomy in the synthetic a priori principle: (2) the moral law.36 Likewise, the existence of
34

KU 5:288

35 A84/B116
36

KPV 5:33; see also Kant’s account of Autonomy in the section “Autonomy of the Will as the Supreme
Principle of Morality” in the second section of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Autonomy
is a self-legislative activity of practical reason, which is conditioned by the lawful practical limits of the
freedom of practical reason. The kind of freedom of reason found in the practical domain is limited by a
standard of lawfulness transcendentally grounded in the moral law. The synthetic a priori principle of the
moral law “arises” from the freedom of the will, i.e. from autonomy. “If we now compare our formal
supreme principle of pure practical reason (as that of an autonomy of the will” (KPV 5:39), we find that
“Autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws…the sole principle of morality consists in independence from all matter of the law…that independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense,
whereas this lawgiving of its own on the part of pure and, as such, practical reason is freedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral law expresses nothing other than the autonomy of pure practical reason, that is
freedom, and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone they can accord with the
supreme practical law” (KPV 5:33), and “a will for which the mere lawgiving form of a maxim can alone
serve as a law is a free will” (KPV 5:29). “Thus freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply
each other” (KPV 5:29). Although I cannot take up the notion of autonomy, the moral law, and in general
pure practical reason, I take my account here to be reflective of a similar role of the first-layer imagination
in pure practical reason. It is the practical free lawfulness identified as a kind of causality in passages like
the following: “Therefore freedom is certainly not lawless, even though it is not a property of will in accordance with laws of nature. It must, rather, be a causality in accordance with immutable laws, which to be
sure, is a special kind…Thus a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same” (Groundwork 4:446-7)
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an a priori principle is the only ground on which reflecting judgment is deserving of a
critique (i.e. Die Kritik der Urteilskraft).37 In the domain of reflecting judgment, we find
the productive “free lawfulness” of heautonomy given in the a priori (3) principle of
purposiveness.38 Spontaneity, autonomy, and heautonomy, are distinct kinds of “legislation” of reason that correspond to the three distinct domains of reason distinguished by
transcendental relations of the subject. They pick out specific hylomorphic condition between freedom and lawfulness of judgments within the given domain of reason: theoretical, practical, and aesthetic (respectively).
The “spontaneity” of the synthesis of the pure understanding is at the heart of
what I call the first-layer significance of the imagination. We now need to see in more
detail how Kant’s notion –of the spontaneity of the pure understanding whereby it productively synthesizes conceptual representations for itself– plays out in the text and also
why this productive source of the pure understanding is essential for the success of Kant’s
critique.
§4) On the Pure Productive Synthesis of the Understanding
Since spontaneity already stands as a posited productive source of the pure conceptual representations, all Kant needs to do is show that this productive power of intellectual synthesis is identifiable in terms that fit the synthetic a priori principle that makes
the domain of synthetic a priori judgments of cognition lawful. In other words, mere
37

See my reference to Kant’s letter to Reihnhold above.
KU 20:225, KU 5:185-6, Heautonomy is a self-legislative activity of reason in general, which is condi tioned by the free lawful limits of the freedom of reflecting judgment (aesthetic and teleological). The kind
of lawfulness of aesthetic and teleological judgment found in the domain of reflecting judgment grounds a
form of indeterminate lawful judgment. In other words, it is a lawful expansion, production, or formation
beyond determinate limits that is grounded on the “free lawfulness of the imagination” or the “a priori
principle of Purposiveness”.
38
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positing of a productive power of the mind does not ground the validity of their origin.
Kant must show that the productive, intellectual synthesis by which the categories are
given is itself lawful. To do this, he has to ground the pure synthesis of the understanding
in the synthetic unity of apperception. And this is precisely what he does, and what I have
termed the first-layer significance of the imagination.
Consider that the principle which grounds determining judgments of the understanding, namely, the synthetic unity of apperception, is a “synthetic unity.” What might
this mean? Of the “pure apperception” and its “principle of synthetic unity,” Kant says,
This synthetic unity, however, presupposes a synthesis, or includes it, and if the
former is to be necessary a priori then the latter must also be a synthesis a priori.
Thus the transcendental unity of apperception is related to the pure synthesis of
the imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all composition of
manifold in a cognition. But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can
take place a priori; for the reproductive synthesis rests on conditions of experience. The principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of
the imagination prior to apperception is thus the ground of the possibility of all
cognition, especially that of experience.39

Two things to note: first, the synthesis is the ground of the possibility of all cognition (pure and empirical). For precisely this reason, Richard Kroner rightly observes,

39 A118
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“How is synthesis possible? That is the central question of transcendental idealism.”40
Second, that synthesis is “presupposed by” or “included in” a “synthetic unity.”
How, then, does Kant define synthesis in general? In “On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding,” Kant defines both sensible synthesis and
pure synthesis in the following ways:
By synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the action of
putting different representations together with each other and comprehending
their manifoldness in one cognition. Such synthesis is pure if the manifold is
given not empirically but a priori (as is that in space and time). Prior to all analysis of our representation these must first be given, and no concepts can arise analytically as far as the content is concerned. …Synthesis in general is, as we shall
subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination… Yet to bring this synthesis
to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding, and by means of
which it first provides cognition in the proper sense. Now pure synthesis, generally represented, yields the pure concepts of the understanding. By this synthesis,
however, I understand that which rests on a ground of synthetic unity a priori…41

The sine quo non of this passage for the categories is this: “pure synthesis…yields
the pure concepts of the understanding.” Key, here, is that the product of pure synthesis is
still a given, that is some yielded representation. Just as in the “figurative synthesis” of

my translation, [Wie ist Synthesis möglich? Das ist die Kernfrage des transzendentalen Idealismus.],
Kroner, 1921, p.77; C.f. pp. 80-1. Unfortunately, Kroner fails to recognize the fundamental answer to this
question, which leads to a misunderstanding of Fichte’s alternative to Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception. On Kroner’s account, Fichte introduces a fundamental productive and reflective power of the imagination, where Kant had the synthetic unity of apperception –“The productive imagination plays the same role
for Fichte that the transcendental apperception is appointed to play for Kant” [Die produktive Einbildungskraft spielt so für Fichte dieselbe Rolle, die bei Kant die transzendentale Apperzeption zu spielen
berufen ist] (my translation, Kroner, 1921, p. 449; C.f. pp. 450-1). On my view, Fichte’s account in the
1794 Wissenschaftslehre of the I as the self-grounding ground in terms of the two-fold movement of the
productive imagination (Fichte, EW, p. 244) is indeed different than Kant’s, but that difference does not
pertain to the inclusion of a fundamental productive power of the mind qua imagination. Fichte’s wavering
of the I according to a productive power that, through its own posited limitation is inter-determinative with
its own reflection (W pp. 135, 142-4, 279), should, I suggest be understood as the two fundamental features
of Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception namely, the productive power of synthesis and lawfulness. As I
argue here, this notion of a fundamental power of intellectual synthesis qua “imagination” was already included (prior to Fichte) in Kant’s notion of synthesis. C.f. Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism, p.
558-9.
41 A77-8/B103-4
40
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the imagination, which yields schemata (second-layer significance), and empirical synthesis of a manifold to form an intuition (third-layer significance of the imagination), so
too, here pure or intellectual synthesis is the productive yielding of a given. It is not mere
“unity,” but the producing of a given, a synthesized whole. So, synthesis is pure if “the
manifold is given… a priori”. It seems from this passage, that Kant has two kinds of
“pure synthesis” in mind. In the first case, the manifold is given a priori “as is that in
space and time.” These pure a priori intuitions (where an “a priori intuition” is the product of a synthesis of an a priori manifold) include the schemata, and in general all pure
intuitions42 (e.g. the pure formal intuitions of space and time that we find in the “Analogies of Experience” passages43 –though not space and time as the “forms of intuition”
which condition even the pure formal intuitions and so are not a sensible synthesis at all –
whether pure or empirical; more on this later.). Since pure intuitions of a synthesized a
priori manifold are the subject of what I call the second-layer significance of the imagination, I will return to them in the next section. Notice, though, in the passage above, that
Kant also identifies a non-sensible pure synthesis. To this end, he says, “synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination” and “pure synthesis, generally represented, yields the pure concepts of the understanding.”44 Now, this
synthesized representation is not an intuition, but a pure representation as Kant describes

42

Pure intuitions are not typically cognitions, but can become cognitions, “insofar as one presupposes that
there are things that can be presented to us only in accordance with the form of that pure sensible
intuition” (B147). But then, “the pure concepts of the understanding, consequently, even if they are applied
[anwenden] to a priori intuitions (as in mathematics), provide cognition only insofar as these a priori intuitions, and by means of them also the concepts of the understanding, can be applied to empirical
intuitions” (B147). See also: A147/B187.
43 A177-217/B218-64
44 A78/B104
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elsewhere: “In the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general
…this representation is a thinking, not an intuiting.”45
One might take a rather straightforward read of the B103-4 passage above defining synthesis. On this reading, synthesis in general just is (i) “the mere effect of the imagination”46 and Kant follows this with a specification that pure synthesis “yields the pure
concepts of the understanding.” 47 Further (as we saw in the previous section), (ii) the
“unity of apperception…in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is
the pure understanding” which contains the “categories, i.e., the pure concepts of the
understanding.”48 And, again lest one think that the A-deduction is at odds here with the
B-deduction, (iii) “insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining and not, like sense, merely determinable, and can thus determine the form of
sense a priori in accordance with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori.”49 Then, on this straightforward
reading, the categories as pure representations are the product of a pure power of productive synthesis, an “original source of the mind,”50 i.e. the “mere effect of the imagination”
and are “the first thing to which we have to attend if we wish to judge about the first origin of our cognition.”51 This productive, synthetic power of the mind is what I call the
first-layer significance of the imagination. I will turn to a direct account of it in a moment.

45

B157

46 A78/B104
47 A78/B104
48 A119
49

B151

50 A94-5
51 A78/B104
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But suppose we don’t take the straightforward account and instead suggest that
either Kant is confused in his use of the imagination and should have done away with it
altogether in both A and B editions, or perhaps we simply ignore the passage concerning
the imagination and assert that it is sufficient to view the pure understanding as that
which synthesized its own pure concepts, i.e. the categories. Whichever route one takes,
there is a serious problem.
What Kant recognizes and what critical accounts cannot leave out, is that the pure
understanding is productive, can give itself pure representations: i.e. pure concepts. But
for this to be lawful, for that structure to be valid for the possibility of experience, it cannot be merely asserted. The ground of the lawfulness of the deduction is the synthetic unity of apperception. It is that supreme, transcendental, a priori principle by which claims
to the lawful validity of all synthetic a priori, determining judgments of the understanding are made. Now, if the deduction rests on mere assertion, which it would if its productive power of synthesis were not grounded, then the entire claim to lawfulness would be
invalid.52 That is, the categories themselves would be mere assertions since they would
be posited as arising by the synthetic power of the pure understanding without that positing being grounded in the very principle that would make it lawful. 53
In other words, what Kant knows very well is that while he must show the ground
of the unity, and form by which the understanding determines, he must also show the
52

The deduction could lay claim to lawful “unity” but not to the lawful unity of the categories in a tran scendental “I think.” And lawful unity on its own is empty form that has no possibility of connecting up
with judgments of experience. The categories are the content of the unity of the pure understanding and the
productive source of that pure content must be shown to be lawful in the deduction, otherwise, the deduction necessarily fails.
53 A reference here to the derivation of the categories from the logical form of judgments begs the question,
i.e. that is a separate matter. The problem here is not whether these categories match up with our judgments
or how they relate to them. Rather, the problem of the productive source is a fundamental requirement by
which the categories can lawfully arise in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception.

!68

ground of the productive power of synthesis. Look again at the conclusion of the passage
cited above, which introduces his account of pure synthesis: “Now pure synthesis, generally represented, yields the pure concepts of the understanding. By this synthesis, however, I understand that which rests on a ground of synthetic unity a priori.”54 Now, it should
be noted that this “ground of synthetic unity a priori” just is the synthetic unity of apperception. So, even if one ignores Kant’s multiple identifications of the pure synthesis of
the imagination as the source of the “pure concepts of the understanding, i.e. the categories,” every valid interpretation of the deduction, must retain the synthetic productive
power of the pure understanding in such a way that they can show its derived lawfulness
from the synthetic unity of apperception.
At the same time, it would be a rather bizarre interpretation to say that these passages about the pure synthesis of the imagination as that by which the categories arise are
objectionable, yet to simultaneously interpret the pure understanding as containing precisely that productive power of synthesis. Why would this be odd? Well, that is all that
Kant is saying by “the unity of apperception in relation to the transcendental synthesis of
the imagination is the pure understanding.” So, in effect, those who take such a reading
are saying that Kant is right, the pure understanding has this productive synthesis, but we
shouldn’t call it the imagination, even a “non-sensible” imagination. The question then is
why not? Why go through all the trouble to keep the proper conception of the pure understanding such that it can be lawfully grounded in the synthetic unity of apperception

54 A77-8/B103-4
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while denying the term, when the term signifies nothing but this very quality? It seems
that such an objection is mere semantics.
Unfortunately, it is not a benign semantic alternative. The problem with doing
away with the pure synthesis of the imagination as the productive power of the pure understanding is that one is liable to forget the fundamental structure of the pure understanding in a way that will lead to the standard duality between the understanding and
sensibility that has long dominate Kant interpretation. That is, doing away with the term
“imagination” at this fundamental level has resulted in a standard view of the understanding and the imagination as external to one another. Such a view further obscures the possibility of understanding the deeper internal unity of reason in general, that is displayed
transcendentally, in part, through this internal quality of the imagination to both the understanding and sensibility.
We might well ask, is the pure synthesis of the understanding fundamentally different than that same synthesis in relation to sensibility, or is the former merely altered in
application. For a full answer, we will have to turn to the second-layer function of the
imagination which yields schemata. But Kant suggests an answer in the following passage from the Deduction:
Now since in us humans the understanding is not itself a faculty of intuitions, and
even if these were given in sensibility cannot take them up into itself, in order as
it were to combine the manifold of its own intuition, thus its synthesis, considered in itself alone, is nothing other than the unity of the action of which it is
conscious as such even without sensibility, but through which it is capable of itself determining sensibility internally with regard to the manifold that may be
given to it in accordance with the form of its intuition. Under the designation of a
transcendental synthesis of the imagination, it therefore exercises that action
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on the passive subject, whose faculty it is, about which we rightly say that the
inner sense is thereby affected.55

Kant is explicit here that the understanding apart from sensibility is that which
“considered in itself alone” synthesize and “through which it is capable of itself determining sensibility…under the designation of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination.”56 This passage from the B-deduction seems to suggest that the activity of synthesis
is fundamentally the same, with the difference that the “given” in question is pure representation in the first case and one of sensibility in the second. In other words, the difference seems to be one of the understanding’s activity in the first case displayed (in the
second case) in its “its first application.”57 The two are not the result of any fundamental
difference in the productive power of synthesis. But if this is right, then the B-deduction
is here also confirming what the A-deduction states, namely that the productive synthesis
of the imagination in relation to the unity of apperception is the pure understanding. This
should not be understood here as anything other than the non-sensible productive power
of the mind whereby non-sensible representations are synthesized or given and unified
according to the transcendental unity of apperception. And if that was not direct enough,
In a footnote on the necessary fit between the synthetic unity of experience and the synthetic unity of the pure understanding, Kant says:
In such a way it is proved that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical,
must necessarily be in agreement with the synthesis of apperception, which is
intellectual and contained in the category entirely a priori. It is one and the same

55

B153-4
B153-4
57 B151
56
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spontaneity that, there under the name of imagination and here under the name of
understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition.58

But if the intellectual synthesis and the pure sensible, figurative synthesis are fundamentally the same productive power of the mind just in two distinct spheres (one pure,
one sensible), then the following “fit” between understanding and sensibility turns out not
to be a “fit” at all, but a shared, internal power of the mind: namely the productive power
of synthetic representation (whether sensible or pure), namely:
The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility
was, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of sensibility stand under the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of
all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold of intuition
stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.59

And now, read in relation to the “unity of representations” given through the formal intuitions of space and time, notice the priority of a productive power of synthesis
that precedes both the conditions of sensibility and of understanding:
In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility only in order to note
that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which
does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time
first become possible. For since through it (as the understanding determines the
sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this a priori
intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding
(§24). 60

This continuity, if not “unitary,”61 productive synthesis that is “presupposed” by i)
the unity of apperception,62 ii) the categories, 63 and iii) the pure forms of sensibility
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B162f
B136
60 B160-1, footnote
61 B129
62 A118
63 B68, B158, A68/B93
59
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(space and time),64 is the productive power of the mind whereby “spontaneity” is not
mere “lawful unity” but a lawful unity of the productive power of the mind. It is a selflegislation of theoretical reason, a spontaneity, whereby synthetic a priori judgments of
cognition are possible. So identical is this fundamental productive synthesis of the mind
both in sensibility and the understanding, that Kant even slips at one point (and in one
other place) in the B-deduction, and speaks of “non-sensible intuition,” where he must
mean non-sensible representation:
Yet the combination (conjunction) of a manifold in general can never come to us
through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of
sensible intuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, all combination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of several concepts, and in the first case
either of sensible or non-sensible intuition, is an action of the understanding,
which we would designate with the general title synthesis in order at the same
time to draw attention to the fact that we can represent nothing as combined in
the object without having previously combined it ourselves, and that among all
representations combination is the only one that is not given through objects but
can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its self-activity.
One can here easily see that this action must originally be unitary and equally
valid for all combination, and that the dissolution (analysis) that seems to be its
opposite, in fact always presupposes it; for where the understanding has not previously combined anything, neither can it dissolve anything, for only through it
can something have been given to the power of representation as combined. 65

I should note a further oddity that confronts accounts that oppose my own. Kant
everywhere attributes synthesis (empirical and figurative/schematic) to the imagination.
Given that he attributes intellectual synthesis to the imagination in the A-deduction, and
given the passages in the B-deduction that seem to retain this notion, what ground is there
for attributing intellectual synthesis to some distinct productive power of the mind? If
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one’s response is “because Kant attributes it to the understanding in the B-deduction,”
this is merely question-begging since the whole point is that we are getting at fundamental quality of the understanding in terms of lawful unity and productive synthesis. An adequate answer to this question requires showing that there is (i) a substantive difference
in kind of synthesis and not merely the sensible non-sensible difference, because that is
already posited, (ii) that Kant can nevertheless ground the productive power of the mind
(i.e. the spontaneity of the understanding) in the synthetic unity of a apperception, and
(iii) can more adequately account for the many passages that identify the imagination in
this first-layer significance.
Nor is this non-sensible use of the term “imagination” unique to the A-edition and
select passages from the B-edition. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, we find a
similar status of the imagination as a condition or principle in the form of the synthetic, a
priori “principle of purposiveness” as the “free lawfulness of the imagination,” 66 where
reflecting judgment takes this synthetic a priori principle of free lawfulness of the imagination “as a law” (and thereby “schematizes without a concept”67). To this end, Kant
says, “reflecting power of judgment, therefore, can only give itself such a transcendental
principle as a law.” 68 Where this principle taken as a law, grounds the validity of reflecting judgments, wherein “the understanding is in the service of the imagination and not
vice versa.” 69
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While I suggest that we understand the first-layer significance of the imagination
in the Critique of Pure Reason as having a parallel status to the “imagination in its freedom” or that principle of “free lawfulness of the imagination,” and while parallel status, it
has the opposite structure in reflecting judgment that it has here in the critique of determining judgments of the understanding; nevertheless, such a helpful parallel is only of
use once we have parsed Kant’s notion of the free lawfulness of the imagination. Until
that point, such a reference won’t clarify how we should understand a first-layer, pure
productive synthesis of the imagination.
In the next section, I will defend my suggestion that the productive source, according to both the A and B Deduction, is the non-sensible (i.e. pure), “transcendental
imagination.” So, when Kant later distinguishes between the understanding and the imagination in judgment, where the latter performs the role of yielding empirical intuitions
and schematized intuitions, we cannot forget that on a non-sensible level, it is nevertheless transcendentally that which forms the pure understanding itself (in relation to the
unity with apperception). In other words, I suggest that, on one level of abstraction, apperception and imagination are the hylomorphic structure of the pure understanding, by
which it has conceptual form (pure concepts) that form a synthetic whole. To have a synthesis requires representational content (even if only logical content), and it is the pure
imagination and its intellectual synthesis that is this productive activity whereby a synthetic unity of the pure understanding is possible. It is precisely the synthetic unity of apperception that stands as that a priori source of this productive lawfulness by which such
an understanding can validly be held as that by which experience is possible.
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At this stage, it is enough if my reader recognizes that what I call the first-layer
imagination is a necessary part of the pure understanding, even if (for now) you think we
should do away with the term “imagination.” Such an objection, again, is merely semantics (though, not a benign semantic difference, for the reasons given above), so I will not
return to this worry.
What exactly is this first-layer significance that makes possible spontaneity or
productive synthesis and not merely “lawful unity.” In other words, what is the structure
of that whereby we have not merely a fundamental lawful unity (the unity of apperception) but a synthetic power to yield pure representations, pure concepts, the categories
and further to unify these as constituting the pure understanding? In other words, what
really is this transcendental synthesis of the imagination in relation to the unity of apperception that transcendentally (i.e. conditionally) makes possible the lawful form and activity (spontaneity) of the pure understanding?
§5) First-layer Significance:
Pure Representations and the Intellectual Synthesis of the Imagination
I suggest that we really have one option for understanding this first-layer significance of the imagination. If it is constitutive of the pure understanding as we have said,
then, given the status of the pure understanding as the mere “condition” for the possibility of cognitions of experience, this pure synthesis of the imagination is a kind of explanatory principle for grounding the categories in the synthetic unity of apperception. If this is
right, we should ask how it does this. Well, the synthetic unity of apperception is itself a
principle of synthesis. Notice that the supreme principles of each domain of reason are
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“synthetic principles a priori.” In other words, it is not the “unity of apperception” but
rather the “synthetic unity of apperception” that stands as this supreme principle for the
validity of determining judgments of the understanding. But what is it in the principle
itself that we call “synthetic.” I suggest that the “synthetic” here just is that identification
of the ground for the productive synthesis of the imagination whereby pure representations of the understanding are possible. That is, Kant is identifying a principle that is not
itself merely a principle of lawful unity, as it is often taken to be, but is a principle of lawful, productive synthesis.
Not only does this seem necessary for the internal success of the deduction, but it
importantly reflects the unity of reason in general, since the three synthetic principles a
priori are principles of pure reason in general; where pure reason in general is divisible
according to domains of self-legislation: spontaneity, autonomy, and heautonomy. In each
case, what is in view is the fundamental validity of, and this is key, a freedom of reason
that is lawful. That is, pure theoretical reason requires a productive power of synthesis, of
self-directedness. At the same time, while self-directed, it is still lawful, as is pure practical reason, and pure reflecting judgments. In every case, the principle must ground a kind
of lawful freedom. Here that lawful freedom is the synthetic unity of apperception, and
the productive synthesis of the imagination on this first layer just is that condition by
which the pure understanding is grounded as both lawful and productive or free to yield
pure representations and to form unities of these representations as the condition for experience. To be clear, none of this commits us to a quasi-sensible notion of productivity
such that the imagination is somehow generating real content for itself. Rather, this is
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merely the necessary transcendental component whereby a deduction of the categories of
the pure understanding is possible.
What I would like to draw attention to is that this first-layer significance of the
imagination can be articulated in terms of four (non-sensible) conditions of sensibility.
That is, I think that there is a further internal unity visible in Kant’s dualism, such that the
two-layer activity of the sensible imagination (pure in its second-layer significance and
empirical in its third) is conditioned by the first-layer, pure imagination. Where the pure
imagination, which is responsible for the productive intellectual synthesis, is also the pure
condition of the (pure and empirical) sensible synthesis imagination. To this end, I will
suggest that we are right to place, for example, the pure forms of intuition (space and
time) in the first layer significance of the imagination, while separating the pure formal
intuitions of space and time into the second layer significance. Where the second is conditioned by the first. I will return to this distinction shortly.
I am not interested in giving an exhaustive account of the pure synthesis of the
imagination, but I will posit four formal conditions that I think are visible and implicit in
Kant’s transcendental account. Acceptance of one or all of these is not necessary for my
argument (given chiefly above) that there is a pure, first-layer significance of the imagination at the heart of Kant’s deduction. I provide them only for the sake of showing a
deeper unity to the first Critique and plausible picture of the imagination in Kant’s dualism.
The four formal conditions of the imagination that I posit as conditioning all activities of productive synthesis are: 1) the form of determinability, 2) the pure intuitional
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forms of space and time, 3) the necessary formal (purposive) relation of the imagination
to the unity of apperception, and 4) the formal ground of internal and external derivation
of the “given”. I think that these four formal conditions successfully characterize Kant’s
conception of the productive power of synthesis of the imagination from his A edition of
the KrV all the way to his account of the “free lawfulness of the imagination”70 and the
“imagination as the faculty of intuitions”71 in the KU. But they are given here in terms of
the theoretical use of reason.
I am not interested in defending these four formal conditions here since they are
not necessary for my argument. That said, it may help my reader to see the internal unity
of all layers of the imagination’s significance if we conceive of the productive synthesis
of the imagination as fundamentally that productive function that must (1) yield that
which is (minimally) determinable,72 since its product is always a synthesis that must (2)
accord with the pure forms of space and time (not yet the formal intuitions of space and
time, which are sensible), and this yielding is always (3) “in relation to”73 or “for the sake
of” the unity of apperception, where the product of synthesis, or that which is yielded, is
always (4) either purely internal to the mind (i.e. intellectual synthesis) or external (i.e.
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KU 5:240
KU 5:287
72 the notion of determinability poses no special problem for the pure concepts of the understanding. They
are not sensibly determinable, but precisely insofar as they are determined as standing in a necessary synthetic unity to form the pure understanding, precisely thereby they are determinable in a pure representational (not intuitional) sense of the word. Otherwise, they could not be so determined in one pure synthetic
unity.
73 A119
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sensible synthesis of pure schemata or empirical intuition). 74 Again, acceptance of these
four conditions of the imagination is not necessary. I provide them only to say that the
interpretation I have given above of the imagination as a fundamentally productive power
of the mind that yields synthetic wholes (sensible and non-sensible) is easily recognizable
under one and the same term (at all levels): imagination.75 It is possible to conceive of all
layers of significance of the imagination according to these four formal conditions. And if
my reader takes an alternative account of the imagination, it is inconsequential to my argument that Kant’s use of the imagination is (1) accountable under one term and is (2)
central to all layers of the first Critique, namely pure understanding, sensibility, and the
bridging function of judgment between the two.
In short, minimally, the deduction is concerned not merely with the lawful “unity”
but also with the lawful “productive source” of the pure concepts of the understanding.
And we have good reason to think that Kant ties the productive source to the synthetic
unity of apperception via what I have called the first-layer significance of the imagination: namely, the pure synthesis of the imagination that yields the categories. Or in Kant’s
words from both A and B-editions (A77-8/B103-4): 1) “Now pure synthesis, generally
represented, yields the pure concepts of the understanding;” 2) “Synthesis in general is,
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Of course, each of these four qualities or conditions of the imagination in general are identifiable as pure
representations (i.e. “determinability,” “pure forms of space and time,” “purposiveness,” and “intensive/
extensive forms of derivation.” But there is no particular worry stemming from the fact that we are positing
the conditions of the very thing that yields the representations of those conditions. After all, the conditions
are only identifiable through transcendental reflection, which depends on itself for the identification of its
highest, abstract conditions.
75 I will really only return to the second condition, the pure forms of intuition, since I want to suggest that
the pure forms of intuitions just are qualities or conditional features of the productive synthesis itself, and
so the transcendental aesthetic stands, in this way, under the synthetic unity of apperception, where this
principle contains within it the principle of the synthesis of the transcendental imagination in relation to the
unity of apperception.
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as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination;” and 3) “By this synthesis, however, I understand that which rests on a ground of synthetic unity a priori.”
§6) Challenges to My First-Layer Account from Contemporary Scholarship
In a moment, we will leave aside the first-layer significance of the imagination
and turn to the two significances of the imagination within sensibility. Before doing so, I
wish to address an issue that arises if one does not distinguish between the first and second-layer significances of the imagination. The imagination, quite naturally, shows up
predominately for Kant within sensibility. What I call the second-layer significance is the
imagination’s figurative synthesis by which it yields a schemata or whole as a bridge between the pure understanding and empirical intuitions. In this second-layer significance
of the imagination, just as with the third-layer empirical synthesis of the imagination, this
figurative synthesis depends (conditionally), on the first-layer significance of the pure
intellectual synthesis of the imagination. That is, the second-layer imagination takes not
merely the validity of productive synthesis, but also the conditions of all intuitions which
are the pure forms given by the first-layer significance of the imagination. In the secondlayer significance, space and time show up as well, but where, in the first-layer, they are
“pure forms of intuitions” that condition all intuitions, now in the second-layer significance, they are pure intuitions or wholes that contain manifolds.76 That is, here space and
time are given as synthetic wholes, whereas in the first layer significance they are mere
“conceptual representations,” which to be sure still requires the productive synthesis of
76

These are available for “cognition” “insofar as one presupposes that there are things that can be presented
to us only in accordance with the form of that pure sensible intuition” (B147). But then, “the pure concepts
of the understanding, consequently, even if they are applied [anwenden] to a priori intuitions (as in mathematics), provide cognition only insofar as these a priori intuitions, and by means of them also the concepts
of the understanding, can be applied to empirical intuitions” (B147). See also: A147/B187.
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the mind (first-layer significance), but nothing of sensibility, and so they are not pure intuitions, but merely the shape or form conditioning all sensible intuitions (i.e. the determinable form to which all sensible intuitions must conform, as the condition whereby
they are possible). The pure forms, thereby define a central feature of what it is to be a
sensible intuition.
There is a lively debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists about the
source of unity of intuitions. There are also those, like Jessica Williams,77 who defend a
kind of middle-ground. Consider Dieter Henrich’s articulation, taken up by Williams, of
the worry: “Wherever we find unity, this unity is itself made possible by the categories
and determined in relation to them. In our representations of space and time, however, we
have intuitions which contain unity and which at the same time include everything that
can be present to our senses.”78 On the account I have been giving, there is no question of
the categories either determining the unity of intuitions or not. Why not? Both the pure
forms of intuitions and the categories are pure conditions for the cognition of experience.
They are both pure representations yielded for the mind by the first-layer significance,
namely the lawful, productive synthesis that is unified through the transcendental unity of
apperception, and this lawful spontaneity just is that which (taken as a principle) is the
synthetic unity of apperception. So the categories just are the conditions of the under-
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To whom I am greatly indebted for her exceptional and thorough critique of my argument at the 2018
Eastern APA and whose article “Kant on the Original synthesis of the understanding and sensibility” is superb work, with which I heartily disagree, yet think brings profound clarity to the subject and stands as a
more or less favorable alternative to my own account; Williams, 2017. In short, I think Williams’ account is
the best one can do if one ignores the centrality of the productive power of the mind that is a priori the
source of the conceptual representations of both pure concepts and the pure forms of intuition. Setting aside
my own argument, Williams provides, to my mind, the strongest handling of the conceptualist/non-conceptualist debate.
78 Henrich, 1969, p. 646
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standing, and the pure forms of space and time just are the conditions of sensibility, but
the status of both conditions are the same. Both sets of conditions are pure representations that have their productive source and lawful form through the pure productive, intellectual synthesis of the imagination in relation to the unity of apperception. In other
words, both the unity and productive source for both the categories and the pure forms of
space and time are to be found in the pure synthesis of the imagination and the unity of
apperception as lawfully grounded by the synthetic unity of apperception. To be sure, the
categories are the source of unity of the function of the understanding, but the very possibility of the categories and the pure understanding depend (as do the pure forms of space
and time and sensibility) on these original sources of the mind for their transcendental
grounding.
What then does this mean, it means that the two sets of conditions (the categories
and the pure forms of intuitions) necessarily accord with each other. That means, the categories will never “encounter” that which does not accord with the pure forms of sensibility, and likewise, the pure forms of sensibility will never condition that which does not
accord with the pure conditions of the understanding. The two kinds of conditions are the
productive, pure synthetic representations of the same productive lawfulness of the mind,
i.e. the spontaneity of the imagination in pure theoretical reason.
Consider Williams conclusion about the relationship between the unity of space
and time and categorial synthesis: “When it comes to explaining the unity of space and
time themselves, we must not appeal to any particular act of categorial synthesis, but to
the subject’s consciousness of the capacity that the categories express; consciousness of
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this capacity in relation to sensibility is what explains the subject’s holistic consciousness
of her ‘entire sensibility.’”79 I take her reference to “unity of space and time themselves”
to be (in the context) a reference to the pure forms of space and time. On one reading, I
could agree with Williams that an explanation of the unity of space and time requires an
appeal to “the subject’s consciousness of the capacity that the categories express.” I could
agree with this formulation if the “capacity that the categories express” just is the fundamental productive lawfulness by which pure representations (i.e. the categories, and the
pure forms of space and time) arise. In that case, yes, it is an appeal to the productive
lawfulness of theoretical reason grounded in the synthetic unity of apperception that explains not merely the unity of the pure forms of space and time, but also the categories.
That is my argument. That, of course, is not what Williams means by capacity.
Among scholars engaged in the conceptualist/non-conceptualist debate, those
most likely to take a sympathetic reading to my argument fall into what Williams calls the
“Broadly Conceptualist’ accounts offered by Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity and Michael Friedman, ‘Kant on Geometry’. Broadly Conceptualist views grant that
categorial synthesis cannot explain the unity of space and time, but nevertheless, attribute
this unity to a pre-conceptual synthesis that stems directly from the unity of
apperception.”80 Such a view could fit easily with my interpretation once one recognizes
that the “unity of apperception” is not a productive power of synthesis but rather is uni-
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fied with such an intellectual synthesis under the synthetic unity of apperception and is
thereby the lawful ground of both understanding and sensibility in cognition.81
Williams critiques both my argument and Longuenesse in a way that I think helpfully draws out a conflation likely shared by most critics. Of Longuenesse, Williams says:
In her more recent defense of her view, she claims that the unity of apperception,
‘prior to any specific synthesis’ accounts for the unity of space and time (Kant on
the Human Standpoint, 36). While I think this is a promising line of response, she
does not retract her earlier claim that space and time are ‘products of the figurative synthesis of the imagination’ (Kant and the Capacity, 216). The problem is
that when Kant introduces figurative synthesis, he explicitly claims that it takes
place ‘in accordance with the categories’ (B152). It is not clear how an appeal to
figurative synthesis is in line with the insistence that the synthesis responsible for
the unity of space and time is pre-conceptual, as Longuenesse and Friedman
maintain.82

There is a conflation in Williams critique between pure forms of intuition and
pure formal intuitions. Longuenesse is right that the pure formal intuitions are in accord
with the categories as are all products of the figurative synthesis (what I call the secondlayer significance of the imagination). Nor is that in conflict with the claim that the pure
forms of space and time have a pre-categorial unity that is accountable in terms of the
unity of apperception since here we are talking about the first-layer significance of a pure
synthesis by which the categories themselves arise. Indeed, if this is what Longuenesse
means, then it is precisely what I am arguing.
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Of non-conceptualists, Williams says, “Recent non-conceptualists (McLear, ‘Two Kinds of Unity’, 90;
Onof and Schulting, ‘Space as Form of Intuition’, 28–9) have argued that space and time as forms of intuition are already unitary infinite wholes without any contribution from or connection to the understanding.”
This is also compatible with my view, so long as this isn’t the end of the story. The unity of space and time
as pure forms of intuition must be traceable to the productive lawfulness of reason that the synthetic unity
of apperception grounds. Otherwise, the stand as mere free-floating assertions and so result in a transcendental dogma of sensibility.
82 Williams, 2017, 9
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My distinction between the first and second-layer significances of the synthesis of
the imagination provides precisely those tools by which something like Longuenesse’s
and my own account of space and time is clear. Namely, on my view, the pure forms of
space and time are pure representations of the first-layer synthesis just as the categories
of the pure understanding are. The pure intuitions of space and time, by contrast, are
themselves intuitions, though pure intuitions.83 Thus, they are the products of the secondlayer “figurative synthesis” of the imagination. To this end, I see no contradiction in
Longuenesse’s attribution of space and time to the figurative synthesis which does stand
under the categories (as its “first application”), so long as what Longuenesse means there
is space and time as “pure intuitions” as they appear, for instance in Kant’s grounding of
causality and substance in the “Analogies of Experience.”84
Likewise, when Longuenesse speaks of a pre-categorial synthesis or unity, this is
perfectly compatible so long as what she means there is precisely that intellectual synthesis by which the categories themselves first occur and the unity of apperception by which
their own unity is possible. In which case, it is perfectly compatible if she is speaking not
of pure intuitions of space and time, but of the pure forms of space and time which are
the mere conditions of all combination in sensibility and cannot be conditioned by the
categories since they themselves have the same status as the categories. Both are pure
representations with the same productive lawful source and each conditions their given
side of the theoretical duality of understanding and sensibility. The categories condition
83

This distinction, though so widespread that it even appears in Allen Wood’s introduction to Kant (Wood,
2005, 54), nevertheless seems to be the source of much confusion, since the proper referent (“pure form”
vs. “pure (formal) intuition) is often not given in scholarly writings and so equivocations abound. For a
helpful handling of the subject, see Allison, 2004, pp. 276-84.
84 A177-217/B218-64
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the former, the pure forms of space and time, condition the latter. But neither conditions
are themselves either the lawful or productive source by which they arise as conditions,
so to seek the unity of each in the other is a category mistake.
When speaking of pre-conceptually determined empirical intuitions, there should
be no surprise that they already contain a unity despite not yet being determined according to concepts of the understanding. Likewise, though it seems to escape notice, it is not
surprising that the concepts of the understanding already accord with the pure forms of
sensibility. So, while pure and empirical intuitions are not unified by the concepts of the
understanding prior to their determination in judgment, they are nevertheless, a priori in
accord with the unity of the categories, since they too are conditioned by a priori forms
produced by the same productive lawfulness that yields the categories, namely, the pure
intellectual synthesis of the imagination in relation to the unity of apperception which just
are, taken as an a priori principle, the synthetic unity of apperception, and taken as a faculty for judgment, the understanding.
It is necessary to recognize that the transcendental unity of apperception and the
intellectual synthesis of the imagination at this purest level do not occur in some kind of
sequence but are a “simultaneous” intertwined sources of the pure reason (lawful and
productive) that is divided only by transcendental reflection for the sake of analysis.85 In
actuality, the transcendental unity of apperception and this fundamental productive power
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“Transcendental reflection” is precisely that process of abstract reflection whereby, “I make the compari son of representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated, and through which I
distinguish whether they are to be compared to one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to
pure intuition” (A261/B317).
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of synthesis stand in a kind of co-prior way to all acts of the mind.86 To this end, Kant
calls both of these the “original sources” or “faculties of the soul” postulated for and
proven to contain “the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind.”87 Moreover, the two do not stand
as purely externally related but are from the very “beginning” intimately bound up in the
possibility of the conditions of the other, such that reference to each is needed to ground
the conditions contained in both.
§7) Second-layer Significance:
Schemata and the Figurative Synthesis of the Imagination
“Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of
the former to the latter. This mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical)
and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a representation is the transcendental schema.” 88
“…finally, that pure concepts a priori, in addition to the function of the understanding in the
category, must also contain a priori formal conditions of sensibility (namely of the inner sense)
that contain the general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object.
We will call this formal and pure condition of the sensibility, to which the use of the concept of
the understanding is restricted, the schema of this concept of the understanding, and we will
call the procedure of the understanding with these schemata the schematism of the pure understanding. The schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination; but since the synthesis of the latter has as its aim no individual intuition but rather only the unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema is to be distinguished from an image.”89
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C.f. Haag’s: “Was diese Einheit stiftet, ist ein weiteres ‘Vermögen der Seele’ [A94], nämlich die ‘ur sprüngliche Apperception’. Diese ursprüngliche, ‘transcendentale’ [A107] oder ‘reine’ [A 116] Apperzeption ist das ‘reine, ursprüngliche, unwandelbare Bewußtsein’ [A107];” [“‘What this unity necessitates is a
further ‘faculty of the soul’ (A94), namely, the ‘original apperception.’ This original,
‘transcendental’ (A107) or ‘pure’ (A116) apperception is the ‘pure, original, unchanging
consciousness’ (A107)” (my translation; Erfahrung und Gegenstand, p. 182).] See also, Erfahrung, pp.
246-7, and 184-5: “In diesem Sinne sind zwei der ‘drei ursprünglichen Quellen, die die Beingungen der
Möglichkeit aller Erfahrung enthalten und selbst aus keinem anderen Vermögen des Gemüths abgeleitet
werden können’ [A94], nämlich die Apperzeption und intellektualisierte Einbildungskraft, Verstandesvermögen.”
87 A94-5
88 A138/B177
89 A139-40/B178-9
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Since, to have a synthetic product of sensibility is a result of the imagination (as
we will see in this and the next section),90 the condition by which that product is given
must be a conditional quality of that very thing by which it is given, i.e. the imagination.
In other words, because the pure forms of space and time are not something external to
intuitions and somehow determine intuitions, but rather are the very conditions by which
intuitional form is possible (according to which, pure and empirical intuitions necessarily
conform prior to determination by an external determiner, i.e. concept), they stand as
necessary internal conditions of the very productive synthesis that gives rise to the intuition. In short, the pure forms of space and time are articulations of the way in which the
sensible imagination (pure and empirical) is active as synthetically yielding a given
whole. To this end, the pure forms of intuition (not pure intuitions themselves, just the
form) are qualities of the first-layer imagination as a condition of sensible synthesis.91
So, on the one hand, space and time (as pure forms of intuition) are themselves
formal conditions by which the sensible imagination (second and third-layer) is active.92
Whereby, they are not pure intuitions that could stand as that in which a synthesized manifold is representable, but rather are the “shape” by which any intuition (pure or empiri-

90 A140-2/B179-81
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To this end, Kant says, “But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intu ition, but also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of the
unity of this manifold in them” (B160) and then in the corresponding footnote, “Space, represented as object… contains more than the mere forms of intuition, namely the comprehension of the
manifold…” (B160f).
92 For example, when Förster says “such ordering is not achieved by sensibility as such, for as a purely re ceptive faculty sensibility is merely passive, pure receptivity for impressions. The task of ordering falls to
the imagination. Hence the fact that space and time are forms of intuition only means that any connection
the imagination may forge within the material given in sensibility is limited and constrained by these forms:
Every connection of appearance to something distinct from myself is inevitably spatio-temporal” (11). But
here, Förster is clearly speaking specifically about the fact that (as I’ve just described it) the functions of
the imagination are conditioned by the first-layer imagination itself not by some set of conditions of the
sensible given that are somehow external to the imagination.
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cal) is possible. They are the manner in which that which is qualitatively given as a determinable takes form. Or in Kant’s words, and just as the postulated forms of the imagination require: Time is an “a priori given form…and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable.” 93 As such it is nothing but a condition. On the other hand, however, just as
the pure concepts of the understanding are conditions, i.e., “mere forms of thought,”94
which can, nevertheless, be taken not as mere conditions of understanding, but as concepts that, once schematized, can themselves determine manifolds, so too, we can take
the pure forms of space and time not merely as conditions but also as products of the a
priori imagination, i.e. as pure formal intuitions.95 In which case, we would actually be
speaking of space and time as intuitions that contain manifolds and are themselves conditioned by the pure forms of space and time.96
As such, this second layer if it is to be included in sensibility is a kind of pure
sensibility, but conceiving of it in this way runs the risk of forgetting that it is equally
“of” the understanding and its “first application.”97 The second layer significance of the
imagination should really be thought of as a bridge between both the understanding and
93

B157f
B150
95 There is yet a third, confusion often brought into play. Namely the ideas of space and time as all-encom passing intuitive wholes. This is the problem Kant takes up in the Mathematical and Dynamical Sublime in
the third Critique. Namely, the imagination is incapable of yielding such all-encompassing pure intuitions
(due to the limits of a finite discursive reasoner). So, while the pure forms of space and time are all-encompassing “conditions” and while the pure intuitions of space and time are intuitional wholes that contain the
manifolds of experience. Those pure intuitions always stand in a relation of inadequacy to the reason’s idea
of the same. It should be carefully kept in mind, however, that “space and time” as ideas of reason are not
interchangeable with the same as conditions of sensibility or as pure intuitions of sensibility.
96 B160 “But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as
intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of the unity of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic” (B160). For a further discussion of how space and time
serve as pure intuitions that are themselves necessary for mathematical representations and judgments and
geometrical representations and judgments, see Terry Pinkard’s discussion of “pure intuitions” in German
Philosophy 1760-1860 (p. 25).
97 For an alternative, but potentially compatible account, see Pollok, 2017, pp. 228-31
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sensibility and so belonging properly to both or neither. In its second layer significance,
Kant describes the imagination as fundamentally the faculty for synthetically yielding
matter for thought: “Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even without
its presence in intuition.”98 Although the imagination functions according to its own
form (i.e. a set of logically necessary conditions, which I have suggested above can be
understood as the four formal conditions), it does not thereby show itself as a faculty for
giving form, but rather as the faculty for synthesizing pure and empirical intuitions. 99
It is always surprising when readers of the third Critique speak of the aesthetic
free-play of the imagination and the understanding as if Kant has introduced some kind of
entirely unprecedented relation.100 In fact, the free-play is only a variant of the purposive
relation between the imagination and understanding already present in the first

98

B15; see also AA.28.I:235.
Hannah Ginsborg’s account of what she calls “primitive normativity” provides an interesting and helpful
way to understand the imagination as simultaneously lawful yet free, i.e. not determined according to a law
(or “lawfulness without a law”). The four forms of the imagination, which I show in the deduction, are the
“lawful” structure of the imagination. I agree with Ginsborg that it is important that we recognize the lawful
structure of the imagination without forgetting that it is free. My account is compatible with Ginsborg’s
since what is significant for my account is that these forms arise necessarily as the pure forms of the imagination when we reflect (transcendentally) on those a priori conditions of its activity. Moreover, these conditions are determiners, but determiners of a free-lawful activity, not of a lawfully determining activity. So,
my account can accord with Ginsborg’s in this regard, but also with a variety of others and is not bound to a
kind of “primitive normativity”. See Ginsborg, 2015, pp. 53-93, 162, 165-8.
See also Samantha Matherne, “Kant and the Art of Schematism,” pp. 196-7.
100 Dieter Henrich makes a similar observation in Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World, p.
33.
Eckart Förster likewise observes that the free play is not something totally new, but a variant of the cognitive relation:“In the cognition of any object we find an interplay of the understanding and the imagination…. Upon reflection, the power of judgment finds the understanding and imagination to be in a mutually
invigorating and animating ‘free play’ with one another” (2012, p. 127)
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Critique.101 And Kant affirms this point in the second introduction to the KU: when he
distinguishes between two kinds of purposiveness: “the representation of the second kind of
purposiveness, since it relates the form of the object not to the cognitive faculties of the subject in
the apprehension of it but to a determinate cognition of the object under a given concept, has
nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things but rather with the understanding in judging
them.” 102 The purposive relation between the two in the first Critique is that which makes

cognition and experience in general possible.103 This synthesis arises first according to
the production of the imagination (spontaneity) that first yields the schema as a mediating
concept that can bring pure concepts of the understanding into a rule or synthesis by
which the latter are applicable to empirical intuitions. Or in Kant’s words:
This mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet
intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a representation is the
transcendental schema, …the schema is in itself always only a product of the
101

Certainly, the same interplay or purposive relationship is underway in aesthetic judgments, but with the
important difference that the imagination there yields manifold intuitions that are unifiable only according
to “indeterminate concepts” of the understanding, thus resulting in the non-cognitive, aesthetic idea (The
Antinomy of Taste and Remark I, Sections 56 & 57 of the KdU, 5:338 to 5:343). This rational relation between the imagination and the understanding, far from being new to the third Critique, is an outworking of
the very free, productive structure of the imagination that makes even cognition possible, since that which
allows the expanse of cognition is precisely that the imagination goes beyond what is immediately determined. It is the function of the understanding to seek out the unification according to ever more complicated relations of determinate concepts, which thereby expand cognition. But, if the imagination is to be purposively engaged with the understanding in this expansion of cognition, then it follows that the same conditions that make such productive work possible, necessitate that it have the possibility of yielding a given
that is “beyond” the understanding’s available determinate concepts. Thereby, it is possible for the understanding to receive determinable intuitions, which are nevertheless not readily (or foreseeably) unifiable
according to a determinate concept of the understanding, so, the understanding provides the fullest possible
synthesis, namely, an indeterminate concept, i.e. not cognition, but an aesthetic idea. Insofar as an aesthetic
idea is unified at some point according to a determinate concept, it becomes an aesthetically derived cognition. It cannot become a cognition, however, unless the understanding does in fact synthetically unify it
according to a determinate concept (and in that case, it is no longer an aesthetic idea, but rather a
cognition).
102 KU 5:192
103 While this kind of purposiveness is constitutive of determining judgments of the understanding, the pur posiveness of reflecting judgment is also necessary (in a kind of secondary way) for cognition of experience: “For it is not a principle of the determining but rather merely of the reflecting power of judgment; one
means only that, however nature may be arranged as far as its universal laws are concerned, we must always seek out its empirical laws in accordance with that principle and the maxims that are grounded on it,
because only so far as that takes place can we make progress in experience and acquire cognition by the use
of our understanding” (KU 5:185-6). These two forms of purposiveness are distinct from yet another, namely, a conception of the freedom of the will as a “principle of practical purposiveness” (KU 5:182).
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imagination; …we will call this formal and pure condition of sensibility, to
which the use of the concept of the understanding is restricted, the schema of this
concept of the understanding, and we will call the procedure of the understanding
with these schemata the schematism of the pure understanding.104

The “transcendental product of the imagination” is that by which pure concepts
gain significance and applicability,105 and are themselves nothing but pure intuitions of
the concept and contain nothing empirical.106 Nevertheless, they make possible the subsumption of the empirical according to concepts of the understanding (e.g. the concept of
a dog or a triangle which grounds the experience of specific sensible intuition without
being restricted to the representation of a concrete, particular dog, etc. 107 It is this interplay at work in the schematism of that which is “always only a product of the imagination” that Kant calls the “hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty.”108
In “Kant and the Art of Schematism,” Samantha Matherne rightly draws attention
to the artistic significance at work in Kant’s understanding of the Schematism. While critics such as Pippin, Guyer, and P.F. Strawson interpret this “hidden art” passage as a reference to the opaque nature of the process,109 Matherne, by contrast, takes seriously the importance of understanding the schematism in terms of a kind of a “non-robust” artistic
104 A138-40/B177-9,

my emphasis

105 A142/B181
106 A141/B180
107 A141/B180
108

A141/B181; For my own purposes, it is important to refrain from speaking of art in terms of the fine
arts, since this risks collapsing the transcendental structure of the mind and the way in which it is fundamentally artistic (via the imagination) into a non-transcendental account. So, here and particularly in the
chapters on Hegel, I speak of an “artistic” quality of the mind and leave aside considerations of works of art
and the ability to create works of art. Despite this difference in my own approach, I agree with Matherne’s
emphasis and connection to “genius” in this article. As Matherne suggests, we need to take seriously Kant’s
insight regarding the “art of everyday experience,” p. 200.
109 Matherne, 2014, pp. 181-2
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function,110 a function that is in a few respects parallel to genius.111 As such, this interplay
is the condition for all judgments. 112 We can agree with Matherne if by “non-robust artistic function” she means the productive power of the imagination, which also forms
(though in a different way) aesthetic judgments.
The synthetic function of the imagination in the power of judgment is simply a
more layered activity of its already transcendental, formal (logically, hylomorphic) relation toward the understanding which it has as a condition of the possibility of its being
that which yields intuitions for the sake of cognition in general, which is necessary for the
possibility of experience.113 This relational function of the second-layer (sensible, a priori) imagination and the understanding forms the faculty of cognition. Remember,
though, that Kant has already said that the pure understanding is the unity of the pure ap-

110

Ibid. 190-1
Ibid. 198-9
112 Regarding this mediating role, Kant says, “The schema of a pure concept of the understanding, on the
contrary, is something that can never be brought to an image at all, but is rather only the pure synthesis, in
accord with a rule of unity according to concepts in general, which the category expresses, and is a transcendental product of the imagination, which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general, in
accordance with conditions for its form (time) in regard to all representations, insofar as these are to be
connected together a priori in one concept in accord with the unity of apperception” (A141-2/B180-1)
113 Now, since the “transcendental synthesis of imagination comes down to nothing other than the unity of
all the manifold of intuition in inner sense, and thus directly to the unity of apperception” (A145/B185) the
first two functions of the imagination are what form the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which
in the second-layer (as the source of the mediating schema between mere sense and the pure concepts of the
understanding) is the basis of the power of judgment in general. As such, this second-layer function of the
imagination is “the condition under which alone [the power of judgment] is authorized to use the pure concepts of the understanding for synthetic judgments” (A148/B187). So, the transcendental synthesis of the
imagination in accord with the formal conditions of the imagination is that through which synthetic judgments, in general, are possible (not just a posteriori, but also a priori) (A155/B194, A158/B197). In Kant’s
words, “synthetic a priori judgments are possible, if we relate the formal conditions of a priori intuition,
the synthesis of the imagination, and its necessary unity in a transcendental apperception to a possible cognition of experience in general” (A158/B197). Of course, the imagination is not the sole ground of synthetic a priori judgments, it serves as the condition of the latter precisely in its second-layer relational structure
with the understanding. To this end, Kant says of the medium through which synthetic, a priori judgments
“originate”, “there is only one totality in which all of our representations are contained, namely inner sense
and its a priori form, time. The synthesis of representations rests on the imagination, but their synthetic
unity (which is requisite for judgment), on the unity of apperception” (A155/B194). It is the formal relation
of the two that makes possible judgments of any kind.
111
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perception and the transcendental synthesis of the imagination,114 so the understanding
here should not be viewed as totally external to the imagination. The imagination is merely supplying a further layer of matter to the understanding than what it has already supplied to make the spontaneity of the understanding possible.115 Likewise, I think it would
be a mistake to attempt to separate this second-layer, figurative synthesis of the imagination from the pure understanding. Kant importantly identifies the transcendental schema
as that mediating representation that is intellectual and sensible and which makes possible
the power of judgment which unites concepts with objects of experience.116 Now the
schematism is itself the product of both the transcendental synthesis of the imagination
(schema) and the pure concepts of the understanding (operating on the schema). The two

114 A119,

B151
As is well known, Kant attributes the synthetic work of the imagination at this stage to a “blind” func tion of the imagination: “Synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at
all, but of which we are seldom even conscious” (A78/B103). I suggest that Kant is here using the term
“blind” to refer in an exclusive sense to the lack of guidance according to the determinations through concepts of the understanding. After all, the synthesis is of course not blind in a general sense, but purposive,
since of the infinite synthetic possibilities, a discursive reasoner could not possibly alight on more than just
a handful of thoughts throughout the reasoner’s life-time if the cognitive process were truly blind. This is
directly related to the free play that makes possible aesthetic judgments (5:240-2, 5:343-4). Moreover,
even a single cognizable intuition would be nothing for us without the consistent train of experience in
which it can make sense for us and possibly even become cogent. Such a coherence of experience requires
a relatively consistent connectivity of such intuitions given for us. The imagination cannot possibly synthesize blindly, but rather forms particular synthetic wholes that are relevant to the unity of cognition and reason in general. Nevertheless, the synthesis is blind as regards the determinate guidance afforded only by the
concepts of the understanding. This of course concerns the question of “aesthetic ideas”, which are intuitions given by the free productivity of the imagination for the “sake of cognition in general” without resulting in a cognition, since such intuitions are unified according to “indeterminate concepts” and never according to a determinate concept adequate to the manifold. For a helpful contrasting account to my own
that, nevertheless, likewise takes up the “free lawfulness of the imagination” as “key” to aesthetic judgments, see Keren Gorodeisky’s chapter “Schematizing without a Concept? Imagine that!” as well as her
article “A Tale of Two Faculties”. Chapter II takes up this topic in detail.
See also: Paul Guyer’s discussion of indeterminate concepts in his chapter, “The Harmony of the Faculties
Revisited” in Values of Beauty (2005).
116 A138-9/B177-8; For a helpful account of the schemata, imagination, and cognition, see Fiona Hughes,
Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World; Matherne, “Kant and the Art of Schematism.” See also,
Günter Zöller, “Schematism and Symbolism. Kant on the Power of the Imagination.”For a use of representations and intuitions that contrasts with my own, see Pinkard on pure intuitions (German Philosophy, pp.
24-6).
115
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together form that which first makes judgment possible and upon which all judgment depends.117 As Kant says in his discussion of the schema, time is the condition by which the
sensible is brought into the mediating representation,118 but more so “the schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination” [“Das Schema ist an sich selbst jederzeit
nur ein Produkt der Einbildungskraft”].119 Since the imagination’s formal condition of
relation is purposiveness, as shown in the deduction, the synthesis of the imagination that
yields the schemata is simply a more complex yielding of intuitions for the sake of the
understanding and of reason in general in accord with the formal condition of its own activity.
We can see this second layered function of the imagination and its mutual dependence and thoroughgoing purposive interaction with the understanding in the following
passage from section 24 of the B deduction:
This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, can be called figurative (synthesis speciosa), as distinct from that
which would be thought in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is called combination of the understanding (synthesis intellectualis); both are transcendental, not merely because they themselves
proceed a priori but also because they ground the possibility of other cognition a
priori.
Yet the figurative synthesis, if it pertains merely to the original synthetic unity of
apperception, i.e., this transcendental unity, which is thought in the categories,
must be called, as distinct from the merely intellectual combination, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. Imagination is the faculty for repre117

Relatedly, Kant says, “the transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination is the pure form of all
possible cognition, through which, therefore, all objects of possible experience must be represented a priori” (A118).
118 For a different articulation, but similar argument regarding how to understand the mediating role of the
schemata, see Samantha Matherne, Kant and the Art of Schematism, 188.
See also, Rebecca Kukla, “Introduction” to Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, pp.
1-34.
119 A140/B179; For a contrasting reading of the schemata, see Terry Pinkard’s German Philosophy
1760-1860, where he says, “A schema is thus just a rule or set of rules that specifies how to construct a
concept and therefore a judgment” (p. 39). C.f. Henry Allison on “schematism” in Kant’s Transcendental
Idealism, pp. 202-228.
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senting an object even without its presence in intuition. Now since all of our
intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs to sensibility…120

More closely considered, the schema of a given concept (e.g. substance, number,
etc.)121 is the “representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing [that
concept] with its image.”122 The imagination yields (in accord with the understanding)
such a representation of its own procedure because of the gap that exists between the
purely sensible and the concepts of the understanding.123 A mediating term must bridge
this gap.124 It is this mediating role that the schema performs: “in fact it is not images of
objects but schemata that ground our pure sensible concepts.”125 So, the imagination is
here engaged in a formal purposive relation with the understanding, the product of which

120

B151

121 A138-9/B177-8
122

A140/B179-80; “Diese Vorstellung nun von einem allgemeinen Verfahren der Einbildungskraft, einem
Begriff sein Bild zu verschaffen, nenne ich das Schema zu diesem Begriffe.”
123 In “Kant’s Theory of the Imagination”, Samantha Matherne likewise argues that, for Kant, the imagina tion serves to “mediate between the sensible and non-sensible aspects of our lives” (p. 3). While I agree
with this, she later says that the imagination mediates “between intuitions and concepts” (p. 11). I’m not
sure how to understand that claim since the imagination just is the faculty for yielding intuitions. So, I
agree with her first articulation (i.e. between the sensible and non-sensible) but not with her second. However, I do not think that Matherne’s argument requires her commitment to the second formulation, and so I
think our accounts could be viewed as standing in accord in this regard.
124 Interestingly, Kant describes the schema such that the product of the coordination of the imagination and
the understanding is itself both “specific” but not “concrete”. To this end, Kant says, “The concept of the
dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal
in general, without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible
image that I can exhibit in concreto. This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and
their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from
nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty” (A141/B180). Specificity arises as the mutual
limitation of the imagination and the understanding. So we find that “although the schemata of sensibility
first realize the categories, yet they likewise also restrict them [obgleich die Schemata der Sinnlichkeit die
Kategorien allererst realizieren, sie doch selbige gleichwohl auch restringieren], i.e., limit them to conditions that lie outside the understanding (namely, in sensibility)” (A146/B186). So, two opposing forces of
one and the same relation are necessarily at work (one productive, the other restrictive).
125 A140/B180
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is the schema, which is yielded for the sake of cognition.126 These pure intuitions or
schemata are nothing but transcendental products of the figurative synthesis of the productive imagination. This cognitive relation that gives rise to schemata depends on a
principle by which the imagination and the understanding are held together to overcome
the gap between the sensible and the pure concepts.127 So, Kant says of this second layer
function, “We therefore have a pure imagination, as a fundamental faculty of the human
soul, that grounds all cognition a priori. By its means we bring into combination the
manifold of intuition on the one side and the condition of the necessary unity of apperception on the other. Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental function of the imagination…”128 As
we’ve seen, the imagination is already posited as the logical condition qua the productive
source of pure representations on the one side in its first-layer significance and is active
on the other side (concerning the manifold) in its third function (i.e. the empirical work of
the imagination in synthesizing manifold’s of sense into empirical intuitions or images).
So, this mediating function is not the imagination’s sole function and indeed the media-

126

These pure intuitions are nothing but transcendental products of the imagination [“Das Schema ist an
sich selbst jederzeit nur ein Produkt der Einbildungskraft”] and only have significance insofar as they are
relatable to empirical intuitions (A140-2/B179-81). They are not transcendental objects qua some kind of
noumenon, but are presented for thought as objects of thought (i.e. abstracted pure matter for judgments)
(B307-8). Nevertheless, they are pure intuitions, in that the imagination yields a given for the mind that
serves a purely transcendental function.
127 A124
128 A124; For more on the subject, see Keren Gorodeisky, “Unity in Variety: Theoretical, Practical and Aes thetic Reason in Kant and his Romantic Successors.”
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tion is made possible by the fact that the imagination is already necessarily active, as
Kant argues, on both sides of this divide.129
The schema does not just arise as some unexplainable power of the mind. Rather
it arises as the necessary mediation of two functions of the mind that are bound together
by the imagination:130 namely, the imagination, which is active on both sides and which
yields the schema to bridge the internal divide is purposively productive for the sake of
the mind in general (and therein for the sake of the understanding). This, then, explains
further the “hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can …
lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty.” 131 I, like Samantha Matherne, take myself to have shown that this often quoted passage from Kant cannot be taken to say that it
is some mystical and unsolvable riddle, rather it is a productive power of synthesis that is
at the structural core of reason in general. It is the creative yet lawful structure of the
mind as concerns the spontaneity of cognition. We can show it “unveiled before our
eyes” though with “great difficulty” precisely because “unveiling” involves determining
according to the concepts of the understanding and as we have already discussed, it is
precisely the nature of this purposive relation of the imagination and the understanding,
which necessitates that not all that is properly given as determinable matter (pure or empirical) by the imagination for the understanding can be unified therein by an adequate
determinate concept (i.e. become a cognition), and so we take up indeterminate concepts
129

By way of providing an example of this mediating work, Kant notes that the schemata of a triangle, “…
can never exist anywhere except in thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with
regard to pure shapes in space. Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical concept, rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule
for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain general concept” (A141/B180).
130 A138/B177
131 A141/B181
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(which results in an idea). The idea here is of this fundamental productive power of the
mind “as an art”.132
§8) Third-layer Significance:
Empirical Intuitions & the Empirical Synthesis of the Imagination
“We can say only this much: the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination [das Bild ist ein Produkt des empirischen Vermögens der produktiven Einbildungskraft], the schema of sensible concepts (such as figures in
space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a priori imagination [der
reinen Einbildungskraft a priori], through which and in accordance with which the
images first become possible, but which must be connected with the concept, to
which they are in themselves never fully congruent, always only by means of the
schema that they designate” –A141-2/B181

On the other side of the divide from the first-layer significance of the imagination
and mediated by the second-layer (a priori, or figurative synthesis), is this third-layer
132

Beyond this fundamental formative role that it plays in the function of the understanding, the imagina tion also serves a practical end (that of developing the power of judgment in individuals) via an aesthetic
function. So, Kant says that “…the power of judgment is a special talent that cannot be taught but only
practiced” (A133/B172) and moreover that practice involves self-development of that faculty through such
things as more dynamic examples: “A physician therefore, a judge, or a statesman, can have many fine
pathological, juridicial, or political rules in his head, of which he can even be a thorough teacher, and yet
easily stumble in their application, either because he is lacking in natural power of judgment (though not in
understanding), and to be sure understands the universal in abstracto but cannot distinguish whether a case
in concreto belongs under it, or also because he has not received adequate training for the judgment through
examples and actual business. This is also the sole and great utility of examples: that they sharpen the power of judgment” (A134/B173). So, examples, which includes analogies, metaphors, narratives, literary stories, poetry, and in general any work of fine art that has this potential for “training the power of judgment”,
are synthesized/yielded by the empirical productive imagination for the sake of greater cognition. These
examples, thereby contribute to a more adequate power of judgment and to that degree the imagination
serves to expand the power of judgment. But that is a kind of practical, cognitive role.
David Wellbery and Terry Pinkard have provided helpful examples of ways in which Goethe’s prose and
poetry have served precisely this function. Speaking of the significance of Goethe’s The Passions of Young
Werther for the pervasive mentality in “Germany” just prior to the publication of Kant’s first Critique,
Pinkard says, “Werther thus played the almost unprecedented role of actually inducing or at least bringing
to a full awareness a duality of consciousness on the part of its readership, an awareness that they were this
character and yet, by virtue of reading about him, were also not this character”, thereby providing the kind
of standpoint needed for critical reflection on “feeling and sensibility” (German Philosophy, p. 13). For a
thorough and enriching handling of Goethe’s poetic work in this regard (concerning Harzreise im Winter),
see Chapter 9 of Wellbery’s The Specular Moment. Of course, Hegel’s aesthetic lectures emphasize precisely this practical role of art and reason as one of the two “layers” on which his lectures are speaking. A notion of Bildung, like that discussed by Kristin Gjesdal in her chapter “Bildung”, is operative in Hegel on
this first layer. The other layer, as we will see in Chapter Four, is the structure of reason, and that is the
“layer” to which this book restricts itself (both in Kant and in Hegel) for reasons of space and focus. The
two layers are of course intimately bound and should not be maintained as independent of each other. For a
handling of the Imagination that bridges these layers, see Michael Forster, “Imagination and
Interpretation;” and Allen Speight, “Art, Imagination and the Interpretation of the Age.”
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significance: the empirical synthesis of the imagination.133 Kant’s identification of empirical intuition with the empirical work of the imagination is relatively stable from the KrV
to the KU. In the KrV, Kant says “Imagination is the faculty for representing an object
even without its presence in intuition.”134 Likewise, in the KU he says, the imagination
is the “the faculty of intuitions or presentation,”135 and again, we find the “common apprehension of an object by the imagination, as a faculty of intuition.”136 The empirical
faculty of the productive imagination yields intuitions (e.g. the intuition of my house) as
derived from an empirically given object (via the senses), while the a priori imagination
is the condition on which the intuition of a sensibly given is possible because it represents
not the given itself, but the ground by which a concrete intuition can stand in relation to
the understanding. As such, the third function is dependent on the second and the second
on the first (though not in a linear way). I spend the least time discussing this empirical
function because it is the most discussed in scholarship and while there are a host of important debates to take up, for my purposes all I need is to show that the imagination is
involved in yielding empirical intuitions.
There is much that should be said of this empirical work of the imagination, such
as whether the synopsis of sense is a part of it or some raw sensible given, in which case
it is nothing for the mind until taken up by the empirical imagination and synthesize, but
all such considerations would merely distract from my core argument and are not essen-

133

A141-2/B181; C.f. B207. For more on this, see Clinton Tolley, “Kant on the Role of the Imagination
(and Images) in the Transition from Intuition to Experience.”
134 B151
135 KU 5:287
136 KU 5:292
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tial to it. Since, for my purposes, I merely need to note that there is such a third-layer
function, I will not take up those secondary debates. My reader need only recognize that
Kant employs the imagination as the productive power of the mind in a three-layered, but
thoroughly consonant manner, qua productive power of synthesis.
§9) Conclusion
It will now perhaps be helpful to draw our account of the three-fold significance
of the imagination more closely together. First, the first-layer imagination, which is the
purely non-sensible productive power of the mind whereby conditions are “given” as
pure conceptual representations through transcendental reflection. This productive source
of the mind is grounded in the synthetic unity of apperception as the productive source
that is unified in relation to the unity of apperception. These pure representations (i.e. the
categories, or the pure forms of space and time) of the intellectual synthesis are themselves formal features of cognition in general (understanding and sensibility) and cannot
themselves be cognitions unless those pure representations are synthesized by a pure sensible schema/schematism and then unified with an empirical intuition in judgment.137 But
in that case, it is no longer the condition, but merely a pure sensible intuition of the conditions that becomes cognition. Second, the second-layer significance, wherein the figurative synthesis of the imagination yields pure schemas, such as the “pure schema of
magnitude” (i.e. the concept of number), 138 are all products of the “a priori imagination”
and dependent on the first-layer synthesis which “concern the determination of inner

137

See Kant’s helpful discussion of the matter in the A-deduction to “On the ground of the distinction of all
objects in general into phenomena and noumena” (A250).
138 A142/B182
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sense in general, in accordance with conditions for its form (time) in regard to all representations, insofar as these are to be connected together a priori in one concept in accord
with the unity of apperception.”139 There can be no function of the imagination in whatever context that is not conditioned by its own transcendentally necessitated form. The
pure form of time, as a formal condition of intuitions, arises for the possibility of pure
and empirical intuitions, via the first-layer, pure synthesis. 140 In its second-layer significance, the imagination yields the schemata, e.g. for the concept of number, “Thus number
is nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general, because I generate time itself in the apprehension of the intuition.”141
So, for example, the analogies of experience are “a priori principles of the understanding” but nevertheless find their proof142 through the “transcendental products of the
imagination,” this second-layer figurative synthesis, namely the pure intuitions that serve
as the schema. As such, for example, we find the proof for substance, causality, and
139 A142/181,

C.f. Pollok, 2017, p. 235.
A142-5/B182-4; “Reality is in the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general
corresponds, that, therefore, the concept of which in itself indicates a being (in time). Negation is the concept of which represents a non-being (in time). The opposition of the two thus takes place in the distinction
of one and the same time as either a filled or an empty time. Since time is only the form of intuition, thus of
objects as appearances, that which corresponds to the sensation in these is the transcendental matter of all
objects, as things in themselves…” (A143/B182). “The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in
time, i.e., the representation of the real as a substratum of empirical time-determination in general, which
therefore endures while everything else changes” (A144/B183). “To time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable and lasting, there corresponds in appearance that which is unchangeable in existence, i.e., substance, and in it alone can the succession and simultaneity of appearances be determined in regard to time.)
…The schema of the cause and of the causality of a thing in general is the real upon which, whenever it is
posited, something else always follows. It therefore consists in the succession of the manifold insofar as it
is subject to a rule”…“The schema of community (reciprocity)…is the simultaneity of the determinations
of the one with those of the other, in accordance with a general rule” (A144/B183-4). “The schema of possibility is the agreement of the synthesis of various representations with the conditions of time in general…
thus the determination of the representation of a thing to some time…. The schema of actuality is the existence at a determinate time…. The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all times…. Now one
sees from all this that the schema of each category contains and makes representable: …magnitude…the
schema of quality…the schema of relation…the schema of modality” (A143-5/B182-4).
141 A142-3/B182
142 A148/B188
140
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community worked out through the pure inner intuition of time.143 Likewise, each of the
principles of the understanding ultimately depends, for its “proof,” on the schema and the
“schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination.”144 To be clear, this means
that more determinate judgments like those that form the fundamental rules in mathematics are dependent on this second-layer significance of the imagination.145 Or, as Kant puts
it:
On this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, in the generation of
shapes, is grounded the mathematics of extension (geometry) with its axioms,
which express the conditions of sensible intuition a priori, under which alone the
schema of a pure concept of outer appearance can come about, e.g., between two
points only one straight line is possible; two straight lines do not enclose a
space….146

Since, “I cannot represent to myself any line, no matter how small it may be,
without drawing it in thought” and “it is exactly the same with even the smallest time. I
think therein only the successive progress from one moment to another.”147 Likewise,
though maybe slightly less self-evident, the most basic judgments, principles, and rules in
143 A177/B218-20
144

A140/B179; Of course, they depend on the understanding via the schematism, but the schematism de pends (as Kant shows) on the schema, and it is this ultimately central role of the imagination that is so often
left un-noted (A138-42/B177-81).
145 This grounding is not the source of their validity (which comes, rather, from the understanding). Instead,
the grounding that mathematics receives from the imagination is via its pure transcendental products, namely as the possibility of mathematical judgments whatsoever. It is important to remember that this in no way
suggests that mathematics depends on experience for its objective validity. Nothing here, if considered fairly, can be construed to mean that.
146 A163/B204
147 A162-3/B203; Geometry is only possible because of this work of the productive imagination, and ac cording to the successive limiting of such a representation according to rules of the understanding which
gives rise to the principles of geometry. This in no way suggests that mathematical or geometrical validity
depends on empirical intuitions or experience. See also, Terry Pinkard on “pure intuitions” in German Philosophy 1760-1860 (pp. 23-5). We also need to be careful, however, not to think that because mathematics
and geometry (among other realms of judgments) require pure intuitions for their possibility, that somehow
“intuitive knowledge” is thereby at work. Pure intuitions are necessary as the transcendental matter of a
judgment, but this is still merely a component in discursive knowledge made possible by the concepts of
the understanding. “Intuitive knowledge” is not necessarily bound up with the presence of a pure intuition,
and so would be a false inference.
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mathematics arise from precisely this same function of the a priori imagination which
yields as determinable a pure intuition (e.g. numerical sequence and various a priori relations pertaining thereto), which is thereby determined by the understanding. This can be
seen as well in Kant’s attribution of the magnitude of “number” in algebraic formulas to
the imagination in the Doctrine of Method.148 Fundamentally, the imagination is the productive source or ground of (qua making possible for thought) the entire schema and
thereby the entire faculty of judgment in theoretical reason and all sciences that arise
therefrom. It does this, we must remember, in a co-prior way with the unity of apperception, and together give rise to the dualism of cognition: the understanding and sensibility.
In short, the imagination grounds all synthetic a priori validity of judgments in a threefold way, then, as that productive source by which they are first possible.149
So, in its first-layer significance, the imagination as that productive power of intellectual synthesis by which the categories are first given as pure representations stands
in necessary conformity to the transcendental unity of apperception and this is what is
thereafter called the “pure understanding.”150 In its second-layer significance, the figurative synthesis of the imagination provides the schema and through this contributes to the
schematism of the understanding which serves as the mediating ground between the pure
understanding and the empirical intuitions/objects of experience. In its third-layer significance, the empirical synthesis of the imagination yields empirical intuitions (i.e. manifold

148 A717/B745
149

This is so because the schema is nothing but the “transcendental product of the imagination,” while the
understanding grounds all judgments by determining objective validity within the “network” of its own
laws.
150 A119, B151
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unities of experience) which are then unified with the concepts of the understanding
through judgment according to the schematism of the understanding.151
In short, we have (as concerns cognition) a three-fold significance of the imagination as the productive power of synthesis.152 So, we find in the first Critique that the
imagination is everywhere shown to be an essential core of the structure of the mind.
Which is why Kant calls it an “original source” of the mind. 153
For the sake of a summary (though agreement is not needed for the argument),
we can see that the postulated conditions are that whereby the imagination is a single
productive source of the mind for synthesizing representations (pure and sensible) and
conditioning the threefold significance of the imagination are the four pure forms of all
such productivity of the mind. Namely, that the imagination (i) purposively yields an (ii)
internally or externally (iii) determinable given (X) in accordance with (iv) the pure sensible forms of space and time. These four forms are the conditional qualities of the imagination itself as the productive power of synthesis, which, together with the transcenden151

We now have the tools to reread that familiar passage in which Kant relates these functions the imagina tion through a discussion of its a priori work, “From this it is clear that the schematism of the understanding through the transcendental synthesis of imagination comes down to nothing other than the unity of all
the manifold of intuition in inner sense, and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception, as the function that
corresponds to inner sense (to a receptivity). Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are
the true and sole condition for providing them with a relation to objects, thus with significance, and hence
the categories are in the end of none but a possible empirical use…to make [appearances] fit for a thoroughgoing connection in one experience” (A145-6/B184-5).
None of this weighs in one way or the other on the question about the manner in which the rule of synthesis
arises in relation to the manifold. For a compelling line of thought on the matter, but to which my account
is not bound, see Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge (pp. 115-21); as well as Hannah
Ginsborg, The Normativity of Nature (pp. 150-4). C.f. de Boer, 2016, pp. 452-3, 458-60.
152 In “Kant’s Theory of Imagination”, Samantha Matherne simply speaks of two functions of the imagina tion: “transcendental” and “empirical”. But in “transcendental” she combines both of the first two functions
(namely the transcendental and a priori) and that combination is fine, so long as we maintain the fullness of
that “transcendental” activity (as it seems to me that she does) (p. 5). Moreover, as Haag notes, it isn’t always clear where the transcendental function leaves off and the a priori function picks up, since “Alle
Wirkungsweisen erweisen sich aber als Wirkungsweisen ein und desselben grundlegenden Vermögens der
Einbildungskraft” (Erfahrung, und Gegenstand, p. 257).
153 A94/B127
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tal unity of apperception, forms the lawful source of the understanding and sensibility as
the foundations of cognition made lawful by the synthetic unity of apperception.
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CHAPTER 3

FREE LAWFULNESS OF THE IMAGINATION:
THE SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLE A PRIORI

!108

“If one draws the conclusion … it turns out that everything flows from the concept of
[aesthetic judgments of the beautiful] as a faculty for judging an object in relation to the free lawfulness of the imagination” 1 and “the principle of [aesthetic judgments of the beautiful] is the subjective principle of the power of judgment in general.”2

§1) Introduction
In sharp relief from the norm in contemporary Kant scholarship, Ernst Cassirer
wrote that far from diverging from the critical path of the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV),
the Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU) displays “the creative power of youth united
with the ripeness and consummation of age. [It] builds upward and outward at the same
time…to the more and more precise architectonic ordering of the intellectual material already assimilated.”3 It is safe to say that this view of what the KU displays is not a widely-shared sentiment. As Rachel Zuckert observes, the KU “remains the least studied
among Kant’s critical works. Unlike Kant’s other Critiques, this work has often been
treated by scholars not as a unified work nor as central to Kant’s critical project, but
rather piecemeal, as an aesthetics or philosophy of biology or a discussion of empirical
knowledge.”4 The central problem standing in the way of a coherent account of the KU
and its place in the whole critical system concerns, as several scholars have argued, our
understanding of the a priori principle of purposiveness. In Henry Allison’s words, this
principle alone is “the condition under which” reflecting judgment is “capable of a critique in the first place.”5
1

KU 5:240

2

KU 5:286

3

Cassirer, 1983, p. 271.

4

Zuckert, 2007, p. 3.

5 Allison,

2001, p. 13.
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However, Allison, like most scholars, never develops an account of the principle
of purposiveness of reflecting judgment in general, despite stating its significance in a
couple of places. Instead, he employs the specified principles of subjective purposiveness and objective purposiveness without addressing the widespread misuse of these or
how his interpretation conceives of the unity of reflecting judgment under one synthetic
principle a priori. As a result, Allison does not see how, for example, pure aesthetic
judgments of the sublime can be unified under the supreme principle of purposiveness
(i.e. under account of reflecting judgment): “anything approaching an adequate integration of the theory of the sublime into the Critique of Judgment would have required,
among other things, an extensive revision of Kant’s conceptions of a purely aesthetic
judgment, reflection, and purposiveness.” 6 Allison is not unique here, I cite him, chiefly
because his view is actually closer to mine than many, but even he stops short of the necessary, fundamental account of the supreme principle of purposiveness.
In this chapter, I will argue that Kant’s notion of the “free lawfulness of the imagination” is the best way to understand the supreme, synthetic a priori principle of purpo-

6

Ibid, 307
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siveness that makes reflecting judgment in general lawful and so worthy of a Critique.7
To begin, we should bring into view the fundamental structure of the KU as the critique
of the possibility of synthetic a priori reflecting judgments (both aesthetic and teleological).
§2 The Architectonic of the Third Critique
Like Cassirer, I see the Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU) as one of the
most elaborate and careful architectonics of system philosophy. Since the disjointed view
of the KU is so pervasive, however, (and rarely articulated as sharply and influentially as
it was by Paul Guyer beginning in the 1970s), 8 I should take a moment to lay out the
structure of reflecting judgment as I see it in the KU.
The following six points are intended to identify the core of the synthetic a priori
structure of reflecting judgments according to the a priori principle that makes them possible: the principle of purposiveness.
7

My account fits within and affirms the tradition of Kantian interpretation in which the lawfulness of
judgments is primary. To this end, I agree with Cassirer, Allison, Longuenesse, and Pollok. However, in
looking more closely at this general principle of purposiveness as free lawfulness, I reject the internal separations of the KU that have become so common even among those giving a “unified account”.
So, my argument can be situated as embracing Pollok’s general account, while cautioning against his account of reflecting judgment. Specifically, my account stands in sharp contrast to Pollok’s in three regards:
First, he refashions the “bridge” that Kant describes in the introduction to the KU from purposiveness and
reflecting judgment to “lawfulness” (pp. 306-7); second, he suggests that teleological judgments would be
more appropriately included in the metaphysics of morals or nature (p. 278); third, he reduces aesthetic
judgments to subjective “celebration” and “pleasure” in the “aptitude of our mind” (p. 113). I believe that
my account of the general principle of purposiveness as what Kant calls free lawfulness, is imbedded in the
broader interpretive frameworks of Longuenesse and Pollok, but also, deviates substantially from them by
defending that Kant was precisely right to see the need for a bridge between the sensible and supersensible,
and the principle of the “free lawfulness of the imagination” is the ground of this bridge (5:240), such that
teleological judgments cannot be resituated under the domain of theoretical cognition.
8

Guyer argues that Kant makes a grave mistake “in interpreting his [own] doctrine of formalism” (1977, p.
57), and there are numerous errors in the KU that result from Kant’s failure to make a “serious attempt to
provide criteria for aesthetic form;” a failure that is the product of "simply importing” the transcendental
doctrine of the “a priority of geometrical knowledge" to aesthetic judgments (Guyer, 1977, pp. 60; C.f.
1992, p. 318). Guyer also sees the inclusion of teleological judgments as incongruous with his account of
aesthetic judgments under one and the same synthetic a priori principle of reflecting judgment, and so
should have been excluded from the KU.
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1. The Power of Judgment in General
In the second introduction to the KU, Kant uses the term “power of judgment in
general” to identify both (i) determining judgments of the understanding as given in the
KrV, and (ii) the reflecting power of judgment, which is the subject of the KU. To this
end, he says:
The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as
contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is
given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it (even
when, as a transcendental power of judgment, it provides the conditions a priori
in accordance with which alone anything can be subsumed under that universal),
is determining. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal
is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely reflecting. 9

This difference between determining and reflecting judgment is a fundamental
difference in judgment form. In determining judgments of the understanding, the second
and third-layer functions of the imagination are determined by the lawfulness of the faculty of the understanding. In its second and third-layer significances, the imagination is
there “in the service of” the understanding. By contrast, in reflecting judgments, practical
reason and “the understanding [are] in the service of the imagination and not vice
versa” [wobei der Verstand der Einbildungskraft, und nicht diese jenem zu Diensten ist].10
2. The Two Synthetic A Priori Principles of The Power of Judgment in General
Grounding these two kinds of synthetic a priori judgments are the two synthetic a
priori principles by which “the power of judgment [is] an a priori legislative faculty.”11
9

KU 5:179

10

KU 5:242; as we will see in the next two chapters, aesthetic judgments of the beautiful have a structure
that is properly described as, in Kant’s words, the “understanding in the service of the imagination,” in
judgments of the sublime it is reason, and in teleological judgments, it is both the understanding and reason. We will see what this “in the service of” formally identifies.
11

5:179
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The synthetic a priori principle of determining judgments of the understanding is (i) the
“synthetic unity of apperception.”12 The synthetic a priori principle of reflecting judgment is (ii) the “principle of purposiveness.” 13
3. Subjective and Objective Division of the Power of Judgment in General
According with this twofold division of the “power of judgment in general,” Kant
terms the synthetic, a priori determining judgments of the understanding from the KrV
“objective judgments,” since they determine intuitions of objects of nature for cognition.
By contrast, synthetic a priori reflecting judgments (which includes aesthetic judgments
and teleological judgments) are “subjective” since “by means of [the a priori principle of
purposiveness] it prescribes a law, not to nature (as autonomy), but to itself (as heautonomy) for reflection on nature, which one could call the law of the specification of nature.”14 So, the KrV gave a critique of the objective power of judgment (i.e. judgments of
cognition), while the KU is a critique of the subjective power of judgment (i.e. reflecting
judgments).
4. Two Kinds of Synthetic A priori Reflecting Judgment: Teleological and Aesthetic
Synthetic A priori Reflecting Judgments are of two kinds: Teleological and Aesthetic. Both are subjective in that the legislation is derived from a subjective principle of

12 As

I argue in Chapter 2, this supreme principle of cognition is characterizable as a fundamentally productive lawfulness.
13 As

I will argue in this chapter, this supreme principle of reflecting judgment is characterizable as a fundamentally free (productive) lawfulness.
14

5:185
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purposiveness that grounds the legislation not of nature or of freedom, but of the judging
subject.15
(4.1) Concerning synthetic a priori teleological judgments: Although, “legislation
through concepts of nature takes place through the understanding, and is theoretical,”16
and although the synthetic a priori teleological judgments proceed according to “a concept of a purposiveness of nature,” 17 nevertheless, “the power of judgment’s concept of a
purposiveness of nature still belongs among the concepts of nature, but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of cognition.”18 This is a source of much confusion, but it
need not be. While it can appear that teleological judgments belong in the KrV, such a
view involves a fundamental misconception of the object of the legislation.19 In determining judgments of the understanding the object of legislation is nature for the sake of cognition. In teleological judgments, the object of legislation is not nature, but the judging
subject.20
The lawfulness of teleological judgments are still derived from the subjective,
synthetic a priori principle of the power of reflecting judgment, but their result is an idea
(namely the idea of a natural end) that is regulative in the theoretical domain of nature

15

KU 5:185

16

KU 5:174

17

KU 5:196

18

KU 5:197

19

KU 5:360-1

20

We will return to this in Chapter 5. For now, suffice it to say: the concept of a purposiveness of nature is
a principle or maxim given to the judging subject (by reflecting judgment) for the sake of advancing cognition, but the idea of a purposiveness of nature can never determine nature (which would be constitutive),
and thus is merely regulative, i.e. a valid source of lawfulness for the judging subject.
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(i.e. judgments of cognition).21 To this end, Kant says, “what is represented is not merely
a purposiveness of nature in the form of the thing, but this product of it is represented as
a natural end. – Although our concept of a subjective purposiveness of nature in its
forms, in accordance with empirical laws, is not a concept of the object at all, but only a
principle of the power of judgment for providing concepts in the face of this excessive
multiplicity in nature (in order to be able to be oriented in it), we nevertheless hereby ascribe to it as it were a regard to our faculty of cognition.”22 As such, its synthetic a priori
principle is not the synthetic unity of apperception which grounds determining judgments
of the understanding but is rather the principle of purposiveness. That is, Kant is not tacking on an account of teleology when it should have been included in the KrV.23 The Critique of reflecting judgment is the proper place for teleological judgments,24 as we will
see more further on.
(4.2) Concerning synthetic a priori aesthetic judgments: Although both
teleological judgments and aesthetic judgments are subjective in their a priori legislation,
aesthetic judgments are further subjective in another sense: namely, where teleological

21

KU 5:197; “an extravagance for our theoretical faculty of cognition, but not thereby useless or dispensable, but which rather serve as regulative principles: partly in order to restrain the worrisome pretensions of
the understanding, as if (in virtue of being able to furnish a priori the conditions of the possibility of all
things that it can cognize) it has thereby also confined the possibility of all things in general within these
boundaries, and partly in order to guide itself in the contemplation of nature in accordance with a principle
of a completeness to which it can never attain, and thereby to further the final aim of all cognition” (5:1678)
22

KU 5:193

23

KU 5:360-1,

24

KU 20:251
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judgments legislate for the subject, they nevertheless take, as the form of the judgment,25
a concept of an “objective purposiveness,”26 i.e. a “natural end.”27 By contrast, aesthetic
judgments not only legislate subjectively but also take as the form of the judgment a
“concept of formal (merely subjective) purposiveness.”28 Where teleological judgments
still apprehend objects and laws of nature in their reflective effort to yield some unifying
form, by contrast, synthetic a priori aesthetic judgments necessitate that the subject “apprehends [the object’s] form,”29 the apprehension is not of the object, or properties of the
object, but “merely” “the form of the object.”30
5. The Synthetic A Priori Principle of Purposiveness
There is a widespread assumption the synthetic a priori principle of reflecting
judgments in general is the principle/concept of the purposiveness of nature given for
teleological judgments. This view has no basis in the text. Kant is quite clear on the matter. The following three subsections (5.1, 5.2, and 5.3) identify three of the key moments
in the text that make this clear.

25

Where “form,” in this sense, just means the unifying term or concept for a given manifold representation
as the “matter” of the judgment: “in every judgment, subject and predicate constitute matter, and the relation of both the form”, whereby, “matter is the determinable – form the determination” (29:847). Of course,
form as the determination is not thereby necessarily a determinate concept according to some determining
judgment, “determination” can also be an “indeterminate concept” as the resolution of the antinomy of taste
states (KU 5:340-1), or an “idea of reason” as shown in the judgments of the sublime and teleological
judgments.
26

KU 5:197

27

Ibid.

28

KU 5:197; the two kinds of synthetic a priori aesthetic judgments are (i) judgments of the beautiful, and
(ii) judgments of the sublime. On my reading there is also a third kind of synthetic a priori aesthetic judgment: a judgment of fine art according to aesthetic ideas; I will return to it in Chapter 5.
29

KU 5:190

30

Ibid.
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(5.1) In point (1) above, we saw that the “power of judgment in general” is
Kant’s term for both determining and reflecting judgments, where the former is objective
and the latter is subjective in its legislation (i.e. heautonomy).31 in the first, spontaneity in
the second). That is, the synthetic a priori principle of determining judgments of the understanding is the synthetic unity of apperception, which grounds the objective validity of
judgments of cognition of nature. The synthetic a priori principle of reflecting judgments
is the principle of purposiveness, which grounds the subjective validity of aesthetic and
teleological judgments. In short, the objective principle of the power of judgment in general was the subject of the KrV, while the subjective principle of the power of judgment is
that which makes the critique of reflecting judgment possible. So what exactly is this subjective principle of the power of judgment in general?
The conclusion of Section 35 of the Deduction of Aesthetic Judgments answers
precisely this question. Namely, “The principle of [aesthetic judgments of the beautiful]32
is the subjective principle of the power of judgment in general.”33 That is, the subjective principle of purposiveness grounding aesthetic judgments of the beautiful is the principle of all reflecting judgments, since the “subjective principle of the power of judgment
in general” is that which demarcates reflecting judgment from determining judgment of

31

20:225, 5:185-6, For more on heautonomy as a form of autonomy in reflecting judgments, see Pollok,
2017, pp. 279-85.
!32 The word here is taste, but I have replaced taste with “aesthetic judgments of the beautiful” for clarity as
we trace out the validity of these judgments. This is an accurate substitute because, “purposiveness of form
in appearance is beauty, and the faculty for judging it is taste” (KU 20:249), and again, taste is “the faculty
for judging the beautiful” (KU 20:250). Thereby, to speak of the exercise of the faculty of taste is to speak
of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful, and to speak of the principle of that faculty is to speak of the fundamental principle of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful. C.f. KU 5:211.
33

my bold, KU 5:286
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the understanding, which are possible through the synthetic unity of apperception, i.e. the
“objective” principle of the power of judgment in general. But since this conclusion of
section 35 is often (though problematically) ignored, consider further:
(5.2) In the second introduction to the KU, Kant notes that the principle of the
purposiveness of nature is “occasioned” by the subjective principle:
The power of judgment’s concept of a purposiveness of nature still belongs
among the concepts of nature, but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of
cognition, although the aesthetic judgment on certain objects (of nature or of art)
that occasions it is a constitutive principle with regard to the feeling of pleasure
or displeasure. The spontaneity in the play of the faculties of cognition, the
agreement of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes that concept
suitable for mediating the connection of the domain of the concept of nature with
the concept of freedom in its consequences.34

The principle of a purposiveness of nature is only a specification of the subjective principle of purposiveness when the judging subject judges nature according to that principle.
Put differently, reflecting judgment (and its synthetic a priori principle of the subjective
purposiveness of judgments of the beautiful) “gives itself” the transcendental “principle
[of purposiveness] as a law;” as a “maxim” for judging nature. The status here is analogous to the difference between the Moral Law as the supreme principle of practical reason and the derived a priori principles and maxims as the specifications of that supreme
synthetic, a priori principle.
In reflecting judgments, this supreme subjective principle of purposiveness is given to itself “as a law” or “maxim,” a “regulative idea” for judging objections of nature
according to its own supreme principle of purposiveness. “The reflecting power of judgment, therefore, can only give itself such a transcendental principle [i.e. its own synthetic

34

KU 5:197
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a priori principle of purposiveness] as a law, and cannot derive it from anywhere else (for
then it would be the determining power of judgment), nor can it prescribe it to nature: for
reflection on the laws of nature is directed by nature, and nature is not directed by the
conditions in terms of which we attempt to develop a concept of it that is in this regard
entirely contingent.”35 That is, the very synthetic a priori principle that makes the third
critique possible is given by the reflecting judgment itself as a maxim or law in the judging of nature. This procedure “represents the unique way in which we must proceed in
reflection on the objects of nature with the aim of a thoroughly interconnected experience”36 The objective purposiveness of nature is thereby a specification of the supreme
principle of purposiveness. And the principle of [aesthetic judgments of the beautiful] is
the subjective principle of the power of judgment in general.”37
(5.3) The fact that Kant speaks of the concept of a purposiveness of nature as arising for reflection on nature and as a concept that reflecting judgment “gives itself,” necessarily designates this concept as a subsidiary principle,38 a specification of purposiveness for judging nature. This status of being given to itself necessarily disqualifies it as
the supreme synthetic principle a priori that makes such reflecting judgments lawful).
Further, if it were a supreme synthetic principle a priori, then a deduction of teleological
judgments would be necessary.

35

KU 5:180

36

KU 5:184

37

my bold, KU 5:286

38

The distinction here is precisely the same as that between the Moral Law and derivative synthetic a priori
principles, specifications, or maxims of that supreme principle.
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It should not go without notice that the only deduction in the KU is the deduction
of aesthetic judgments which stand under the subjective principle of purposiveness. This
does not mean that the other kinds of judgments (of the sublime or teleology) are not
valid synthetic a priori judgments; but, for different reasons, they do not have a separate
synthetic a priori principle. Instead, they are grounded in the synthetic a priori principle
of reflecting judgment which is “the principle of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful.”39
The only synthetic a priori principle of reflecting judgment is thereby further flagged by
the only deduction in the third Critique.
Those who think that the teleological judgments do not take the subjective principle of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful need to give a deduction for teleological judgments. Kant does not give a deduction for either teleological judgment or judgments of
the sublime, because the analytic of each is at “same time their deduction.” 40 How can
the analytic also be their deduction?
The analytic of a judgment can only be “at the same time” its deduction if what is
revealed in the “exposition” of each judgment is the already provided synthetic a priori
principle of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful. Explaining how the analytic could serve
as the deduction of those judgments, Kant says: “for when we analyzed the reflection of
the power of judgment in these, we found in them a purposive relation of the cognitive
faculties,”41 that is, we found in them precisely the free lawful form already grounded in
39

KU 5:286

40

KU 5:280

41

KU 5:280, while this passage is given in the account of the sublime, it is not particular to the sublime.
That is, Kant is here talking about the validity with which an analytic of a judgment can at the same time
serve as its deduction.
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the synthetic principle a priori of purposiveness of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful.
This “purposive relation of the cognitive faculties” just is that lawful source by which
each kind of reflecting judgment can lay claim to synthetic a priori, universal, subjective
validity.
6. The Synthetic A Priori Principle of Purposiveness of Aesthetic Judgments of the Beautiful
At the end of the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant calls this synthetic a priori principle of purposiveness, by which the cognitive faculties stand in a free lawful relation of
purposiveness, the “free lawfulness of the imagination.” It is this principle that picks out
the unique productive lawful form of reflecting judgment in which reason and the “understanding is in the service of the imagination and not vice versa.”42 As such the Analytic of
the Beautiful concludes:
If one draws the conclusion from the above analyses, it turns out that everything
flows from the concept of taste as a faculty for judging an object in relation to the
free lawfulness of the imagination. But if in the judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom, then it is in the first instance taken… as
productive and self-active (as the authoress of voluntary forms of possible intuitions)…Thus only a lawfulness without law and a subjective correspondence of
the imagination to the understanding without an objective one – where the representation is related to a determinate concept of an object – are consistent with the
free lawfulness of the understanding (which is also called purposiveness without
an end) and with the peculiarity of a judgment of taste.43

So, the “power of judgment in general” legislates a priori according to an objective principle a priori, namely, the synthetic unity of apperception, which governs determining judgments of the understanding, and according to a subjective principle a priori,
namely the principle of purposiveness or free lawfulness of the imagination for reflecting
42

KU 5:242

43
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judgments. Where the synthetic unity of apperception (as the objective principle) identifies a productive lawfulness whereby representations are determined by the schematized
understanding for the sake of cognition; the principle of purposiveness (as the subjective
principle) identifies a free productive lawfulness whereby representations are given which
require action on the part of reason and the understanding to supply adequate forms, i.e.
its sets in motion a play of the faculties whereby reason and the understanding are in the
service of the imagination. Here in the reflecting judgment, we find not only “schemata”
but also “symbols” as equally valid variations, where “the first of which [schemata] contain direct, the second [symbols] indirect presentations of the concept.” 44
Under the “free lawfulness” of reflecting judgment, we find the reverse relation of
productive lawfulness as that found in the objective power of judgment under the synthetic unity of apperception. Namely, where the first is determining, this is free of such determinations of the law and so reflecting. This is why Kant calls it a “lawfulness without
a law.”45
But now we want to know more about what precisely this free lawfulness of the
imagination is, its status, and how it serves as the synthetic principle a priori for each
kind of reflecting judgment. To this end, we need to draw, again on the threefold significance of the imagination. This chapter will focus on (§3) the first-layer significance of the
imagination, i.e. the free lawfulness of the imagination, or the “imagination in its freedom,”46 which concerns the synthetic principle a priori.
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The second-layer significance of the imagination, as we will see more later, is that
a priori productive synthesis by which it yields both schemata and symbols47 for the reflecting use of judgment, and stands in a principled relation of free play qua a faculty of
production (under the supreme principle). The third-layer significance is its empirical
synthesis of apprehension whereby it synthesizes representations of, for example, the
“mere form” of objects for aesthetic judgments of the beautiful or the “mere apprehension” of “purposive form” of empirical laws and objects in teleological judgments. 48
I will turn to the second and third-layer significances of the imagination in Chapters 4-5.49 Chapter 4 will do so through an account of the unique judgment forms of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and sublime, while Chapter 5 will do so through an account of the unique judgment forms of mixed aesthetic judgments of art through aesthetic
ideas and teleological judgments of a natural end. The division of content from Chapter 4
to Chapter 5 pertains to the specification of the supreme principle of purposiveness in
question.50 Namely, while both concern the subjective principle of purposiveness, Chap-

47

For an account of Cassirer and symbols and the distinction between “word-concept” and “artistic symbol-felt life,” see Anne Pollok, “Significant Formation: An Intersubjective Approach to Aesthetic Experience in Cassirer and Langer,” pp. 13-5. For an account of Gadamer on Kant and symbols, see Kristin Gjesdal, “Reading Kant Hermeneutically: Gadamer and the Critique of Judgment” pp. 362-8.
48
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One upshot of my account is that we are not justified in following Zuckert, Pollok, and Longuenesse and
the “standard practice” of using “aesthetic judgment” to refer to judgments of taste which are aesthetic
judgments of the beautiful (Zuckert, 2006, p. 599). My emphasis on free lawfulness will pave the way for a
return to the three kinds of aesthetic judgments that Kant discusses: (1) pure subjective aesthetic judgments
of the beautiful, (2) pure subjective aesthetic judgments of the sublime, and (3) mixed subjective and objective aesthetic judgments of art.
50

Where “specification” just identifies the derived law that reflecting judgment gives itself from its own
supreme principle for the sake of its own unique kinds of judgment: “The reflecting power of judgment,
therefore, can only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law, and cannot derive it from anywhere
else (for then it would be the determining power of judgment)” (KU 5:179-80).
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ter 4 looks to the further subjective application of that principle in judgment,51 whereas
Chapter 5 looks to the objective application of that principle in judgment.52
§3) First-layer Significance: The Free Lawfulness of the Imagination
By first-layer, as we have seen above and as I have shown in Chapter 2, I mean
that fundamental productive power of the mind conditioning all layers of its activity. It is
the same productive power of the mind, which, in the theoretical domain of reason forms
spontaneity: “reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which could start to act from itself,
without needing to be preceded by any other cause that in turn determines it to action according to the law of causal connection. It is especially noteworthy that it is this transcendental idea of freedom on which the practical concept of freedom is grounded.”53
This transcendental idea of spontaneity is the recognition of the necessary condition of all
lawful activity of reason; namely, that it depends on some fundamental productive power,
and this productive power stands in some relation to lawfulness.
Likewise, a first-layer account of this free productive power of the mind in the
practical domain is likewise of a causality that “could start to act from itself,” but now
this freedom is practically identical with itself as lawfulness: “Thus freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other,” 54 so autonomy of the will is “a

51

It is a “subjective application” because it is a judgment about the free lawful “state of mind” (a purposive
harmony of the faculties) of the judging subject.
52

It is an “objective application” because it is a judgment about the free lawful, unifying form (a form of
purposiveness) of object to the judging subject “as if” the form were a property of the object.
53 A533/B561
54
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causality in accordance with immutable laws,”55 which gives rise to the supreme synthetic principle a priori for practical reason, namely, the moral law.
This first-layer significance of the imagination (as a principle of freedom) shows
up, then in three distinct roles (as determined by its relation to a principle of lawfulness):
a) In the theoretical domain it was that productive power of the mind which yields a synthesis of “pure representations” (i.e. the categories) through what Kant called the “pure
intellectual synthesis.” b) In the practical domain, it is the “freedom of the will,” its productive power of practical synthesis, which is at the same time its determination according to its own law. c) In the reflecting domain, it is the “free lawfulness of the imagination,” which picks out a purposive relation between freedom and lawfulness grounding
all other layers of reflecting judgment.
So what precisely is meant by that first-layer free productive power of the mind
that stands in a purposive relation to lawfulness?
Fundamentally, “free lawfulness of the imagination” just is that principle of relation between the free productive power of the mind and lawfulness whereby a structure of
reason is grounded in which, wherever the law is given (whether by reason or the understanding) it is not identical with the productive power (which is autonomy) nor is it determining of the productive power (which is spontaneity), but is rather a purposive productive relation in which freedom and lawfulness of the mind are in a kind of productive
relation. It is this productive free lawful relation that will ground what Kant terms the free
play of the imagination and understanding. In aesthetic judgments of the beautiful, the
specified form of judgment made lawful is one in which: “the understanding is in the ser-
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vice of the imagination and not vice versa.” 56 This identical structure is repeated in the
aesthetic judgments of the sublime, with the difference that, there, it is practical reason,
not the understanding, with an idea of reason that is in the service of the imagination. In
such a subordinate role practical reason supplies the infinite of the (a) “mathematical”
and (b) “dynamical” sublime).57
The adequacy or inadequacy of the understanding, reason, or the imagination in
these judgments is not predetermined by this free lawfulness. That is, this purposive relation of freedom and lawfulness equally grounds judgments in which the understanding is
inadequate to the purposive play (e.g. judgments of the beautiful) and equally grounds
judgments in which the imagination is inadequate to the purposive play (e.g. judgments
of the sublime). In judgments of art and natural ends, the form of judgment that is
grounded is more complex since the purposive relation that is grounded is that of the reflecting judgment itself (whether of art or natural ends) in relation to either the theoretical
domain of cognition or to the practical domain of morality. The purposive relation in
these latter kinds of reflecting judgment are thus relations between reflecting judgment as
such and the other domains which have their own synthetic a priori principles. It is in this
latter manner that this supreme principle of free lawfulness or purposiveness serves to
bridge the domains of freedom (practical reason) and necessity (theoretical reason):
now if the understanding yields a priori laws of nature, reason on the contrary,
laws of freedom, then by analogy one would still expect that the power of judgment, which mediates the connection between the two faculties, would just like
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those, add its own special principles a priori and perhaps ground a special part of
philosophy, even though philosophy as a system can have only two parts.58

And this supreme principle of purposiveness provides the ground for the mediation of the
two domains in the following way:
That which presupposes this a priori and without regard to the practical, namely,
the power of judgment, provides the mediating concept between the concepts of
nature and the concept of freedom, which makes possible the transition from the
purely theoretical to the purely practical, from lawfulness in accordance with the
former to the final end in accordance with the latter, in the concept of a purposiveness of nature; for thereby is the possibility of the final end, which can become actual only in nature and in accord with its laws, cognized.59

Only with such a first-layer account of the free lawfulness of the imagination do
we see that what appeared at first as the “thorny question of the unity of the Critique of
Judgment” turns out to be a straightforwardly coherent structure of a free lawful relation
all the way down through each kind of reflecting judgment.60 To this end, I suggest the
58

KU, second introduction, 20:202; C.f. “…there remains among the properties of mind in general an intermediate faculty or receptivity, namely the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, just as there remains
among the higher faculties of cognition an intermediate one, the power of judgment. What is more natural
than to suspect that the latter will also contain a priori principles for the former?” (KU, First Introduction,
20:207-8).
59

The fuller passage is as follows: “The concept of freedom determines nothing in regard to the theoretical
cognition of nature; the concept of nature likewise determines nothing in regard to the practical laws of
freedom: and it is to this extent not possible to throw a bridge from one domain to the other….The effect in
accordance with the concept of freedom is the final end, which (or its appearance in the sensible world)
should exist, for which the condition of its possibility in nature (in the nature of the subject as a sensible
being, that is, as a human being) is presupposed. That which presupposes this a priori and without regard to
the practical, namely, the power of judgment, provides the mediating concept between the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom, which makes possible the transition from the purely theoretical to the
purely practical, from lawfulness in accordance with the former to the final end in accordance with the latter, in the concept of a purposiveness of nature; for thereby is the possibility of the final end, which can
become actual only in nature and in accord with its laws, cognized. Through the possibility of its a priori
laws for nature the understanding gives a proof that nature is cognized by us only as appearance, and hence
at the same time an indication of its supersensible substratum; but it leaves this entirely undetermined. The
power of judgment, through its a priori principle for judging nature in accordance with possible particular
laws for it, provides for its supersensible substratum (in us as well as outside us) determinability through
the intellectual faculty. But reason provides determination for the same substratum through its practical
law a priori; and thus the power of judgment makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept
of nature to that of the concept of freedom” (KU 5:195-6).
60 Allison,
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KU actually displays Kant’s thought at its height, in Cassirer’s words, through a “more
and more precise architectonic ordering of the intellectual material already assimilated”
in the preceding critical works.61 If we attempt an account of purposiveness whereby we
hope to explain the different kinds of reflecting judgments and their relations in a unified
critique but do not look first to the first-layer significance of the imagination, then we
will be forced to conclude, with excellent scholars like Henry Allison that, while it is
“possible and important” to give a unified account, we must forgo the task (as he did in
his book on the subject), because of the “great variety of the senses that Kant gave to the
notion of purposiveness and the difficulties involved in reconciling them with one another.”62
In short, the supreme principle of purposiveness as the free lawfulness of the
imagination is, as noted in the prelude chapter, fundamentally a principle of “systematic

61

These difficulties arise, however, by proceeding without an eye to the preceding step, like the kayaker
who wishes to work upstream, but puts in below a waterfall: she sees the possibility but finds the task
overwhelming. By contrast, putting in above the falls would have made instantly clear the two-fold causality (mechanical and practical) whereby the procedural unity in a single idea occurs. The difference set before us is that, instead of a looming waterfall that presents itself as the first objective, we have the task of
abstracting to the formal significances of the imagination, understanding, and reason in terms of first-layer
productive power of the mind, which conditions (along with lawfulness) the possibility of all “acts” of the
mind. Yet, when we perceive this level of abstraction looming before us, it appears deceptively easier to set
in below the “falls” rather than bothering to first climb above. Kant did not make that mistake (as my account argues), and contemporary scholarship needs to follow his lead to rectify the situation, which has
resulted in so many unnecessary difficulties.
For example, as a result of this failure to distinguish purposiveness as concerns the first-layer significance
of the imagination not only does Allison leave off a unified account of teleological judgment, but he problematically categorizes aesthetic judgments of art and judgments of the sublime under his repurposed use of
Kant’s term “parerga” (2001, p. 279), where Allison argues that these judgments are “extra-systematic” (p.
8). As my account will show, in chapter 4 and 5, all kinds of pure reflecting judgments (aesthetic and teleological) are systematically united under the principle of purposiveness as the free lawfulness of the imagination. And aesthetic ideas and natural ends, on my account, show themselves to preclude the problematic
dichotomy that results in what Allison terms the “Zweck-condition” and “Natur-condition” (p. 277). To this
end, my account contrasts with Allison’s conclusion that “anything approaching an adequate integration of
the theory of the sublime into the Critique of Judgment would have required, among other things, an extensive revision of Kant’s conceptions of a purely aesthetic judgment, reflection, and purposiveness” (2001,
307).
62 Allison,
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contingency,” it is the fundamental principle of the mind not merely for freedom or necessity, but for the free productive lawfulness as the unifying ground of the two. It is that
by which freedom and necessity can be lawfully held together in a purposive relation
characterizable as a principle of systematic contingency, as the principle of the free lawfulness of reason in general.
§4) Opposing Accounts of the Supreme Principle of Purposiveness
Far the optimism of my account (and that found in Cassirer's) representing the
norm, it would be more accurate to characterize the prevailing feeling toward the principle of purposiveness as one of unease as toward some Hydra rearing its ugly heads. Characterizing this norm in Kant scholarship, Rachel Zuckert writes that the principle of purposiveness is typically viewed as either the “least interesting” or “most easily criticized
claims.”63 We can agree that it is often taken as least interesting because it is supposedly
either an introduction of a problem that is unnecessary for the insights of the KU, insufficiently justified to warrant its supposed status, or unhelpful for aesthetic experience. Easily criticized, because, like the Hydra, it is a paradox of seemingly conflicting “heads” of
teleology, free play, etc. that are somehow supposed to be held under the same term, but
which can only find vacuous unity in a fictive notion. 64
Among the relatively few who take seriously this principle and give a rigorous
account of it, we find a significant divide. On the one hand are those who interpret the
supreme principle in the context of aesthetic judgments as pertaining in various respects
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Zuckert, 2006, p. 599.
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It seems to me that Paul Guyer falls into both camps at various points. See Guyer, 1977, pp. 53, 60. See
also, 1979, ch. 6.
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to the properties of the object.65 Along with Keren Gorodeisky,66 Zuckert’s account of
“whole formalism” is perhaps the strongest example of this,67 and Johannes Haag’s account of the principle of the purposiveness of nature takes up the principle in terms of
objective purposiveness. On my argument, these accounts conflate the supreme principle
(i.e. a first-layer account) with a specification, maxim, or “law” of that principle, which
serves as the form of specific kinds of judgments (i.e. a second-layer account).68 But to
conflate these, does indeed make a unified account of the critique a messy business since
it is on the ground of the former that the various kinds of reflecting judgment are worthy
of a critique. That is, it is the first-layer account that distinguishes the synthetic a priori
validity of the various kinds of reflecting judgment forms (of the beautiful, of the sublime, of art, and of natural ends).
Further, without this first-layer conception of the free lawfulness of the imagination, Kant’s claims that this principle bridges the domains of theoretical and practical rea-
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See Zuckert’s important clarification of the manner in which the object is reflectively judged “as if” the
form were a property of the object: 2007, pp. 3-4, 81-2.
66

Gorodeisky, 2011, p. 418. It seems to me that Gorodeisky’s account is somewhere between Zuckert’s and
Ginsborg’s.
67

Zuckert, 2006, p. 610. On my account, if we were to adopt something like Zuckert’s view as expressed in
this article of hers, it would need to be under the third kind of judgment: aesthetic judgments of art, which
Kant discusses briefly in terms of genius in the aesthetic deduction, but then our agreement or disagreement
with Zuckert would be on the level of an adequate aesthetic theory, not as concerns the transcendental principle of purposiveness and the subject of the KU.
Alternatively, but still broadly in this camp, see Johnson “Kant’s Unified Theory of Beauty”.
See also, Zuckert’s account of pleasure, 2002, pp. 241-3; which corresponds to her interpretation of purposiveness in the afore mentioned article. While I disagree with her account of pleasure, it is to my mind one
of the most helpful interpretations of pleasure in this interpretive camp.
68

Samantha Matherne has noted that the imagination is fundamental to all three domains theoretical, prac tical, and aesthetic: 2016, pp. 55-7. What Matherne means by the “basic” function of the imagination is its
“productive” capacity (see Kant’s discussion of the distinction between productive and reproductive imagination in the Anthropology 7:167). While that distinction was sufficient for Matherne, it is not sufficiently
nuanced for my purposes and is precisely the problematic conflation that I intend to address. That is, her
notion of “basic” spans both my first-layer and second-layer functions, though she typically has the secondlayer function in view.
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son would seem dubious indeed. This confusion is what leads to attempts at suggesting
that Kant’s references to the beautiful as a “symbol” of the morally good is somehow the
heart of what he has in mind by this “bridging” principle. But that, I suggest is to turn
everything on its head. The beautiful as a symbol of the morally good, however, is just
one of the connections between the domains of reason that are made a priori valid as a
result of the supreme principle of purposiveness, i.e. the free lawfulness of the imagination.
On the other hand are accounts that emphasize the purposiveness, not in terms of
objects, but predominately in terms of the lawfulness of judgments and specifically in
terms of purposiveness as the principle that makes reflecting judgments lawful. Here we
find Ernst Cassirer, 69 Henry Allison,70 Hannah Ginsborg,71 Robert Pippin,72 Béatrice
Longuenesse,73 and Konstantin Pollok.74 Among these, we have a further divide, with
Ginsborg on the one side emphasizing the principle of purposiveness as arising in a nontranscendental sense through what she calls “primitive normativity”. On the other side,
are a cluster of various accounts by Cassirer, Allison, Longuenesse, and Pollok of this
69

Cassirer, 1983, p. 334, 311. See also Pollok, “The ‘Transcendental Method.’”

70 Allison,

2001, pp. 32-3, 169. Of course, Allison’s account also includes “purposiveness of form” and
“form of purposiveness” (pp. 133-4), which pertain to the matter and form of the object, but these are distinctions between what I will call the second and third-layer functions of the imagination. Whereas the
principle of purposiveness that makes reflecting judgments lawful is on the first-layer as we will see. Allison’s account admits of such a distinction (p. 49).
71

Ginsborg, 2015, p. 53. Of course, Ginsborg’s approach is strikingly non-transcendental in orientation,
and to that extent differs substantially from the others in this camp.
72

Pippin, 1996, p. 552. Although Pippin talks of the supreme principles as grounding the lawful validity of
the judgment types, and so I have included him here, I think his interpretation actually fits more closely
with the first group (i.e. with Zuckert and Gorodeisky).
73

Longuenesse, 2003 148-9.
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Pollok, 2017, pp. 200, 212, 218.
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principle as a transcendental principle of reflecting judgment in general that (in various
ways) contains or grounds both objective and subjective purposiveness of teleological
and aesthetic judgments. Even among these, the interpretations differ substantially, but
what they have in common is a shared commitment to this principle as the structural core
of reflecting judgments and as key to a complete account of the KU in terms of the lawfulness of judgments.
Longuenesse situates her discussion of reflecting judgments and the principle of
purposiveness in the context of her well-known account of the KrV in terms of the “guiding thread” of the “logical forms of judgments.”75 More recently, Pollok has similarly defended an account of Kant in which the lawfulness of judgments take priority.76 In particular, he argues that judgments are to be understood in a uniquely normative manner as
structuring the heart of Kant’s critiques and indeed the entire “space of reason.” The lawfulness of judgments stems from the “synthetic a priori principles” which “represent the
structure of the ‘space of reason” and are the “core of Kant’s theory of normativity,” since
they are normative for and constitutive of certain domains of judgments.” 77 Moreover,
“In the terminology of Kant’s transcendental hylomorphism, synthetic principles a priori
are meant to make explicit the reasonable forms of our cognition, volition, and aesthetic
75

Longuenesse, 1998, p. 8. C.f. 2003, pp. 157-60. For Henry Allison’s similar account and discussion of
the fundamental ground of the lawful form in judgments of the beautiful see, 2001, p. 242. For Allison’s
account of the centrality of judgments to Kant’s idealism, see 2004, pp.77-96.
76

There are numerous similarities in the interpretations of Pippin and Pollok; e.g. regarding the thing-initself see Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form, pp. 204-5; and Pollok, 2017, pp.146-7; and concerning the
schemata and schematism in the KrV see Pippin, pp. 130-1, and Pollok, 2017, pp. 225-36.
However, there are substantial points of difference. For example, Pippin emphasizes aesthetic judgments as
providing a key epistemic “orientation” (569), whereas Pollok seems to see aesthetic judgments as a kind of
appendix to the critique and significant chiefly for the sake of a complete account of the “space of reason.”
See also Pippin, 1996, p. 566. My account differs from both in this regard.
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appreciation.” 78 Among those who prioritize judgment and trace the logical function of
judgments through an account of the lawfulness of reason, one interesting commonality is
that an important clarification concerning the principle of purposiveness is not typically

78

Pollok, 2017, p. 200. And again, “synthetic principles a priori determine the validity of all kinds of judgments – cognitive, moral, or aesthetic – according to Kant” (212).
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made. Namely, Cassirer, Allison, Longuenesse, and Pollok 79 all follow Kant’s lead in distinguishing between the “general principle of reflecting judgment” and the principle of
subjective purposiveness in aesthetic judgments and the principle of objective purposive-

79

These differing conceptions of the general principle of purposiveness results in some striking interpretations. For example, Pollok’s conception of the general principle leads to a conception of heautonomy that
results in a seeming incompatibility between the heautonomy of the first introduction to the KU and the
second. Where, the first pertains to aesthetic judgments and the second to teleological. Pollok defends a
“compatibilist interpretation” of heautonomy that allows for both forms of heautonomy as the lawful authority of teleological and aesthetic judgments (p. 284). While his compatibilist account does show a way in
which both lawful forms can be held together as one and the same lawful authority of reflecting judgment
in different uses, it leads him to the conclusion that in its teleological use, heautonomy is merely a “presupposition for our reflecting power of judgment to construct greater and greater unities among the manifold of
empirical laws, and thus aiming at – not verifying – a logical system of those laws” (p. 285). Of course,
such a logical system of empirical laws is already given under the principle of reason in Appendix of the
KrV. So, Pollok suggests, it would make sense to include teleological judgments under the metaphysics of
nature or of morals (p. 278). Similarly, what is left to aesthetic judgments is a subjective “interest” of reason to “celebrate, as it were, the aptitude of our higher faculties” (p. 284). This of course is as much as to
say that we must “confine ourselves to ‘seeing,’ or perhaps more precisely, imagining or reflecting on the
phenomenal order of nature ‘just for pleasure,’ as it were, i.e., not even with the further intention of scientifically investigating it, then ‘ordered nature may appear to us not only, theoretically, as blue, wet, etc., but
also, aesthetically, as a twinkling stream in a sunny meadow, the only ‘purpose’ of which is our enjoyment
of nature (as art)” (pp. 113-4). Perhaps just as significantly, Pollok concludes that the real “bridge” is “lawfulness”, not reflecting power of judgment or purposiveness as Kant seems to claim in the KU. To this end,
he says, “I think there is no good reason against the KpV concept of lawfulness mediating between these
two parts of philosophy” (306). And again: “This does not mean that Kant’s critical philosophy culminates
in the second Critique, where he introduces the ‘form of lawfulness in general’ (5:70), provided by the
power of judgment. It only means that it is the second (rather than the third) Critique where we can find
Kant’s unifying idea for a system of philosophy. The idea of lawfulness marks the center of the space of
reason described by Kant’s theory of normativity” (p. 307). Pollok’s account is vital in that it simultaneously identifies the sine qua non of Kant’s critical philosophy (i.e. lawfulness) but leaves off the other fundamental quality of the three synthetic principles a priori, namely, the productive power of synthesis. The
three principles should be seen as variations of the fundamental relation of lawfulness and a kind of (free)
productive power. There is no spontaneity of the mind, no autonomy of the will, no heautonomy of soul
without this fundamental conception of a productive power that is co-conditionally prior with “lawfulness.”
Indeed, the supreme principles only arise from such fundamental co-conditions. To this end, for example,
of the Moral Law arises from the “freedom of the will” (KPV 5:46). So, Kant says in the Groundwork:
“freedom of the will” as “autonomy,” “is the principle of morality; hence a free will and a will under moral
laws are one and the same”(KPV 4:447). C.f.
“If we now compare our formal supreme principle of pure practical reason (as that of an autonomy of the
will” (KPV 5:39), we find that “Autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws…the sole principle of morality consists in independence from all matter of the law…that independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense, whereas this lawgiving of its own on the part of pure and, as such, practical reason is freedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral law expresses nothing other than the autonomy of pure
practical reason, that is freedom, and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone
they can accord with the supreme practical law” (KPV 5:33), and “a will for which the mere lawgiving
form of a maxim can alone serve as a law is a free will” (KPV 5:29). “Thus freedom and unconditional
practical law reciprocally imply each other” (KPV 5:29). C.f. 4:446-7.
All three supreme principles are formed from unique relations of two fundamental conditional features: (a)
a productive power and (a) “lawfulness.” Where the three relations of these two conditions represent: (1) a
lawfully determined productive power at the heart of theoretical reason, (2) a lawfully determined practical
freedom/power, and (3) a freedom that is a lawfulness without law in reflecting judgments. At the heart of
all three relations is both a productive power or source of the mind and its lawfulness.
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ness in teleological judgments. However, the similarity ends there. They each take something different as the “general principle of reflecting judgment”. And none of them offers
more than a passing reference in defense of their definition, which is interesting given
both the centrality of this principle for reflecting judgments for their accounts and given
the lack of concurrence as to how the supreme principle should be understood. Allison
defines it rather succinctly, if opaquely, as the “absolutizing” ground, and Longuenesse
simply says that she agrees with Allison on this point in general.80 Pollok (and others like
Johannes Haag) identifies it with the “idea of ‘purposiveness of nature.’”81 Cassirer is
slightly less forthcoming on the subject, but suggests that the general principle of purposiveness is a concept of “cohesiveness and correlation of parts” where the parts can be the
“accidental formations of nature” and also the “strictly necessary formation of pure intuition and pure concept,” where the parts are harmoniously unified.82
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Longuenesse, 1998, p. 157.

81

Pollok, 2017, p.186, 302.
Pollok identifies the following passage in support of this view: the “common general principle” of both
aesthetic and teleological judgments is that “ ‘nature conforms to our power of judgment’ (20:202; cf.
20:216, 5:180)” (284). But this passage from the first introduction is not speaking of the general principle at
all, but rather the reason why the general a priori principle of the power of judgment does not warrant its
own doctrinal domain (thus we have only a doctrine of nature and freedom). The reason, Kant gives is that
“if there is to be a concept or a rule which arises originally from the power of judgment, it would have to
be a concept of things in nature insofar as nature conforms to our power of judgment, and thus a concept of a property of nature such that one cannot form any concept of it except that its arrangement conforms to our faculty for subsuming the particular given, laws under more general ones even though these
are not given” (my emphasis, KU 20:202) Kant’s terminology here is precisely that by which he describes
the principle of objective purposiveness as “occasioned” by subjective purposiveness.
82

Cassirer, 1983, pp. 287-8.
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§5) The Three-layer Significance of the Imagination as the Structure of Reflecting
Judgments
Just as in the Critique of Pure Reason, here in the KU Kant employs the term
“imagination” predominately in its second and third-layer significances as the “faculty of
intuitions,”83 where this means that it is the faculty for “apprehending,”84 and
“exhibiting,”85 or “yielding” pure and empirical intuitions. 86 Kant also sometimes talks of
it as the faculty of for yielding matter, where matter should be understood quite expansively as not merely empirical but also pure, and sometimes logical (e.g. “S” and “P” are
the logical matter of some judgment S is P, where the copula “is” is the form qua unifying
term by which one logical given (symbol) is bound to another logical given (symbol).87
To this end, Kant says, “in every judgment, subject and predicate constitute matter, and
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KU 5:292, 5:287, 5:343
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KU 5:227, 5:317
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KU 5:366

86

KU 5:286-7
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Kant makes numerous references to a kind of logical hylomorphism of the faculties (A266-8/B322-4),
where the understanding applies form as the “faculty of concepts” (5:406, 5:343, 5:228-9, 5:244, 5:286-7,
5:292, 5:365-6, 5:406) and reason applies form as “the faculty of ideas” (5:265-6, 5:343). C.f. “Transcendental matter is the thing that is determinable <determinabile>; but transcendental form the determination,
or the act of determining <actus determinandi>. Transcendental matter is the reality or the given <datum>
for all things” (28:575). In short, the hylomorphic language of matter and form should be taken as highly
general, such that at times they refer to sensible matter/form, transcendental matter/form and sometimes
also mere logical matter/form relations of a symbolic judgment.
Pollok notes, as does Allison, that Kant “relates the matter-form distinction to ‘the nature of our reason,’ not
to the nature of things…’Schon in der Natur unserer Vernunft liegt dieser Unterschied von der Materie und
Form’” [Already in the nature of our reason lies this difference between matter and form] (2017, p. 144).
For more on this see Pollok, 2017, pp. 143, 136-8; as well as JG MacFarlane, “What does it Mean to Say
that Logic is Formal?”, 2000, 54, and Longuenesse on Kant’s hylomorphism: “It is significant, in this regard, that in Kant’s Logic distinctions of matter and form recur at each level of increasing complexity in the
exposition of the activity of thinking…Objects are the matter for concepts…Concepts are the matter for
judgment…Judgments are the matter for syllogisms… Finally, combined and connected cognitions are the
matter for the whole of cognition, system its form” (1998, pp. 149-50).
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the relation of both the form,” whereby, “matter is the determinable – form the determination.”88 Or again transcendentally, “in every judgment one can call the given concepts
logical matter (for judgment), their relation (by means of the copula) the form of the
judgment” and “in the concept of pure understanding, matter precedes form.”89
In its third-layer significance, the productive imagination yields empirical intuitions. It is to this layer of significance that Kant attributes everything from empirical intuitions in judgments of experience to the power of memory, 90 “dreams,”91 and the creative functions of yielding examples, producing art, etc.92 On this reading, however, we
must also take seriously that for Kant there is a first-layer significance qua productive
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29:847, from Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics in 1782-1783, wherein he modifies the scholastic conception of the same.
89 A266-7/B322-3;

to see this, let us take a few examples. We can see the matter-form structure in pure
formulas of algebra, where, Kant notes, it is the imagination that yields the symbols as the matter, and the
understanding the rules as the form (A716-7/B744-5). Likewise, the imagination and understanding are at
work in this specific sense even in a symbolic judgment: “S is P”. The yielding of “S” and “P” as a symbol
(for some possible corresponding object and property) is the matter that is unified according to the form,
which is yielded by the understanding, namely the copula as a rule or determinate concept (A266/B322).
90

5:234, In its empirical function, Kant naturally attributes to the imagination the ability of the mind to
yield intuitions of past, present, and future possible experience (i.e. memory, perception, and anticipation)
through what he respectively calls “the faculty of imitation”, “the faculty of illustration”, and “the faculty
of anticipation” (28:235)
91

KU 5:380

92

Importantly, the imagination is receptive to the data of the senses and “apprehends” these (KU 5:243,
A142-3/B182). This basic stage of apprehension is a non-identifiable, but necessarily posited point at which
the sensible given first becomes matter for us. From the point at which the sense-data is “apprehended” or
taken up through the imagination, the empirical imagination can then yield the sensibly given as a manifold
to be reproductively synthesized in an intuition. This is what is often called the first-fold, “synthesis of apprehension in intuition” from the KrV (A99). An intuition of a synthesized manifold of the senses is an empirical intuition which the imagination yields often called the second-fold, “synthesis of reproduction in
imagination” (A102), and finally, this empirical intuition is taken up as matter in determining and reflecting
judgments of experience through the bridging term (schematized concept in determining judgments) as the
third-fold, “synthesis of recognition in a concept” (A103, 118). This standard “three-fold synthesis of the
imagination” commonly discussed in the scholarship on the KrV takes place in what I am here terming the
second and third-layer functions of the imagination.
In the schematizing work of the understanding, the imagination yields pure intuitions which are the
schemata, or bridging terms, whereby the pure concepts of the understanding can become schematized concepts, which are capable of determining empirical intuitions of the imagination (A140-2/B179-81).
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power posited as the supersensible substratum of the free productive lawfulness of reason
in general, i.e. the pure sources or lawful conditions of the mind.
Any judgments standing under the synthetic principle a priori necessarily has a
structure whose form (law or principle) is such that a deduction is possible. The form of a
judgment whereby a deduction from a synthetic principle a priori is possible must reflect
that supreme principle. This is the case because the ground of the validity of particular
judgments depends on the law or form of that judgment type, and the law or form is lawful (i.e. synthetic a priori valid) through the supreme principle. What this means is that
under every a priori domain, there is a second-layer “schematized” specification of the
supreme principle. In the case of theoretical reason, this second-layer is the “schematism
of the understanding,” which (as we saw in Chapter 2) corresponds to the second-layer
significance of the imagination as that which yields schemata as the product of its synthesis. As we saw, “the schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination” [“Das
Schema ist an sich selbst jederzeit nur ein Produkt der Einbildungskraft”].93
In practical reason, this is the difference between the moral law as the freedom of
the will and the categorical imperative whereby specific practical maxims are brought
under the moral law. Likewise, in reflecting judgment the “reflecting power of judgment,
therefore, can only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law.”94 Here we find
another principle of purposiveness, but only as a specification of the supreme principle.
Fundamentally, it accords with the first-layer purposiveness, but on the second layer, it is

93 A140/B179
94

KU 5:179-80
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that “trascendental principle as a law.” What is particularly interesting, and important for
the two-fold division of the KU, is that this second-layer significance of the imagination
whereby it yields (through synthesis) the schemata in theoretical reason, here in reflecting
judgment, yields both “schemata and symbols, the first of which contain direct, the second indirect presentations of the concept.”95
Now, we can see an identical threefold relation between reflecting judgments and
determining judgments. In determining judgments of the understanding, the schemata of
the imagination requires the lawfulness of the pure concepts of the understanding to become the schematism of the understanding:
From this it is clear that the schematism of the understanding through the transcendental synthesis of imagination comes down to nothing other than the unity
of all the manifold of intuition in inner sense, and thus indirectly to the unity of
apperception, as the function that corresponds to inner sense (to a receptivity).
Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are the true and sole
condition for providing them with a relation to objects, thus with significance,
and hence the categories are in the end of none but a possible empirical use…96

The same exact structure applies in reflecting judgment. Only now, instead of the
categories of the understanding (which are themselves the product of “intellectual synthesis”),97 we have the rule of purposiveness itself standing as the unifying form of the
schemata and symbols, where the schemata and symbols bring the empirical apprehension of form as empirical intuitions under a rule of reflecting judgment. The significance
of this second layer is the same as it was in the KrV. There we learned that a pure intuition as the schema of a given concept is the “representation of a general procedure of the
95

KU 5:352

96 A145-6/B184-5
97 A142/B181,

B151
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imagination for providing [that concept] with its image.”98 Further, just as in the KrV,
Kant sometimes uses “understanding” to refer to the second-layer schematism, which is
comprised of both the understanding and figurative synthesis whereby the schemata arise,
so too in reflecting judgment, Kant typically terms this second-layer “application” of a
rule the representation of the imagination in its freedom or “free play.” However, just as
in the KrV we cannot forget that the term “understanding” still includes the productive
synthesis of the imagination, so too here, we cannot forget that even when Kant uses the
term “productive imagination,” a “productive and self-active…authoress” that is a
schematizing that is “lawful without a law,” a process in which the imagination “schematizes without a concept” nevertheless, the understanding (and reason) are still necessarily
involved in comprising this stage.99 To this end, Kant says, “Yet for the imagination to
be free and yet lawful by itself, i.e., that it carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction.” 100
Rather, this second-layer significance of the imagination is the “first application” of the
free lawful purposiveness.
It is precisely this schematizing of purposiveness –though without a concept– that
Kant calls the purposive “free play.”101 This is the supreme principle given “as a law:” “a
principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions
or presentations (i.e., of the imagination) under the faculty of concepts (i.e., the understanding), insofar as the former in its freedom is in harmony with the latter in its law98 A140/B179-80.
99

C.f. KU 5:179-80, 5:288, 5:353

KU 5:240-1

100

KU 5:241

101

KU 5:190, 5:217, 5:243-4
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fulness.”102 It is a pure intuition of a purposive form of subsumption “schematized without a concept” not of concepts and intuitions but of the “subsumption of the imagination
itself,”103 such that the understanding is set into motion through this free lawful form to
search out adequate concepts.
The only adequate form turns out to be an indeterminate concept of the supreme
principle itself. In other words, the productive lawfulness of a posited supersensible substratum.104 What is the posited supersensible ground by which Kant gives the resolution
to the antinomy of taste (the antinomy of which concerned the absence of the lawfulness
of concepts, yet the need for such lawfulness)?
The issue at stake in the Antinomy of Taste is precisely how there can be a judgment that has the form of free lawfulness (i.e. lawfulness without a concept). Kant’s answer, and the resolution to the antinomy of taste, is that judgments of the beautiful do indeed have a concept of the understanding, but only an “indeterminate concept” of a supersensible substratum, i.e. of a free lawful power of the mind (heautonomy) according to
the supreme principle of purposiveness, i.e. we have “to look beyond the sensible and to
seek the unifying point of all our faculties a priori in the supersensible: because no other
way remains to make reason self-consistent.”105 This is the same move to the supersensible positing of the freedom and lawfulness at the heart of each domain of reason. Here, in
reflecting judgment, it is that supreme principle of free lawfulness that makes lawful, i.e.
102

KU 5:286-7
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Ibid.
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KU 5:340
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grounds the synthetic a priori form, those judgments that take as their form a purposive
play of the faculties, a free lawfulness of the imagination where reason and the “understanding is in the service of the imagination and not vice versa.”106
Normally, a schematized concept would be the law or rule of application. So to
here, in reflecting judgment, Kant speaks of the “concept, as a law of the understanding,”
but the resolution of the antinomy of taste, picks out an “indeterminate concept,” which
thereby serves as the “purposive form,” the schematized representation of a free play of
the faculties, where this “schematism without a concept”107 means without a determinate
concept, but still in accord with a principle of “lawfulness without a law,”108 i.e. with free
lawfulness. It is precisely thereby that Kant grounds the aesthetic judgment form in the
supreme principle of “free lawfulness of the imagination.” 109
The Specific Forms of Reflecting Judgment
The rule of purposiveness that results in this second-layer significance of the
imagination110 –which bridges empirical intuitions (of the purposive form) of art, nature,
etc, to the free lawfulness or heautonomy of the judging subject– takes the following
forms: (1) In aesthetic judgments of the beautiful we find that this “subjective power of
judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of
106

KU 5:242
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KU 5:287
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KU 5:240-1

109

KU 5:241
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Judgment requires representing the principle as a law. This representing is a bridging function, a pure
intuition. In the case of the concept of a principle of subjective purposiveness (i.e. the free play of the faculties), the structure is the same as the general principle (5:287). In the case of the concept of a principle of
objective purposiveness, the form is “occasioned” by the subjective form in relation to an object of nature
(KU 5:197, 5:376).
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the faculty of intuitions or presentations (i.e., of the imagination) under the faculty of
concepts (i.e., the under- standing), insofar as the former in its freedom is in harmony
with the latter in its lawfulness.”111 That is, purposiveness as the “aesthetic free play of
the cognitive faculties” is the schematized form of aesthetic reflecting judgment.112 In this
way, “the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes
without a concept,”113 and thereby places the “understanding in the service of the imagination and not vice versa.”114
In aesthetic judgments of the sublime, the reflecting power of judgment still takes
its own supreme principle and derives or gives this “principle as a law,”115 through an act
of the second-layer significance of the imagination, i.e. whereby it yields symbols as pure
synthesized intuitions instead of schemata.116 The symbol is the necessary form of a
bridging intuition for an “idea of reason,” since it is an “indirect presentations of the concept,”117 for which no “direct representation” i.e. schema can be given. A “symbol” is
thus a product of the second-layer significance of the imagination wherein it “schematizes without a concept”118 but is “inadequate” 119 to the task, since “no presentation ade111
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For more on the free play as a law, see Eckart Förster, Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy, pp. 127-8; and
Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste, (pp. 49, 187-8).
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For a particularly helpful article on the subject, see Keren Gorodeisky, “Schematizing without a concept? Imagine That!”
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quate to them is possible.”120 So the imagination must yield an “indirect
representation”121 as the approximation of the schema. So, in the sublime, the lawful form
of the judgment is a relation of “the imagination either to the faculty of cognition or to
the faculty of desire.”122 This latter “free play” where the imagination still stands in a
purposive “accord with the faculty of concepts of the understanding or of reason, as
promoting [reason],”123 and so is lawful, is nevertheless a kind of “contrapurposive”
form. The purposive play between the imagination and reason reveal the “limits” or “inadequacy” of the mind and this “countrapurposive for our power of judgment, unsuitable
for our faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to our imagination.”124 We
will see this fleshed out in more detail in the next chapter. For now, suffice it to say, that
we have to be careful in the KU to recognize that there is a three-layer significance of the
imagination, and thus a three-layer use of “purposiveness.”
In short, on the first-layer significance, we find the supreme principle of purposiveness as the free lawfulness of the imagination. On the second-layer significance, we
find purposiveness as the law or form of the various judgment types (we will see this in
each kind of judgment in Chapters 4-5), where this law requires a “schematizing without
a concept” 125 and just is the pure synthesis of the a priori productive imagination, which
yields schemata and symbols and “schematizes” according to a “lawfulness without
120
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law.”126 Or, in short, as we have seen, “the reflecting power of judgment, therefore, can
only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law, and cannot derive it from anywhere else (for then it would be the determining power of judgment).”127 And finally, on
the third-layer significance, we have the “purposiveness of form,” which is the empirical
synthesis of the productive imagination, whereby it apprehends the purposiveness of the
mere form of the object without properties of the object itself. Indeed the subject of Section 11 of the Analytic of the Beautiful concerns precisely the third-layer conception of
purposiveness. Namely, the “objective purposiveness in the representation of an object
without any end (objective or subjective), consequently the mere form of purposiveness
in the representation through which an object is given to us.”128 At this third-layer of significance, the imagination is
productive and self-active (as the authoress of voluntary forms of possible intuitions); and although in the apprehension of a given object of the senses it is of
course bound to a determinate form of this object and to this extent has no free
play (as in invention), nevertheless it is still quite conceivable that the object can
provide it with a form that contains precisely such a composition of the manifold
as the imagination would design in harmony with the lawfulness of the understanding in general if it were left free by itself.129

As a result of the three-layer distinction in significance of the imagination, we can
see the way in which the supreme principle of purposiveness, i.e. the free lawfulness of
the imagination, provides the structure of lawfulness all the way down to specific judg-
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ments whose synthetic a priori validity depends on that thoroughgoing purposive quality
at all three-layers of significance.130
In light of this three-fold structure, we can turn (in the next two chapters) to a detailed account of each judgment form with the tools necessary to make sense passages
like the following: “the lawfulness of the power of the judgment in its freedom, [die
Gesetzmäßigkeit der Urteilskraft in ihrer Freiheit]” is such that “the satisfaction in the
object depends on the relation in which we would place the imagination: namely, that it
entertain the mind by itself in free activity” (my emphasis, 5:270). 131
§6) Concluding Remarks from a Principle of Free Lawfulness
In the next two chapters, we will turn to the specific kinds of reflecting judgments.132 At first glance, the relationships between the kinds of reflecting judgments in
the KU might appear tenuous at best. I have argued that this is not the case if we under130

From the roles that Kant gives to the imagination, we can draw up a chart of the three-layer work of the
imagination (See Figure 3 at the end of this paper). This chart helps by laying out the different status that
“purposiveness” serves as the general principle of free lawfulness of the imagination (5:240), by which
reflecting judgments determine the faculty of desire (20:245). So, in concrete terms, purposiveness as this
bridging term (i.e. as the law that reflecting judgment gives itself) makes possible the teleological and aesthetic judgments. As a pure intuition (just like the schemata, and symbols)(A140/B180, 5:352), it arises via
the second-layer function of the imagination as a bridging term for the sake of “cognition in
general” (5:217-8). It is the representation of a state of the mind in which the faculties are maintained in
harmony (5:217-8, 5:222). So, the representation of the “free play” of the faculties requires the second-layer function of the imagination to give the principle as law, while the general principle of free lawfulness
(which has the same structure as the free play) is the unique relation of the fundamental productive power
of the mind to its lawfulness.
131

“Das Wohlgefallen an dem Gegenstande hängt von der Beziehung ab, in welcher wir die Einbildungskraft setzen wollen; nur daß sie für sich selbst das Gemüt in freier Beschäftigung unterhalte,” KU 5:270.
132

KU 20:249-50 5:286-8, 20:239, 20:226, Concerning the specifications of the principle of purposiveness,
it is worth mentioning in brief that by internal purposiveness, Kant means that manifold which is judged
(i.e. unified) according to a concept/idea of an end internal to the manifold (i.e. the concept of the manifold
as a whole). By contrast, relative purposiveness is the relation of the manifold to a concept or end that is
external to the manifold in question. Not surprisingly, these distinctions change depending on whether they
concern subjective or objective purposiveness.
So, for example: “Objective purposiveness can be cognized only by means of the relation of the manifold
to a determinate end…. Objective purposiveness is either external, i.e., the utility of the object, or internal,
i.e., its perfection” (5:226). Moreover, relative purposiveness in the context of subjective purposiveness is
a relation of the manifold to an idea of reason that is external to the whole (i.e. the idea of the sublime), yet
is purposive for the judging subject (5:244).
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stand Kant’s divisions of reflecting judgments quite straightforwardly as he suggested,
namely according to the differing kinds of purposiveness at work.133 In turn, purposiveness must be understood in terms of (as Kant suggests) the various layers of significance
of the imagination.134
Rather than finding a KU that fails to fit the critical project of the first two Critiques and far from running into an incongruent menagerie as the KU is sometimes depicted, it is a careful architectonic of critical philosophy and the capstone to a tripartite
unity of reason. The key to this architectonic is, as we have seen, a proper conception of
purposiveness according to the three-layer significance of the imagination in which the
free lawfulness of the imagination is the supreme principle that makes the KU possible.
In light of this, we cannot accept a charge against the KU of the kind leveled by
Guyer:
133

Teleological judgments are reflecting judgments that give themselves the principle of purposiveness as a
concept of an objective purposiveness of nature, which is regulative for cognition
(20:249,5:401-4,5:379,5:396). Teleological judgments can be further divided according to internal and relative purposiveness as judgments of perfection and judgments of usefulness
(20:250,5:366-7,5:373,5:376-8,5:425). There are three kinds of a priori aesthetic judgments: judgments of
the beautiful, the sublime, and art. Aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and sublime are subjective in their
application, while aesthetic judgments of art are mixed in their application and teleological judgments are
objective in their application judgments (5:279,5:236,20:243). Judgments of the beautiful are the only kind
of reflecting judgment related purely to the faculty of taste (5:279-80, 5:224, 5:290), where “taste” just is
the faculty by which we make judgments of the beautiful (5:190). Kant attributes to the reflecting power of
judgment in general the function of a bridge between the realms of the understanding and practical reason
(5:195, 5:175-7, 20:202, 20:207-8). In the product of its judging, it bridges the divide between the sensible
and supersensible (5:196, 5:175-6). The reflecting power of judgment does not constitute its own realm
since it “contains no objectively determining propositions” (20:201). In a “doctrine of philosophy” there is
only practical and theoretical philosophy (20:195). Practical reason proceeds according to practical lawfulness (i.e. autonomy), theoretical reason according to lawfulness (i.e. spontaneity), reflecting judgments proceed according to free lawfulness (5:240-1), i.e. heautonomy (20:225). This free lawfulness expressed as a
principle is purposiveness. This free lawfulness expressed in terms of a basic transcendental activity of the
mind, is the “imagination in its freedom” (my emphasis 5:287), which, is lawful because of its own principle (5:196), by which the faculties of form (i.e. reason and the understanding) are “in the service of the
imagination and not vice versa” (5:242).
134

The formal subjective principle of the imagination in its freedom (i.e. “free lawfulness”) thereby
grounds a two-fold bridging function of reflecting judgments. The bridge is two-fold because as a subjective bridge, it is an aesthetic judgment that results in an aesthetic idea and as an objective bridge it is a teleological judgment that results in the idea of a natural end.
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there is every reason to believe that the Critique of Judgment, like Kant’s other
great works, was hastily written, and although its exposition shows a superficial
concern with methodology, much is unclear about how its various arguments are
really meant to cohere; Kant must have been somewhat confused about just what
the structure of his theory really was. The real character of Kant’s theory of taste
is also obscured by the fact that the KU treats it as part of a larger theory of the
reflective judgment of nature…purposiveness which [is] the concern of this larger theory [is] quite disanalogous to the judgments of beauty with which they are
associated.135

The step that Kant ushers in his notion of the free lawfulness of the
imagination,136 is not a step beyond critical philosophy, but enables a major shift in what
is involved in the possibilities of a system that is both grounded in critical philosophy and
pushing toward a complete outworking of the structural unity of reason through this
bridging function of the mind. The KU viewed through the lens of the central principle of
the free lawfulness of the imagination (the general principle of purposiveness), shows
itself no longer as “a thorny thicket,”137 but as a richly and elaborately cultivated work, or
at least, that is what I hope to show in the closer analysis of the judgment forms (ch. 4-5).
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1979, p. 10; this conviction, leads Guyer to “a reconstruction of Kant’s theory of taste…identifying certain concepts and arguments as those which are truly fundamental to Kant’s theory and, where necessary,
revise his own exposition to reflect the fundamentality of these premises” (11).
My readers will, of course, recognize that my argument regarding the KU is diametrically opposed to Paul
Guyer’s in Kant and the Claims of Taste. By contrast, I see the KU as a profoundly unified whole in which
Kant has carefully crafted his most complex and interesting account of a function of the mind that is itself
complex (as any adequate account of a bridging function between the supersensible and sensible should be
expected to be). If Kant was “confused about just what the structure of his theory really was”. For an excellent handling of that subject, see Hannah Ginsborg’s essay “On the Key to Kant’s Critique of Taste”, reproduced in Chapter 2 of The Normativity of Nature, particularly 34-45.
I recognize that most scholars stand somewhere between Guyer’s and my own assessment of the coherence,
internal validity, and success of Kant’s account of reflecting judgments, which is a reason that I think my
analysis of the imagination plays an important secondary role in defending a unified reading of the KU and
thereby stands as a kind of defense of Kant.
136

The aim of Jane Kneller’s book, Kant and the Power of the Imagination, quite different than mine. Her
book focusses on the degree to which the KU displays a need for aesthetics as a kind of mediating ground
between thought and action. For comparison, see her account of the bridging work of the reflecting power
of judgment as showing an “interplay of both thinking and acting,” and “reflective judgments” just are this
“interface” or “mediation” (81), where this mediating function is one in which it “negotiates” and “harmonizes” thinking and action (76).
Also on the imagination as a bridging function, see Matherene, 2016, p.66.
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Genova, 1972, p. 459; and Allison, 2001, p.6.
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As such, we can affirm, with Cassirer, that the KU displays “the creative power of
youth united with the ripeness and consummation of age. [It] builds upward and outward
at the same time…to the more and more precise architectonic ordering of the intellectual
material already assimilated.”138 This chapter has taken up the supreme principle that
gives both lawfulness and form to the various types of reflecting judgment. In the next
two chapters, we will look to the second and third-layer significances of the imagination,
which concern a taxonomy of the unique structure and kinds of reflecting judgment. We
will turn first to pure aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and sublime (chapter 4). We
will then take up reflecting judgments of art and natural ends (chapter 5). I end this chapter with a figure of the threefold significance of the imagination. This figure plays no role
in my argument. It is merely meant to provide my reader with a helpful outline of the key
significances of the imagination not just for reflecting judgment, but for pure reason in
general.
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Cassirer, 1983, p. 271.
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CHAPTER 4

FREE LAWFULNESS IN JUDGMENTS OF
THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE SUBLIME
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§1) Introduction

Something has gone wrong when even scholars offering holistic interpretations of
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU) as a “unified” work have largely abandoned judgments of the sublime and adopted what Rachel Zuckert has termed the “standard practice” of using “‘aesthetic judgment’ to refer to …judgment of beauty.”1 According to Paul Guyer, part of the problem concerning the “theoretical status and force of
Kant’s distinction of judgments of the beautiful and sublime,” is that Kant is unable to
provide an adequate “common principle.”2 I contend that Kant is able to provide such a
principle and it is only our failure to bring this principle clearly into view qua its transcendental status that has resulted in an impoverished view of the transcendental significance of aesthetic judgments on the one hand, and,3 on the other hand, an abandonment
of that synthetic a priori principle, which Allison reminds us is alone “the condition un-

1

Zuckert, 2006, p. 599. Those who seek to provide a unified account of the KU, but who nevertheless fall
into this camp include Konstantin Pollok, 2017; Béatrice Longuenesse, 1998; Henry Allison, 2001; and
Rachel Zuckert. But far more who do not seek a unified account likewise fall into this camp. Even among
those who give an account of the sublime, such as Robert Clewis (2015, p.11, 135) and Jean-Luc Nancy
(1993, pp. 30-1, 50), we nevertheless do not find an account of “aesthetic judgments”, but merely an isolated analysis of one kind of aesthetic judgment.
2 Guyer, 1982, p. 755, 757.
3

In Kant on Beauty and Biology, Zuckert identifies a form of “purposiveness without a purpose” as the
general principle of reflecting judgment by which she accounts for the diverse forms of reflecting judgment
that result in a unified account of the KU (2007, pp. 1-22, 143-5, 190-2). Insofar as Zuckert is understood to
be speaking of the principle as “law”, then I am in broad agreement. Zuckert does not maintain this distinction, however, which results in an exclusion of judgments of the sublime –because of a corresponding mischaracterization of “contra-purposive” (2007, p. 18). One upshot is that my account makes possible interpretations like Zuckert’s objectivist account without the need for a “reconstructivist” account of the KU as
she takes herself to give (2007, p.17). On one reading, our accounts are compatible (Zuckert is unlikely to
agree, however, and a defense would require its own paper).
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der which” reflecting judgment is “capable of a critique in the first place.” 4 It is in this
context that I want to suggest we move toward an investigation of the difference between
the a priori principle of purposiveness and the “law” that reflecting judgment “gives itself” in pure aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and the sublime. A brief contextualization is in order.
§2) Contextualizing Kinds Aesthetic Judgment and Types of Purposiveness

We should note that there are arguably three kinds of a priori aesthetic reflecting
judgments: (1) judgments of the beautiful, (2) judgments of the sublime, and (3) “logically conditioned aesthetic judgments of art”5 or the “talent of genius” for producing art.
Most scholars only recognize the first two and combine talk of the third with the first or
exclude it all together from synthetic a priori accounts.6 I think that many of the standard
problems arise only when we miss that Kant not only directly identifies the third kind of
judgment,7 and discusses its form according to quality, quantity, relation, and modality,8
but further provides quite some explanation of its features (including spirit, genius, aes4 Allison,

2001, p. 13. Keren Gorodeisky categorizes accounts like my own, Allison’s, Ginsborg’s, etc. as
providing an “extra-aesthetic interpretation” in contrast with her own “aesthetic interpretation” of free lawfulness, beautiful objects, and free play of the faculties in the KU, 2011, p. 421. She argues that such “extraaesthetic” approaches fail to account (adequately or at all) for the particularities of the beautiful object by
which that object gives rise to the aesthetic play and concomitant judgment. While I do not think this criticism justified, since the subject of the KU is fundamentally, a critique of synthetic aesthetic a priori judgments, not of all aesthetic judgments. While I find Gorodeisky’s account exceptionally helpful, I think that
it, like Zuckert’s “Whole-formalism,” takes up conceptions of aesthetic judgment that fall outside a critique
according to the synthetic principle a priori of the judgment type. I do think that her positive account of the
object itself is a much needed complementary undertaking.
5 KU 5:311-2. I do not think that this third kind of judgment directly concerns the debate regarding free and
dependent beauty.
6

David Berger collapses the first and the third, 2009, ch1. Cf. Gorodeisky, 2011, p.429. Rachel Zuckert is
one of only a few to clearly distinguish the third kind of judgment, although she excludes the latter two
from her account because she views them as external to “Kant’s justification of judgments employing the
principle of purposiveness” (2007, p.18). See also Anne Pollok, 2016, (p. 2), which is chiefly concerned
with the third kind of judgment, but not directly as an account stemming from Kant’s KU.
7 KU 5:311-2
8

KU 5:317-8
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thetic ideas, etc.) as distinct from the form of judgments of the beautiful.9 Further, it will
turn out to be at the heart of a proper understanding of the synthetic a priori validity of
teleological judgments. I will return to this third kind of aesthetic judgment in Chapter 5
along with an account of teleological judgments as sharing the same principle.
(2.1) Three Layers of Purposiveness
The three-layer significance of the imagination and the kinds of purposiveness
corresponding to these layers of significance are as follows. On the first-significance of
the imagination, we have (1) the supreme, synthetic, a priori principle of purposiveness,
which is the free lawfulness of the imagination. This was the subject of Chapter 3. This
layer corresponds with the other synthetic a priori principles (namely, the synthetic unity
of apperception, and the moral law) as well as those pure faculties, namely the synthetic
unity of the categories in the pure understanding, the freedom of the will as pure practical reason (without any determinations), and the pure purposive relation of the cognitive
faculties. Each principle picks out one of three possible unities of Freedom and Lawfulness: (i) Freedom is “subordinate”10 to Lawfulness to form a unity, (ii) Freedom and
Lawfulness “reciprocally imply each other”11 and so form a unity, (iii) Lawfulness is
subordinate to Freedom to form a unity. These three kinds of unities of the supersensible
conditions of Freedom and Lawfulness are the three synthetic a priori principles of pure

9

KU 5:343-4,5:352-3. If we separate out the third judgment, it is easier to see key ways in which Goethe
and Hölderlin recognized the significance of their works of art in the context of the KU, which, via “aesthetic ideas”, is central to the question of reflection on natural ends). For more on the former see Wellbery,
1996, particularly ch. 9. Also on the former, see Förster, 2012, pp. 359-60, 369; and on the latter, see
Förster, 1995, pp.182-93.
10 Kant uses various synonymous terms for the three relationships between the co-prior conditions of freedom and lawfulness, but the term “subordinate” is used in several places including in the KU: 5:269.
11

KPV 5:29
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reason (theoretical, practical, and aesthetic/reflecting). 12 On the second-layer significance
of the imagination, we have (2) formal purposiveness which is the real purposive play of
the imagination in harmony with either the understanding or reason. At this level, purposiveness is a representation of the free lawful harmony of the faculties, where this representation is the product whereby the imagination “schematized without a concept” and so
“gives itself…a law” as an application of the pure faculties to objects or the mere form of
objects. On the third-layer significance of the imagination, we have (3) the form of purposiveness of an object which is either taken up in a subjective synthetic a priori judgment (i.e. is judged aesthetically) or it is taken as an indeterminate form, an idea for the
judging of objects of experience as possible only through that purposive form (i.e. is
judged teleologically). In what follows, while we are tracing out the free lawfulness of
the first-layer by which the judgments have their validity, we are tracing out this structure
through the second and third-layer account. As such, I won’t return to a careful account of
the first layer, since Chapter 3 served that purpose.
(2.2) A Problematic Common Inclusion in the Third-layer Conception of Purposiveness
The final point to note is that many scholars take up an account of the form of
purposiveness on the third-layer in a problematic, but understandable manner. For instance, Rachel Zuckert gives a compelling account of the form of purposiveness according to a conception of the form of purposiveness, whereby properties of the object are
judged in relation to the purposive form and by this standard, we judge of works of art
that they are or are not beautiful. Zuckert’s account in that article is a complex and com-

12

KU, first introduction, 20:246
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pelling theory of art criticism. However, as much as I think Zuckert is actually providing
us with one of the most valuable standards for judging a work of art, and this standard is
directly derived from Kant’s aesthetic judgments, nevertheless, such an account necessarily steps outside of the synthetic, a priori form of aesthetic judgments that Kant has in
view qua Critique. So, while I think that Zuckert’s objectivist account is immensely helpful as an aesthetic theory of art criticism, I cannot take up such a conception of the relation of properties as the purposive form, since this does not fall within the scope of synthetic a priori. In short, accounts, like Zuckert’s Whole-formalism are are on the level of
a kind of maxim for judging art, where this maxim.13 I will return to this question in
Chapter 5 on aesthetic judgments of art, but for now, we must keep clearly in view that
on the third-layer conception of the representation or reflection on the mere “form of purposiveness” of an object “does not bring to our attention any property of the object.”14
Again, –on this third-layer significance of (the empirical productive) imagination– the
intuition is merely of a purposive form of the object and not of the object or its properties.
To this end, Kant says:
Now the purposiveness of a thing, insofar as it is represented in perception, is
also not a property of the object itself (for such a thing cannot be perceived), although it can be derived from a cognition of things. Thus the purposiveness that
precedes the cognition of an object, which is immediately connected with it even
without wanting to use the representation of it for a cognition, is the subjective
aspect of it that cannot become an element of cognition at all. The object is therefore called purposive in this case only because its representation is immediately
connected with the feeling of pleasure; and this representation itself is an aesthetic representation of the purposiveness.15
13

For my fuller account of Zuckert’s conception of “Whole-formalism” see, my article, “Purposiveness in
Kant’s Aesthetic Judgment.” As a standard for judging works of art, I think that Zuckert’s Whole-formalism
is essentially right and actually bears much in common with Hegel’s principle for judging art in his Aesthetics.
14 KU 5:228
15

KU 5:189
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I turn now to a conception of purposiveness that is operable on the second-layer
significance of the imagination. Here we find purposiveness as the free lawful form of
aesthetic judgments (both of the beautiful and the sublime). Purposiveness, on this level,
is a free lawful relation of the real faculties of imagination, understanding, and reason.
§3) Purposiveness as the Form of Aesthetic Judgments

The analytic of the beautiful concerns the structure and form (quid facti) of judgments of the beautiful (by contrast with the deduction of aesthetic judgments which concerns the ground of their lawfulness; quid juris). Consider now the passage that we
looked at in the preceding chapter. In the General Remarks at the end of the Analytic of
the Beautiful, Kant says, “If one draws the conclusion from the above analyses, it turns
out that everything flows from the concept of taste as a faculty for judging an object in
relation to the free lawfulness of the imagination.”16 So, if one draws the conclusion from
an analysis of the judgments of the beautiful, “everything flows from the concept of [the
faculty for judging the beautiful]17 as a faculty for judging an object in relation to the
free lawfulness of the imagination.”18 This is not mere rhetoric on Kant’s part. The analytic, which concerns the form or structure of judgments of the beautiful “flows from the
concept of” judging in accord with the supreme principle: namely. To judge an object as
beautiful is to “judge an object in relation to the free lawfulness of the imagination.” But
how could the analytic, the exposition of the form of the judgment fall out from this con-

16
17
18

KU 5:240
Taste is the faculty for judgments of the beautiful (KU, first introduction, 20:249)
my emphasis, KU 5:240: “freie Gesetzmäßigkeit der Einbildungskraft”
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ception of judging an object in relation to the supreme principle? In short, this passage is
suggesting that the second-layer significance of the imagination and the corresponding
conception of purposiveness as the middle-term of the judgment is nothing other than the
supreme principle itself is that which is represented as the schematized “law” for judging.
This, as we have seen, is why Kant says that the imagination thereby “schematizes without a concept”19 and the aesthetic judgment has the form of lawfulness without a law according to an “indeterminate concept”20 of the understanding, namely the free lawful,
purposiveness of pure reason. Thereby, the reflecting judgment “gives itself” its own
principle “as law.”21 This law, is the representation of purposiveness as the form or rule of
subsumption, i.e. a rule of free lawfulness.
In a moment, we will look more closely at the judgment types to see if this right.
If this is correct, the form of the judgments themselves should display precisely this free
lawful structure, since the law is a “schematized” representation of the supreme principle
(though without a concept).
One last thing to note, it is a priori necessary that the imagination “schematizes
without a concept,” if it is to have as its lawful grounding the supreme principle of purposiveness. This is a priori necessary, because, as we saw in Chapter 3, this supreme principle has the reverse structure from that of the synthetic unity of apperception. Where the
latter was a productive power of synthesis in the service of the lawfulness of the unity of
apperception, here lawfulness is in the service of the free productive power of the mind

19
20
21

KU 5:287
KU 5:244, 5:340
KU 5:180
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(i.e. the imagination in its freedom). So, if on the second-layer of significance we were to
find the imagination schematizing with a concept, this schematism could not derive its a
priori validity from that which subordinates the lawfulness. Instead, it would have to derive its lawfulness from that which subordinates the free productive power, namely the
synthetic unity of apperception. And if that were the case, then it would be a determining
judgment of the understanding. So, we can begin with the following recognition: every
valid synthetic a priori reflecting judgment must necessarily have as its “schematized”22
rule or form some specification of purposiveness. And indeed, as we will see, each judgment type is identifiable by a unique form of purposiveness as the specification of the
supreme principle of reflecting judgment in general.
Given that Kant describes the “free lawfulness of the imagination” as the “imagination in its freedom,” it is not surprising that the distinctive form of the judgment of the
beautiful “depends on the relation in which we would place the imagination: namely, that
it entertain the mind by itself in free activity.”23 The “free activity” of the imagination is
the state in which it functions (qua cognitive faculty) “as productive and self-active (as
the authoress of voluntary forms of possible intuitions).”24
In this specific sense of the imagination, Kant says, “to be free and yet lawful by
itself, i.e., that it carry autonomy with it, is a contradiction. The understanding alone
gives the law.”25 So, its freedom consists not in a lack of relation to the understanding or
22

Here “schematize” is used loosely as Kant does in the KU to mean not only schemata and concepts, but
also symbols, representation of purposiveness and the corresponding concepts, ideas of reason, and indeterminate concepts.
23
24
25

KU 5:270
KU 5:240
KU 5:241
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reason, but rather in that it is not “determined through concepts.”26 In judgments of the
beautiful, the imagination yields intuition as matter according to a synthetic a priori principle of “lawfulness without law.”27 What this means for the form of judgments of the
beautiful is that there is no determinate concept to serve as the determining form. Kant
also often uses the term “purposiveness without a end/purpose”28 and at times even seems
to formulate it as purposiveness without a concept of the object,29 where “without a concept” means no determinate concept, but nevertheless still an indeterminate concept,30
since form is necessary for all judgments. 31 Importantly, then, for an accurate understanding of the term, we should hold together Kant’s various formulations of it in the general
remarks to the first part of the Analytic of the Beautiful: Namely, that the schematized
“indeterminate concept” of as the “law” that reflecting judgment gives itself is “purposiveness without an end”, “lawfulness without law”, “free lawfulness of the
Imagination”,32 and –what is the same thing– the “free lawfulness of the
understanding”.33 These are variations of the formal a priori principle by which form is
sought in reflecting judgment (in the service of the imagination) that can adequately unify

26
27

Ibid.
Ibid.

28

KU 5:220: “einen Zweck”; 5:226, 5:228, 5:241, 5:247, 5:301

29

KU 5:306, 5:364
KU 5:340-1

30
31

Cf. Rachel Zuckert, 2002, p. 249.
The term free lawfulness helpfully recalls the way in which Kant is differentiating these judgments as
lawful yet free in comparison with the lawfulness of judgments of the understanding and inferences of reason.
32

33

KU 5:240-1: “Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck”, “Gesetzmäßigkeit ohne Gesetz”, “freie Gesetzmäßigkeit
der Einbildungskraft”, “freien Gesetzmäßigkeit des Verstandes”. Even though Zweck also means purpose, I
think that it is clear from the broader context that what Kant means by this term is a formal relation between the faculties of the mind wherein an adequate form is sought (i.e. where the faculties for giving form
are in the service of the faculty for giving matter, and so the judgment is reflecting).
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the matter via a judgment. Since the form is not already given, the reflection is thereby
“without a law”, “without an end”, and as such is a unique “lawfulness”, namely, a “free
lawfulness”.34
As an aside, we should note that some scholars translate ““Zweckmäßigkeit ohne
Zweck,” as “purposiveness without purpose,” while “purpose” is a permissible translation
of “ein Zweck,” “end” is also valid and is most often used in the second part of the Critique on Teleological judgments. This is a unique case where I think that Guyer’s translation of Zweck as “end,” in contrast with the translation “purpose” that Zuckert, Pippin,
and Allison employ is helpful (though not necessary; so long as we have the proper conception of “purpose” in view, but then “purpose” becomes awkward in certain contexts).
Either way, we have to be careful not to obscure the term’s employment of a notion of
transcendental adequacy via Kant’s standard hylomorphic (matter/form) distinction at the
most abstract level of the principle’s structure. After all, “without an end” is a direct reference, I suggest, to the inadequacy of the understanding to provide a determinate concept. In other words, “purposiveness without an end” signifies the quality of a “lawfulness without a law” or a “free lawfulness.” And that is very different than saying that it
has no “purpose,” since the latter is harder to reconcile with teleological judgments according to a Naturzweck and judgments of art according to an “aesthetic idea.”
So, if we employ the translation of “a purpose” for “ein Zweck,” we must maintain in this term the idea that the “purpose” that it is “without” is an adequate determining

34

KU 5:240-1: “ohne Gesetz”, “ohne Zweck”, “Gesetzmäßigkeit”, “freie Gesetzmäßigkeit”. “Free lawfulness” draws particular attention to the kind of lawful ground by which an account of reflecting judgment is
“capable of a critique in the first place.” Allison, Theory of Taste, p. 13.
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concept that would make the judgment a determining judgment of the understanding. Indeed, preceding his use of this term, Kant explicitly identifies the “ohne Zweck” with the
“law” of a “determinate concept of the understanding: “Thus only a lawfulness without
law and a subjective correspondence of the imagination to the understanding without an
objective one – where the representation is related to a determinate concept of an object –
are consistent with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which is also called purposiveness without an end).” 35 For these reasons, and to maintain the underlying unity of
aesthetic and teleological judgments, I do not alternate uses of the term “ein Zweck.”
Otherwise, we run the real risk so common in scholarship on the KU of obscuring the
connection to the idea of a Naturzweck and Kant’s grounding of teleological judgments in
the same supreme principle as that which grounds aesthetic judgment.
Judgments of the beautiful display an authority derived from the supreme princi-

ple, namely, heautonomy,36 which just is subjective self-legislation. 37 In the case of pure
aesthetic judgments, to receive the form from the structure of reflecting judgment itself
cannot qualify as a determinate end or objective law, but only a subjective law,38 and so
the unifying term is necessarily an indeterminate concept, which was the conclusion of
the Resolution to the Antinomy of Taste. 39

35

KU 5:241
I use heautonomy to mean the subjective lawful authority whereby reflecting judgment gives itself its
own principle as a law (i.e. subjective self-legislation, which is an aesthetic analog to autonomy). For a
helpful account of heautonomy, but with which my account differs, see Pollok, 2017, pp. 279-85.
36

37

The uniquely “free” quality of this lawfulness, of course, contrasts with the theoretical lawfulness of the
understanding (spontaneity) and the practical lawfulness of practical reason (autonomy).
38 5:288
39

5:340-1
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So, what does it mean to say that the aesthetic judgment of the beautiful is the
judging of an object “in relation to the free lawfulness of the imagination” (my emphasis)? The result of what I have argued is that the judgment of the beautiful is a judging of
an object, or more appropriately the “mere purposive form” of the object (given by the
empirical imagination as an intuition) and brought under a unifying conceptual representation that is neither a determinate concept of the understanding, nor an idea of reason,
but the representation of a unique purposive form of the faculties of representation themselves (the imagination and the understanding). This hylomorphic purposive structure of
the faculties is one in which the imagination in its freedom gives rise to the lawful work
of the understanding,40 where the latter is “in the service of the imagination and not vice
versa.”41 This representation of the logical, hylomorphic relation of the two faculties
serves as the unifying form for the empirical intuition in the judgment of the beautiful.42
Of course, the principle or lawful relation itself cannot be the form by which the intuition
is unified. That is quite simply impossible (a principle as a logical relation of faculties is
not a “form” of an empirical intuition). However, it is here that Kant makes a unique
move of identifying the second-layer imagination as “schematizing without a concept”43
the representation of this purposive play for the sake of “a law” for judging. The reflecting judgment gives itself its own principle “as a law.”44 For reflecting judgment to give
40
41

5:295-6
5:242

42

KU 5:185-6. Whereby, the faculties of matter and form should be understood not as pertaining to empirical objects and their determination nor to the faculties that yield these, but rather to the logical “functions”
presupposed for the kind of hylomorphism of matter and form that Pollok and Longuenesse analyze at
length. See also, MacFarlane, “Logic is Formal”, 2000, 54.
43 KU 5:286-7
44

KU 5:180, 5:288
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“itself such a transcendental principle as a law,” 45 means that the purposive relation of
the faculties, which are themselves grounded in the supreme principle, is represented as a
form or rule for the judging. It is through this schematized representation (though without
a concept) of the purposive (harmonious) play of the faculties (i.e. second-layer conception of purposiveness), which is thereby a law for judging (i.e. parallel function to that the
schematized understanding), that we can aesthetically judge an object “in relation to the
free lawfulness of the imagination.”46 Namely, it is the second-layer purposiveness as a
kind of schematized rule for judging, that brings an object (or the mere form of purposiveness, i.e. third-layer purposiveness) under the synthetic a priori validity of a judgment that proceeds according to the supreme principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination (i.e. the first-layer purposiveness). Let’s turn now to the analysis of that judgment
of which Kant says, “If one draws the conclusion from the above analyses, it turns out
that everything flows from the concept of [the faculty for aesthetic judgments of the
beautiful] as a faculty for judging an object in relation to the free lawfulness of the imagination.”47
§4) Synthetic A Priori Aesthetic Judgments of the Beautiful
Just as determining judgments of the understanding take their specific shape
through a combination of one of three categories under the four necessary components
making up the form of a judgment, namely its quantity, quality, relation, and modality.

45

KU 5:180, “Ein solches transzendentales Prinzip kann also die reflektierende Urteilskraft sich nur selbst
als Gesetz geben.”
46 KU 5:240
47

KU 5:240
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Further, these forms are pure representations of the first-layer significance (i.e. a pure
intellectual synthesis of the imagination as we saw in Chapter 2), but through the schemata of the imagination (second-layer) by which the understanding is schematized, these
formal, pure concepts gain applicability, i.e. the “first application” of the understanding.
It is this second-layer, schematized relation of an object under select categories as the
form of the judgment,48 makes determining judgment of the understanding a priori valid.
There is a parallel structure with aesthetic judgments.
Now, however, the form of the judgment is spoken of not in terms of categories
(lest we confuse the lawful relation to be that of the synthetic unity of apperception) but
of “moments,” which are the parallel structure of the categories in the form of determining judgments, but under the lawful relation of the judgment to the supreme principle of
purposiveness, i.e. a judgment “in relation to the free lawfulness of the imagination.”49
These four “moments” that constitute the form of a synthetic a priori aesthetic
judgment are (1) universality,50 (2) disinterest,51 (3) purposiveness,52 and (4) necessity.53
Or in Kant’s words, the form of aesthetic judgments a priori “must be represented as universally valid in its quantity, as without interest in its quality, as subjective purposiveness in its relation, and the latter, as far as its modality is concerned, as necessary.”54

48

Where this schematism is grounded in the synthetic principle a priori of the judgment type, through the
deduction.
49

KU 5:240

50

KU 5:219, where this universality is “without a concept.”
KU 5:211

51
52
53
54

KU 5:236
KU 5:240
KU 5:247
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There are four essential points to note, which are often overlooked. First, these
“moments” are the a priori forms, yet Kant’s terminology is that they “must be represented” as having these. This should be cause for pause. He is giving the a priori forms of
aesthetic judgment and for which he later gives a deduction according to the synthetic
principle a priori of these forms, yet says the lawful form “must be represented.” This is
because what the deduction will prove is not the objective, but rather subjective necessity
of these moments, where “subjective” just means the synthetic a priori validity for selflegislation as concerns a discursive reasoner (not merely practical self-legislation), as opposed to “objective” lawfulness, which requires that the judgment be of such a form that
its deduction from the synthetic unity of apperception is possible. So, while these moments are parallel to the forms of judgment under the categories, they are the form of a
judgment that is fundamentally grounded in a principle where lawfulness is subordinated
to freedom, i.e. the free lawfulness of the imagination as a reflective lawfulness without
law. Whereas the “objective” attribution to the categories stems precisely from the reversal of the conditional unity of freedom and lawfulness in their principle. Namely, in the
synthetic unity of apperception (as we saw in Chapter 2) freedom is subordinated to lawfulness.
So the form of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful must be represented as having
these moments by which it is an a priori valid synthetic judgment. This representation is
lawful, though without a law, and thus not determining but reflecting. That is, the very
principle of free lawfulness is a reflective relation, a process that lawful in its productivity, but still fundamentally free productivity, i.e. moves toward an adequate unifying term
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for that which it gives itself. It should not be surprising then, that its very form, its moments are given to itself. And this “giving itself” its own form is still lawful because
while free productivity, nevertheless stands (qua its principle) in harmony with lawfulness. This is what Kant means when he says, “the reflecting power of judgment, therefore, can only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law, and cannot derive it
from anywhere else (for then it would be the determining power of judgment).”55 Keeping in view the nature of these moments as both parallel to the forms of determining
judgment under the categories, yet also valid qua free lawful reflection instead of determination, we gain an important framework for reconsidering the specificity of each moment.
(4.1) First Moment of an Aesthetic Judgment of the Beautiful
First, critics sometimes quote the moments as if they pertain to an object. This is
understandable, given definition of each moment in terms of the “beautiful.” Naturally, it
sounds as if the moments pertain directly to an object insofar as that object can be called
“beautiful.” However, the Analytic of the Beautiful is not an analytic of an idea or object
but of a synthetic judgment, it is thus an analytic of the synthetic a priori aesthetic judgments of the beautiful. In light of what we have just seen, consider the first moment of
the Analytic of the Beautiful: “Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a kind of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest. The object of
such a satisfaction is called beautiful.56 Much has been said about what “satisfaction or
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dissatisfaction” means. While this is an important topic, it opens a larger set of question
than we have space to address. What is important for the current consideration is this:
What is in question is not the object or properties of the object, but rather a judgment that
proceeds “through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest.” The object only
comes into view as that X which affords “such a satisfaction” is called beautiful. For the
beautiful to concern properties of the object would necessitate that the judgment itself
“have interest” in the object in question. But it is to be “without interest.” The formulation “X is beautiful” is only significant for synthetic a priori aesthetic judgments insofar
as it “gives rise to” the state of mind or “satisfaction” through which such a judgment can
be given. Thus, “only where the imagination in its freedom arouses the understanding,
and the latter, without concepts, sets the imagination into a regular play is the representation communicated, not as a thought, but as the inner feeling of a purposive state of
mind.”57 The judgment itself is a judgment that, while it takes a form that depends for its
content on a “purposive state of mind” instead of on an empirical manifold, is constituted
by a priori valid forms through the supreme principle of purposiveness and from which
they derive their own shape, i.e. reflecting judgment “gives itself such a transcendental
principle as law.” 58
So when Kant says that “Taste” is the “faculty for judging the beautiful,”59 we
‑

cannot import some object or properties of the object as the content. The content just is
the reflective form of purposiveness, which is an idea given by the productive (third-lay57
58
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er) imagination in accord with the free lawfulness of the imagination. To this end, we
must keep in mind that what such a faculty of synthetic a priori judgments really is.
Namely, “the purposiveness of form in appearance is beauty, and the faculty for judging it
is taste,”60 so taste is the “faculty for judging formal purposiveness.”61 And this “formal
purposiveness” is only attributed to some X “as if” the purposiveness were a property of
the object since the first gave rise to a state of mind that is judged to be purposive. To this
end, Kant says, “pleasure” or “satisfaction” is nothing but “the consciousness of the
merely formal purposiveness in the play of the cognitive powers of the subject.”62 It is
“nothing other than the state of mind that is encountered in the relation of the powers of
representation to each other insofar as they relate a given representation to cognition in
general.”63 It is this purposive free play of the faculties of cognition that is judged aesthetically according to the four moments. It is not the object that is judged as beautiful.
Rather, the judgment of the beautiful is a judgment of a specific free lawful state of the
mind. The judgment of the beautiful is then attributed to the object that gave rise to that
state of mind “as if” it were a property of the latter. But what has synthetic a priori validity, is the judgment concerning the “state of mind” or “relation of harmonious free play”
between the imagination and the other cognitive faculties.
To this end, Kant says,
We shall call the critique of this faculty with regard to the first sort of judgments,
not aesthetics (as if it were a doctrine of sense), but a critique of the aesthetic
60
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power of judgment, because the former expression has too broad a meaning,
since it could also signify the sensibility of intuition, which belongs to theoretical cognition and furnishes the material for logical (objective) judgments; that is
why we have already restricted the expression ‘‘aesthetic’’ exclusively to the
predicate that belongs to intuition in cognitive judgments. However, to call a
power of judgment aesthetic because it does not relate the representation of an
object to concepts…64

So, according to the first moment, aesthetic judgments of the beautiful are “disinterested”
where this means they take nothing of the object as the content of the judgment, but only
the representation of the harmonious, purposive free play of the faculties themselves.
Now, consider the other three moments in light of this “disinterest” in the object
and instead in light of the free lawful, harmonious play of the faculties.
(4.2) Second Moment of an Aesthetic Judgment of the Beautiful
Kant frames the second moment as follows: “That is beautiful which pleases universally without a concept.”65 So, from the first moment, we have no property of the object, but rather the mere form of purposiveness which is really, as we saw, a representation of a state of mind that is set into play by the object. That is, from the first moment we
find that the content of the judgment is really a representation of the harmonious play of
the faculties of cognition. Now, in the second moment, we find that the form adequate to
such a representation by which its “universal communicability” is possible is not a concept.
In the resolution to the Antinomy of Taste, Kant adds further, that what this means
is that it is not a “determinate concept” of the understanding, but rather an “indeterminate
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concept.” 66 And what is the indeterminate concept that makes this “state of mind” universally communicable? Again, the resolution to the Antinomy of Taste, it is the idea of the
supreme principle of purposiveness in a supersensible substratum, that is, the idea of
freedom and lawfulness in a free lawful relation whereby the empirical free play is universally necessary.67 Thus the first-layer purposiveness, the free lawfulness of the imagination is given by reflecting judgment as a pure representation, an “indeterminate concept” for the lawful, universal communicability of the state of mind, or free play of the
cognitive faculties.
(4.3) Third Moment of an Aesthetic Judgment of the Beautiful
Kant then frames the third moment as follows: “Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of an end.”68
This moment is vital, because from the first, we had not the properties of the object nor the object given in intuition, but rather the “representation” of our “state of
mind,” add to that a form that is not a determinate concept of the understanding, but the
representation of the supreme principle of purposiveness itself, and the judgment seems
highly singular (as it is) and equally insignificant. However, in this third moment, we find
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To this end, the resolution reads: “Thus, the thesis should say that the judgment of taste is not based on
determinate concepts; but in the antithesis, it should say that the judgment of taste is still based on some,
although indeterminate concept (namely, of the supersensible substratum of appearances); and then there
would be no conflict between them” (KU 5:340).
The unifying term can only be an “indeterminate concept” (5:341, 5:217), namely the “concept of the supersensible” and this is the concept of “a general ground for the subjective purposiveness of nature for the
power of judgment” (5:346), i.e. the representation of free lawfulness of the imagination (5:240), or “lawfulness without a law” (5:355, 5:287, 5:241). And Kant has already said that the concept of the “subjective
purposiveness of nature for the power of judgment” arises from the a priori principle of purposiveness
(5:287, 5:217). So, the concept of the supersensible that serves as the unifying term or (indeterminate concept) is the representation of the free-lawful, purposive relation of the imagination and the understanding.
67
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the form of the judgment is such that it takes the very representation of purposiveness in
both the “state of mind” of the first moment, and the “indeterminate concept” of the second moment, and employs this as a valid attribution to the object “insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of an end.” If we take this moment in isolation, it almost seems to validate a reintroduction of the properties of the object. However, if held in
productive lawful unity with the other moments that are the form of the judgment, it is
clear that this purposive form is a free lawful structure of the cognitive faculties that is
attributed to the object as if the “form of purposiveness” were its property. The validity of
this pertains to the two-fold fact that the object first gives rise to the state of mind in
which the judgment occurs, and second, that state of mind is synthetic a priori valid according to the supreme principle of purposiveness, i.e. free lawfulness of the imagination.
Namely, through this supreme principle, it is lawful to judge of the object that it is such
an X as ought to give rise to such a state of mind in any judging subject. Where this ought
is precisely the heautonomy of an aesthetic judgment grounded in the free lawfulness of
the imagination.
(4.4) Fourth Moment of an Aesthetic Judgment of the Beautiful
Finally, Kant articulates the fourth moment as follows: “That is beautiful which
is cognized without a concept as the object of a necessary satisfaction.” 69 Because the
free play of the faculties is itself the harmonious free lawfulness in accord with the
supreme principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination, and because the judging form
by which an object gives rise to such a state that is universally communicable without a
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concept, it is thereby modally necessary that all discursive reasoners assent to the free
lawful validity of this judgment. That is, every judging subject ought to judge of the object that it is beautiful because the structure of the mind, whereby such judgments and
their form are given, is itself grounded in the free lawfulness of the synthetic a priori
principle of reflecting judgment. That is, it is a supreme principle a priori that constitutes
part of what it is to be a discursive reasoner. As such, no discursive reasoner can deny the
validity of such a judgment. In short, assent is heautonomously necessary.
(4.5) Beyond the Analytic of the Form of Aesthetic Judgments
According to Kant, it should be clear that “by the aesthetic power of judgment as
a special faculty necessarily nothing else can be meant than the reflecting power of
judgment…,”70 where “special faculty” just means the ability to make judgments according to a unique a priori principle of the mind. 71 It is worth pausing to ask why the aesthetic power of judgment is identifiable with the more general category of the reflecting
power of judgment, such that “necessarily nothing else can be meant by [the former] than
[the latter]”. This is a claim that Kant makes in the first introduction, but spells out at
length in Section 35, titled “The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the power
of judgment in general.”72
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KU 5:286-7. In the introduction, Kant precisely states that the “principle of formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of the power of judgment” (5:181) and further clarifies that it is “neither a
concept of nature nor a concept of freedom, since it attributes nothing at all to the object (of nature), but
rather only represents the unique way in which we must proceed in reflection on the object of nature…consequently it is a subjective principle (maxim) of the power of judgment” (5:184). This is key because it will
offer vital insight into the notion of “objective purposiveness” as grounded in this subjective principle of
purposiveness (5:197).
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To answer this question adequately would require an analysis of teleological
judgments (which will come in Chapter 5). For now, I will merely note, that Kant does
not retain the same divide between aesthetic and teleological that is so pervasive in the
scholarship on the subject. According to Kant, “the purposiveness of form in appearance
is beauty, and the faculty for judging it is taste” (20:249). This is strikingly similar to a
teleological judgment which likewise judges the mere “form of purposiveness” or “natural end” according to a concept of the “purposiveness of nature.” The difference is that the
judging of the form of purposiveness in the teleological case is an application to an object of nature as a regulative idea for cognizing nature. Whereas in the aesthetic, the application is to the judging subject. But if that is right, then the distinction between teleological and aesthetic judgments may have more to do with application than with the form
of the judgment. Again, if this is right, this might give a further layer of meaning to
Kant’s notion that the objective specification of purposiveness (i.e. a representation of the
purposiveness of nature) is “occasioned”73 by the subjective principle when the judging
subject judges of nature (i.e. of an object in experience). Unfortunately, that question
must be set to the side until Chapter 5.
In other words, this is yet another way in which Kant is describing in the aesthetic
deduction what he earlier concluded, namely that in judgments of the beautiful, the empirical productive imagination yields a representation/intuition that “sets into motion” or
causes the mind (according to the principle of purposiveness) to seek out an adequate
concept of the understanding, but the understanding is unable to provide an adequate
73
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concept.74 So, in short, the freedom of the imagination, “as the authoress of voluntary
forms of possible intuitions,” 75 holds the understanding in its service (where the understanding’s vocation is to provide an adequate unifying concept) for the sake of cognition
in general. 76
We can see then that the entire structure of synthetic a priori aesthetic judgments
“depends on the relation in which we would place the imagination.”77 Indeed, the whole
form of aesthetic judgment is structured by the three layer-significance of the imagination. (First-layer) the object of empirical imagination is subsumed under the (second layer) representation of the formal relation of the imagination and the understanding. It is
subsumed under, namely, the representation of a transcendental structural free play of the
imagination and the understanding wherein, the “understanding is in the service of the
imagination and not vice versa”).78 And this synthetic judgment is a priori universally
necessary through the deduction of its form in accord with the synthetic principle a priori
of the free lawfulness of the imagination, i.e. the principle of purposiveness as one of the
three supreme principles of pure reason in general.
(4.6) The Deduction of Aesthetic Free Lawfulness
Let us look more closely at the relationship between this principle and the judgment through the deduction. Recall that in the aesthetic deduction Kant argues that this
representation involves a unique kind of hylomorphism. Namely that the formal, a priori
74
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principle of reflecting judgment is the principle of free lawfulness in which the matterform relation that is grounded is not between intuition and concept, but between the faculty of matter (imagination) and the faculty of concepts (understanding).79
It is this formal, free lawful hylomorphic relation of the faculties (imagination and
the understanding) that makes possible all reflecting judgments (aesthetic and teleological), since it gives the law by which the faculty of form can be said to be in the service of
the faculty of matter: “As a subjective power of judgment, [it] contains a principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations
(i.e., of the imagination) under the faculty of concepts (i.e., the understanding), insofar as
the former in its freedom is in harmony with the latter in its lawfulness.”80 Likewise, the
law or form of the judgment “can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself…under the condition” of purposiveness.81 My suggestion, then, is that we understand
the product of the imagination, whereby it “schematizes without a concept,”82 to be the
representation of purposiveness as an indeterminate form for judging a manifold according to the idea of the beautiful.83 This representation of purposiveness is, as we saw
above, a purposiveness of the cognitive faculties, but as a representation, it here serves as
a kind schematized concept or rule of subsumption.
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This means that what the imagination “schematizes” is its very purposive relation to the understanding.
And this is how we should understand Kant’s claim that the “free play of the imagination and the understanding” is represented as the form for the subsumption of the manifold (5:286-7).
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Moreover, although the beautiful is thereby not a unity that determines the object,
so we cannot rightly say that the object is “objectively beautiful,” nevertheless we attribute beauty to the object “as if” it were a property of the object insofar as the object
sustains84 or holds85 the mind in a state where the satisfaction of matter and form in a
judgment (i.e. purposive fit) is felt, 86 yet indeterminate.87 Thus the state of mind is one in
which we are conscious of the fit between matter and form as is requisite for cognition,
yet the unity is not a cognition, but rather a unity of the object with a law given by the
mind to itself (heautonomy).88 That law, i.e. the principle of purposiveness represented as
the unifying form, is the (second layer) representation of a vital (first-layer) principle of
the mind: “the free lawfulness of the imagination”.
Unfortunately, there is not space here to discuss the much-debated “feeling of
pleasure.”89 For now, it must suffice to say that Kant identifies the “feeling of pleasure”
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In this passage, Kant says that the feeling of pleasure is not “the sensation in an empirical representation
of the object, nor as its concept, but must be regarded as dependent only on reflection and its form” (KU,
first introduction, 20:249, 5:222). Where the form is “the special action of the power of judgment” and “by
means of which it strives to rise from intuitions to concepts in general, and as connected with it in accordance with a principle a priori” (20:249; 5:295-6). So, the aesthetic power of judgment is “nothing else”
than the pure (unmixed) use of the reflecting power of judgment and the feeling of pleasure at the heart of
the subjective universality of the judgment is nothing but the state of mind in the “representation of subjective purposiveness”. I emphasize here that the unique ground of the universality of these judgments is a
representation, it is a consciousness of the form of purposive reflection itself in the judging (KU 5:217-9,
5:287-8, 5:281-2, 5:218). Compare with Ginsborg’s view that the judgment and the pleasure are one, “On
the Key” (1991), reproduced in Chapter 2 of Normativity of Nature, pp. 32-52, as well as Pippin, 1996, for
whom the feeling of pleasure is not an “independent ‘ground’” of the judgment, but rather “a component of
the judgment of taste ‘regarded subjectively;’” and Zuckert, 2002, pp. 239-52. For a contrasting account to
my own, which identifies the pleasure as the purpose and worth of the judgment (i.e. the sought effect), see
Pollok’s account according to which we should “confine ourselves to ‘seeing,’ or …imagining…the phenomenal order of nature ‘just for pleasure’” (2017, 113, 273, 288-9, 288f.13).
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as immediately accompanying a “state of mind” (as we saw above) and as “identical with
the representation of subjective purposiveness.”90
The consciousness of the merely formal purposiveness in the play of the cognitive powers of the subject in the case of a representation through which an object
is given is the pleasure itself, because it contains a determining ground of the activity of the subject with regard to the animation of its cognitive powers, thus an
internal causality (which is purposive) with regard to cognition in general, but
without being restricted to a particular cognition, hence it contains a mere form
of the subjective purposiveness of a representation in an aesthetic judgment.91

We now have the principle of free lawfulness in view along with this same relation as a law of subsumption whereby the form of the judgment is made possible by a
representation of the free lawful relation of the imagination and the understanding. I will
now briefly return to the relation of the empirical intuition to this law of subsumption, a
subject already touched on in the discussion of the moments from the Analytic.
If an empirical object gives rise to such aesthetic reflections, we judge the object
as if beauty were a property of the object and so attribute purposiveness to the object itself as if the object really has a purposive form. This is a subjectively valid attribution,
because the object really is subjectively purposive for our faculty of reflecting.92 In this

90
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priori, universally necessary state of the faculties of the mind in relation to X-object, so while the beautiful
is not a property of the object, only objects that give rise to that specific harmony of the faculties can qualify as beautiful.
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sense, “purposiveness of form in appearance is beauty, and the faculty for judging it is
taste.”93 The purposiveness of form in the object is a form attributed to the object as a result of the object’s giving rise to such a mental state but always remains a reflecting
judgment, i.e. “as if” it were purposive or “as if” beauty were a property of the object.94
This judgment is constitutive for the judging subject, but only regulative for the object.
That is, we cannot determine the object as actually purposive, as if this were actually a
property of the object, which would be a determining judgment and so could not take
purposiveness as its form but would have to take the schematism of the understanding
under the synthetic unity of apperception as the ground of the validity of the judgment, in
which case, the idea of the beautiful as the form of purposiveness between the object and
the judging subject would disappear. This is the case since this relation between the object and judging subject only arises through the free lawfulness of the judging subject
whereby an object can be taken as according with the interiority of the free lawful structure of the reflecting act of a discursive reasoner. If we could attribute beauty to the object as a real property, then it would be determining and so constitutive of nature.95
So, putting these formal components together: the empirical imagination actively
yields an empirical intuition, i.e. a manifold as an object to be judged, for which an adequate concept (i.e. unifying form) is sought (but for which no adequate determinate concept can be given). This seeking for an adequate concept is the giving rise (according to
93

KU, first introduction, 20:249
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2005, pp. 332-3.
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The question of the purposiveness of form in the judging of an object is a key consideration, but it must
be distinguished (as secondary) to the purely formal principle of the purposive relation between the imagination and the understanding (as primary).
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the four moments of an aesthetic judgment of the beautiful) to a real (not ideal) state of
mind in which the imagination and the understanding stand in reciprocal free play. 96 This
real free play is a state of mind that is judged according to an ideal (i.e. transcendental)
free lawful harmony of the faculties, which is a priori valid because of the supreme principle of free lawfulness.
The four moments of a judgment of the beautiful, which we discussed above,
specify the way in which the object as matter (here the mere form of purposiveness that is
retroactively attributed to the object) is judged according to the representation of the free
lawfulness of the imagination.97 These moments specify that aesthetic judgments of the
beautiful are qualitatively disinterested,98 quantitatively universal,99 relationally purposive,100 and modally necessary.101 These are specifications precisely in that they specify
the way in which the empirical intuition is unified with the form and further the relation
that the unity of the two have to the faculties of the mind, namely the free lawful necessity of the formal subjective purposiveness.
An object that makes possible the sustained play of the faculties of the mind is
thereby judged to be beautiful, i.e. the object is unified according to the principle of this
reciprocal relation (i.e. the free play of the imagination and the understanding) as the only
concept (again schematized representation of purposiveness) “adequate” to the manifold
96
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(matter). 102 This resulting, indeterminate fit yields satisfaction for cognition, but does so
despite not actually yielding a cognition (an adequate concept for the manifold), since
“beauty is not a quality of the object considered for itself.” 103
So, uniquely, in judgments of the beautiful, the imagination in its freedom (1) necessitates the principle of purposiveness (i.e. free lawfulness) and (2) gives rise to a law
of subsumption according to a unifying form (i.e. representation of free lawfulness) for
(3) the indeterminate subsumption of an empirical intuition.
The imagination is active, then, in a three-fold manner.104 We will see that this
three-fold significance of the imagination likewise shows up again in judgments of the
sublime. These three functions are all specifications of a single productive power of the
mind.105 We should not be surprised to find as we consider the other forms of aesthetic
and teleological judgments that the distinctions are merely the outworking of the different
relations of the imagination to the other faculties of cognition. 106 In short, we will find
that because the synthetic principle a priori of reflecting judgment is the free lawfulness
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This three-fold function of the imagination should not be understood as an aggregate of distinct functions.
105 Although I speak of a three-fold significance, my argument is that there is a single imagination, which
just is the identification of the free productive power of the mind, and it is merely the relation that this productive power stands to lawfulness and sense that determines which of the three-layer significance we have
in view. Of course, we bring such layers into view only through transcendental reflection. Otherwise, it is
all one and the same productive power of an empirical discursive reasoner. Within a transcendental account,
however, unlike Ginsborg (2015, 34), I do think that the second and third-layers significances are layers of
specification in relation to the faculties of form (understanding and reason), with the purposive structure of
being “for the sake of cognition in general” (KU 5:217-9, 20:223-4), which “expands the faculties of the
mind” in accordance with the principle of reason for systematic unity.
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of the imagination, the specific difference between kinds of reflecting judgment “depends
on the relation in which we would place the imagination.” 107
§5) Synthetic A Priori Aesthetic Judgments of the Sublime
If my thesis is right, then by explicating the form of judgments of the beautiful
qua aesthetic judgment, the task at hand is merely a matter of showing that the structure
is the same qua aesthetic judgment while also noting the key formal sub-differences that
make it a distinct kind of aesthetic judgment. After all, Kant says, “the judgment on the
sublime in nature is not to be excluded from the division of the aesthetic of the reflecting
power of judgment, because it also expresses a subjective purposiveness which is not
based on a concept of the object.”108
As the principle of aesthetic judgment, the principle of purposiveness, i.e., the
“free lawfulness of the imagination,”109 is necessarily the ground of the lawful authority
of the judgment of the sublime.110 Just as in judgments of the beautiful, in judgments of
the sublime there is a purposive play of the faculty of intuitions (imagination) with the
faculty of form, but instead of the understanding as the faculty for yielding determinate
concepts, we find the imagination “is related to reason” as the faculty for yielding ideas
as the adequate form.111 This is still a relation that accords with the general principle of
free lawfulness of reflecting judgments since it is that reflectively purposive relation be-
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tween the free productivity of the mind (the imagination) and the lawful faculty of reason
which yields ideas of reason for the unifying term in the judgment.112 Here too, as with
the understanding in judgments of the beautiful, reason as a faculty of form is in the service of the imagination and “not vice versa.” 113 However, the specification is unique.
The imagination, as faculty for yielding intuitions, moves the mind according to
the principle of reflecting judgment (free lawfulness) to seek out a form adequate to the
synthesizes empirical manifold (e.g. of an expanse of space or of the intellect).
Although the idea of reason arises reflectively, (i.e. in the service of the imagination) quite surprisingly, the intuition, the product of the imagination itself, is
inadequate.114 That is, the imagination fails in the very task that it sets before the mind,
namely to reflect on the limitless expanse. The manifold of the given is greater than the
imagination is able to yield in intuition.115 That is, the imagination attempts to take up a
manifold and yield it as a quasi-infinite or infinite magnitude (and this endeavor gives
rise to the purposive work of reason for an adequate form). Despite giving rise to the purposive play of the faculties, the imagination turns out to be inadequate to the very task
that it began. More specifically, while reason successfully yields a form adequate to its
unification (namely, the idea of a mathematical infinite or sensible “limitlessness”, i.e. the
mathematical and dynamical sublime), the imagination is unable to yield an adequate intuition (i.e. the representation of the manifold in a single whole).116 By contrast with
112
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judgments of the beautiful, where the understanding was unable to yield an adequate concept, and so the faculties remain in a state of “free play” of “lingering,” “sustaining,”
“maintaining” their harmonious accord without resulting in a cognition/end of the judgment.117 Here, in the sublime, the opposite is the case. Reason shows itself to be adequate
to its task. The inadequacy is on the part of the imagination. The result of this inadequacy
is what Kant identifies as “contrapurposive.”118
There is no conceptual problem between the principle of purposiveness and the
fact that this inadequacy in the effort of the mind under that principle is characterizable as
“contrapurposive,” or “subjective non-purposiveness.”119 The reason is his. Apprehension
of the sublime is “contrapurposive,” since, rather than a state of “calm” and “harmonious
play” between the faculties of matter and form, the state of the mind in the judging of the
sublime is a kind of frantic “movement” of the imagination such that it is “not play but
something serious in the activity of the imagination.” 120 In other words, the sublime is
contrapurposive, because “what is properly sublime cannot be contained in any sensible
form.” Again, at first glance, there might seem to be a contradiction. After all, in contrast
with the theoretical or practical domains, here in the domain of “the imagination in its
freedom,” we find reason in the service of the imagination. So, why is contrapurposiveness not in conflict with the principle of purposiveness?
Let us look more closely. It is precisely because “no presentation adequate to
[such manifolds] is possible” that the sublime as an idea of reason is “provoked and
117
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called to mind” as the adequate form.121 This relation between the faculties is the free
lawfulness of the principle of purposiveness. In other words, the faculties stand in a purposive relation according to a transcendental rule of purposive relation (schematized
without a concept) to one another, but in the empirical imagination falls short in the actual execution of this judgment. Since such judgment depends not merely on its analytic
form, but also on the content given to it. Since the content to be judged is precisely incapable of arising as a determinable intuition because of the failure of the imagination. This
failure of the empirical productive imagination is the result of the fact that it is a finite
productive power of the mind striving to synthesis an infinite or quasi-infinite expanse in
a single whole of intuition). It is the mind’s recognition of this falling short of its own
discursive power of production that is a felt contrapurposiveness. It is the felt “finitude”
of the mind. However, that contrapurposiveness is at the level of the actual subsumption
of the manifold, not at the level of the principle by which the faculties are held together in
this purposive relation.122
The normative demand originates first from the (second layer) transcendental
purposive relation that is the law of subsumption where reason is in the service of the
imagination, a lawful form that is itself a representation of the (first layer) supreme principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination. So it is not an external, heteronomous demand, but rather an internal, heautonomous demand123 of the imagination “in its freedom” on the empirical imagination as the empirical productive power of the mind, “as
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productive and self-active (as the authoress of voluntary forms of possible intuitions).”124
This demand on the imagination is felt as an obligation, i.e. law, to which it must conform, but to which it is inadequate. The demand or “felt obligation” is not the idea of reason, but rather the very principle of free lawfulness whereby the reflecting judgment occurs. There would be no sublime as an idea of reason if it were not also first called on to
yield a form for some infinite expanse as the product of the imagination. And even if
there were somehow such an idea of reason apart from the productive synthesis of the
imagination, the idea would not stand in a normative relation to the imagination apart
from the purposive form that holds the faculties in the relation to each other that they
have. The demand or obligation stems precisely from this purposive form by which the
imagination and reason are held together in a purposive movement of expectation (each
on the other). So, even though the sensible productive imagination (third-layer significance), cannot complete that process, the process itself is still a purposive one between
the faculties.
This means, the sublime is not a law for application to nature but is rather an idea
that arises to account for that which experience (via the imagination) yields as a “formless object insofar as limitlessness is represented in it…yet it is also thought as a
totality.” 125 The very law that causes a “contrapurposive” state of judging is only possible
because of the synthetic, a priori principle of purposiveness whereby reflecting judgment
is heautonomous (i.e. the self-legislation of a free lawful discursive reasoner).
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To understand this form in judgments of the sublime, we should look more closely
at what Kant has to say about the structure of this problematic relationship between the
imagination and reason. The relationship is simultaneously one in which the imagination
is in “accord with the faculty of concepts of the understanding or of reason, as promoting
[reason in general].” 126 To this extent, the (second and third-layer) imagination is, as in
the judgment of the beautiful, in purposive play with the faculty of form. Yet, simultaneously, it is in necessary discord with reason, since “no presentation adequate to [the form]
is possible”.127 In the first case, (the second-layer significance of the imagination), it is in
transcendental accord, in the second (the third-layer significance of the imagination) it is
in empirical discord. But the discord of the latter is only possible because of the accord of
the former.
Tracking precisely with this second and third-layer distinction, Kant describes the
judgment as yielding a mixed, two-fold feeling. The satisfaction arising with the sublime
is a mix of “indirect” pleasure that stems from its purposive relation, and displeasure because of the “momentary inhibition of the vital powers.”128 This inhibition is felt by the
mind as “something serious” as a form that is “contrapurposive for our power of judgment, unsuitable for our faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to our
imagination.”129 Whereas the satisfaction in the case of the beautiful is attributed to
“nothing but the form of the purposiveness of an object,”130 in the case of the sublime, the
126
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two-fold movement of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, of “attraction” and “repulsion,”131
consists “in the enlargement of the imagination itself,” 132 where this “enlargement” is
necessarily the empirical productive imagination in its third-layer (not first-layer significance), though possibly also an “enlargement” of the second-layer imagination.
In short, “the satisfaction in the sublime, just like that in the beautiful, must be
represented as universally valid in its quantity, as without interest in its quality, as subjective purposiveness in its relation, and the latter, as far as its modality is concerned, as
necessary.”133 The judgment form is identical. But the faculties in play are different as are
their adequacy to the task. Here, the imagination is incapable of meeting the demand set
on it by its own principle of free lawfulness.
Even in this relation between the imagination and reason, however, the judgment
of the sublime involves “merely the subjective play of the powers of the mind (imagination and reason) as harmonious even in their contrast”.134 In both cases, “it is the disposition of the mind resulting from a certain representation occupying the reflective judgment, but not the object, which is to be called sublime.”135 In other words, it is the “violence” done to the imagination in such judgments that presents itself as both problematic
and satisfying; satisfying because it is this movement of the mind that leads to the “enlargement of the imagination itself,”136 and this enlargement is “purposive for the whole
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vocation of the mind,”137 i.e. for the expansion and unity of reason in general, which is a
fundamental directive of the principle of the free lawfulness of the productive power of
the mind.138 The “enlargement of the imagination itself” is necessarily “purposive for the
whole vocation of the mind” because the imagination as the productive power of the
mind is elsewhere (in the domains of cognition and practical reason) in the service of the
understanding and reason. That is, the contrapurposive “violence” to the imagination is a
source of growth that reflecting judgment makes possible, which in turn expands the possibility whereby the imagination adequately serves the understanding as the faculty of
intuitions for determining judgments and reason as that which yields “symbols” as the
representational content of practical ideas and syllogistic inferences.139 Thus, beyond the
inherent value in the judgments of the sublime, they also show themselves to be “purposive for the whole vocation of the mind.”140
Conclusion
In both aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and aesthetic judgments of the sublime, the form and free lawful, universal validity accords with the same three-layer significance of the imagination. Thee free lawfulness of the imagination as the principle that
makes aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and sublime is fundamentally a synthetic principle a priori of the productive power of the mind. As such, it is not surprising to find that
under its free lawfulness, we find various structures that are purposive for the expansion
of the mind in general. After all, the requirement on the faculties in reflecting judgments
137
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is not some external standard, but rather an internal demand of the productive power of
the “imagination in its freedom” (i.e. a “demand” necessitated by the first-layer significance, which conditions the other two).
In both cases, the indeterminate judgment reveals inadequacies internal to the
mind, but which are vital to its expansion and normative task. In each case, it is an aesthetic judgment because the faculty of form (whether the understanding or reason) is in
the service of the imagination, where this free lawfulness is both the heautonomous
ground of the judgment as a valid synthetic, a priori judgment (first-layer significance of
the imagination),141 and also the form (second-layer significance of the imagination)
whereby the judgment is a structural procedure of the faculties of the mind from a particular given toward some adequate form that is not determining but rather a reciprocal
“play,” “harmony,” and “movement.” The endeavor of the imagination (third-layer significance) to yield either the “mere form of purposiveness” of an object or an infinite expanse or magnitude in an empirical intuition is thereby bound by the form of the secondlayer (i.e. schematized representation of the transcendental purposive play where reason
and the understanding are “in the service of the imagination”) according to the free lawful
principle of the imagination (first-layer). As such, the three-layer significance of the
imagination structures these aesthetic judgments in a more thoroughgoing way than it did
in the KrV, since here, the domain just is the free lawfulness of the imagination, the productive power of the mind “in its freedom.”
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As the three-fold significance of the imagination suggests recognizing the coherence, structure, and significance of the aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and the sublime entirely “depends on the relation in which we would place the imagination.”142 As
we would expect when seeking to ground synthetic principles a priori, the supreme principle of free lawfulness is the condition of the universal validity and necessity of these
judgments. Thus, “if one draws the conclusion from the above analyses it turns out that
everything flows from the concept of …a faculty for judging an object in relation to the
free lawfulness of the imagination.”143
Put contentiously (by contemporary standards), but unavoidably: reason (in general) could not be reason and could not legislate as it must without the purposive structural relations between its faculty of the imagination, understanding, and (practical) reason.
These purposive relations not only ground aesthetic judgments but are vital structural
components of reason in general. In both cases, these pure, singular judgments bear the
authority of a deduction from the free lawfulness of a synthetic, a prior principle of reason in general.144
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CHAPTER 5

FREE LAWFULNESS IN JUDGMENTS OF
ART AND NATURAL ENDS

!192

§1) Introduction
If we ask any contemporary Kant scholar what kind or kinds of synthetic a priori
judgments the Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU) concerns, the answer will almost
exclusively be “judgments of taste” and in many, though fewer, cases “both judgments of
taste and teleological judgments.” If the latter, the answer is typically followed by some
qualification or expressed hesitancy as to the worth of teleological judgment, particularly
in light of Kant’s account of systematicity and empirical laws in the Critique of Pure
Reason (KrV). Of course, pure aesthetic (synthetic a priori) judgments of the sublime are
almost entirely ignored; but more puzzling than judgments of the sublime, to contemporary Kant scholars, is Kant’s account of judgments of art. In Henry Allison’s words,
“apart from the treatment of aesthetic and teleological judgment in a single work, perhaps
the strangest feature of the Critique of Judgment… is the fact that it is only near the very
end of the portion dealing with aesthetic judgment (§43 to be exact) that Kant turns to the
topic of fine art.”1 But if a discussion of art might be expected in an account of judgments
of the beautiful, what Kant actually gives is sufficiently baffling that it is simply ignored
in most accounts. Regarding judgments of fine art, Allison notes, “the whole discussion
of fine art and its connection with genius has an episodic character about it that makes it
difficult to integrate into the overall argument of the work.”2
However, it is no coincidence that scholars who ignore judgments of art in an account of the KU likewise, find the internal coherence of aesthetic and teleological judg-

1 Allison,
2

2001, p. 271.

Ibid, p. 271.
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ments obscure at best.3 Allison is one of the few scholars to draw attention to this fact.
Concerning the idea of a “natural end” and an “aesthetic idea,” Allison says, “here we
find an interesting and perhaps unexpected result, namely, that these two conceptions are
virtual mirror images of each other.”4 Just as importantly, Allison recognizes the normativity (lawfulness) of aesthetic judgments of art established via “Kant’s much-belated
‘deduction’ of judgments of fine art.”5 However, although Allison recognizes both that
“aesthetic ideas” and ideas of “natural ends” bear a uniquely analogous form,6 and that
the aesthetic deduction establishes the lawfulness of synthetic a priori judgments of art
according to aesthetic ideas (not just of judgments of the beautiful), he fails to take the
final step as to the significance of such judgments in the KU, and instead attributes a
“parergonal” role to them.7 Namely, they are valid and thereby important for Kant to include in a complete account of synthetic a priori judgments; yet, nevertheless, not of particular importance. By contrast, I suggest that what Allison noted as a perhaps surprising
mirror image of an aesthetic idea to an idea of a natural end, concerns precisely the very

3 Accounts

that look to the principle of purposiveness for the unifying thread come closest to defending the
kind of internal unity that Kant seemed to see. For alternative accounts to mine that likewise place this a
priori at the core of a systematic account of the KU, see Henry Allison, 2001, p. 242; Béatrice Longuenesse, 1998, 148-9; Konstantin Pollok, 2017, pp. 212, 218; Ernst Cassirer, 1983, p. 334, 311; Rachel Zuckert, 2007, pp. 321, 346; Hans-Georg Gadamer, 2004, pp. 37-49; on Gadamer’s conception of the same in
the KU, see also Kristin Gjesdal, 2007, p. 352. However, even among such rare, unified accounts as theirs,
judgments of art are a puzzle. Zuckert does not distinguish sharply between judgments of art and judgments
of the beautiful and sometimes seems to view judgments of the beautiful as encompassing judgments of art
insofar as the latter concerns the purposive form of the object and not a determinate property of the object
(Zuckert, 2007, pp. 345, 356. Aside from Alison, Cassirer, the others do not separate out a third synthetic a
priori aesthetic judgment in the KU that might be called an aesthetic judgment of art.
4 Allison, 2001, p. 278. In contrast to Allison and myself, see Paul Guyer’s review of Allison’s book in
which he critiques the view that they are analogous, 2002, pp. 406-08.
5 Allison,

2001, p. 274.
For an alternative account to both my own and to Allison’s, but which likewise recognizes the significance of keeping aesthetic judgments of art distinct from judgments of the beautiful, see Ernst Cassirer,
1970, pp. 84-5.
6
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2001, p. 272.
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essence of the significance of the third Critique. Judgments of art are not, per se, the core
of the KU, but it is in the significance of an “aesthetic idea” that we encounter the core of
the unity of aesthetic and teleological judgments and the path by which the supreme principle of purposiveness of aesthetic judgments grounds a faculty as a bridging function for
the domains of nature (determining judgments of the understanding) and the domain of
freedom (practical reason), “in its effect;” It is through the free lawfulness of the imagination in judgments of art that the purposiveness of reflecting judgment becomes “suitable
for mediating the connection of the domain of the concept of nature with the concept of
freedom in its consequences.”8 How this is possible is what I here undertake to show.
In short, what I will argue is that the synthetic a priori judgment of art is a judgment of a representation according to an “aesthetic idea” as an “idea of the whole” that is
the product of an artistic formative power (genius). This idea of the whole is the standard
by which the given manifold of nature is judged. In exactly the same way, and by the
same free lawful authority of the supreme principle of purposiveness, the teleological
judgment of nature is a judgment of an empirical intuition according to an “idea of a natural end” as an “idea of the whole” that is the product of an artistic formative power of
nature as “art and artist of itself.”9 The formative power of the subject is the Einbil-
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My paraphrase of KU 5:360-1: “hence we conceive of nature as technical through its own capacity;
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dungskraft of the judging subject. This same formative power attributed to nature is Bildungskraft.10
§2) Setting the Stage for an Analog of Aesthetic Ideas and Natural Ends
Although the pure aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and the sublime are undeniably central to the identifying of the principle of purposiveness and its critical domain
as well as to a complete account of synthetic a priori reflecting judgments, it is actually
judgments of art that make possible the closest structural analog between aesthetic and
teleological judgments. I use the term “judgments of art” to mean “synthetic a priori aesthetic judgments of a representation according to an aesthetic idea,” where “representation” can be either an intuition of an object or conceptual representation of the productive
imagination without anything external to the mental activity to which the representation
corresponds through empirical synthesis. Examples of conceptual representations occur
in what Kant calls “artistic genius” through which production of a work of art is possible
according to an idea of the whole given prior to a manifold, which is the cause or form of
that which is produced in accordance with the artistic idea of the whole.
If a determinate concept of the understanding can be called “characteristic” of determining judgments of the understanding (by which the manifold is unified for cognition), then an “aesthetic idea” is characteristic of an aesthetic judgment of art, and an
“idea of a natural end” is characteristic of a teleological judgment of nature (and as we
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KU 5:374; I take Kant to be saying that the attribution of "design" to an organic object is regulatively
valid because we take this to be a causal "property" of the object itself for the sake of the judging subject.
By contrast, if that purposive design were attributed to some "designer/artist/God" (as we attribute a work
of art to an artist), then it would be constitutive of the object (but invalidly so). So the regulative attribution
is that the organic object just is its own artist. I.e. the "formative power" [Bildungskraft] is internal to it.
This is the idea of a natural end or purposiveness in organic wholes.
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have seen the idea of the beautiful and the sublime are likewise characteristic of those
kinds of synthetic a priori judgments).
In this chapter, I pose the quite straightforward, but unique suggestion that aesthetic judgments of art and teleological judgments of nature bear a vital relation to one
another such that the idea of a “natural end” cannot be properly understood without a
clear conception of the an “aesthetic idea” and vice versa. Moreover, such an account of
the significant internal relation of judgments of art and judgments of natural ends, is vital
to a fuller account of reflecting judgments as containing not merely the pure aesthetic
judgments of the beautiful and the sublime, but just as significantly, judgments of art and
judgments of natural ends. As I have argued in the preceding chapters, the synthetic a
priori principle of purposiveness is the ground on which a critique of the power of judgment is possible to begin with. I argue that, if we take seriously the structural relation between judgments of art and teleological judgments in light of this general principle, we
bring into view both the particular structures of these judgments as well as the ground for
Kant’s often claimed “bridging” function between freedom and nature that reflecting
judgment supposedly achieves. More specifically, it becomes clear how aesthetic judgments and teleological judgments are rightly unified under the category synthetic, a priori reflecting judgment.
(2.1) Three-layer Significance of the Imagination and the Corresponding Layers of Purposiveness
As in the previous chapters, my account depends on a three-layer conception of
the imagination. In reflecting judgment, as we have seen, this results in a three-layer con-
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ception of purposiveness. On the first layer is the supreme principle of purposiveness,
which is the free lawfulness of the imagination. This is not a real, but a purely transcendental ideal principle that grounds the lawfulness of synthetic a priori reflecting judgments. On the second-level, are specifications of this supreme principle as rules or forms
for special kinds of judgments. Here we find a subjective specification as the free play of
the imagination and the understanding as the representation of purposiveness for pure
aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and sublime. Likewise, we find an objective specification as the concept of a purposiveness of nature, a representation of purposiveness for
the application of the supreme principle through reflecting judgment to the realm of nature, where objects in the realm of nature are both works of art (by a phenomenal creating/judging subject, i.e. genius), and natural ends (by nature as a formative power: “hence
we conceive of nature as technical through its own capacity”).11 I suggest that this distinction between the (first-layer) supreme principle of purposiveness in accord with
which the critique needs a deduction, and the (second-layer) purposiveness as an application of this principle as a rule for judging is fundamental. The second-layer purposiveness
as an application to the realm of nature is an idea of the purposiveness of nature that
serves as a regulative a priori principle for the judging of objects of nature. But this status is still one wherewith it is “occasioned” by the supreme principle in its application
(through reflecting judgment) to experience. As such, it is a specification of the supreme
principle and thereby still an “a priori principle, even if it is merely regulative and even if
that end lies only in the idea of the one who judges and never in any efficient cause. One
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can thus call this principle a maxim for the judging of the inner purposiveness of organized beings.”12 This specification of purposiveness, will, as we see take an “idea of reason” as its form, but it will not thereby derive its principle from reason. After all, as we
have seen, “the reflecting power of judgment, therefore, can only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law, and cannot derive it from anywhere else (for then it would
be the determining power of judgment).” Unlike in pure aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and the sublime, this second layer “giving itself such a transcendental principle as a
law” is “occasioned”13 by reflection on nature. This second-layer purposiveness is the
concept of a purposiveness of nature. It is this second-layer purposiveness that will be the
law for judging art and natural ends, whereby these ideas of reason become the unifying
terms for such reflecting judgments in the realm of nature.
To this end, Kant says of the second-layer objective specification of purposiveness which is the law for judgments of art and natural ends (as opposed to the subjective
specification which is the law for pure aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and the sublime):
if nature is considered technically (or plastically), on account of an analogy
which its causality must be represented as having with that of art, its procedure
can be called technical, i.e., as it were artistic… The critique of the reflecting
power of judgment with regard to nature will therefore consist of two parts, the
critique of the aesthetic and of the teleological power of judging things in nature.14

While this passage on its own might be taken as referring simply to the full division of the third Critique, we will see that what Kant really has in view by the term a cri12
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tique “of the reflecting power of judgment with regard to nature,” is the application of
this unique power of the mind to nature. In relation to nature, we find not merely purposiveness as a representation of the free play of the faculties, but the representation of an
objective purposiveness of nature. This representation of an objective purposiveness is
the representing of the supreme principle of purposiveness as an idea of reason, namely
either an “aesthetic idea” or a “natural end.”
The lawfulness is still the first-layer supreme principle of purposiveness, but the
(second-layer) law for judging turns out to be an idea of reason as the representation of
that supreme principle for the application to nature. We must keep this strictly in mind:
although the aesthetic idea and the idea of a natural end are both ideas of reason according to the idea of a purposiveness of nature, that idea of a purposiveness of nature is given not by pure practical reason, but by the reflecting judgment. That is, it is an idea that
arises where reason is “in the service of the imagination and not vice versa.”15 This is absolutely necessary since, “the reflecting power of judgment… can only give itself such a
transcendental principle as a law, and cannot derive it from anywhere else (for then it
would be the determining power of judgment).”16 This is further why, Kant will attribute
these ideas to the work of the imagination in “approximating” an idea of reason,17 but
what he means is that it is the imagination in its freedom, where reason is in its service
15

KU 5:242, recall that for reason to be in the service of the imagination in reflecting judgment just means
that the relation of freedom and lawfulness governing the use of reason is one of a free lawfulness, such
that lawfulness is subjugated to freedom. For reflecting judgment to derive the idea of a purposiveness of
nature from reason would be for the idea to be given in accord with the supreme principle of the freedom of
the will in which case Freedom and Lawfulness “reciprocally imply each other” (KPV 5:29). For more on
the three necessary relations of freedom and lawfulness represented by the three supreme principles of reason, see Chapter 4, section 2.1 on “Three Layers of Purposiveness.”
16 KU 5:180
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(as is the understanding). Thus, it is actually an idea of reason, but not as an external determinate law, but is rather an idea of reason arising through the freedom of the imagination as an approximation of such a determining law of reason, yet, which is “lawfulness
without a law” as is required by the supreme principle of the free lawfulness of reflecting
judgment.18 So, the idea of a natural end is a representation of the imagination that is
rightly called an “idea” since reason is in its service, yet which is not an idea of reason as
an external law for the determination of the manifold, but remains a “representation of
the imagination” as an “idea”19 through the subordination of reason in a free lawfulness
“without law.”20
The law or second-layer specification of purposiveness as an idea of reason
(namely, the idea of a purposiveness of nature) just is the supreme principle of purposiveness given as a law for the application of reflecting judgment to the realm of nature.
In contrast with its subjective specification, which likewise is a representation of
the imagination –where it serves as an indeterminate concept of the free lawful, harmonious play of the faculties– here it is applied to or “occasioned” by an object in the realm
of nature. As a second-layer objective specification of the supreme principle of purposiveness, we find,
the concept of the purposiveness of nature in its products is a concept that is necessary for the human power of judgment in regard to nature but does not pertain
to the determination of the objects themselves, thus a subjective principle of reason for the power of judgment which, as regulative (not constitutive), is just as
necessarily valid for our human power of judgment as if it were an objective
principle.21
18
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By contrast with its analog to the subjective specification of the supreme principle, “One can thus call this principle a maxim for the judging of the inner purposiveness
of organized beings.”22
(2.2.) Aesthetic Ideas and Natural Ends
I will identify the manner in which an “aesthetic idea” is the unifying term in the
aesthetic judgments of art, where judgments of art take the concept of an objective purposiveness as its law in the judging of a representation. Likewise a “natural end” is the unifying term, which serves as the product of a reflecting judgment that takes the concept of
an objective purposiveness as its law in the judging of an object. As we will see, both
judgments are lawful synthetic a priori judgments because they proceed according to the
free lawfulness of the principle of purposiveness which makes possible the heautonomous status of synthetic, a priori reflecting judgments in general.
In regard to the first-layer supreme principle of purposiveness, they are subjective.23 In regard to their second-layer principle/law/maxim of application, i.e. their law
for judging of representations/objects, they are objective. Insofar as they proceed according to an objective principle of application, they concern nature but are only regulative
for nature (they do not determine cognition of nature). They are regulative since to be
constitutive of cognition of nature, is to be a determining judgment, but this would over-

22

KU 5:376

23
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an identity of supersensible and sensible reasoning self: a human being.
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step the lawful bounds of the supreme, subjective principle of purposiveness through
which the free lawfulness of their objective application of purposiveness is possible.24
Thus, any such attribution, as we will see, would be an invalidation of their very heatonmous, free lawful authority, and thus they would no longer be valid synthetic a priori
judgments.
What I will suggest, is that while both have their authority from the supreme principle of purposiveness as free lawfulness, the law or form of application is the secondlayer principle of purposiveness (which is a specification of the first as an application to
objects of nature). As a specification, it is precisely that parallel stage to pure aesthetic
judgments where reflecting judgment “gives itself such a transcendental principle as
law.”25 However, instead of the second-layer imagination representing the supreme principle of purposiveness or free lawfulness of the imagination as a concept of indeterminate
purposiveness, as a law (i.e. as a free lawful, harmonious play of the faculties), here, in
judgments of art and natural ends, we have a second-layer conception of purposiveness
that takes an idea of reason as the law of purposiveness for an object/representation of
nature. That is the second-layer conception of purposiveness in the application of the
supreme principle to the realm of nature is the “idea of a purposiveness of nature” for the
subjective judging of nature according to “final ends” or “aesthetic ideas.” My suggestion
is that these two second-layer representations of the imagination are the same, with the
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sole difference that the latter is occasioned by an object of nature (i.e. concerns that object), while the former is occasioned by a “state of mind” that arises from an object.26
We will see later on that this distinction between first and second-layer conceptions of purposiveness will be the ground for identifying why teleological judgments do
not need a deduction from a unique principle but stand under the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments according to the free lawfulness of the imagination. While still taking a
unique second-layer maxim of purposiveness as their rule. This second-layer specification is the concept of a purposiveness of nature. This principle of application will result in
analogous ideas of reflecting judgment: Namely, “aesthetic ideas” and “natural end.”
These two analogous results are distinct not in their second-layer rule of application according to an objective principle of purposiveness (which is the same in both), but in the
content to which they apply. Both concern objects of nature, but judgments of art concern
objects of nature produced by the judging subject as both a supersensible and sensible
productive power (i.e. artistic genius), 27whereas teleological judgments also concern objects of nature, but objects of nature that are produced not by the judging subject, but by
nature itself as if it possessed the same productive power by which artistic genius yields a
product; it is thereby judged according to its own analog of artistic genius, namely Bildungskraft28 or formative force (i.e. which is nothing but the regulative analog of artistic
genius).
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§3) Aesthetic Judgments of Art
It is in Kant’s discussion of aesthetic judgments of art in the aesthetic deduction
that we find terms like “aesthetic idea,” “genius,” and “spirit.” If we proceed with this
material out of context misunderstanding is understandable. Between the mystical terms
and the relatively brief passages concerning them, it sure can seem like a moment of critical fugue. Nor does a quick situating of these terms in their context seem to help. Their
definitions can feel somewhat circular. After all, Kant describes “aesthetic ideas” as the
product of “genius” according to the “spirit” as an “animating principle of the mind”
which takes four moments similar to an aesthetic judgment of the beautiful, yet which
depends on determinate concepts of the understanding, and further takes its rule from the
principle of reflecting judgment in accordance with ideas of reason.29
However, Kant’s account is quite clear and systematically intuitive if we proceed
as he directed in regard to both judgments of the beautiful and the sublime with an analysis of the relational differences in which the imagination, as productive faculty of the
mind, stands with the understanding and reason as the lawful faculties for giving form in
general. Or in Kant’s words, “the lawfulness of the power of the judgment in its freedom,
[die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Urteilskraft in ihrer Freiheit]” is such that “the satisfaction in
the object depends on the relation in which we would place the imagination…”30

29

To say that aesthetic ideas do not follow a rule is to miss the way in which the reflecting power of judgment gives the rule to itself via the free lawfulness of the imagination, and it does so in various ways (pure
in the case of judgments of the beautiful, and mixed in aesthetic judgments of art and teleology). The rule is
precisely the concepts of subjective and objective purposiveness as specified (second-layer) principles for
judging, according to the free lawfulness of the imagination. Of course, this lawful necessity is “without
law” and must be carefully specified. For an alternative account, see Jane Kneller, 2007, p. 152.
30

KU 5:270: “Das Wohlgefallen an dem Gegenstande hängt von der Beziehung ab, in welcher wir die Einbildungskraft setzen wollen; nur daß sie für sich selbst das Gemüt in freier Beschäftigung unterhalte.”
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This purposive relation between the basic faculties of free productivity and lawfulness serves as the ground on which universal subjective validity can be attributed to
the reflecting judgment of a free productive or formative power (of genius or nature) in
such a way that these become valid judgments in the realm of nature according to ideas of
reason.
We have already discussed at length, in Chapter 3,31 how the first-layer conception of purposiveness is the supreme, synthetic a priori principle by which a critique of
synthetic a priori reflecting judgment is possible.32 As we saw, free lawfulness of the
imagination as “the principle of [aesthetic judgments of the beautiful] is the subjective
principle of the power of judgment in general.”33 Further, as we also saw, “the power of
judgment in general” is comprised of determining and reflecting judgments.34 Determining judgments of the understanding stand under an “objective principle” of the power of
judgment in general, namely the synthetic unity of apperception, which made possible the
KrV. Reflecting judgments stand under the “subjective principle” of the power of judgment in general,35 namely the “principle of purposiveness”36 or what we found to be the
same: “free lawfulness of the imagination,”37 which makes possible the KU.38 The formal subjective principle of purposiveness in the judgments of the beautiful just is, accord31

See Ch. 3, §2 “The Architectonic of the Third Critique,” esp. subsection 2.3 “Subjective and Objective
Division of the Power of Judgment in General” and subsection 2.4 “Two Kinds of Synthetic A priori Reflecting Judgment: Teleological and Aesthetic”
32 KU, first introduction, 20:243
33

KU 5:286

34

KU 5:179-80
KU 5:289-90

35
36
37
38

KU 5:184
KU 5:240
KU 5:191-2

!206

ing to Kant, the principle of the reflecting power of judgment in general.39 As such, it
should not come as a surprise that in the “Deduction of pure aesthetic judgments”,40 Kant
concerns himself predominately with a deduction of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful
and “by this means accomplish the task for the whole of the aesthetic power of judgment
in its entirety.”41
(3.1) Deduction and Analytic of Aesthetic Judgments of Art
The inevitable question is this: even if the deduction of aesthetic judgments of the
beautiful serves as the deduction for all aesthetic judgments as Kant claims, where is the
Analytic of Judgments of Art? The analytic is that through which the form of the judgment is given. So even if the free lawfulness of aesthetic judgments of art is given
through the deduction, we should expect an analytic if it is really a unique synthetic a
priori aesthetic judgment.
The answer to this will strike readers initially as strange. Namely, while for judgments of the sublime the exposition of the analytic served “at the same time” as the deduction, in aesthetic judgments of art, the deduction serves at the same time as their analytic. How can this be? What we will find in our analysis hereinafter is that the free law-
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KU 5:286-8, C.f. section 35 of the aesthetic deduction. See also: KU, first introduction, 20:249, 20:239,
20:226
40 After all, if the aesthetic deduction is meant to establish the lawfulness of aesthetic judgments, and the
principle that reflecting judgment gives itself as a law in judgments of the beautiful, just is “the subjective
principle of the power of judgment in general” (KU 5:286), then, insofar as a judgment takes that same
principle as its law, a deduction for one judgment (e.g. judgment of the beautiful) necessarily “by this
means accomplish(es) the task for the whole of the aesthetic power of judgment in its entirety” (KU 5:280).
Moreover, if in a particular judgment the reflecting power of judgment does not “give itself such a transcendental principle as a law” (KU 5:180), then it is necessarily either not a synthetic a priori judgment (in
which case no deduction is needed), or it is a judgment in the service of reason or the understanding, in
which case the lawfulness does not stem from the principle of purposiveness and the judgment cannot be
considered a reflecting judgment.
41
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fulness that becomes the rule/law for aesthetic judgments of the beautiful and the sublime
and is thereby the constitutive form of those judgment types, is necessarily thereby the
analytic of all judgments that fall under that deduction.
If this is right, then why do we get an analytic of the beautiful and the sublime if
these could have been included in a larger single chapter: “the deduction of pure aesthetic
judgments”?42 I suggest that the answer is twofold. First, Kant is following the method of
the previous critiques for good reason. It is already hard for critics to recognize the thoroughgoing structural unity of the KU with the other two Critiques. By following the same
pattern as the other two, Kant seeks to make explicit the same method of determining the
possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. Second, these judgments do still have both (1)
a form/structure, and (2) a lawful, a priori validity. To this end, even if the analytic and
the deduction are one in this unique judgment type, there is still a meaningful sense in
which reflection on the form of the judgment is an analytic and reflection on the lawfulness is a deduction. But this separation of the two is purely for the sake of bringing more
carefully into view what makes it the kind of synthetic a priori judgment that it is.
Supposing that I am right about this. How can an analytic be at the same time the
deduction and the deduction at the same time the analytic? What must be the case for this
to be possible/valid? It is with an eye toward answering these questions, that we should
42

This same question should arise even for teleological judgments. But if the architectonic of the KU isn’t
confusing enough, combining the entire critique into one deduction/analytic would have been even more
confusing. In actuality, there could well have been just one deduction (as there is), and this could have
served (in expanded form) as the general analytic, with sub-categories in the analytic according with the
object of the judgment. But as far as the general form and validity of synthetic, a priori reflecting judgments are concerned, the deduction and analytic are one and the same. If anyone disagrees with this, It does
not matter for my purposes. I only note this so as to suggest that the lack of deduction of teleological judgments and judgments of the sublime, as well as the lack of analytic of judgments of art, is not at all an
omission and actually part of a deeper reality of the unity of reflecting judgments according to the supreme
principle of purposiveness as the free lawfulness of the imagination.

!208

look to Kant’s account of aesthetic judgments of art in the deduction of aesthetic judgments.
Let us bring into view moments in the deduction in which Kant gives components
of what one might expect in an Analytic of an account of judgments of art. We find the
following points. First, the product of an aesthetic judgment of art is an aesthetic idea.
What makes this judgment (and the resulting aesthetic idea) “logically conditioned,”43 is
that it is a mixed in its application in that it employs a two-fold “universal” unifier. That
is, the aesthetic idea is simultaneously an idea of reason in the service of the free lawfulness of the imagination. As such, it is an idea of the whole that is casually prior to its
parts. At the same time, that aesthetic idea becomes the form by which a product of genius as a work of art is judged. In this sense, the work of art is judged according to “concepts of perfection”, i.e. determinate concepts of the properties of the object according to
the concept of the whole.44 So, the judgment of art requires determinate judgments of the
understanding as well as an idea of reason or the idea of the whole as the cause of its
parts, but both of these occur together “in the service of the imagination and not vice versa.”45 That is, the free lawfulness of the imagination still dictates that the reflection proceed from the “given particular” toward some adequate “universal.”46

43

Kant calls a judgment of art a “logically conditioned aesthetic judgment” (KU 5:312). Such judgments
employ a principle of reason in the service of their unifying form (Ibid).
44

KU 5:280; I need to be clear here that the distinction between free and dependent beauty is not a distinction that concerns judgments of art except externally. Any aesthetic judgment of art will necessarily be capable of being judged as beautiful qua dependent beauty (and possibly also free beauty), but such judgments are judgments of the beautiful, and not the topic at hand. For more on this, see KU 5:311-2. See also
Rachel Zuckert, 2007, pp. 202-12.
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In other words, an object of art is judged through to determinate concepts of the
properties of the object in accordance with an idea of reason that serves as the causal
standard for what the art is supposed to be. Yet, that aesthetic idea, which is the unifying
(lawful) form of the manifold of art, is at the same time itself the product of the productive power of the mind. That is, it arises first through the productive power of the imagination in its creative capacity, i.e. genius. It is this creative power of the mind that requires (qua free lawfulness of the imagination) that reason yield an adequate universal
form. The only form adequate to a free lawful production of genius is an idea of the
whole as designed according to the productive power of genius.47 This is precisely what
an aesthetic idea is. It is an idea of the whole as the product of a free lawful productive
power of the mind (i.e. the third-layer imagination). The aesthetic idea is the product of
the artistic genius as the designer. Where this product of genius is also thereby the end
under which the parts of the work of art are to be judged according to determinant concepts of perfection. Perfection here is not some external standard but is entirely internal
and relative to the aesthetic idea itself. These determinate concepts of the understanding
according to a conception of perfection is a standard set by the aesthetic idea of the given
formative activity of the artistic genius. So, the employment of determinate concepts of
the understanding, just as the idea of reason itself, are entirely in the service of the imagination as is required for the reflecting form of judgment to carry with them the synthetic
universal validity of the a priori principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination.

47
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Now, “aesthetic art, as beautiful art, is one that has the reflecting power of judgment and not mere sensation as its standard.”48 Concerning this judgment type, Kant
says: “Just as in the case of an idea of reason the imagination, with its intuitions, never
attains to the given concept, so in the case of an aesthetic idea the understanding, by
means of its concepts, never attains to the complete inner intuition of the imagination
which it combines with a given representation.”49 To that degree, it is like judgments of
the beautiful, not the sublime.50 And insofar as its second-layer principle is concerned, it
has the same formal structure whereby the imagination enlivens the understanding to a
free play. However, here, Kant terms that enlivening of the mind, “spirit.” This distinction
concerns two primary distinctives from judgments of the beautiful.
First, determinate concepts of the understanding are present in the representation
of the object of art and condition the possibility of judging as well as the enlivened faculties of the mind (imagination and understanding). The resulting unifying term in judgments of art has a two-fold quality. On the one hand, judgments of art are the same as
judgments of the beautiful in that they both take as their law “a free and indeterminately
purposive entertainment of the mental powers with that which we call beautiful, where
the understanding is in the service of the imagination and not vice versa.” 51 As such, any
aesthetic judgment of art gives rise to the state of mind that corresponds with the judg-
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To be clear, both “beauty” and “sublime” can serve as “aesthetic ideas” in aesthetic judgments of art.
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ment of the beautiful (though again, the latter is a distinct judgment). On the other hand,
judgments of art differ from judgments of the beautiful in that, as we learn in the resolution to the antinomy of taste, the latter do not concern determinate concepts of the object,
but do concern an indeterminate concept of the supersensible substratum by which the
object is judged according to the representation of the supreme principle of purposiveness
as a unifying form for the purposive form judged as if it were a property of the object.52
By contrast, in aesthetic judgments of art, like teleological judgments of natural ends, determinate features of the object (i.e. work of art) are considered in the judgment, but the
judgment depends on an idea of the whole for assessment of the parts (not vice-versa).
The idea of the whole, is of course, the aesthetic idea, by which the work of art is
judged according to an idea of reason employing determinate concepts of the understanding in the service of the freedom of the imagination and not “vice versa”. As such, the
judgment gives rise to a free play, a lingering, and sustained aesthetic reflection, but it
does so not in a “pure” manner where no determinate concepts of the understanding or
ideas of reason are brought into view. Rather the free play occurs, as we will see, precisely in the consideration of the aesthetic idea (as the form) of the work of art (as the
matter), where the former reveals reason in the service of the imagination and the later
reveals the understanding in the service of the imagination for the sake of a subjective,
two-fold causality in which the object is judged according to an idea of the whole that is
both cause and effect of the parts.
(3.2) The Aesthetic Judgment of Art is Twofold
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Here it is easy to miss something fundamental. The aesthetic judgment of art is
twofold. First, it is a judgment of genius by which the aesthetic idea arises through the
imagination of the artist (and the corresponding work of art that is produced as a manifestation of that idea). Second, it is a judgment of that now existing work of art as an object
of nature according to the aesthetic idea as the end or a cause of its parts (by which the
parts are determined as cohering or failing to cohere under the aesthetic idea). But the
aesthetic idea is still itself the productive of Einbildungskraft, the free lawful productive
power of genius. So the judgment of art involves a two-fold activity of the mind according to the free lawfulness of the imagination. The one is a formative power that if free yet
lawful in its production. The other is an aesthetic reflection that is free yet lawful on that
which was produced (i.e. the work of art) according to the creative power of production
that was its form (i.e. the aesthetic idea of the genius, where the aesthetic idea is the design of the productive artistic power of the imagination). So the judgment of art is a twofold productive and reflective process of free lawfulness of the imagination.
(3.3) Spirit
Second, and as a result of the first, Kant says, “both sorts of ideas, the ideas of
reason as well as the aesthetic ideas, must have their principles, and indeed in both cases
in reason, the former in the objective and the latter in the subjective principles of its
use.”53 Now for an aesthetic idea to have as its principle a “subjective principle” of reason’s use, is to take an idea of reason as the form in the service of the free lawfulness of
the imagination (as in judgments of the sublime). 54 Regarding the free lawful power of
53
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production that yields the aesthetic idea, Kant says, “Spirit, in an aesthetic significance,
means the animating principle in the mind. That, however, by which this principle animates the soul, the material which it uses for this purpose, is that which purposively sets
the mental powers into motion, i.e., into a play that is self-maintaining and even strengthens the powers to that end.”55 So, spirit stands here as the productive power of the mind
that proceeds according to the free lawfulness of the imagination. Similarly to the secondlayer free play of the faculties in judgments of the beautiful, spirit is that “play that is
self-maintaining and even strengthens the powers to that end.” It is thus, the precise relationship of those faculties, but as productive in nature, not merely as reflective. But that
which it produces is not necessary an object in nature, but rather the aesthetic idea, which
can either be yielded as a product in nature (a work of art) or remain as a purely conceptual productive of spirit. To this end, Kant says,
now I maintain that this principle is nothing other than the faculty for the presentation of aesthetic ideas; by an aesthetic idea, however, I mean that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible. – One readily sees
that it is the counterpart (pendant) of an idea of reason, which is, conversely, a
concept to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate. 56

Explaining this productive power of the mind (second and third-layer imagination), which here stands under the first-layer, free lawfulness of the imagination, Kant
says:
The imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is, namely, very powerful in
creating, as it were, another nature, out of the material which the real one gives
it…in this we feel our freedom from the law of association [that is, the third-layer
55
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imagination under the synthetic unity of apperception] (which applies to the empirical use of that faculty), in accordance with which material can certainly be
lent to us by nature, but the latter can be transformed by us into something entirely different, namely into that which steps beyond nature.57

Through “spirit” as the productive power of the imagination in artistic formation,
“nature…can be transformed by us into something entirely different, namely into that
which steps beyond nature.”
This two-fold productive power of the mind and its own production as the standard of reflection marks the difference with judgments of the beautiful. Namely, taste as
the faculty for judging the beautiful was “merely a faculty for judging, not a productive
faculty; and what is in accordance with it is for that very reason not a work of beautiful
art.”58 However, in the judgment of a work of art, we have a function that is simultaneously a producing and a judging. It is the “free lawfulness” of the productive power of
the mind, i.e. “the imagination in its freedom” as “authoress of voluntary forms of intuition”59 that when it sets itself into motion (heautonomy) to create something out of its
own nature, it simultaneously manifests a product of free lawfulness and a standard of
free lawfulness. The product is the aesthetic idea (whether or not it matches up with a
given empirical object, or is purely conceptual). This product is also, at the same time, a
standard as an aesthetic “end” that is normative for reflection on itself by the same free
lawful heautonomy by which it arose. It is thus, a self-reflexive productive power of the
mind and is governed by one and the same free lawfulness. What is unique is that the free
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lawfulness grounds a two-fold activity concerning the same aesthetic idea. This two-fold
activity is the productive and reflective according to the free lawfulness of an artist or of
the artistic function of the mind.
What should become evident is that this free lawfulness of the productive power
of the mind is simultaneously employing reason in its practical work of producing an end,
while also employing the understanding in its reflection on the product as purposive. As a
result, the concomitant judgment of the beautiful in art thereby arises, since reflection on
the product of genius as an aesthetic idea is thereby the form of purposiveness and “sustains” the free play of the faculties, such that the pleasure, in that felt state of mind
grounds the simultaneous judgment of the beautiful. But that judgment, though concomitant is merely attendant.
The judgment of the beautiful is merely attendant on the judgment of art, since the
latter is constituted by “spirit” as the “animating principle in the mind,” whose product
“purposively sets the mental powers into motion, i.e., into a play that is self-maintaining
and even strengthens the powers to that end.”60 Whereas the judgment of the beautiful is
merely attendant on or “must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally animating imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its lawfulness.”61
(3.4) Genius
So the creative power of the mind, which yields the aesthetic idea, is called “genius.”62 Genius is the result of the reason in the service of the imagination through the
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free lawfulness of the latter. And that productive activity of the mind whereby reason is in
the service of the imagination is called “spirit.” 63
Our question now becomes: what is the nature, then, of an aesthetic idea such that
it can stand both as the product of such a productive activity and as the reflective unifier
or “idea” by which an intuition or reflection of an object is assessed in a judgment of art?
To this, Kant answers,
One can call such representations of the imagination ideas: on the one hand because they at least strive toward something lying beyond the bounds of experience, and thus seek to approximate a presentation of concepts of reason (of intellectual ideas), which gives them the appearance of an objective reality; on the
other hand, and indeed principally, because no concept can be fully adequate to
them, as inner intuitions.64

So an aesthetic idea is a product of the imagination as the creative power of the
mind, and thus an “inner intuition” for which the understanding in the service of the
imagination cannot give an adequate unifying concept. Simultaneously, the same aesthetic idea is itself a unifying form as an end, or approximation of an end, of reason. Here
approximation just means that the idea of an end is not a law, but rather “lawfulness
without law,”65 thus an approximation.66 It is in this sense that Kant says, “genius is the
talent…that gives the rule to art.”67 It is the faculty for “giving the rule” for the imagination’s production in accordance with an idea of reason,68 where the latter is in the service
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of the former. At the same time, this activity is also a reflection on its own productive
purposiveness, as we saw above. In this latter sense: “The mental powers, then, whose
union (in a certain relation) constitutes genius, are imagination and understanding… in
an aesthetic respect…the imagination is free to provide, beyond that concord with the
concept, unsought extensive undeveloped material for the understanding…for the animation of the cognitive powers, and thus also indirectly to cognitions.”69 Judgments of art,
then, are the most complex articulation of the productive power of the mind according to
the free lawfulness of the imagination. In judgments of art, the mind employs both reason
and the understanding “in the service of the imagination” and not vice versa (whereas
judgments of the beautiful employed the understanding, and judgments of the sublime
employed reason). Moreover, it is simultaneously a productive function of the mind and a
normative ground of reflection on itself as a productive function of the mind.70 The aesthetic idea is both its product (as either the end of a work of art or of a representation of
art), as well as the form by which the productively yielded manifold is judged. The judging subject is thus active through the free productive lawfulness of the mind and is selfdetermining (heautonmously) of itself according to that productive free lawfulness.
(3.5) An Analytic of Aesthetic Judgments of Art, if We Must Have One
Aesthetic judgments of art, then, since they combine, not merely the imagination’s
free lawfulness in judging but also in its production, necessarily have the following four
moments.71 Namely, as concerns quantity, such judgments apply a subjectively universal
69
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rule (derived from the imagination according to an idea of reason) and given as a regulative objective rule (for the judging of the object of art);72 concerning quality, they are interested, since they presuppose an end (the idea of the work of art as a causal end according to which the parts can be judged);73 concerning relation: they are purposive not
chiefly for the sake of the end of the object, but for the sake of the “exposition or the expression of aesthetic ideas;”74 and concerning modality: they are subjectively, necessary
since they take the formal subjective principle of purposiveness as free lawful ground
whereby the purposive production and form of the aesthetic idea arises through the productive power of the mind. 75
As we will see in the next section on teleology. The judgment of an object of nature according to a natural end is nothing other than the judging of nature according to an
aesthetic idea as the causal idea of the whole. The difference will be that instead of rec-
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“first, that it is a talent for art, not for science, in which rules that are distinctly cognized must come first
and determine the procedure in it” (KU 5:317).
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“second, that, as a talent for art, it presupposes a determinate concept of the product, as an end, hence
understanding, but also a representation (even if indeterminate) of the material, i.e., of the intuition, for the
presentation of this concept, hence a relation of the imagination to the understanding” (KU 5:317). On the
surface, this seems to be a sharp difference between the equivalent moment in judgments of the beautiful,
since the latter are qualitatively “disinterested.” However, they are disinterested because they are attendant
on judgments of art and of natural ends and concern the state of mind that arises in the reflection on such
products of art or natural end. But, as we’ve seen, within judgments of art is a two-fold, simultaneous relation of production (which requires interest) and reflection, which does not, but concerns the mere relation
of the manifold to the purposiveness of the aesthetic idea. The only real difference then, in quality stems
from the fact that the judgment of the beautiful is not two-fold and so necessarily will only accord with one
fold of the judgment of art (and likewise of the teleological judgment).
74 “third, that it displays itself not so much in the execution of the proposed end in the presentation of a
determinate concept as in the exposition or the expression of aesthetic ideas, which contain rich material
for that aim, hence the imagination, in its freedom from all guidance by rules, is nevertheless represented as
purposive for the presentation of the given concept” (KU 5:317).
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“fourth, that the unsought and unintentional subjective purposiveness in the free correspondence of the
imagination to the lawfulness of the understanding presupposes a proportion and disposition of this faculty
that cannot be produced by any following of rules, whether of science or of mechanical imitation, but that
only the nature of the subject can produce” (KU 5:317-8).
These four, would of course, be the conclusion of an analytic of judgments of art if an analytic were needed, but for reasons discussed above, the deduction served at the same time as the analytic, and so Kant just
notes these in passing.
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ognizing the judging subject (or some other judging subject) as the source of the productive power (Einbildungskraft), the judging subject attributes the formative force (Bildungskraft) to the object of nature itself as if it were art and artist of itself. This too is the
approximation of an idea of reason that is not a law for nature but is lawfulness without a
law, according to the free lawful principle of purposiveness grounding such reflecting
judgments. The judgments are the same in their free lawful form, as we will see, and different only in the attribution of the productive source of the idea of purposiveness that
serves as the form of the object. Before turning to teleological judgments, however, let’s
look more closely at examples of aesthetic ideas and works of art.
(3.6) Aesthetic Ideas and Works of Art
As genius, the creative imagination produces the shape that it gives to ideas.76
This shape that it gives, which “step beyond nature,”77 is art.78 Moreover, “By right, only
production through freedom, i.e., through a capacity for choice that grounds its actions in
reason, should be called art.”79
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KU 5:317

77

KU 5:314
KU 5:319; It is crucial to remember that a work of art need not be material. Genius can and must produce
an aesthetic idea in the mind as the work of art before also manifesting that or some related work of art. But
nothing minds an aesthetic idea or work of art to actual empirical production.
78
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KU 5:303. As such, Kant says: “The poet ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the
kingdom of the blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation, etc., as well as to make that of which there
are examples in experience, e.g., death, envy, and all sorts of vices, as well as love, fame, etc., sensible beyond the limits of experience, with a completeness that goes beyond anything of which there is an example
in nature, by means of an imagination that emulates the precedent of reason in attaining to a maximum….
This faculty, however, considered by itself alone, is really only a talent (of the imagination)” (KU 5:313-4).
By “is really only a talent (of the imagination),” Kant means, it is not, in fact, a function of practical reason
nor of cognition, but of the imagination in its own domain, without denying, however, what has been said
about the relation of both concepts of the understanding (concerning properties of the object) as well as
ideas of reason (as ends).
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It is at this point, that Kant draws perhaps the most important conclusion from this
analysis of aesthetic judgments for reason in general. Namely, the imagination is artistically productive not merely by giving material shape to ideas but is also so active by giving artistic shape to ideas in thought alone (i.e. where the matter is a merely a representation). He makes this conclusion explicit in the following passage:
Now if we add to a concept a representation of the imagination that belongs to its
presentation, but which by itself stimulates so much thinking that it can never be
grasped in a determinate concept, hence which aesthetically enlarges the concept
itself in an unbounded way, then in this case the imagination is creative, and sets
the faculty of intellectual ideas (reason) into motion, that is, at the instigation of a
representation it gives more to think about than can be grasped and made distinct
in it (although it does, to be sure, belong to the concept of the object).
Those forms which do not constitute the presentation of a given concept itself,
but, as supplementary representations of the imagination, express only the implications connected with it and its affinity with others, are called (aesthetic) attributes of an object whose concept, as an idea of reason, cannot be adequately
presented…. They do not, like logical attributes, represent what lies in our concepts…[they give] the imagination cause to spread itself over a multitude of related representations, which let one think more than one can express in a concept
determined by words; and they yield an aesthetic idea, which serves that idea of
reason instead of logical presentation, …and give the imagination an impetus to
think more, although in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended in a
concept, and hence in a determinate linguistic expression.80

What is key here is that by judgments of art and “aesthetic ideas” Kant is bringing
into view central features of the reflecting power of judgment. That is all discursive reasoners depend for the expansion of the mind on this fundamental productive power. This
further means that, while it is a “talent” of the mind that needs cultivation, it is an essential free lawful form of pure reason and so essential to the transcendental structure of the
mind. Kant is clearly not talking about those few individuals who happen to be artists in
the world. He is talking about the artistic, subjective, universal necessity of pure reason
in the domain of the free lawfulness of the imagination.
80
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Kant then provides the following three examples of aesthetic ideas by which the
imagination can become more artistically productive for the mind, not chiefly through
material objects. Of course, the aesthetic ideas are still typically occasioned by objects of
art, such as poetry, but the productions are products of the imagination in thought itself,
not in the externality of the material. First example:
[1] ‘Let us depart from life without grumbling and without regretting anything, leaving the world behind us replete with good deeds. Thus does the
sun, after it has completed its daily course, still spread a gentle light across
the heavens; and the last rays that it sends forth into the sky are its last sighs
for the well-being of the world,’ …which arouses a multitude of sensations and
supplementary representations for which no expression is found.81

Second example: [2] “‘The sun streamed forth, as tranquillity streams from
virtue.’ The consciousness of virtue, when one puts oneself, even if only in thought, in
the place of a virtuous person, spreads in the mind a multitude [of aesthetic ideas], which
no expression that is adequate to a determinate concept fully captures.” 82 Lastly, the third
example: [3] “the inscription over the temple of Isis (Mother Nature): ‘I am all that is,
that was, and that will be, and my veil no mortal has removed.’”83 In each example, while
an object as art still occasions the mind, what is particularly significant (for my point
here) is that the imagination in its artistic, productive function drives the faculty of cognition itself. Just as in judgments of the sublime, where it was the imagination that was
forced to expand to become adequate, 84 so too, here for the sake of attaining to the signif-
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icance of aesthetic ideas, the faculty of cognition is forced to expand. To this end, Kant
says,
In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, associated
with a given concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial representations in the free use of the imagination that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for it, which therefore allows the addition to a
concept of much that is unnameable, the feeling of which animates the cognitive
faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter of language.85

Perhaps a better example of such an aesthetic idea is found in Goethe’s reflections: “I call architecture frozen music.” This aesthetic idea can be the source of substantial and significance reflection on the nature and significance of architecture. At the same
time, it is clear that there is no such thing as frozen music, and architecture can neither be
frozen nor music, much less frozen music. Yet, this aesthetic idea “allows the addition to
a concept [architecture] of much that is unnameable, the feeling of which animates the
cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter of language.”86 “It gives more
to think about than can be grasped and made distinct in it (although it does, to be sure,
belong to the concept of the object)…[and gives] the imagination an impetus to think
more, although in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended in a concept, and
hence in a determinate linguistic expression.87 This development of the productive power
of the mind is essential not just in its free lawful functions, but also when the imagination
is in the service of the understanding and reason (in theoretical and practical reason). In
general, at the heart of pure reason are the co-prior conditions of freedom and lawfulness,

85
86
87
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and that which is a free productive power in reason whereby it is active and not merely
lawful is what is fundamentally strengthened thereby.
In other words, the imagination forces the mind to reach beyond the symbolic use
of words to a “manifold of partial representations,” to a mode of thought which the faculties of cognition are incapable of adequately determining. This brings us to the last major
significance of judgments of art and the resulting aesthetic ideas. Namely, the imagination’s role in producing symbols, which serve as bridging terms for the ideas of reason in
an analogous way that the imagination’s role in producing schema serve to bridge pure
concepts of the understanding with empirical intuitions. 88
(3.7) Symbols
It is in Section 58, “On the idealism of the purposiveness of nature as well as art,
as the sole principle of the power of aesthetic judgment” that Kant makes explicit what
was necessary and implicit the whole time in both the Analytic of the Beautiful and Sublime, as well as in main part of the aesthetic deduction, namely, that the imagination as
productive power of the mind in all judgments, must, a priori yield for practical reason a
bridging term whereby its ideas can be applied to the sensible. Just as this was necessary
for cognition, wherein the imagination produces the schema (pure intuitions) as the bridging terms that make possible the schematism.89 So too, the imagination yields an analog

88

For more on Kant’s notion of a symbol and Goethe’s inheritance of it, see Ernst Cassirer, “Goethe and
Kantian Philosophy” in Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, pp. 77-8.
89

KrV A124, A140/B179-80
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of the schema whereby alone ideas of reason can be applied to the sensible.90 To this end,
Kant divides the work of the imagination, as the faculty for yielding pure intuitions (as
the rule of synthesis by which pure representations, concepts or ideas are “made
sensible”), in the following way:
All hypotyposis (presentation, subjecto sub adspectum), as making something
sensible, is of one of two kinds: either schematic, where to a concept grasped by
the understanding the corresponding intuition is given a priori; or symbolic,
where to a concept which only reason can think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate, an intuition is attributed with which the power of judgment
proceeds in a way merely analogous to that which it observes in schematization,
i.e., it is merely the rule of this procedure, not of the intuition itself, and thus
merely the form of the reflection, not the content, which corresponds to the concept…for the symbolic is merely a species of the intuitive. The latter, namely (the
intuitive), can be divided into the schematic and the symbolic kinds of representation. Both are hypotyposes, i.e., presentations (exhibitions): not mere characterizations, i.e., designations of the concepts by means of accompanying sensible
signs, which contain nothing at all belonging to the intuition of the object, but
only serve them, in accordance with the laws of association of the imagination,
and hence in a subjective regard, as a means of reproduction.91

It is important to recognize that the productive imagination (second and third-layer significance) as the faculty for yielding intuitions always already included the symbolic. This is not something exclusive to the aesthetic domain. All judgments require this to
the degree that the manifold of the judgment corresponds to an idea of reason and not to a
concept of the understanding. Strictly speaking, an idea of reason is not schematizable
according to a schema, but only according to a symbol. Pure intuitions serving this bridg90

KU 5:352; I think that, if one combines a rigorous account of the imagination in its first-layer significance to an analysis of second-layer significance of the imagination whereby schema, symbol, and a representation of purposiveness arise as “analog” bridging terms, then we would finally see clearly the imagination fundamental role as the creative power of the mind, the fundamental artistic condition of reason itself.
And to this end, we might even conclude what Kant concluded in the first Critique, namely, that what we
observe in this work of the imagination is a “hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can …lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty” (A141/B181). Where such a characterization is not some flowery or mystical talk, but precisely a descriptor of the fundamental manner in which the
imagination functions as a kind of hidden art (there at the second-layer). For a good handling of this passage from the first Critique concerning the “hidden art in the depths of the human soul,” see Samantha
Matherne, “Kant and the Art of Schematism.”
91
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ing function with ideas of reason include “words, or visible (algebraic, even mimetic)
signs, as mere expressions for concepts. All intuitions that are ascribed to concepts a priori are thus either schemata or symbols, the first of which contain direct, the second indirect presentations of the concept.”92 Moreover, the relation between a symbol as the
pure intuition by which is given the rule of synthesis for the application of an idea of reason to phenomenal world is determined by the relation of the imagination to reason, such
that, while schemata “do this demonstratively,” symbols serve as the bridging term “by
means of an analogy (for which empirical intuitions are also employed), in which the
power of judgment performs a double task, first applying the concept to the object of a
sensible intuition, and then, second, applying the mere rule of reflection on that intuition
to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol.”93
Just as in the schematizing work of the understanding, we have the second-layer
work of the imagination in view, wherein it yields pure intuitions, which are sensible representations of rules by which empirical intuitions are subsumable under the form (here
an idea of reason). These are the bridging terms then, which in relation to the pure concepts of the understanding are called schemata and in relation to the ideas of reason are
called symbols.
Kant goes on to explain the pervasive need of reason for this function of the imagination (the yielding of pure intuitions as symbols), saying that, “Our language is full of
such indirect presentations, in accordance with an analogy, where the expression does not
contain the actual schema for the concept but only a symbol for reflection.” In other
92
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words, in its “nonschematic” but “symbolic” work, the imagination proceeds both on its
own and in the service of reason “not by means of a direct intuition, but only in accordance with an analogy with it, i.e., the transportation of the reflection on one object of
intuition to another, quite different concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond.”94
This second-layer operation of the imagination, when in the service of reason, is
the transcendental productive power of the imagination whereby it yields symbols for the
practical or inductive (syllogistic) use of reason. The same second-layer operation of the
imagination, when in the service of the understanding, is the transcendental synthesis of
the imagination that yields schemata for determining judgments. Finally, this same second-layer operation of the imagination in its own domain under the free lawfulness of the
imagination is the productive imagination in its freedom whereby it yields a representation of its own principle of free lawfulness as a law or rule of for its own application in
aesthetic and teleological judgments. It is through this second-layer operation that “the
reflecting power of judgment, therefore, … gives itself such a transcendental principle as
a law.”95
Of course, just as the same pure intuition is called “a schema” in the service of the
understanding, while in the domain of the imagination is simply “a pure production” of
the faculty of intuitions, so too the “symbol” is a pure intuition in the service of practical
reason. Moreover, that same intuition that in the one case serves as a symbol, can likewise be (in the service of the imagination) an artistic presentation of an aesthetic idea (to
94
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which the presentation is never adequate). Thus, the productive free lawfulness of the
imagination can subjectively determine the mind “in accordance with points of view that
nature does not present by itself in experience either for sense or for the understanding,
and thus to use it for the sake of and as it were as the schema of the supersensible.”96
Even when it is inadequate (e.g. to the moral idea), the production of the imagination still
serves to expand the mind (as in judgments of the sublime). After all, it would be a gross
mistake to assume that only that which results in a determinate concept is significant for
the faculties of cognition or reason in general.97 Such an assumption would be to misconceive of reason in general and its internal demands.
It is in this context and in this sense that Kant says, “the beautiful is a symbol of
the morally good.”98 It is not a “judgment of the beautiful” that is a symbol of the morally
good. It is rather, the beautiful itself. But “the beautiful” cannot be a symbol unless it is
given as a product of the imagination (i.e. a representation that serves an analogous role
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KU 5:326; It is precisely because these pure intuitions are produced by the imagination in its freedom,
“both on account of its inner possibility in the subject as well as on account of the outer possibility of a
nature that corresponds to it, as related to something in the subject itself and outside of it” (KU 5:353).
Such a product of the imagination is neither “nature nor freedom”, neither an intuition determined by a law
of nature, nor a product determined by the moral law, yet nevertheless “connected with the ground” of freedom, namely the “supersensible”. But the ground here is not the supersensible of theoretical reason, nor the
supersensible of practical reason, but rather a concept of the supersensible “in which the theoretical faculty
is combined with the practical…to form a unity” (KU 5:353).
97 KU 5:331-2; As such, in a work of art, the “free play of sensations” can precede the “play of thoughts”,
where the play of thoughts “arises merely from the change in the representations, in the faculty of judgment, by means of which, to be sure, no thought that involves any sort of interest is generated, but the mind
is nevertheless animated” (KU 5:331). And this animation of the mind is not one way. Rather, the play of
thought can proceed “from the sensation of the body to aesthetic idea (of the objects for affects), and then
from them back again, but with united force, to the body” (KU 5:332).
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as the schema) for the sake of an idea of reason (namely, the morally good).99 As a symbol, the product is a pure intuition as a rule for the application of the moral idea to the
sensible. In such a case, however, the imagination is in the service of practical reason,
just as in its production of the schemata it is in the service of the understanding. Here,
however, as concerns aesthetic ideas, the understanding and reason are in the service of
the imagination in its freedom, such that the purposiveness grounds not a lawfulness, but
a “free lawfulness” whereby the heautonomy of reflecting judgments is asserted. So, the
widespread assumption that if something is judged as beautiful, it is automatically thereby significant as “analogous to” the morally good is a category mistake, nor is the fact
that it can be yielded as a symbol (which is significant) thereby its only or chief significance.
(3.8) Bridging the Supersensible and Sensible
Thus, at the level of concepts of the supersensible governing the domains of nature and freedom, we have the domain of the imagination, not as a domain with determinate knowledge, but one in which a distinct function of the mind is active according to its
own a priori principle. Through judgments of art, we find one half (the other being teleological judgments) of the method whereby it serves to bridge the sensible and supersensi-
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Concerning beauty as a symbol of the morally good, Kant says, “That is the intelligible, toward which…
taste looks, with which, namely, even our higher faculties of cognition agree, and without which glaring
contradictions would emerge between their nature and the claims that taste makes. In this faculty the power
of judgment does not see itself, as is otherwise the case in empirical judging, as subjected to a heteronomy
of the laws of experience; in regard to the objects of such a pure satisfaction it gives the law to itself, just as
reason does with regard to the faculty of desire; and it sees itself, both on account of this inner possibility in
the subject as well as on account of the outer possibility of a nature that corresponds to it, as related to
something in the subject itself and outside of it, which is neither nature nor freedom, but which is connected with the ground of the latter, namely the supersensible, in which the theoretical faculty is combined with
the practical, in a mutual and unknown way, to form a unity.” (5:353).
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ble and in that function expands cognition and moral representation.100 We can see the
bridge between nature and freedom beginning to be displayed in the free lawfulness of
the imagination in its production of and reflection on art:101
As a result of this, one can also explain genius in terms of the faculty of aesthetic ideas: by which at the same time is indicated the reason why in products of
genius nature (that of the subject), not a deliberate end, gives the rule to art (the
production of the beautiful)…it is not a rule or precept but only that which is
merely nature in the subject, i.e., the supersensible substratum of all our faculties
(to which no concept of the understanding attains), and so that in relation to
which it is the ultimate end given by the intelligible in our nature to make all our
cognitive faculties agree… 102

There exists in the “nature of the subject” a power to “give the rule to art” and this
just is the (first-layer) free lawfulness of the imagination governing the (second-layer)
productive power of the imagination by which the mind is active and in accord with
which it (third-layer) yields empirical intuitions. Namely, the free lawfulness of the imagination as a productive faculty of a creating subject is “genius,” by which the judgment of
art is given as a production according to a supreme principle of free lawfulness.103 The
product is an aesthetic idea. This aesthetic idea serves as the standard or form for assessing the given work of art or the matter in thought (i.e. the representation). But the aesthetic idea is itself a unity of matter and form, an “inner intuition” or product and a form or
100

Eckart Förster defends a similar reading as concerns the source of the bridge, 2012, p.179.

101 As

a result of this bridging function of the imagination, Kant states that three ideas of the supersensible
“are revealed” (through the aesthetic deduction): “first, that of the supersensible in general, without further
determination, as the substratum of nature; second, the very same thing, as the principle of the subjective
purposiveness of nature for our faculty of cognition; third, the very same thing, as the principle of the ends
of freedom and principle of the correspondence of freedom with those ends in the moral sphere” (KU
5:346).
102 KU 5:343-4
103 And

in this way, aesthetic judgments which take the free lawfulness of the imagination (i.e. the principle
of formal subjective purposiveness) as their a priori guiding principle, thereby serve to bridge the domains
of nature and freedom in the faculties of the mind. Since the free lawfulness of the imagination just is the
relation of the imagination as the faculty for yielding matter in a purposive play with the faculties of form
(understanding and reason).
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purposive end, whereby we have a conception of a whole in which we judge the work as
a product of nature, where the power of formation is attributed to a subject (of artistic genius) that is both of nature and a supersensible intelligence. 104
§4) Teleological Judgments of Natural Ends
We should not be surprised to find that the second-layer specification of a purposiveness of nature for teleological judgments depends, as I have indicated, on the firstlayer supreme principle of purposiveness, i.e. the free lawfulness of the Imagination. After all, Kant introduces this free lawful dependence from the outset in his second introduction to the KU: “In a critique of the power of judgment the part that contains the aesthetic power of judgment is essential, since this alone contains a principle that the power
of judgment lays at the basis of its reflection on nature entirely a priori.”105 So, when
Kant identifies the supreme principle of reflecting judgment with the principle of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful,106 namely, the free lawfulness of the imagination,107 and
further says that this supreme principle “occasions” the idea of a purposiveness of nature,
which serves as the law or principle for judging nature according to natural ends, none of
this should be surprising. Teleological judgments are, after all, reflecting judgments, and

104 Allison

has a nice passage discussing Kant’s claim that art must show itself as nature. Allison argues,
“Clearly, this does not mean that it must seem to be nature in the sense of a faithful copy or representation.
It is, rather, that it must seem natural in the sense of being spontaneous, unstudied, or, as Kant puts it, ‘unintentional’ [unabsichlich] (KU 5:174; 307), that is, as if it were a product of mere nature rather than art… the
requirement is that the object appear ‘natural’ or undesigned in its very purposiveness, and it must do so
even though we know it to be a product of art…that is, in a way that preserves the freedom of the imagination” (2001, 276).
105
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KU 5:193
This is the conclusion of Section 35, KU 5:286.
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KU 5:240, as we saw in Chapter 3 and 4, the free lawfulness of the imagination is what Kant means by
the supreme principle of aesthetic judgments of the beautiful. In light of the conclusion of Section 35, this
principle stands as the supreme principles of reflecting judgment, and thereby as the “subjective principle
of the power of judgment in general” (KU 5:286).
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reflecting judgments have a single supreme principle a priori whereby a critique of the
lawful validity of synthetic a priori reflecting judgments is possible. Further, the following two propositions have no basis in the texts: (i) that teleological judgments gain their
validity from one of the other supreme principles a priori (either the moral law as the
principle of the freedom of the will, or the synthetic unity of apperception) or (ii) that they
are not synthetic a priori judgments at all. Kant everywhere identifies teleological judgments as reflecting judgments requiring a critique to establish their synthetic a priori validity and nowhere attributes their lawfulness to either the supreme principle of practical
reason or to the supreme principle of cognition. By contrast, he does identify teleological
judgments as standing under the supreme principle of reflecting judgment.
(4.1) Reconsidering the Three-layer Significance of the Imagination and Corresponding
Layers of Purposiveness: the Free Lawful Structure of Teleological Judgments
Further, it is not at all hard to square (a) the relationship between the supreme
principle of reflecting judgment as the free lawfulness of the imagination, in which the
understanding and reason are “in the service of the imagination and not vice versa” 108 and
(b) the idea of an objective purposiveness of nature. The latter is the second-layer specification of the purposiveness of the first. It is a maxim or principle for judging objects of
nature according to the supreme principle of a subjective purposiveness or free lawfulness. This relationship is nothing other than the two-layer relation that Kant speaks of
when he says, “The reflecting power of judgment, therefore, can only give itself such a
[first-layer] transcendental principle as a [second-layer] law, and cannot derive [that law]
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from anywhere else [i.e. one of the other two transcendental principles] (for then it would
be the determining power of judgment).” 109
So, in short, we should recognize the following three-layer conception of purposiveness, according to the three-layer significances of the imagination. (1) The first-layer
purposiveness is the supreme principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination, which
grounds the validity of the judgment structures in which reason and the understanding are
“in the service” of the “imagination in its freedom.”110 (2) The second-layer purposiveness is the idea or representation of a purposiveness of nature, which the reflecting power
of judgment derives from its own (first-layer) supreme principle of purposiveness as a
law/principle/maxim for judging objects of nature according to a (3) third layer reflective,
empirical purposiveness, namely an “idea of a natural end” or an “aesthetic idea.” To this
end, he says:
thus the power of judgment, which with regard to things under possible (still to
be discovered) empirical laws is merely reflecting, must think of nature with regard to the latter in accordance with a principle of purposiveness for our faculty
of cognition, which is then expressed in the maxims of the power of judgment
given above. Now this transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature is neither a concept of nature nor a concept of freedom, since it attributes nothing at all
to the object (of nature), but rather only represents the unique way in which we
must proceed in reflection on the objects of nature with the aim of a thoroughly
interconnected experience, consequently it is a subjective principle (maxim) of
the power of judgment. 111

To this end, we find Kant further affirming that the ground of the lawfulness of
teleological judgments depends on the free lawfulness of the imagination. Since the free
lawfulness of the imagination is the synthetic principle a priori of purposiveness ground109
110
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ing aesthetic judgments of the beautiful, and since this principle just is the principle of
reflecting judgment, and further since teleological judgments receive their lawfulness
from this principle, teleological judgments are synthetic a priori valid because of the
principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination. The distinction, then, between teleological and aesthetic judgments has nothing to do with the principle of the free lawfulness
of the imagination, which governs both, but rather the difference between the second-layer purposiveness, which is derived from the first, namely the maxim or concept of a purposiveness of nature for the judging of objects according to this law. To this end, Kant
makes the following distinction: “The aesthetic power of judgment is thus a special faculty for judging things in accordance with a rule but not in accordance with concepts. The
teleological power of judgment is not a special faculty, but only the reflecting power of
judgment in general, insofar as it proceeds in accordance with concepts.” 112
The following question naturally arises from this: how is it that this second-layer
purposiveness is simultaneously the representation that the reflecting power of judgment
gives itself from its own first-layer purposiveness as a law, while also being an “idea of
reason,” and occasioned by an experience of nature?
To answer this, let us look more closely at how Kant describes the second-layer
purposiveness as both the reflecting judgment giving this law to itself, yet also being that
which is “occasioned” by an experience of objects of nature.
As for what occasions it, this principle is of course to be derived from experience, that is, experience of the kind that is methodically undertaken and is called
observation; but the universality and necessity that it asserts of such a purposiveness cannot rest merely on grounds in experience, but must have as its
112
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ground some sort of a priori principle, even if it is merely regulative and even if
that end lies only in the idea of the one who judges and never in any efficient
cause. One can thus call this principle a maxim for the judging of the inner purposiveness of organized beings.113

The maxim for judging inner purposiveness of organized beings, i.e. judging nature according to an idea of a natural end, is a maxim of reason in the service of reflecting
judgment. That is, it is an idea of an end as the causality of a thing in accordance with
which the parts are first made possible. But if this idea of a natural end were derived from
the supreme principle of practical reason, then the judgment on nature in accord with it
would be determining. In other words, we would thereby determine nature as cognizable
according to the realm of ends. But such a cognition would contradict the laws of the understanding, which alone (under the synthetic unity of apperception) is the ground of
cognition. However, the supreme principle of purposiveness as the free lawfulness of the
imagination is the domain in which lawfulness is subordinated to the productive power of
the mind in its freedom. This principle results in the transcendental possibility of reason
and the lawfulness of the ideas it yields serving the productive power of the mind in a
relationship that is reflecting, i.e. free and yet lawful or “lawfulness without a law.”114 To
this end, Kant says,
The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as
contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is
given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it (even
when, as a transcendental power of judgment, it provides the conditions a priori
in accordance with which alone anything can be subsumed under that universal),
is determining. If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal
is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely reflecting.
The reflecting power of judgment, which is under the obligation of ascending
from the particular in nature to the universal, therefore requires a principle that
113
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it cannot borrow from experience…The reflecting power of judgment, therefore,
can only give itself such a transcendental principle as a law, and cannot derive it
from anywhere else (for then it would be the determining power of judgment)115

Thus, the reflecting power of judgment proceeds with the idea of a natural end as
an idea of reason that accords with its own specification or maxim of a purposiveness of
nature as the law of its own synthetic principle a priori. It is this principle of free lawfulness of the imagination that causes reflecting judgment to be “under the obligation of ascending from the particular in nature to the universal.” When it does so proceed in conjunction with objects of nature in experience, then it employs the understanding and reason to discover “the universal [that] is to be found.” Now, since this procedure just is the
productive power of the mind, namely the “imagination in its freedom” proceeding according to a lawfulness without a law, the universal necessitated by this procedure is one
that can nevertheless fall under that principle of free lawfulness and its specification of a
purposiveness of nature. Idea of a purposiveness of nature just is the idea that the empirical intuition of a natural object yielded by the imagination is purposive, not to the realm
of ends, nor to the synthetic unity of apperception, but to the free lawful relation of the
faculties, to the imagination in productive accord with reason and the understanding.
To this end, such an empirical intuition of the imagination under this principle sets
the faculties into play such that the imagination requires of reason an adequate universal
to account for the representation of the manifold according to free lawful purposiveness.
The only idea of reason that is adequate to such a free lawful purposiveness is the idea of
a natural end, where that causality is one in which the object is judged as if it were cause
115
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and effect of itself. But this is nothing other than precisely the aesthetic idea of reason as
the unifying design of a free lawful production. Only here it is borrowed for the sake of
conceiving of nature. Again, what keeps this from being cognition or determining, which
would be an invalid use of reason, is that it proceeds according to the free lawfulness of
reflecting judgment.
But how is this procedure justified? It can only be justified iff it is occasioned by
an object of nature and iff the reflection accords with the supreme principle of reflecting
judgment. That is, if a given manifold occasions such a reflective use of reason, then the
free lawfulness of the imagination requires of reason that it supply the faculty of reflecting judgment with an idea of nature according to a design, just as it would in the free lawful productive power of genius in the formation of art and the judging of art according to
such an artistic design.
But why design? Why nature as a technique? This is because at its core the free
lawfulness of the imagination is the productive power of the mind. Reflection according
to this principle is a reflection of lawfulness without law through the productive power of
the mind. So, that which gives rise to reflection in accord with that free lawfulness must
be judged in accordance with that principle. While that judging in accordance with the
free lawfulness of the imagination cannot be determining, it is nevertheless a subjective,
synthetic, universally valid judgment of the object as a work of art. A judgment of an object of nature according to this principle is likewise a judgment of art, where a judgment
of art contains the two-fold necessity of the productive power of the mind whereby the
aesthetic idea of the art is given, and the reflecting process whereby the manifold is as-
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sessed in light of that same idea of the whole as the lawfulness without law by which the
object is judged.116
This is precisely the same in a judgment of a natural end, with the substantial
(though not formally distinct) difference from judgments of art, namely that the object of
nature is judged as art and artist of itself.117 Or at least, that is what we will find.118
So a natural end, as an idea of reason in the service of reflecting judgment,119 is a
regulative idea of nature (second-layer significance of the imagination)120 as possessing
the formative power [Bildungskraft] by which it can be judged as art and artist of itself.
116

For an alternative account of the general principle of purposiveness and purposiveness of nature, see
Konstantin Pollok’s recent account, 2017, p. 112. Pollok argues that the significance of the “new principle”
is predominately that it makes possible the judgment of the beautiful, since “only here does the reflecting
power of judgment operate sui generis, rather than on behalf of understanding and reason;” and again,
“Unlike teleological judgments, aesthetic judgments of taste relate to a genuine faculty of the mind other
than cognition and volition” (2017, p. 278). As I have shown, in both judgments of art and natural ends, it is
the understanding and reason that are in the service of the imagination, not vice versa, and they take the
supreme principle of judgments of the beautiful as their free lawful grounding and form for judging.
117 The reason this is not a formal distinction is that even in judgments of art, the first-fold productive power of the mind (artistic genius) does not have to be judged as arising from the judging subject, but can be
judged as arising from some other judging subject (e.g. Goethe), such that my judging of art according to
the two-fold quality of the judgment involves the recognition of artistic genius as belonging to Goethe, yet
the reflecting use of the aesthetic idea as given to me from him for the purposive assessment of the manifold in light of this aesthetic idea. Thus, when in judgments of natural ends, the productive power is attributed not to some judging subject, but to nature, this is not a formal difference but is the same process
whereby we attribute the artistic genius to anyone (regulatively or constitutively).
118

In the first introduction, Kant provides a clear summary of the distinction in reflecting judgments: “Nature is necessarily harmonious not merely with our understanding, in regard to its transcendental laws, but
also, in its empirical laws, with the power of judgment and its capacity for exhibiting those laws in an empirical apprehension of its forms through the imagination, and that indeed only for the sake of experience,
and so its formal purposiveness can still be shown as necessary with regard to the latter accord (with the
power of judgment). But now, as the object of a teleological judging, it is also to be thought of as corresponding, in its causality, with reason, in accordance with the concept that it forms of an end; that is more
than can be expected of the power of judgment alone, which can certainly contain its own principles a priori for the form of intuition, but not for the concepts of the generation of things. The concept of a real end
of nature therefore lies entirely outside the field of the power of judgement if that is considered by itself,
and since this, as a separate power of cognition, considers only two faculties, imagination and understanding, as in relation in a representation prior to any concept, and thereby perceives the subjective purposiveness of the object for the faculty of cognition in the apprehension of the object (through the imagination), in
the teleological purposiveness of things, as ends of nature, which can only be represented through concepts,
it must set the understanding into relation with reason (which is not necessary for experience in general) in
order to make things representable as ends of nature)” (KU 20:232-3).
119 And which is also called, as we saw above, a representation of the imagination as an idea that approxi mates the idea of reason (KU 5:313-4).
120
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This formative power is an idea of nature as having a “natural end” as the cause of its
own productive formative power according to which it’s parts are more complexly identifiable than is possible through mere mechanistic causality.
(4.2) Reconsidering Aesthetic Ideas and Natural Ends from the Standpoint of Teleological
Judgments
As we can surmise from the forgoing, while in aesthetic judgments, “what is at
issue is not what nature is or even what it is for us as a purpose, but how we take it in,”121
by contrast, in teleological judgments, what is at issues is “what nature is” but not as determined by cognition, but rather as perceived through reflection on nature.122 The first is
the concept of the “subjective purposiveness” of nature, “which rests on the play of the
imagination in its freedom;” namely, “how we take it in.”123 While the second is the concept of “objective purposiveness” of nature, namely a purposiveness that is reflectively
judged to be internal or external to the object, but which concerns the real existence of
the object and “how we take it in”, not purely how we take it in.124 This is why Kant says,

121

KU 5:350

122

This is so because the manifold in an object of nature is unified according to an idea of reason, “as if it
were possible only through reason; but this is then the capacity for acting in accordance with ends (a will);
and the object which is represented as possible only on this basis is represented as possible only as an
end” (KU 5:370). More specifically, this is the idea of nature according to a non-mechanistic causality (KU
5:364). Namely, it is the idea of a natural end as the causality of the parts, which serves to unify the manifold indeterminately (as concerns the domain of nature) and adequately (as concerns the domain of freedom) (KU 5:360-1).
123 KU 5:351
124

Kant calls the “specific” (versus “general”) use of the faculties of imagination, understanding, and reason, correspond directly to the basic hylomorphism of judgments (logical, transcendental, and sensible)
described in numerous places, such as in the amphiboly of concepts and in the second section of the B deduction, etc. (KrV A266-7/B322-3, A716-7/B744-6, 5:242, 5:287, 5:343, 5:355). Judgments fundamentally
require that the understanding applies form as the “faculty of concepts” (KU 5:406, 5:343, 5:228-9, 5:244,
5:286-7, 5:292, 5:365-6, 5:406) and reason applies form as “the faculty of ideas” (KU 5:265-6, 5:343). The
imagination yields matter (pure and empirical) as the “faculty of intuitions”(KU 5:292, 5:287, 5:343),
where this means that it is the faculty for “apprehending” (KU 5:227, 5:317), and “exhibiting” (KU 5:366),
or “yielding” pure and empirical intuitions (KU 5:286-7).
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“The power of judgment’s concept of a purposiveness of nature still belongs among the
concepts of nature, but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of cognition, although
the aesthetic judgment on certain objects (of nature or of art) that occasions it is a constitutive principle with regard to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure.”125 When reflecting
judgment is operable according to the concept of an objective purposiveness of nature,
which arises from the formal principle of purposiveness,126 the object is judged as if it
were art.127 To this end, Kant says:
The self-sufficient beauty of nature reveals to us a technique of nature, which
makes it possible to represent it as a system in accordance with laws the principle
of which we do not encounter anywhere in our entire faculty of understanding,
namely that of a purposiveness with respect to the use of the power of judgment
in regard to appearances, so that this must be judged as belonging not merely to
nature in its purposeless mechanism but rather also to the analogy with art. Thus
it actually expands not our cognition of natural objects, but our concept of nature,
namely as a mere mechanism, into the concept of nature as art: which invites profound investigations into the possibility of such a form. 128

The judgment form of both aesthetic ideas and natural ends is the same and the
judgment in both cases is of an object as art. As I have shown above, and as this passage
further indicates, the distinction has entirely and only to do with the attribution of the
productive power of whereby the design of the object according to a purposive idea (aesthetic idea or idea of a natural end) is given. The productive power is attributed in the one
case to an artistic genius and in the other case to nature itself as if it were art and artist of
itself. But this attribution is not a fundamental difference in the form of the judgment.
These judgments, then, are strict analogies and differ only in their possible reach over a
125
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given object, and that reach is determined by whether the object arises from a intelligence
or from nature. If from an intelligence, then the judgment is of art, if from nature, then
nature is treated as if it possessed that productive power of a supersensible intelligence
(as human beings do).
(4.3) The Two-fold Causality of (Aesthetic Ideas) and Natural Ends
We can now see the contrast clearly: The aesthetic judgment of art results in an
aesthetic idea, which is an idea of the object as an artistic whole according to the idea of
ends, as a rule given to the object by the subject (i.e. via “genius”).129 The teleological
judgment results in an idea of a natural end, which is an idea of ends as a maxim given to
the object as if it were so formed by a subject.130 Which is to judge the object as if it were
formed in analog to genius, namely according to an artistic “wisdom,” 131 while at the
same time attributing the role of the subject to the object itself as simultaneously cause
and effect of itself.132 Since, as Zuckert notes,133 to judge that it is art is to determine it
according to the cognition of a supersensible designer, a deity, but such would not be a
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KU 5:307
KU 5:376; “An object or a state of mind or even an action, however, even if its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, is called purposive merely because its possibility can only
be explained and conceived by us insofar as we assume as its ground a causality in accordance with ends,
i.e., a will that has arranged it so in accordance with the representation of a certain rule” (KU 5:220)
130

131
132

KU 5:441
KU 5:373-4

133 At

various points in Zuckert’s account of the relation between aesthetic and teleological judgments can
sound as if her view cannot allow for the kind of mirror that Allison notes and which I develop further here.
For example, see 2017, p. 356. However, I think that her observations regarding the role that the understanding plays in teleological judgments versus aesthetic judgments only holds if we collapse judgments of
art into judgments of the beautiful. Zuckert is aware that she is following the “standard practice” in Kant
scholarship by doing this, but I think that the price of following this norm is too high; see Zuckert, 2006, p.
599. Instead, if we keep the aesthetic judgments distinct, then I think that Zuckert is likely to find the connection that I have shown acceptable within her own interpretive framing, particularly as expressed at the
end of her section “Purposiveness without a purpose as a normative principle for reflective judging,” 2007,
pp. 362-3. C.f. Kroner, 1921, p. 237.
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valid use of reason,134 and so the role of artist is “attributed” to the object of nature itself
as if it were both art and artist of itself. 135
A natural end, judged by the determining judgment, according to the mechanical
causality via a concept of the understanding, is a product of nature, i.e. the effect.136 That
same natural end, judged by reflecting judgment, according to a causality as an idea of
reason in the service of the free lawfulness of reflecting judgment, is the idea of the
whole as the cause of the parts. 137 When an object of nature is so judged according to the
causality of reason, “this object must be thoroughly regarded as an end, but not a natural
end, i.e., as a product of art (vestigium hominis video).”138 A Teleological judgment
judges of the same object that it is “cause and effect of itself”. To this end, a “thing exists
as a natural end if it is cause and effect of itself (although in a twofold sense).” 139 The
teleological judgment judges of the manifold that it is determinable according to a concept of the understanding (i.e. according to mechanical empirical laws), such that a tree,
for example, “generates itself as far as the species is concerned.”140 But to be a teleological judgment, the judgment does not merely bring the manifold under a determinate concept of mechanical causality (which would be a determining judgment), it simultaneously

134

Zuckert, 2007, p. 39-40, 81, 91.

135

Note that this says nothing of the actual source of such design, it is merely attributed to nature, whether
nature is itself the source of its own fundamental laws and design as a kind of intelligence or whether this
formative power is ultimately from without is not at issue and is beyond the scope of a synthetic a priori
use of pure reason.
136
137
138
139
140

KU 5:375
Ibid.
KU 5:370
KU 5:370-1
KU 5:371
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brings the manifold under an idea of reason, namely the concept of causality or an “end”,
according to which, for example, “a tree also generates itself as an individual.” 141
The teleological judgment would not be teleological if it proceeded either according to the understanding or according to reason. In the first case it would be a determining judgment, but because the concept arises from reflecting on the empirical, it would be
a judgment that treats the object as a thing in itself and not merely as an appearance,
which cannot be lawful. In the second case, by which it relates the manifold to an idea of
reason, the judgment would be an aesthetic judgment of art in which we judge products
of nature “as a product of art.”142 After all, “insofar as a thing is conceived of as possible
only in this way it is merely a work of art, i.e., the product of a rational cause distinct
from the matter (the parts), the causality of which (in the production and combination of
the parts), is determined through its idea of a whole that is thereby possible.”143 To judge
objects of nature as a product of art and not merely “as if” it were art, however, would be
to take the supersensible as the cause of the object of nature, that is the idea of an end
would be taken as a law, which likewise would treat appearance as a thing-in-itself and
would be an invalid use of reason. 144 The “representation of the imagination”145 of an
“idea of a natural end” as an “approximation”146 of an idea of reason is a “lawfulness
without law.”147 Whereas the idea of an end as a legislation of reason would be a law for
141
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142

KU 5:370

143

KU 5:373
KU 5:389, 5:411-3
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the determination of nature, which is not valid. The judgment in both cases would be determining.
Because the teleological judgment is reflecting (i.e. seeks out a concept adequate
to the manifold) as standing under the guidance of the free lawfulness of the imagination
(the a priori principle of purposiveness), and further judges the object in a “twofold
sense” according to both the causality of mechanism of nature (a concept of the understanding) and the causality of ends (a concept of reason), the idea of a natural end that
results as the unifying term for teleological judgments is a composite in which the manifold is judged (unified) only according to both forms of causality. In other words, the
judgment relates the object to itself “reciprocally.”148 The judgment itself, then, is a reflecting judgment that is only possible by relating the manifold, via the imagination, to
both the understanding and to reason. It does this not as two separate judgments, but as
one and the same “reciprocal” judging concerning the same object. The only way this is
possible is if the unifying term (i.e. the form) is both kinds of causality at once (i.e. simultaneously a concept of the understanding and a concept of reason). These concepts of
the understanding and reason function as maxims in teleological judgments, such that
“power of judgment can set out from two maxims in its reflection.”149 And that is precisely how we are to understand a “natural end,” not as a concept of the understanding or of
reason, but as a unified use of both in the service of the imagination under the free lawfulness of the latter.
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This means that the idea of a natural end is the idea of a thing as “reciprocally”
“producing the other parts” and “self-organizing,”150 since only thereby can it be a cause
in both senses, by which it is the effect of natural causality and the cause of itself as if it
were art.151 And what is this combination of the two conceptions of causality but precisely that lawful synthesizing that proceeds freely (reflectively) according to each concept of
causality as the matter that it synthesizes in a single idea: a natural end.
This two-fold causality is precisely the same as it was in judgments of art, except
now the causality of freedom, of an intelligence, and productive power of the mind, i.e.
artistic genius, is attributed to nature as if it were both “cause and effect of itself.”152
In the judging of objects according to the idea of natural ends, the “formative
power” attributed to nature must be attributed to nature, since “one says far too little
about nature and its capacity in organized products if one calls this an analogue of art:
for in that case one conceives of the artist (a rational being) outside of it.”153 The idea of a
natural end, then, is one in which the manifold of an object of nature is reciprocally unified according to both sensible and supersensible causalities. This one idea, moreover,
arises as a unifier through the reflecting power of judgment and is regulative for experience.154 While it is ultimately an idea that arises in the domain of the imagination,155 it
employs an idea of reason, for the sake of unifying the given manifold.
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In short, the aesthetic idea bridges the domains of nature and freedom through the
unity of a manifold of an object that is both judged and formed according to rules prescribed by the judging subject qua the the free lawfulness of the imagination in its production (genius) according to a unifying concept of the object whose parts are causally
determined by the idea of the whole, where the idea of the whole is an idea of reason given by and for the subject via the faculty of spirit. 156
The idea of a natural end serves as the same bridge because it is a two-fold
causality of nature (mechanism) and freedom (ends) represented as the unifying term of
an object through reflection on that object for the possibility of that object as both cause
and effect of itself. As such, when we judge teleologically of an object, we judge it simultaneously according to mechanistic, empirical laws as art and according to a free, supersensible causality as if it designed itself, that is we attribute to it the formative power
[Bildungskraft] of its own design, as cause and effect of itself. So insofar as it is judged
as a work of art, we judge the causality of production according to ends to be internal to
the object, as if the formative powers of the artist were a property of the object itself as its
own cause. That is to say, whereas the causality of a work of art is the artist (qua genius
and spirit), or more directly the idea that governs the production, that same causality is
attributed to the object of nature not externally, but internally as if the object of nature
were both art and artist of itself.

156

Just as in teleological judgments, the two-fold causality can be split in judgments of art, such that the
artistic power of formation (genius) need not be the judging subject her/himself, but can be attributed to
another rational subject as the source of the artistic power of production.
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(4.4) The Free Lawful Unity of the Supersensible and Sensible
Either way, it is the same formal judgment according to the free lawfulness of the
imagination and as the same formal judgment is that whereby the human being judges of
itself as both a supersensible intelligence and a sensible object of nature, as both a judging subject with the productive power of genius and as a manifold of sensibility, as both
free yet lawful. The free lawfulness of the imagination that grounds the validity of this
self-legislation of the mind as a human being according to a unity of freedom of the supersensible and lawfulness of the sensible. Where the KrV gave only a principle of reason’s unity in light of this dualism, here in the KU under the principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination, the unity is not a regulative principle of systematicity,157 but a
constitutive principle of a discursive reasoner for the valid synthetic a priori determination of the self as both supersensible and sensible. Thus to judge of the self according to
this unified form, as a human being, is to judge of the self according to the two-fold form
of a judgment of art, as a productive power of the supersensible subject whereby self-legislation is possible and as a sensible being whose unifying form is reflectively given in a
purposive conception of the self according to an end. In this way, the free lawfulness of
the imagination bridges the domains of the supersensible freedom and legislation of reason and the sensible lawfulness and determinations of cognition. The human being is thus
judge-able not merely according to a duality of transcendental and sensible, but also according to a unity through an idea of the human being according to an aesthetic idea, as
157

The concept of a natural end should not be confused with the regulative demand for a unity of empirical
principles or laws stemming from the systematicity found in theoretical reason. The latter is a regulative
principle concerning mechanistic coherence in nature. A natural end, is a concept of a whole wherein the
object of nature is “cause and effect of itself” (KU 5:370, 5:249).
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both art and artist. This does not imply that the sensible is fabricated by the self, but
rather that the self is both productively and lawfully forming and that which is formed.
This is what it means to be a discursive human being.
It turns out, then, that the concept of a living being as a natural end, as operative
according to a two-fold causality (i.e. cause and effect of itself, such as is needed for the
idea of a real human being) is only possible because of the a priori principle of purposiveness, which grounds teleological judgments, whereby an object of nature can be unified according to both the understanding and reason, such that mechanism in nature is
shown to be in unity with the freedom of the supersensible in one and the same object of
experience. Of course, such a judgment is regulative for cognition, but constitutive (selflegislation) for the judging subject and the use of the cognitive faculties. It is thereby an
idea that necessarily accompanies any conception of an individual human being, not in a
merely transcendental sense as the I think of the KrV, but as a unity of a single subject,
where the duality is regulatively necessary for Transcendental Reflection, but not constitutively valid of the human being as such.
Bound up in such a unified judgment of human beings is the human being as simultaneously a product of causal laws, yet also as a product of art where the object (the
human being) is judged as both art and artist of itself; i.e., the causality according to ends
of practical reason is attributed to the object itself qua human being. This means that the
freedom (morality) of humans is judged as a sensible property of the human being as a
discursive reasoner (not merely of a supersensible will but of a sensible human being):
the human being as a discursive reasoner is artist of itself as its art according to a
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supreme principle of free lawfulness. These two causalities are not judged as two separable elements, but as forming one and the same concept of a non-dualistic object: a human
being. This freedom, of course, is not a freedom from lawfulness but is rather lawfulness
in its freedom, namely: autonomy or (self-reflectively and aesthetically) heautonomy;
where spontaneity of the understanding and autonomy of the will are bound together in a
representation of a purposive, heautonomous unity, a human being.
Nor is this the same as saying that we judge of the human being according to both
the sensible and supersensible, which preserves the original duality. Rather, in this concept of the human being as a natural end, as art and artist of itself according to a free lawfulness of pure reason, we have one and the same idea (not an idea from two realms).158
In short, the principle of purposiveness, grounding reflecting judgments in general, makes
possible (as Kant claims in the introduction) the bridging of the theoretical and
practical.159
So, the subjective principle of purposiveness that shows the necessary free lawful
relation of the imagination to the understanding and reason is precisely that whereby nature is shown to be in accord with reason in general as if it were itself a product of genius,
158 And

this unity arises through reason and the understanding via their reciprocal relation in the teleological power of judgment according to the a priori principle of purposiveness (KU 5:414), whereby both stand
in the service of the imagination in its freedom, i.e. the free lawfulness of the imagination that governs reflecting judgments.
159

KU 5:175-7, 5:195-6, 20:242-3; A further question now presents itself. If the teleological reflecting
judgment stands (via the subjective principle of purposiveness) as the “objective” bridging judgment between the sensible and supersensible, how are we to take this “bridge” as a real bridge when it is precisely
valid only according to a subjective principle of purposiveness? Indeed, the entire point of the antinomy of
teleological judgments is that were it to rest on objective purposiveness it would result in a contradiction.
The idea of a natural end is only possible because of a subjective principle of the mind (the free lawfulness
of the imagination) and cannot be represented as objective (5:386-8). And this conclusion of the antinomy
of teleological judgments accords both with the point of section 35 of the aesthetic deduction (KU 5:286-7),
as well as with both introductions (KU, first introduction, 20:249, 5:182-6, 5:197). Nor is the bridge somehow supposed to collapse the distinction between the “should-be” and the “be” of the practical and the theoretical according to the domains of freedom and nature (KU 5:404).
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i.e. as if it were art.160 We have then, a bridge that does not collapse the divide, but rather
shows a unity in judgment “between a practical law concerning that which is possible
through us and the theoretical law concerning that which is actual through us.” 161
(4.5) Conclusion
As we saw in Chapter 2, the fundamental productive power of the mind, the pure
productive intellectual synthesis of the imagination, in the KrV, is a relationship in which
the free productive power of the mind is subordinate to the lawfulness of the mind
through the supreme principle of the synthetic unity of apperception. This subordination
of the function of the imagination to the lawfulness of the mind was traceable through a
three-fold significance of the imagination as the lawful structure of determining judgments of the understanding.
Here in the KU, the supreme principle is not the synthetic unity of apperception,
but the principle of purposiveness as the free lawfulness of the imagination. This principle is a reversal of that fundamental relationship between the conditions of freedom and

160

So, a principle of the mind that a priori grounds the imagination in a relation to the understanding and
reason, such that we can judge teleologically of nature, reveals that reason, in general, is such that it not
only determines nature and the will but also necessarily discovers/yields nature (undetermined) as standing
in conformity with the laws of the understanding and of reason. It is precisely this lawful “display” of nature through the imagination (KU 5:352, 5:366, 20:232), though “without law” (KU 5:240-1), that becomes
a demand for the understanding and reason to yield adequate concepts or ideas (KU 5:378, 5:431). This
demand on the latter is, of course, what makes the judgment reflecting, i.e. the manifold is given for which
an adequate unifying idea or concept is sought (KU 5:179-80, 20:211, 5:314).
161

KU 5:404; And this is the greatest possible affirmation one could hope for from the sensible since no
determinate knowledge of the thing in itself is possible. So, objects of nature show themselves to stand in
conformity with the laws the understanding and reason even when judgments proceed from nature and seek
out adequate, unifying concept, as is the case in reflecting judgments. More accurately: objects in nature are
exhibited by the imagination as standing in conformity with the faculties of form (i.e. the laws of the understanding and reason)(KU, first introduction, 20:232-3, 5:352, 5:366). Through the power of the imagination
according to the subjective principle of purposiveness, nature comes before us as in need of a concept adequate to the manifold of a whole conceivable only according to the two-fold causality of freedom and
mechanism.
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lawfulness, such that here lawfulness was subordinated to freedom. 162 It is this principle
of purposiveness as the free lawfulness of the imagination that grounds the validity and
necessity of the fundamental productive power of the mind as operative in a forming
process that is lawful productivity “without a law.” Through this free lawfulness, pure
reason in general is unified with empirical reason in a free productive power of reason,
where lawfulness is internal, not an external standard of determination, but an internal
structure of necessity to the productive power of the mind.
What we will see in the coming chapters is that it is for this reason that Hegel
identifies the transcendental productive imagination in the KrV as the “germ of speculation.” It is the seed of speculation, according to Hegel, because it alone contained within
it the two-fold stems of the a priori and the a posteriori and thereby the possibility of a
bridge between. Or in Hegel’s words: “we must not place Kant’s merit in this, that he puts
the forms, as expressed in the categories, into the human cognitive faculty… We must
find it, rather in his having put the Idea of authentic a priority in the form of transcendental imagination,” 163 and further that the “germ of speculation lies in this triplicity alone.
For the root judgment, or duality, is in it as well, and hence the very possibility of a posteriority.”164 But, for Hegel, while the productive imagination in the KrV showed this
possibility only “negatively” (which, for Hegel means, only one-sidedly), the KU displays it positively. Hegel will go on to claim in the Science of Logic, at the very heart of
his transition to the absolute idea, that it is Kant’s principle of purposiveness [Zweck-

162
163
164

By contrast, as we saw, in the KPV, freedom and lawfulness are unified in a reciprocally implying form.
GW, p. 80
GW, p. 80
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mäsigkeit] as the free lawfulness of the imagination in the KU, that is one of Kant’s
“greatest service to philosophy.”165 This fundamental purposiveness as the free lawfulness of the imagination, interpreted as I have in Chapters 3-5, is the ground on which
Hegel will show the transition from Critical Idealism to his Absolute Idealism, such that
the latter is the necessity of reason according to a justified free lawful bridge of the a priori and a posteriori. In short, this free lawfulness of the imagination becomes the essence
of what Hegel identifies as the internal necessity of the dialectic movement of reason.
Hegel’s conception of absolute reason should be viewed, I will argue, as a unified free
lawful, self-determining, productive power of necessity. That is, as a systematically
worked out sublation of Kant’s free lawfulness of the imagination.

165

WL 12.157; To my knowledge, no one has interpreted this passage in the Science of Logic as referring to
the free lawfulness of the imagination, but my account of Kant to this point is one-half of my argument for
why this notion is at the heart of both Kant and Hegel’s idealism. I turn now to Hegel to provide the other
half of this argument.
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PART TWO

HEGEL
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CHAPTER 6

THE GROUND OF HEGEL’S LOGIC OF LIFE AND THE UNITY OF REASON:

FREE LAWFULNESS OF THE IMAGINATION
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§1) Introduction
The status of Hegel’s logic of life in the Science of Logic (WL) and,
correspondingly, the Encyclopedia of Logic (EL) is at the heart of how one reads Hegel’s
system in relation to (i) Kant’s critical Idealism, (ii) forms of pre- or post-critical
monisms, and (iii) contemporary philosophical interests. That his logic of life is so
central to these divergent perspectives is not itself a standard view, but that it should be
the standard view is, I trust, the conclusion that my readers will reach as a byproduct of
my argument.
Hegel’s chapter on teleology in the Science of Logic concerns the final transition
of the transcendental necessity of thought to the idea and thereby stages of the “idea of
life” the idea of theoretical and practical cognition, and the “absolute idea.” It is the idea
as such that is the basis of Hegel’s absolute idealism as the internally necessitated unity
of the a priori and a posteriori in a given determination of reason. It is the point in his
system where his own science of logic proceeds beyond what he called the “subjective”
idealism of Fichte and Kant into absolute idealism. This final transition is the transition to
an internally necessitated unity of the a priori and a posteriori. And thereby the
possibility of a historical, contingently valid and necessary use of reason. In this chapter,
I argue against the standard readings of this final transition, which takes place in the
chapter on Teleology, according to which Hegel is employing a concept of Aristotelian
teleology of the “soul” in De Anima or of Kant’s conception of a “natural end.” Not only
do those interpolations necessarily fail in the context of the WL, we also have strong
theoretical and textual reason to think that Hegel was right to identify Kant’s principle of
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purposiveness from the KU, the free lawfulness of the imagination as the moment of this
final transition whereby the move from transcendental idealism to the internal necessity
in absolute reason grounded. This argument, if right, will set the stage not only for
recognizing the fundamental structure of Hegel’s absolute idealism as a necessary
outworking of Kant’s idealism, but also makes possible a retrospective recognition of the
importantly Hegelian conclusions that Kant’s critical idealism reached, although these
were not followed through to their fuller, internally necessitated, systematic implications.
§2) Kant’s Greatest Service to Philosophy According to Hegel
In his 1802 critique of Kant in Glauben und Wissen (GW), Hegel gives voice to
the same interpretation of Kant that culminates in the final transition of the 1816/17 Logic
and Encyclopedia and which is maintained in the revised versions. Namely, Hegel takes
special note of what he calls Kant’s (a) the “germ of speculation” and (b) “greatest
service to philosophy.”
Of (a), Hegel says: “we must not place Kant’s merit in this, that he puts the forms,
as expressed in the categories, into the human cognitive faculty… We must find it, rather
in his having put the Idea of authentic a priority in the form of transcendental
imagination,”1 and further that the “germ of speculation lies in this triplicity alone. For
the root judgment, or duality,2 is in it as well, and hence the very possibility of a
posteriority.”3 Hegel’s view here is that Kant’s transcendental imagination in the KrV
represents the “germ of speculation” because it contains within it the very duality of the a

1

GW, p. 80
For more on this duality in Kant’s Productive Imagination, see Zambrana, 2015, p. 38.
3 GW, p. 80
2
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priori and a posteriori and, thereby, the possibility of their critical unity, which is
speculative thought.4 I suggest that we understand this triplicity as precisely the threefold significance of the imagination in the KrV, by which it is operative as a purely
productive power of intellectual synthesis (first-layer significance), and as a bridging
principle whereby it synthesizes pure intuitions or “schemata” to form the “rule” of the
schematized understanding (second-layer significance), and finally synthesizes empirical
intuitions from the sensibly given as the content of determining judgments of the
understanding (third-layer significance). In the first-layer, it is a purely a priori condition;
in the second-layer, it is an a priori sensible bridge; in the third-layer, it is an a posteriori
productive synthesis of an empirical intuition.
I gave the full argument for this in Chapter 2, but it is worth recalling some of the
textual evidence in Kant for this root duality in the transcendental imagination. These
include Kant’s often overlooked passage on A119 of the KrV in which he says that “the
unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding,
and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is
the pure understanding.” It is interesting to note that, in the B edition, Kant largely
abandons explicit talk of the imagination in relation to apperception or as internal to or
constitutive of the pure understanding. At the same time, he begins (from that point
forward in the first Critique) in both A and B editions to speak of the pure understanding
in a way that seems to depend on a fundamental (non-sensible) productive power as
internal to the pure understanding –a productive power that is otherwise attributed to the

4

GW, 73
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transcendental imagination– as the source of its spontaneity by which it yields pure
conceptual representations through an act of pure intellectual “synthesis.”5 And of this
pure synthesis, Kant says (in both the A and B-editions): “Now pure synthesis, generally
represented, yields the pure concepts of the understanding,” i.e. the categories, and “by
this synthesis, however, I understand that which rests on a ground of synthetic unity a
priori” and further “synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect
of the imagination.”6 So, Kant seems to be maintaining in the B-edition as well, precisely
that role of the “transcendental synthesis of the imagination” in relation to the “unity of
apperception,” as that wherein the synthetic unity of apperception serves as the synthetic
principle a priori whereby the pure understanding can be the pure form of a faculty for
determining objects of nature as cognition.7
So, seemingly some form or condition of the imagination is in some way
internally constitutes the pure understanding and the understanding. 8 At the very least, an
interpretation of the understanding that removes any talk of the imagination must still
posit the productive power of spontaneity internal to the understanding by which it gives
itself pure conceptual representations (as the objects of pure categorial thought). In any
5 A142/B181
6 A77-8/B103-4
7

Please see Ch. 2 for my complete argument on the subject.
Notice the compatibility between A119 and the way Kant speaks (in the B edition) of a productive a
priori capacity of the understanding by which it gives itself a “purely intellectual manifold” “synthesized”
to yield the categories or “forms of thought”: “…forms of thought, through which no determinate object is
yet cognized. The synthesis or combination of the manifold in them was related merely to the unity of
apperception, and was thereby the ground of the possibility of cognition a priori insofar as it rests on the
understanding, and was therefore not only transcendental but also merely purely intellectual” (B150).
While the term imagination does not appear there, Kant repeats the exact structure of “unity” forming the
understanding that he identifies in A116-9. And further in the application of these forms of thought a few
pages later: “insofar as the Imagination is spontaneity, I also occasionally call it the productive
imagination” by which it is an “effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application” a
“determining of sensibility a priori…in accordance with the categories” (B152).
8
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case, that pure productive power is the essence of what Kant and Hegel seem to have in
view in these passages on the significance of the imagination in the KrV.
We do not need to settle the matter here of how to read Kant. What is important is
that Hegel views Kant’s conception of the transcendental Imagination in the KrV as the
“germ of speculation.” The transcendental Imagination is the seed of speculative thought,
for Hegel, because (he thinks) it somehow contains within itself the “duality” of necessity
and contingency, the a priori and the a posteriori; and, thereby, internal to the productive
imagination is the possibility of a bridge, a unity, and of absolute knowledge. I suggest
that this source or seed of speculation is what Hegel will later refer to as the “imperfect,
ambiguous, and only negative” success of the KrV.9 By contrast, speaking of the KU,
Hegel argues that Kant “positively” raises philosophy to the threshold of absolute
idealism. If this is right, then the essence of what Hegel has in mind in this early writing
(from GW) is only fully worked out later in the WL and Encyclopedic system.
As referenced above, early in his chapter on Teleology in the Logic, Hegel
introduces purposiveness with the striking declaration:
One of Kant’s greatest services to philosophy was in drawing the distinction
between relative or external purposiveness and internal purposiveness [äußerer
und innerer Zweckmäßigkeit]; in the latter he opened up [aufgeschlossen] the
concept of life, the idea [den Begriff des Lebens, die Idee], and with that he
positively raised [erhoben] philosophy above the determinations of reflection and
the relative world of metaphysics, something the Critique of Reason does only
imperfectly, ambiguously, and only negatively.10

In the next section, I will consider standard readings of this chapter on Teleology,
which take Hegel’s notion of “innerer Zweckmäßigkeit” to hold systematic parity with
9

WL 12.157
WL 12.157

10
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Kant’s notion of a Naturzweck or with Aristotle’s principle of the soul (in De Anima). I
will suggest that both interpolations are untenable and that what Hegel has in mind here
is a notion of innerer Zweckmäßigkeit that is systematically comparable (holds parity
with) Kant’s a priori principle of Purposiveness, which Kant specifies as the “free
lawfulness of the Imagination.”
Before turning to standard interpolations, we should bring to mind some passages
that suggest the possibility of understanding “innerer Zweckmäßigkeit” as an a priori
principle of purposiveness qua the “free lawfulness of the imagination.” In the
penultimate chapter of the Logic where Hegel provides his exposition of the second stage
of the Idea from “life” to the “true” in “cognition,”11 Hegel says, “Kant made the
profound observation that there are synthetic principles a priori”12 What is more, Kant
“recognized as their root the unity of self-consciousness, hence the self-identity of the
concept.” 13 That is, Kant recognized that they are principles of a unified pure reason in
general.14
The problem, according to Hegel, is that Kant does not demonstrate the necessity
of these a priori principles. Rather, their necessity is assumed as requisite explanatory
grounds of the possibility for synthetic a priori judgments (theoretical, practical, and

11

Idea of Life: WL 12.179; Idea of Cognition: WL 12.192; and the unity of the two in self-recognition
becomes the Absolute Idea: WL 12.236.
12 WL 12.205; These are the principles whereby a given judgment form lays claim to a priori synthetic
validity. That is, without such principles, no transcendental deductions are possible. Accordingly, the three
Critiques have three a priori principles: (1) the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, (2) the Moral Law,
(3) Purposiveness; or as Kant identifies them in the second introduction to the KU (1) Lawfulness, (2) Final
End, (3) Purposiveness (5:198).
13 WL 12.205
14 That is, they form a unity qua reason in general, but Kant never demonstrates that unity, it stands only as
a regulative presupposition.
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aesthetic). To this end, Hegel continues, “However, he takes the specific connection, the
relational concepts and the synthetic principles, from formal logic as given; the deduction
of these should have been the exposition of the transition of that simple unity of selfconsciousness into these determinations and distinctions; but Kant spared himself the
effort of demonstrating this truly synthetic progression, that of self-producing concept.”15
It is this “truly synthetic progression” or “self-producing concept” that is the necessity of
speculative thought.
I suggest, somehow the “transcendental imagination” in the KrV contained the
“germ of speculation” because it possessed the “duality” of the “a priori” and “a
posteriori” not as external, but as “internal”16 and so also the possibility of a
demonstrating “truly synthetic progression.” Further, on Hegel’s view, the KU succeeds
through the notion of “innerer Zweckmäßigkeit” in “raising philosophy” to the “true” (i.e.
speculative) “idea” through the “concept of life.”17 This raising of philosophy to the
necessity of speculative thought was “only negatively” achieved18 in the KrV and
“positively” in the KU.
The negative/positive difference that Hegel is referencing between the KrV and
the KU is, I suggest, precisely that Kant makes this internal duality of the imagination in
the first Critique into an a priori principle grounding the third Critique and so recognizes
a key structure of the mind not merely as a quality of the imagination, but as a
15

WL 12.205
GW, p. 80
17 WL 12.157
18 It should be kept in mind that “negative” in the Science of Logic and Hegel’s entire system is a technical
term that identifies a necessary quality whereby the “movement of the concept,” the “truly synthetic
progression,” or “self-producing concept” is possible (WL 12.205). A such, “only negatively” is a critique
qua “only,” since it is an important, negative step but not the full picture.
16
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fundamental principle of pure reason. There is not space here to defend any particular
reading of the third Critique, for that, I refer my reader to Ch. 3-5. However, I wish
simply to identify a few passages to keep in mind in which Kant identifies the a priori
principle of purposiveness. These passages will serve as a seven-part background image
of what might be involved in interpreting Hegel’s notion of “inner purposiveness” as
inheriting something like Kant’s a priori principle of free lawfulness of the Imagination.
First, Kant uses purposiveness in numerous ways. Some of these include the (a)
form of purposiveness as kind of “schema” or “symbol,” which result from the
imagination’s relation to the understanding and reason respectively; 19 (b) formal
purposiveness which concerns the relation of the faculties of the imagination and the
understanding as standing in an actual relation identifiable in some respects as a
“harmonious free play,” 20 (c) the a priori principle of purposiveness,21 and (d) at least a
formal difference between the a priori principle of purposiveness and “such a
transcendental principle as a law.”22 Whatever the relationship between these forms of
purposiveness, whether they are continuous, identical in various ways, or altogether
incompatible or invalid distinctions, (a), (b), and (d) are not what I have in view in this
argument. The following points are intended merely to identify a possible way that we
might (in an effort to understand Hegel) reasonable read Kant’s conception of (d) the a
priori principle of purposiveness.

19

KU 5:352-5
KU 5:217-8, 5:287, 5:380
21 KU 5:286, 5:288, 5:376, 5:417, 20:225-6, 20:202
22 KU 5:180, 20:225
20
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Second, In his 1787 letter to Reinhold, Kant famously announces his “discovery”
of a new a priori principle,23 which he terms “purposiveness.”24
Third, Kant identifies two specifications of the a priori principle of
purposiveness. These are (i) subjective purposiveness (in the Aesthetic Power of
Judgment), and (ii) objective purposiveness (in the Teleological Power of Judgment). It is
not readily apparent whether the objective, “concept of purposiveness in nature” is
actually an a priori principle.25 It might merely be a regulative result, i.e. a “maxim” that
is “occasioned” by the subjective specification of purposiveness or otherwise. 26 In fact,
this latter possibility was the proper conception according to my argument in Ch. 3 and 5.
For our present purposes, we need only observe that some underlying relation between
teleology and aesthetics in the KU is operative at the level of the a priori principle of
purposiveness, such that Kant says:
The power of judgment’s concept of a purposiveness of nature still belongs
among the concepts of nature, but only as a regulative principle of the faculty of
cognition, although the aesthetic judgment on certain objects (of nature or of art)
that occasions it is a constitutive principle with regard to the feeling of pleasure
or displeasure.27

Fourth, of the subjective specification of the “constitutive principle,” Kant says,
“the principle of [aesthetic judgment] is the subjective principle of the power of judgment
in general.”28
23

Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, pp. 127-128.
In the words of Henry Allison, this principle is “the condition under which” synthetic, a priori reflecting
judgment is “capable of a critique in the first place” (Kant’s Theory of Taste, p. 13). At the heart of each
critique is a transcendental deduction, and such a deduction concerns precisely the a priori principle by
which the lawfulness of synthetic a priori form of the given judgment is grounded.
25 KU 5:196
26 KU 5:376
27 KU 5:197
28 Section 35, 5:286; C.f. 5:287, 20:232-3, 20:243, 5:181, 5:197, 5:226-7, 20:249-50
24
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Fifth, “…consequently all our judgments, in accordance with the order of the
higher cognitive faculties, can be divided into theoretical, aesthetic, and practical,
whereby aesthetic judgments are understood only the judgements of reflection, which
alone are related to a principle of the power of judgment, as a higher faculty of
cognition.”29
Sixth, concluding the entire Analytic of the Beautiful, which he says is alone in
need of a deduction as a result of its a priori principle:30 “If one draws the conclusion
from the above analyses, it turns out that everything flows from the concept of [aesthetic
judgments of the beautiful] as a faculty for judging an object in relation to the free
lawfulness of the imagination”31 This principle of “free lawfulness of the imagination” is
a principle as if it were independently free and lawful, “yet for the imagination to be free
and yet lawful by itself…is a contradiction. The understanding alone gives the law.”32
The free lawfulness of the imagination, is thus a principle of “lawfulness without law and
a subjective correspondence of the imagination to the understanding without an objective
one –where the representation is related to a determinate concept of an object– are
consistent with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which is also called
purposiveness without an end) and with the peculiarity of an [aesthetic judgment of the
beautiful].”33

29

KU 20:226
KU 5:279
31 KU 5:240
32 KU 5:241
33 KU 5:241
30
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Seventh, this a priori principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination [freie
Gesetzmäßigkeit der Einbildungskraft],34or “Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck” grounds the
validity by which the aesthetic judgment “as a subjective power of judgment, requires a
principle of subsumption, not of intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions
or presentations (i.e., of the imagination) under the faculty of concepts (i.e., the
understanding), insofar as the former in its freedom is in harmony with the latter in its
lawfulness.”35 Therein the principle of purposiveness (i.e. free lawfulness of the
imagination) is that whereby the imagination and understanding are in “harmonious”36
relation such that the “understanding is in the service of the imagination and not vice
versa.”37
Now, since Kant says that this principle of purposiveness “mediates the
connection of the domain of the concept of nature with the concept of freedom in its
consequences”38 and, put differently, “mediates the connection of the two faculties
[theoretical and practical reason]”39 it is conceivable that Hegel had this a priori principle
of “purposiveness” in mind when crediting Kant with his “greatest service to philosophy”
and with having “opened up the Idea.” After all, it is directly following Hegel’s
introduction of purposiveness in the Logic as the final transition to the Idea, that he
likewise shows the unity of theoretical and practical “cognition” in the Logic.40 That is,
34

KU 5:240
KU 5:286-7
36 KU 20:224
37 my emphasis, KU 5:242; in judgments of the sublime it is practical reason that is in the service of the
imagination as opposed to the understanding, where we find “merely the subjective play of the powers of
the mind (imagination and reason) as harmonious even in their contrast” (KU 5:258).
38 KU 5:197
39 KU 20:202
40 WL 12.235-6
35
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Hegel’s “Zweckmäßigkeit” is at the core of the final transition in the Logic by which the
relation between theoretical and practical reason are displayed as unified in the free, selfdetermining necessity of the absolute idea.
It might turn out that this absolute idea, which is the “truth” of the selfdetermining necessity of thought (i.e. the true unity of reason) is the result of a
recognition of the internal, “free lawfulness” by which the self-determining concept
grounds the self-determining dialectic method of speculative thought. We will return to
this possible readings shortly. At present, we need to take up the standard interpolations
of the Philosophy of Nature into the Logic by which Hegel’s notion of Zweckmäßigkeit is
taken to refer to a Kantian idea of a Naturzweck or a kind of Aristotelian notion of the
soul as a “principle of life.” 41
§3) Standard Interpolations of the Philosophy of Nature into the Logic
It is tempting to interpret the distinction between “äußerer und innerer
Zweckmäßigkeit” as the distinction between an external (mechanistic) causality in the
case of an artifact (e.g. a watch) and an internal (teleological) causality in the case of a
natural end (e.g. an organism). In “The Logic of Life: Hegel’s Philosophical Defense of
Teleological Explanation of Living Beings,” James Kreines does precisely this.42 He then
argues that, in contrast to Kant’s notion of a natural end [Naturzweck], Hegel’s “analysis
of life is more complex.” 43 Where the idea of a natural end is, for Kant, merely
41

De Anima II.4, 415b26-8; C.f. II.3, 414b19-25. What it means, on Aristotle’s account, for something to
have a principle of life (i.e. soul) is to have an internal, unified structure according to which it grows,
sustains itself, and in light of which it is susceptible to various kinds of decay. Of the soul, Aristotle states,
“the soul is the cause of its body alike in all three senses which we explicitly recognize. It is the source of
movement, it is the end, it is the essence of the whole living body” (De Anima II.4, 415b10-2).
42 Kreines, 2008, p.345
43 Kreines, 2008, pp. 358, 348-9
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regulative, such that we cannot claim cognition of the object,44 Hegel’s account of the
same, according to Kreines, complexifies the picture through three major requirements,45
such that the final conception of “life” that results “differs greatly from Kant’s analysis of
the concept of a Naturzweck.”46
Ultimately, Kreines would have us read Hegel’s logic of life as an “explanation, in
response to Kant’s specific problem, of how a complex system (e.g., an organism)
produced by reproduction might satisfy the requirements of inner purposiveness.”47
Somehow, on Kreines' view, Hegel’s logic of life –what was for Kant a “merely”
regulative idea of einen Naturzweck– adequately explains organisms. This means that it is
not merely regulative but (in Kant’s terms) constitutive or determining. We are to
understand Hegel’s idea of life in the Logic as escaping the Kantian regulative
classification because “living beings satisfy the analysis of inner purposiveness not in
virtue of the relation between the whole and the mutually external material ‘parts’ in
space, but in virtue of the relation between the whole and the ‘members' (6:476).”48
Beyond the dubious claim that this overcomes the Kantian status of a natural end as
merely regulative for cognition, it reveals a deeper problem.
Kreines takes inner purposiveness to be a matter of real teleology of the kind
characteristic of the second part of Hegel’s system: the Philosophy of Nature. On Kreines

44

Kreines, 2008, p. 353; this regulative idea is for Kant “logically consistent” and has heuristic value for
theoretical reason.
45 These three requirements are: (1) “self preservation,” i.e. “‘all members are reciprocally momentary
means as well as momentary ends’” (EL § 216); (2) “engaged in a ‘struggle with the outer world’” (EN §
365Z); and (3) mortal and so “must aim for the reproduction…by which a species endures” (2008, p.356.
46 Kreines, 2008, p. 357
47 Kreines 2008, p. 370
48 Kreines, 2008, p. 370
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view, “the Logic and the Encyclopedia offer philosophical arguments in favor of a
different metaphysical account of reality - one that contrasts with ‘organic monism’ …
arguing that the whole of reality is structured into different ‘levels’ or Stufen. Mechanistic
phenomena form the lowest level, and biological phenomena form a much higher
level.”49 But this cannot be a correct account of the Logic. The real problem with Kreines
account is that it loses any significant distinction between “logic of life” and the “nature
of life.” It is the idea of life in both cases, but in one case the idea of life in the Logic, in
the other it is the idea of life in the Philosophy of Nature. One would hope that there is a
meaningful difference otherwise the latter is a superfluous repetition of the former. On
Kreines account, however, Hegel’s philosophy of nature and his logic are collapsed into
one.
In short, Kreines’ interpretation of the Logic is less interpretation than it is
interpolation. Kreines imports Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature into a reading of Hegel’s
chapters on Mechanism, Chemism, Teleology, and Life in the Logic.
Kreines is not alone in giving an interpolation of the logic of life. Indeed, such
interpolations are the norm. There are several immediate reasons we should be hesitant to
accept this norm. If we follow Kreines, then it is not at all clear why Hegel had to write
an entire Philosophy of Nature between the Encyclopedia of Logic and the Encyclopedia
of Spirit (which he took to be a necessary part of his tripartite system).50
At best we can say with Kreines that the only remaining task for the Philosophy of
Nature after the Logic is to show that “our empirical knowledge of plant and animal
49
50

Kreines 2008, p. 375
S §575-7
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biology fits the analysis of life,”51 and showing this will be “uncontroversial – after all,
there are living beings, and they do assimilate and reproduce. The philosophical heavy
lifting comes in the Logic….”52 In short, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature is superfluous. 53 It
does nothing but state that there are in fact living beings.
If that is the view, then the Logic does indeed do the heavy lifting. But such a
reading cannot square with the Logic and certainly cannot square with Hegel’s many
claims about the significance of the Philosophy of Nature.54 What is more, such a view
invalidates Hegel’s argument concerning the constitutive status of the Philosophy of
Spirit through the Philosophy of Nature.55 These are the immediate problems that arise
from such an interpolation. And yet, such a reading is the norm.
One might think that Robert Pippin’s non-metaphysical, Kantian-leaning account
would avoid such an interpolation of Hegel’s logic of life. Indeed, the section on
“Purpose and logical life” in Hegel’s Idealism, distinguishes between “nothing other than
the Notion [der Begriff]56 in its determinations” and its “real content,” i.e. the
“presentation which the Notion gives itself in the form of external existence.”57 However,

51

2008, p. 361
2008, p. 361
53 This view undermines Hegel’s, at least stated claim, of the necessary constitution of the Philosophy of
Spirit through the Philosophy of Nature.
54 N §376
55 S §575: here Hegel notes that Nature is central to three systematic “syllogism”: (1) a middle term
between the Logic and Spirit, (2) a presupposed unity with the principles of the logic to form the content of
mind (§576), and (3) a division of philosophy into its “universal extreme, as process of the objectively and
implicitly existing Idea. The self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances characterizes both as its (the
self-knowing reason’s manifestations” (§577). Further, the systematic truth shown through and retained by
the Philosophy of Nature is the externality of the “action of cognition” and in which the absolute Mind
“eternally sets itself to work” (S §577). At the very least, then, it would seem that Hegel thinks the
Philosophy of Nature does indeed do some systematic “heavy lifting” after all.
56 Pippin uses the term “Notion” for Hegel’s “der Begriff.”
57 EL § 213; Pippin, 2001, p. 243.
52
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it quickly becomes apparent that he too interpolates the Philosophy of Nature in the
Logic. According to Pippin, Hegel’s logic of purposiveness is meant to show “how
‘internal’ requirements of Notionality [the Concept] somehow ‘play themselves out’
when the object of study, ‘external existence,’ is the observable natural world.”58 Put
differently, Pippin would have us read the logic of purposiveness as having the equivalent
status as a natural end or teleology of an organism.
If this were what Hegel was endeavoring to show in the logic of purposiveness
and life, then we should conclude that he failed for two primary reasons. First, the Logic
displays an absence of examples (of organisms, laws, etc.), where the Philosophy of
Nature abounds with such precise examples and determinate ideas. Second, Hegel fails to
give anything like a dynamic account in the Logic of the idea of teleology. At best, one
steps away from the text with something like Kreines’s derived “requirements” that
somehow govern a conception of teleology, but even these requirements are vague and
unsatisfying.
Not surprisingly, Pippin comes to a similar conclusion, when he follows this
account of purposiveness in the Logic with the assessment, “Hegel’s success in such a
demonstration seems to me quite limited.”59 At the same time, Pippin tries to salvage
Hegel’s supposedly inauspicious account of purposiveness. On Pippin’s reading, the only
real significance of this notion of purposiveness for Hegel’s Logic is that “with the
[Concept] of purpose, the general issue of Reason’s own purposiveness - in Hegel’s
Logic, its internal development – and the nature of the idealist claim made for the
58
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objectivity of the results of such a development, are both now clearly in focus.”60 I find
this attempt to save the worth of Hegel’s teleology unsatisfactory. It is not clear to me
what significance is gained by the notion of “now clearly in focus,” since as Pippin notes,
this quality of reason was present from the beginning. It is not clear how a failed attempt
or “quite limited success” at grounding a notion of teleology should bring the
purposiveness of reason clearly into view in anything like a helpful manner.
But the bigger problem is that Pippin, like Kreines, is interpolating into the Logic
content that Hegel places squarely in the Philosophy of Nature. Nor does appeal to
Hegel’s account of teleology in the Phenomenology of Spirit help,61 since such an appeal
merely begs the question by going further than the Philosophy of Nature, straight to the
product of the Philosophy of Spirit, namely, the historical shapes of the Spirit or the
Phenomenology of Spirit. The logical necessity of Hegel’s account of Teleology in the
PhG depends (systematically) on the Logic, not vice versa. Our question, then, is this:
what is the status of purposiveness which transitions to life in Hegel’s Logic.62 To answer
this, we should briefly bring into view the status of the Logic, before turning to the more
immediate context.63
60

Ibid, p. 244
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62 Keren Ng’s “Life and Mind in Hegel’s Logic and Subjective Spirit” at times uses terminology that is
suggestive of a Kreinesian interpolation. For example: “Logic aims to highlight what Hegel takes to be the
formal aspects of this existence: the logical concept of life attempts to identify the formal characteristics of
sentient living activity, determining the mode of life-form activity that is relevant for cognition in general,
independent of particular external manifestations” (2016, Part III). I would agree with this phrasing if
“logical concept of life” were replaced with “the idea of life in the Philosophy of Nature.” That is the logic
of life concerns the logic of the concept, which will do the work Ng has in view, but only in the Philosophy
of Nature. In the Logic there is no “identification of the formal characteristics of sentient living activity.”
But since Ng’s argument does not depend on this kind of phrasing, her argument may be thoroughly
compatible with my own.
63 In section 6, I will identify the reason why Aristotle’s notion of the soul as a teleological principle of life
is likewise an interpolation and cannot be what Hegel means by purposiveness in the Logic, although this
Aristotelian notion will play a central role in the PN and S.
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§4) The Status of the Logic
The question of the status of the Logic inevitably draws out versions of
metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings. Steven Houlgate contrasts his metaphysical
reading of the Logic with Pippin’s non-metaphysical, Kantian interpretation in the
following way: “On Pippin’s reading, therefore, Hegel’s logic is merely a transcendental
philosophy that shows the conditions needed for objects to be determinate objects of
thought. It is not a metaphysics or ontology that discloses the intrinsic structure of things
themselves (or the ‘conditions’ required for them to be the things they are).” 64 Houlgate’s
account is not unlike Robert Stern’s “Conceptual Realism” reading of Hegel as inheriting
Kant’s critical turn while also going “beyond Kant” by giving critical expression to many
“classical” philosophical insights (notably Aristotelian thought).65 I think, however, that
this opposition between the metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings results from
misplaced emphases, which obscure the method of the Logic and absolute reason.
Of course, how to read the Logic, is not a question that can be answered here, but
it is necessary to give some reason for why I think a proper conception of the status of the
Logic results in an affirmation of both a metaphysical and a non-metaphysical reading, or
put negatively and more accurately, the result is a denial of both as adequate framings.
There is a way in which the dichotomy between the two types of readings misses the very
point of the transition to the absolute idea that occurs at the end of the Logic.
On my reading, the absolute idea does not allow for such a dichotomy. It is
precisely through the absolute idea that speculative thought is capable of laying claim to
64
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true metaphysics. The logic is not metaphysics at first, but the entire point of the method
of the logic is that, as the internal necessity of thought in its most abstract form develops
its “proofs,” it eventually reaches the final “transition” of the concept through these
stages of internal necessity to the point at which it is rightly called a true metaphysics. It
cannot start out as metaphysics, without presupposing its result and thereby obviating the
validity of that which it will prove. As such, the status of the Logic is closer to Pippin’s
non-metaphysical account. At the same time, once the necessity of the absolute idea is
shown, there is a kind of retroactive way in which the Logic is a logic of metaphysics,66
but to conceive of it as metaphysics from the start (or even at any point prior to the
absolute idea) would be to miss the very ground on which it can lay claim to the absolute.
To miss this ground would be to invalidate the result. Further, to take the result and then
do away with the transcendental ground by which it was first established is to fall back
into pre-critical dogma. The Logic must never be taken as passed, but always as bound up
in the constitutive activity of the Philosophy of Spirit. The result of the Logic makes the
PN and PS possible but is not thereby dispensable. Rather it is bound up, through its
result, as the constitutive structure of the latter.
According to Houlgate, “Hegel conceives of his logic as both a logic and a
metaphysics or an ontology because he understands the fundamental concepts of thought
to be identical in logical structure to the fundamental determinations of being itself.”67 In
a way, Houlgate is right. The fundamental concepts of thought are identical, on Hegel’s
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Eckart Förster may have meant something like this in his 2017 SGIR-NAKS Keynote Address. If so, I
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account to the fundamental determinations of being. But, such a claim to identity is a
uniquely Hegelian result (i.e. the product of the absolute method), not a standard logical
identity claim. The mistake, in accounts like Houlgate’s, is to think that “being” at outset
of the Logic has content that can possibly be called a metaphysics. Hegel’s starting point
is the opposite of Spinoza’s.68 The Logic is not starting with content and determining or
specifying what is already contained in it. Quite the reverse. The Logic is showing that
starting with nothing still results in a structure of thought’s necessity:69 its structure, its
movement, and its content. Hegel’s method begins with no method, no content, no form,
only pure abstraction for the sake of reflecting on what, if anything, is necessitated by
empty thought. Eventually, by the end of the Logic, the absolute idea, as the result of the
WL, grounds a kind of metaphysics precisely in that it allows for a justified unity in
discursive reason between the a priori and a posteriori.

68 According

to Hegel, “Spinoza stops short at negation as determinateness…therefore his substance does
not contain the absolute form, and the cognition of it is not a cognition from within” (WL 11.376). Hegel
contrasts his absolute idealism further in its product through the critique of Spinoza that in his “absolute
which is only unmoved identity, the attribute, like the mode, is only as disappearing, not as becoming, so
that this disappearing also makes its positive beginning only from without” (WL 11.377). And again, “what
is lacking, therefore, is the necessity of the progression of the absolute to inessentiality, as well as the
dissolution in and for itself of the latter into identity or again, missing are both the becoming of the identity
and its determinations” (WL 11.378). In short, Hegel argues that Spinoza asserts a kind of absolute, but
does not have nor prove the absolute necessity of thought (its method and content). Spinozistic monism, is
thereby, according to Hegel, merely “dogmatic reflection” (WL 11.379).
69 Here, necessity means “absolute necessity” (i.e. the product of the logic) not merely “real necessity” or
“formal necessity”: “Real necessity is determinate necessity; formal necessity does not yet have any
content and determinateness in it” (WL 11.389), whereas “absolute necessity is not so much the necessary,
even less a necessary, but necessity…The sides of the absolute relation are not therefore, attributes” but
rather “the expositor of the absolute is the absolute necessity which, as self-determining, is identical with
itself” (WL 11.393). That is to say, the absolute necessity turns out to be the structure and movement (i.e.
the constitution) of the thing developed by such a method. It is such a product of that method. To reach a
justified notion of the absolute as identical with its own method, requires such a purely abstract starting
point in which nothing but necessity of thought constitutes that which cannot be otherwise, until at last
what is in view is the necessary structure of a pure concept, judgment, etc. and at last to the absolute idea
and absolute reason as the realized unity of reason, which was in Kant, quite rightly, merely a systematic,
regulative ideal. If Hegel goes beyond Kant in this way, he does so only in a way that Kant and every other
discursive reasoner should assent to (or else give an account of how this internal necessity fails qua such a
necessity of thought).
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Consider from the reverse systematic approach: in Hegel’s introduction to the
Philosophy of Right, he says, “the concept of right, so far as its coming into being is
concerned, falls outside the science of right; [the concept of right’s] deduction is
presupposed here and is to be taken as given.”70 By “science of right” Hegel is
referencing the Philosophy of Spirit, where the science of right is given. It is the third part
of the Encyclopedia that Hegel identifies as the science by which the “deduction” of right
is given and which is presupposed in the Philosophy of Right. I suggest that we trace this
relation backward. Namely, had Hegel undertaken to write a Philosophy of [Natural]
Science then this would have a parallel status as the Philosophy of Right, namely, the
Philosophy of Nature (the second part of the Encyclopedia) would stand as the “science
of nature” by which the deduction of the “concept of natural science” (i.e. biology,
chemistry, physics, etc) is grounded. Likewise, the greater and lesser Logic (as the first
part of the Encyclopedia) is the “science of thought” by which the deduction of the
“absolute idea” is grounded.
This is why Hegel introduces the Logic with the stipulation: “Logic, on the
contrary, cannot presuppose any of these forms of reflection, these rules and laws of
thinking, for they are part of its content and they first have to be established within it.”71
This is the necessary starting “point” for the Logic if it is to remain what it is through and
through, since “in no science is the need to begin with the thing [Sache] itself, without
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preliminary reflections, felt more strongly than in the science of logic.”72 Even the Sache
or object and method/“laws” of the logic cannot be presupposed:
Logic, therefore, cannot say what it is in advance, rather does this knowledge of
itself only emerge as the final result and completion of its whole treatment.
Likewise its subject matter, thinking or more specifically conceptual thinking, is
essentially elaborated within it; its concept is generated in the course of this
elaboration and cannot therefore be given in advance.73

To take “generation” here to refer to anything like metaphysical “content” is to
undermine precisely that abstraction from all presuppositions that Hegel stipulates and
follows. The Logic cannot be read as “generating” in a metaphysical sense without
contradicting Hegel and undermining the very ground of a “true” metaphysics. Hegel
begins the Logic with “being and nothing,” but is careful (as Houlgate notes) to abstract
these terms from any determinations: “it has no difference within it, nor any outwardly.”74
It is precisely because “being” is abstracted from everything (conceptual or real),
that Hegel says it is thereby “nothing”: “Being, the indeterminate immediate is in fact
nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing” and shortly thereafter, “Nothing is
therefore the same determination or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether
the same as what pure being is.”75 The logical method that then proceeds from this can
only be valid synthetic a priori (to use Kant’s term, a term that Hegel moves away from
for reasons that I cannot here take up, and instead importantly employs notions of the
“necessity of thought”).
72

My change, WL 21.27
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74 WL 21.69
75 WL 21.69, It is the most abstract conception of being as “is,” where “is” cannot even be taken as a copula
(which would itself be a relational determination) or assertion, or reference, it is at this highest level of
abstraction, where “being/nothing,” “is/is not” have their only determination, only meaning as that which is
opposed to its opposite. As such, they are the same.
73
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It is through this empty starting point that Hegel begins to show a necessity to
thought that is not a matter of assent but is an internal necessity of the given stage. Even
the thought of a deduction is not warranted, and indeed, the method that arises as the
necessity of thought is a unique kind, namely the internal necessity of the concept, which
will ground the self-determination of the concept, and the dialectic method.
Consider the origin of this internal necessity that the Logic proves. At the highest
level of abstraction “being” necessarily gives rise to “nothing” as what such pure
abstraction is, but in this giving rise to its opposite as what it is, we find in thought a
transitioning a movement,76 And “their truth is therefore this movement” i.e.
“becoming”…so the logical method is itself given synthetically through the “internal
necessity” of pure abstraction (abstraction to nothing), i.e. the pure necessity of thought,
simpliciter. Nothing in this can be called metaphysical without importing precisely what
was set aside and must be proved.
It is important to think through each of Hegel’s steps in the Logic, in order to
recognize that this is not some preformed standard by which the logic must progress.77
Likewise, even when Hegel gets to “Actuality” at the end of Volume One, 78 we cannot
envision anything actual nor, as of yet, even the form or condition of something actual.
Recall that Hegel will not even provide his “deduction” of the pure forms of
intuition (space and time) until the Philosophy of Nature after he has grounded the
76

This is a determining of what is by what is not, and vice versa. The method cannot be analytic at this
stage because there is no content to the starting point of being/nothing. The first content comes with this
synthetic movement of necessity given the pure abstraction (not yet judgment in Hegel’s sense): “Pure
being and pure nothing are therefore the same” (21.69).
77 Unfortunately, a deeper analysis of the stages of the argument itself takes us too far afield of our present
task.
78 WL 11.380
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absolute idea. 79 So the entire logic, through to the absolute idea is not dealing with
anything like the kind of content found in Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic, much less
anything of the content found in the schematism of the understanding. The status of the
logic is on par with (though not parallel to) “the deduction of the categories in the KrV.
With the fundamental difference that it is an internal necessity from nothing, not from a
given principle or set of pure concepts or categories. I suggest, though I will not defend
here, that the Logic is a proof of the internal necessity of thought whereby Hegel is
proving the equivalent of what Kant asserts as a condition of a transcendental pure
understanding, namely: “the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in relation to the
unity of apperception is the pure understanding.”80 For Kant, this fundamental productive
power of intellectual synthesis and the unity of apperception by which the categories
arise is a proposition for the sake of a transcendental critique of cognition. For Hegel,
however, such propositions can only be given through the absolutely, internally
necessitate movement of thought itself.
Moreover, this method will lead to the grounding, not of a transcendental duality
of the a priori and a posteriori,81 but of the “absolute idea.” Where this grounding of the
absolute idea is the determining of a valid conceptual unity of a priori and a posteriori.
That is, the absolute idea as the result of the Logic will be the ground a hylomorphic idea
that bridges necessity and freedom, and overcomes and resolves the transcendental
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duality as an important source of its own unity, i.e. the unity of the absolute idea and so
the absolute method of speculative thought and ultimately of spirit.
The actual or conditions of experience cannot be imported at this stage. Rather,
this is the moment in the development where the necessity of thought reaches an
affirmation of actuality as the truth of the necessity of thought. As such, in the Logic,
when Hegel turns to “Actuality” we should think of this as a kind of pure category or
quality of thought that is necessary not as a condition for the possibility of experience,
but rather, simply, that which is internally necessitated by thought as what it is whether
or not experience and the fuller conditions of experience come into view). Of course,
once the conditions of experience come into view, there is a retrospective way in which
every part of the Logic is a deduction of the conditions of experience, but even that would
be invalid attribution except as a retrospective use through the result (i.e. once the
absolute idea has already been grounded).
This is why Hegel says that actuality is “equally simple immediacy or pure being
and simple immanent reflection or pure essence, it is this, that the two are one and the
same…absolute necessity is thus the reflection or form of the absolute.”82 By contrast, the
absolute idea, the result of the logic, is the ground of true metaphysics, true philosophy,
and true spirit. Hegel is not trying to be vague, metaphorical, or mystical in his language.
His logic simply is operative on such a high level of abstract necessity that these
seemingly contentless moments of thought are requisite to the valid embrace of more
dynamic, content-full stages.
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Consider further the level of abstraction required for his logical hylomorphism
given in his account of form and matter in the chapter on Ground in the Doctrine of
Essence: “Matter, therefore, is the simple identity, void of distinction, that essence is,
with the determination that it is the other of form…If abstraction is made from every
determination, from every form of a something, matter is what is left over. Matter is the
absolutely abstract.”83 And “this abstraction from which matter derives is…the form itself
which, as we have just seen, reduces itself by virtue of itself to this simple identity.
Further, form presupposes a matter to which it refers.”84 Yet again, “Matter is rather the
identity of the ground and the grounded, as the substrate that stands over against this
reference of form,” and later, “Hence matter must be informed, and form must materialize
itself; it must give itself self-identity or subsistence in matter.”85 This moment in the
Logic should not be read as an establishment of the “matterialization” of form or the
“informing” of matter, but rather the establishment of the validity and necessity of such a
conception of matter and form. That is, Hegel is here showing the logical requirement of
matter and form at any level, he is not establishing a particular conception of matter and
form, but merely the absolutely necessary conditions for all conceptions of matter and
form. Hegel’s hylomorphism here in the Logic concerns the highest kind of abstraction of
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continuing with: “(One cannot see, feel, etc. matter; what one sees or feels is a determinate matter, that
is, a unity of matter and form” (WL 11.297).
84 WL 11.297
85 WL 11.298; It is helpful to notice the contrast at this stage between the posited hylomorphic unity and the
kind of logical unity in the chapter on teleology, which we will turn to shortly: “First, form and matter presuppose each other…[Second] The activity of form by which matter is determined consists therefore in a
negative relating of the form to itself…Third, through this movement of form and matter, the original unity
of the two is, on the one hand, restored; on the other hand, it is henceforth a posited unity” (WL
11.299-300).
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the matter/form distinction and relation. Nothing more. And this is precisely how each
stage of the Logic should be read.
There could be no absolute Philosophy of Nature or Spirit without these stages of
highly abstract, proven, conditional necessity. There could only be a dogma of nature and
dogma of spirit.86 Hegel’s method of necessity really is a matter of “all or nothing.” There
can be no point of progression that is not a matter of the pure necessity or requirements of
thought. That is why, at the end of the Logic, Hegel says:
A comment may be in order here to differentiate … the logical life as the idea
from natural life as treated in the philosophy of nature, and from life in so far as
it is bound to spirit. –As treated in the philosophy of nature, as the life of nature
and to that extent exposed to the externality of existence, life is conditioned by
inorganic nature and its moments as idea are a manifold of actual shapes. Life in
the idea is without such presuppositions, which are in shapes of actuality; its
presupposition is the concept as we have considered it, on the one hand as
subjective, and on the other hand as objective…the concept that came on the
scene earlier as a subjective concept is the soul of life itself; it is the impulse that
gives itself reality through a process of objectification.87

We will return shortly to the question of how Zweckmäßigkeit makes possible the
transition to “the soul of life itself,” to the “impulse that gives itself reality through a
process of objectification,” namely, to the self-determining unity of reason.
My description of the status of the Logic within Hegel’s larger system was not
intended to compel assent, but rather to identify the larger context in which my present
argument fits. For now, we should turn to the question of what might be involved in an
account that takes seriously Hegel’s differentiation between the chapters in the Logic on
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Mechanism, Chemism, and Teleology and those same three divisions by which he
outlines the entire Philosophy of Nature.
§5) Mechanism
Narrowing in on the final transition in his chapter on Teleology, I want to briefly
bring into view his immediately preceding account of in the Chapters on Mechanism and
Chemism. Since Hegel broadly includes Chemism with Mechnism as concerns Teleology,
an account of Chemism is not necessary for my present argument.88
Hegel gives a “premature” account of the way in which Teleology will prove to be
the “truth” of Mechanism. This foreshadowing of his argument occurs in Section I of the
Logic, Ground:
That connection, the whole as essential unity, is to be found only in the concept,
in the purpose. Mechanical causes are not sufficient for this unity, for they do not
have as their ground the purpose which is the unity of the determinations.
Accordingly, by ‘sufficient ground’ Leibniz understood one that sufficed also for
this unity and comprehended, therefore, not just causes but final causes. But this
definition of ‘ground’ is at this point still premature; to be a ground in a
teleological sense is a property of the concept and of the mediation effected
through it, and this mediation is reason.89

So, the result of Mechanism will indeed be the conclusion that mechanical
causality is “not sufficient for this [essential] unity.” But if this is right, the argument in
mechanism needs to show that –taken entirely on its own terms– a pure, abstract
conception of a “mechanical object” and the “mechanical process” are incapable of

88 Although

I do not have space or need to look at the logic of Chemism, the following summary of
Chemism as the transition out of Mechanism to Teleology may be of help. The logic of Chemism shows the
necessity by which “free necessity”(WL 12.146) (or absolute mechanism, traced through an internal
“syllogism” as a reconstituted conception of the objectivity of the concept, WL 12.148-52) sublates its
moments and so becomes “the objective free concept” and “this objective free concept is purpose” (WL
12.153).
89 WL 11.293 …der teleologische Grund ist ein Eigentum des Begriffs und der Vermittlung durch
denselben, welche die Vernunft ist.
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maintaining what they are necessarily posited as being while displaying the internally
necessitated truth of that for which they are first posited.
First, we should recall that Hegel does not employ a simple hylomorphic
distinction of form and content at this stage. Already in the chapter on the absolute in the
final section of the Doctrine of Essence, the Logic has proceeded to the following
conclusion: “When therefore one asks for a content of the exposition, for what the
absolute manifests, the reply is that the distinction of form and content in the absolute has
been dissolved; or that just this is the content of the absolute, that it manifests itself.”90 So
by the point of the chapter on Mechanism, this hylomorphic relation is already shown to
be the structure of the necessity of thought.
Hegel begins the chapter on Mechanism with a pure abstraction of a possible
mechanical object (though in light of the necessity of thought already established in the
Logic through what preceded it):
To begin with, therefore, the object does not differentiate itself into matter and
form, matter being its presumed self-subsistent universal aspect and form the
particular and singular instead; according to its concept, any such abstract
differentiation of singularity and universality has no place in the object; if
regarded as matter, the object must then be taken to be in itself informed matter.91

My reader is likely tempted to view sentences like these as hiding some real
content. That is, if we could just choose the right example, we could understand what
Hegel means by this. But that, I argue, is precisely how we will misunderstand Hegel.
With the Logic, we must hold fast to each stage of the proven logical necessity: “At first
therefore, the object is indeterminate, for it has no determinate opposition within, because
90
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it is the mediation that has collapsed in immediate identity.”92Again, we must resist the
temptation to assume further content.
Hegel reminds us of this saying, “The object, therefore, has neither properties nor
accidents, for these are separable from the thing or the substance, whereas in the object
particularity is absolutely reflected into the totality.”93 Nor should sentences like this be
taken as assertions of how we should actually understand mechanical objects. Hegel is
here proceeding through the necessary requirements of thought if we start with a pure
abstract conception of a mechanical object, where this is empty, without any
presupposition as to its matter and form beyond what has been given previously as pure
conditions of thought as such. So, this posited conception of the mechanical object in
pure abstraction will eventually result in a contradiction that necessitates a modification
and so forth, and that process of necessity is what Hegel is after.
To see how far abstracted Hegel is from any determinations that might be
conditions of possible experience, recall again that even Hegel’s correlate to Kant’s pure
forms of space and time are not given here. Instead, he turns to such “pure forms of
intuition” in the corresponding section on Mechanism in the Philosophy of Nature. It is
there that he provides his account of the “pure form” of Space as the “abstract
universality of Nature’s self-externality, self-externality’s mediationless indifference. It is
wholly ideal side-by-sideness because it is self-externality; and it is absolutely
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continuous, because this asunderness is still quite abstract, and contains no specific
difference within itself.”94
Likewise, of the “pure form” of Time, he will say “as the negative unity of selfexternality, is similarly an out-and-out abstract, ideal being…it is Becoming directly
intuited…Time, like space, is a pure form of sense or intuition, the nonsensuous
sensuous.”95 Hegel will then go on to give an account of the conditions or ideality of
mechanical objects and law/relations of space and time (e.g. “inert matter,”96 “thrust,”97
“gravity,”98 to qualities of matter or Chemism, e.g. “objects” such as “light,”99
“elements,”100 electromagnitism in,101 force, etc. In short, after his account of the pure
forms of space and time, he takes up the conditions of experience and of cognition of
nature102 all the way up to the teleological conditions for living organisms. 103 Even there,
in the Philosophy of Nature, his primary interest is not the natural sciences, such as
physics, but rather the second sphere of the necessity of absolute reason, namely its
constitution through the idea/necessity of Nature).104 [This could broadly be set up as
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102 The four fundamental laws held in physics now being gravity, electromagnitism, and the strong and
weak nuclear forces.
103 Of note is that Hegel includes an account of Geology in his section on Organics §348-42, not
mechanism. This should give further pause, even when taking up his Philosophy of Nature, that what Hegel
is after in the Philosophy of Nature is not a simple classification. On the contrary, it is a continuation of the
necessary structure of absolute reason, whereby the totality becomes a more richly intelligible yet ever
more complex whole.
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parallel to what I identified in Ch. 2-5 as the second-layer significance of the
transcendental in Kant’s critical idealism.]
So, if Hegel is reserving all such examples for a later stage and provides no such
example in the Logic, then I think it a helpful clue that we are unlikely to do better by
adding them ourselves in our attempt at understanding what the Logic is up to. Instead,
after providing us with the initial account of what a pure concept of a “mechanical
object” is at this stage of the Logic, Hegel suggests that a close, though still inadequate,
example would be Leibniz’s monad. Notice that he says, that the monad “would be more
of an object.” That is, it does not fully meet the specifications of a pure mechanical
object, but it comes close because “it is a total representation of the world which, shut up
within its intensive subjectivity, in essence at least is supposed to be a one.”105 The
Leibnitzian monad is the closest Hegel gets to an example. I suggest that we should not
read more into this than Hegel makes explicit. He is clear that this conception of a
mechanical object is problematic: “The need to avoid the interaction of substances was
founded on the moment of absolute self-subsistence and originariness which was made a
fundamental assumption.”106 It turns out that a “self-subsistent” [selbständig] object
cannot truly be self-subsistent over and against the necessary relation in which it stands to
other objects by virtue of what it was first posited to be qua self-subsistent, mechanical
object.
That is, Hegel shows that even when we posit the possibility of a purely selfsubsistent, indifferent object, such a posited mechanical object cannot maintain itself (qua
105
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that posited definition) because, even such Selbständigkeit turns out to necessitate a pure
relation to other self-subsistent objects,107 such that the mechanical process (or relation
between the posited pure mechanical objects) is the necessary result.
Since the mechanical process only comes about as the necessary form or relation
of the parts in a larger mechanical whole (or object as an aggregate), the process itself is
thereby contained in the original posited object. But for this to be the case, the
independent, indifferent object has to hold within itself a kind of contradiction of
relatedness, yet self-subsistent indifference to an “other.” This necessary selfcontradiction that results from the pure posited object, is what drives the concept of the
mechanical object to a point where something like the Leibnitzian monad is conditionally
no longer acceptable, where the conditions are the absolutely necessary requirements of
thought itself on such a possibility (i.e. Hegel proves the impossibility of such an object
through its very positing within the larger system of necessity).
Far from having “truth” (i.e. internal necessity) in itself, the mechanical process
exhibits…formal uniformity. This uniformity is indeed a rule, but not law. Only
free mechanism [i.e. absolute mechanism,108] has a law, the determination proper
to pure individuality or to the concept existing for itself. As difference, the law is
in itself the inexhaustible source of a self-igniting fire and, since in the ideality of
its difference it refers only to itself it is free necessity. 109

This free necessity should be a clue to the self-determining “free lawfulness” that
we will see in Hegel’s notion of Zweckmäßigkeit.
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This is so whether in indifferent aggregative relations of some further whole or as in opposition to such
relations.
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What is necessarily contained in the mechanical object is complicated, and must
be left to the side for now. Indeed my argument in no way depends on an exposition of
Hegel’s argument in the chapter on Mechanism. I aim only to show that Mechanism in
the Logic has to do with the necessity of thought in full abstraction from anything like the
content found in the Philosophy of Nature. Suffice it to say, Hegel’s quite clear avoidance
of examples, where the one example (Leibniz’ monad) is asserted as an inadequate, but
closest, example from the outset.110 And even his avoidance of reference to the pure
intuitions of space and time that comes in the PN, is important, because –just as at every
other stage of the Logic, he has abstracted as far as possible from all presuppositions–
here too, his purpose is to trace out that which is internally necessitated by thought from
what has preceded (from the beginning of the Logic). So, if this is right, what kind of
abstraction is in view when he posits the teleological object and its process?
We must walk with Hegel’s argument patiently if we wish to avoid importing
precisely that by which it would be falsified.111 To succeed as the necessity of thought
that eventually yields absolute reason, we cannot skip these steps and import later stages
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There are a few exceptions. For example, on page 12.139 of the WL, he speaks of “laws, morals, rational
concepts in general” as examples of “communicable entities” and of “motion, heat, magnetism, electricity”
as such entities, but he specifies in both cases that these examples are “in the region of spirit” and “in the
region of the body” respectively (i.e. not examples of the concepts in the Logic, but rather examples of the
later stages in the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit.
111 And such falsification proves nothing but that X-system with Y-import is false, but such a modification
and failure says nothing about Hegel’s absolute idealism.
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of content. If we do that, then we replace necessity with assertion, and the Logic does
indeed become mere dogma of thought or rather unfounded, assertoric ratiocination. 112
So, how (according to Hegel) does Kant provide, in the KU, that by which the
bridge between the transcendental and the real is closed and that wherewith the unity of
reason becomes no longer a merely regulative ideal of systematicity, but an actual: the
absolute bridge of supersensible and sensible in a single identify?
§6) Teleology and the Free Lawfulness of the Imagination
As we have noted above, only through the absolute idea does Hegel’s system take
up the Philosophy of Nature, in which he repeats the structure of Mechanism, Chemism,
and Teleology found in the Logic, but with a significant difference. So, what is that
difference? What is achieved through the grounding of the “absolute idea” that allows for
the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit?
The achievement concerns precisely that transition from critical to absolute
idealism. This can only be a necessary transition if Hegel shows that Kant was indeed
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Only if the Logic succeeds at its task can the dualistic gap of transcendental idealism between the a
priori and the a posteriori. It is important to note that Hegel’s often cited rejection of the thing-in-itself,
metaphysics, transcendental idealism, etc. in the introduction is not a part of his Logic. That is when the
“argument” of the Logic begins on 21.53 it presupposes nothing of the introduction. No agreement from the
introduction is needed for the validity of the Logic. The introduction merely sets the stage or context
motivating the Logic. So, when Hegel speaks of the Kantian relationship between the categories and things
in themselves as “untrue” (WL 21.30), truth must be understood in terms of the conception of “truth” that
results from the necessary method and “scientific” content that the Logic itself first proves. It can only offer
such a valid conception of truth (on its own grounds) if it does begin without presuppositions and abstracts
to the emptiest forms of thought. Moreover, Hegel’s conclusion regarding the thing-in-itself, is not actually
a rejection of it as worthless. Much in the Logic that is shown to have “no truth” is nevertheless a necessary
stage by which necessity or truth is proven. To this end, it is through Kant’s distinction between the
transcendental or a priori and the “thing-in-itself” that Hegel views Kant as having raised philosophy out of
“the relative world of metaphysics” albeit the KrV accomplishes this “imperfectly, ambiguously, and only
negatively,” whereas the KU does so positively and constitutes his “greatest service to philosophy” (WL
12.157).
For three helpful accounts of the thing-in-itself, see the following: For Hegel on Kant’s thing-in-itself, see
Stern, 2008, p. 149, for Kant’s thing-in-itself as the limit of pure reason, see Pollok, 2017, p. , for Kant’s
thing-in-itself as noumena, see Franks, 2008, p.
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wrong to stop short. That is, on my account, Hegel shows that through synthetic a priori
judgments there was indeed a necessity present in Kant’s Idealism, which Kant himself
“opened up” to philosophy, and which, if recognized for what it was, would necessarily
have required Kant to make the same move into absolute idealism.
The final transition of the Logic to the Idea of life –which proves to be the
absolute idea and concludes the Logic– takes place in the logic of what Hegel calls innere
Zweckmäsigkeit. If this is right, then the real question becomes, why does Hegel place
“inner purposiveness” as the final transition, as that which marks the shift out of the
subjective sphere of the Logic, which is precisely the sphere in which his 1802 critique of
Kant argues that Kant’s idealism wrongly (unjustifiably) stops?
Here again, we should recall that Hegel attributes this concept of inner
purposiveness to Kant. Moreover, he says that it was one of Kant’s “greatest services to
philosophy.” Again, he says that it is Kant that “opened up the concept of life, the
idea.”113 Given the context of this statement, Hegel is clearly crediting Kant with opening
up the final transition to the absolute. But why? And why does Hegel not credit Aristotle
with this? Indeed, in the Philosophy of Nature Hegel is clear in his credit to Aristotelian
teleology as Terry Pinkard discusses at length.114 Further, in the Philosophy of Spirit,
Hegel identifies Aristotle’s notion of the soul as the “most admirable, perhaps even the
sole, work of philosophical value on [the “speculative treatment” of the mind].” 115 So
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why, here in the Logic, does Hegel say that Kant gives this great service to philosophy,116
and at the point of transition between the sphere in which critical idealism stops and
absolute idealism begins?
First, note that Hegel takes the chapter on Teleology to provide his system with
the resolution to the antinomy between determinism and freedom: “The antinomy of …
determinism and freedom is equally concerned with the opposition of mechanism and
teleology…”117 And “since they do stand opposed, the necessary first question is, which
of the two concepts is the true one; and the higher and truly telling question is, whether
there is a third which is their truth, or whether one of them is the truth of the other.”118
Hegel’s resolution will be that freedom is the truth of determinism, where the latter is a
constitutive quality of the former. And if this sounds like a relation in which “lawfulness”
is subordinated to “freedom” in to form a unity of free lawfulness or “lawfulness without
a law,” that is because it is, as we will see.
Likewise, the “purposive connection has proved to be the truth of mechanism. –
Regarding chemism, what came under it can be taken together with mechanism…”119
Somehow, (we don’t have time to trace how) the determinism of the mechanical law
(which is indifferent to that which it determines) internally necessitates the transition
through chemism to its fuller realization in purposiveness.
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In the lesser Logic Hegel also notes that it is an idea “contained” in Aristotle’s thought, and this is why
he will draw so extensively on Aristotle in the Philosophy of Nature, § 204. The difference is that it is not
an idea made explicit in its necessity. By contrast, Kant does make it so explicit.
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Second, purposiveness of the concept in the logic is self-determining relatedness
of a conceptual unity that exists in and for itself:
Now purposiveness presents itself from the first as something of a generally
higher nature, as an intelligence [Die Zweckmäßigkeit nun zeigt sich zunächst
als ein Höheres überhaupt, als ein Verstand] that externally determines the
manifoldness of objects through a unity that exists in and for itself, so that the
indifferent determinacies of the objects become essential by virtue of this
connection. In mechanism they become so through the mere form of necessity
that leaves their content indifferent, for they are supposed to remain external and
only the understanding as such is expected to find satisfaction by recognizing its
principle of union, the abstract identity. In teleology [der Teleologie], on the
contrary, the content becomes important, for teleology presupposes a concept,
something determined in and for itself and consequently self-determining [weil
sie einen Begriff, ein an und für sich Bestimmtes und damit Selbstbestimmendes
voraussetzt], and has therefore extracted from the connection of differences and
their reciprocal determinateness, from the form, a unity that is reflected into itself,
something that is determined in and for itself and is consequently a content.120

Of particular note is that the internal necessity of the concept is now establishing
the ground on which a pure object of thought cannot be a mechanical lawful relation
where X is indifferent to Y and the determination of X through Y is equally a matter of
indifference.
Rather, this necessity of thought is proving itself to be a self-determination that is
lawful yet somehow also a free totality: “according to its form purpose is a totality
infinite within itself [der Zweck ist seiner Form nach eine in sich undendliche
Totalität].”121 As such, “Teleology possesses in general the higher principle, the concept
in its concrete existence, which is in and for itself the infinite and absolute – a principle
of freedom which, utterly certain of its self-determination, is absolutely withdrawn from
the external determining of mechanism.”122 In short, on the one hand the, concept of a
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mechanical object necessitated a mechanical process/relation, which resulted in an
internal incongruity whereby the transition into teleology occurs. On the other hand, the
concept of purposiveness shows itself to be the truth of the teleological concept.
This means that the purposive relation does not contradict the concept of a pure
purposive object. It is in this internal adequacy of the concept at this stage that warrants
the attribution of purposiveness as the truth of mechanism. As concerns determinism and
freedom in the Logic, we find here the “one thing that alone is of philosophical interest
namely the investigation of which of the two principles has truth in and for itself.”123 The
purposive process is the self-determination of the object, which is itself the determining
subject, a (qualitatively) infinite subject. Thereby, Hegel grounds the self-determining
truth, in and for itself, that provides the highest (most abstract) ground of the unity of the
a priori and a posteriori of the absolute idea.
Again, if this strikes the reader as suspiciously similar to Kant’s free lawfulness of
the imagination that grounds the free lawful productive power of artistic genius whereby
spirit is self-determining and productive, and which is also judge of nature as a formative
power of nature as art and artist of itself, i.e. “as cause and effect of itself,” 124 that is
because it is suspiciously similar to that very same principle. And in this similarity is in
complete accord with Hegel’s claim to be employing the free lawfulness of the
imagination.
On Hegel’s account, “Kant’s discussion of the teleological principle” is
“unsatisfactory” because he is only able to ground a “subjective maxim,” a regulative
123
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guide for the proper use of reason.125 Here, I believe, the norm is to misinterpret Hegel’s
critique.
Hegel is not suggesting that Kant’s mistake was in failing to show the objectivity
of this principle such that determining judgments of the understanding according to
teleology are possible. That is, Hegel does not think that Kant should have defended the
result of teleological judgments as “cognitions.”
On the contrary, Hegel immediately specifies that what is particularly important
and “worthy of note is the place that Kant assigns to” this teleological principle.126
Namely, Hegel thinks Kant rightly and insightfully places this principle and the
judgments that it makes lawful under the domain of “a reflective faculty of judgment.”
Again, according to Hegel, “since [Kant] ascribes it to a reflective faculty of judgment, he
makes it into a mediating link between the universal of reason and the singular of
intuition.”127 In other words, Kant’s insight, here is that reason has a distinct form of
synthetic a priori validity, but which does not retain the a priori and a posteriori dualism.
Instead, it becomes a “mediating link.” How should we understand this mediating link?
I suggest the answer is twofold. First, Hegel orients us in the second significance
of Kant’s placement of teleological judgments under the faculty of reflecting judgments.
Namely, “further, [Kant] distinguishes this reflective judgment from the determining
judgment, the latter one that merely subsumes the particular under the universal. Such a
universal that only subsumes is an abstraction that becomes concrete only in an other, in
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the particular. Purpose, on the contrary, is the concrete universal containing within itself
the moment of particularity and of externality; it is therefore active and the impulse to
repel itself from itself.”128 In other words, for Kant’s determining judgments, there is
necessarily, rightly, a dualism. The judgment is lawful via the form of the judgment, but
its significance rests entirely on the empirical. This is another way of saying that
intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts without intuitions are empty. In itself,
this isn’t strictly problematic. What is significant, to Hegel, is that Kant is here
recognizing that the method of determining “merely subsumes the particular under the
universal. Such a universal that only subsumes is an abstraction that becomes concrete
only in an other, in the particular.”
By contrast, the free lawfulness of reflecting judgments consists precisely in the
bridging of this externality between abstract universal and concrete particular. Namely,
“Purpose, on the contrary, is the concrete universal containing within itself the moment
of particularity and of externality.”129
That is perhaps the clearest definition of purpose that Hegel will give. Remember
on what level this definition occurs. That is, Hegel is endeavoring to show the internal
necessity of thought itself, not of objects of experience. That is, he is only concerned at
this stage with the absolutely necessary relation and structure that will later constitute
cognition, and reason. At present, he is speaking purely at the level of that necessary
structure of reason prior to the theoretical and practical forms of cognition.
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So, if Kant insightfully categorizes teleological judgments as reflecting and
grounds their validity in the principle of purposiveness, what precisely did he miss on
Hegel’s view? What Kant misses are the necessary implications of the very principle of
purposiveness grounding those judgments. Namely, “The concept, as purpose, is of
course an objective judgment in which one determination, the subject, namely the
concrete concept, is self-determined, while the other is not only a predicate but external
objectivity.”130 That is, the teleological judgment, as grounded on the free lawfulness of
the imagination, displays the altered relation of the faculties, such that understanding and
reason are “in the service of the imagination and not vice versa.”131 In this altered
relation, the significance consists not in some sense of purposive design in an organic
object. The deeper significance here is mediating structure of discursive reason, which
unifies the supersensible and sensible into an absolute.
This new lawful relation is not one of subsumption, but one in which the
objectivity of the judgment consists precisely in the determination of the subject through
the judgment itself. This lawful power of self-determination is what Kant refers to as
heautonomy. 132 Moreover, the self-determination of the subject through the judgment is
not one of mere “predication” but of “external objectivity.”133 That is this structural form
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132 KU 5:185; “Strictly speaking, one must call this legislation heautonomy, since the power of judgment
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see Pollok, 2017, pp. 279-85.
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of discursive reason is such that at far more complex stages of Hegel’s system such as
Nature, or Spirit, this self-determination will consist in cognition of the self as a fully
developing organic being in a world. More uniquely, this form will ground the validity by
which his account takes up history as constitutive, through the “external objectivity” of
art, religion, philosophy, culture, etc, as precisely that which is not merely externally
“predicated” but serves as the constitutive quality of the internal self-determination of the
subject. This principle is, thereby, describable as a principle of systematic contingency.
So, on Hegel’s account, it is because of this necessity of reason displayed by
Kant’s own principle of purposiveness that he thinks Kant mistakenly concludes that
“purposiveness” in teleological judgments can serve merely as a subjective maxim. That
is, he thinks that Kant did not fully recognize the necessary implications of the principle
the KU for his tripartite critique of reason. If we work out the necessary implications of
this distinct form of discursive reason, then, we should conclude, as Hegel has shown,
“for that reason the connection of purpose is not a reflective judgment that considers
external objects only according to a unity, as though an intelligence had given them to us
for the convenience of our faculty of cognition; on the contrary, it is the truth that exists in
and for itself and judges objectively, determining the external objectivity absolutely. The
connection of purpose is therefore more than judgment; it is the syllogism of the selfsubsistent free concept that through objectivity unites itself with itself in conclusion.”134
Again, this does not mean attributing the productive power of nature to some designer.
Hegel is nowhere near that level of complexity. He is strictly concerned here with the
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internal necessity of reason. That Kant’s principle of the free lawfulness of the
imagination grounded a self-legislation where purposiveness is the essence of reason’s
progressive necessity is what Hegel thinks we must recognize (if we trace out the internal
requirements of thought to this point).
In short, for Hegel, this new structure of discursive reason, displayed in the
principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination, reveals the necessary ground on which
reason in general is rightly understood as “the self-subsistent free concept.”135 The truth
of reason as “the self-subsistent free concept,” as self-determining, cannot, on this
account be termed some solipsistic, monistic power. It is precisely this mediating
principle of discursive reason –this principle of free lawfulness, this structure of selfdetermining free necessity of the concept– that “through objectivity unites itself with
itself in conclusion.” We must be clear that what Hegel has in view here is a selfdetermining necessity of reason that grounds the systematic contingency of the objective
sphere, which will (in the Philosophy of Nature) turn out to make possible knowledge of
and growth through the empirical world. 136
This is the same structure we will see repeated in Hegel’s account of art, culture,
religion, philosophy, etc. as the manifestation of the spirit by which and through which it
constitutes itself. All of those shapes of the spirit are only grounded as valid forms of the
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This is as opposed to a mechanistic model where the concept was posited as self-subsistent but turned
out to conflict with the very relation made necessary by its own positing: “Because of this commonality of
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Nature that is made possible by the systematic contingency given in the Logic through purposiveness and
the Idea of Life.
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life of spirit if they are first shown to be the truth of self-conscious life. At present, in the
Logic, all we have is the conditional, structural necessity, by which the empirical
contingent will later be shown to be the valid externality in a self-determining, selfconstituting absolute idea (as he moves toward a fuller conception of spirit as selfconscious life).
It is in this way that we should interpret Hegel’s chapter on Teleology as taking up
Kant’s greatest service to philosophy and showing the necessary result of the final
transition to the absolute Idea. To this end, Hegel concludes, “purpose has resulted as the
third to mechanism and chemism; it is their truth.”137 This grounded relation also results
in an implicit resolution to Kant’s antinomy of teleological judgments. Namely, “from
this side, mechanical causality, to which chemism is also in general to be added, still
makes its appearance in this purposive connection which is the external one, but as
subordinated to it and as sublated in and for itself.”138 That is, there are still grounds for
recognizing in the structure of reason a mechanistic and chemistic relations and forms,
but only as a part of this larger conception of the self-determining, free lawfulness of the
concept as the logic of absolute reason. In other words, Hegel hereby shows that the
fundamental structure of rationality involves a principle of systematic contingency which
is constitutive of self-conscious life and grounds the validity of the latter in response to
fundamental forms of skepticism.
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§7) From Critical to Absolute Idealism: Further Evidence Against
Standard Interpolations
It should be clear at this point, that Hegel cannot be interpreted as referencing a
standard conception of teleology in nature, nor something like Kant’s teleological “idea
of a natural end.” Such interpolations contradict the structure of the encyclopedic system.
If it is not clear from what was shown above, consider further that Hegel positively
denies this possibility, saying, “Purpose can of course also be defined as a force or a
cause, but these expressions cover only an incomplete side of its signification; if they are
to be said of purpose according to its truth, this can be done only in a way that sublates
their concept – as a cause that solicits itself to expression, or a cause that is a cause of
itself or whose effect is immediately the cause.”139 In other words, Kant’s idea of a
natural end, as that for which the idea of the whole is cause and effect of itself, can have
validity only as an “incomplete” articulation of purposiveness in the Logic. The fuller
articulation requires its incorporation into the notion that “purpose, therefore, is the
subjective concept as an essential striving and impulse to posit itself externally. In this, it
is exempt from transition.”140 Therein, the transitions of the Logic come to an end.
Further, to be clear, the logic of purposiveness is that by which purposiveness of
spirit will be groundable. In the Logic, purposiveness of spirit is not yet grounded. Hegel
notes this too in his account of the “attribution” of purposiveness to an intelligence:
When purposiveness is attributed to an intelligence, as was said above, this is
done with specific reference to a certain content. But, as such, purpose is to be
taken as the rational in its concrete existence. It manifests rationality by being
the concrete concept that holds the objective difference in its absolute unity.
139
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Within, therefore, it is essentially syllogism. It is the self-equal universal; more
precisely, inasmuch as it contains self-repelling negativity, it is universal though
at first still indeterminate activity. But since this activity is negative selfreference, it determines itself immediately and gives itself the moment of
particularity, and this particularity, as likewise the totality of the form reflected
into itself, is content as against the posited differences of the form. The same
negativity, through this self-reference, is just as immediately the reflection of the
form into itself and singularity. From the one side, this reflection is the inner
universality of the subject, from the other side, however, it is outwards reflection;
and to this extent purpose is still something subjective, its activity still directed to
an external objectivity.141

I contend, that such passages as this, while opaque on standard interpretations of
purposiveness in Hegel’s account of teleology, are rather straightforward on mine.
Namely, one of Kant’s greatest services to philosophy, the principle of free lawfulness of
the imagination, is an identification of a fundamental structure of rationality. It is
precisely an identification of the final transition to the absolute, through which the duality
of the a priori and a posteriori (which was important for grounding the necessity of
thought against skepticism) is an artificially maintained distinction in light of this final
logical transition. Since through the free lawfulness of the imagination, systematic
contingency is displayed through the structure of discursive reason as self-determining in
a way that takes up the objective externality, including the a posteriori, empirical world
as a valid part of the internal necessity of the very processes of self-determination
through which absolute idealism is possible. And the absolute just is the valid claim to
know the self-consciousness of life and its historic shapes.
Moreover, it is here in Hegel’s chapter on Teleology that his Idealism passes
beyond Kant’s critical idealism which remains “subjective” because of the necessary
141
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dualism between freedom and nature. It is here that Hegel’s idealism has “attained the
determination of objectivity.” That is, Kant’s objectively valid synthetic a priori
judgments, are ultimately, on Hegel’s account subjective, as his own idealism would be if
it could not show the internal unity of the transcendental and empirical. To this end, he
says, “Already in the formal judgment are subject and predicate determined as selfsubsistent over against each other; but their self-subsistence is still only abstract
universality. It has now attained the determination of objectivity, but, as a moment of the
concept,142 this complete difference is enclosed within the simple unity of the
concept.” 143
No longer is a synthetic a priori judgment form with its strict distinctions between
subject and predicate the most adequate expression of the internal necessity of rationality.
The Logic has shown that there is a deeper unity of subject and object in the purposive
relation whereby the subject self-determines itself through objectivity. This, in turn, will
make possible a fuller conception of the organic method of reason in history. So, Hegel
concludes, “Thus the concept is essentially this: to be distinguished, as an identity
existing for itself, from its implicitly existent objectivity, and thereby to obtain externality,
but in this external totality to be the totality’s self-determining identity. So the concept is
now the idea.”144 And so we can conclude that for Hegel, the principle of the free
lawfulness of the imagination (purposiveness) as a unique form of discursive reason that
amounted to one of “Kant’s greatest services to Philosophy” was the final transition of
142
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the internal necessity of the Logic of the concept from critical idealism to absolute
idealism.145
§8) A Likely Worry
I would like to briefly address a probable question at this stage. Namely, if Kant
had given that a priori principle of purposiveness (the free lawfulness of the
imagination), and had even called this principle the bridge between theoretical and
practical domains (a function it also serves here at the end of the Logic), why didn’t Kant
see the possibilities for grounding a fuller unity of reason? We could intuit Hegel’s
answer from the method of the Logic, but fortunately, Hegel answers this question
directly at the end of the Logic:
Kant made the profound observation that there are synthetic principles a priori,
and he recognized as their root the unity of self-consciousness, hence the selfidentity of the concept. However, he takes the specific connection, the relational
concepts and the synthetic principles, from formal logic as given; the deduction
of these should have been the exposition of the transition of that simple unity of
self-consciousness into these determinations and distinctions; but Kant spared
himself the effort of demonstrating this…146

This is why Hegel’s “exposition of the transition” of the self-determining “unity
of self-consciousness” can be viewed as a rectified or complete deduction of the same
fundamental conditions or principles of reason that Kant gives.
Kant rightly says that the principle of the free lawfulness of the imagination
bridges the domains of freedom and necessity and of practical and theoretical cognition.
145
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rationality fundamentally transitions from critical idealism to absolute idealism, but they are not essential
points for my present argument.
146 WL 12.205
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However, he could not have shown the internal necessity of this bridging principle and so
the transition to absolute idealism. This is because he had not undertaken or “spared
himself the effort” to show the fundamental internal necessity by which his three a priori
principles (1) the synthetic unity of apperception, (2) the moral law, and (3)
purposiveness, were grounded and not merely posited for the sake of the validity of the
corresponding synthetic a priori judgments, which leaves them as free-floating,
ungrounded transcendental presuppositional principles. What the logic does, is proceed
through the necessity of thought with similar results to Kant’s critical idealism, but he is
unwilling to take an approach that requires postulated principles whose internal necessity
and unity is not shown. Kant’s approach necessitates his dualism, but his dualism is not
thereby a necessary result of a critique of discursive reason.
In the Logic, by the point that Hegel reaches the notion of purposiveness, Kant’s
third a priori principle, the internal necessity of the structure of rationality147 has built to
the point where this final transition148 is precisely the ground on which the dualism
becomes a justified unity: an absolute idea.
Retrospectively, then, the necessity of the “concept” that the Logic traces is
twofold: (1) the “scientific method” and (2) “the concept itself of science”149 and the

147

“the sphere of necessity is the highest point of being and reflection; of itself, in and for itself, it passes
over into the freedom of the concept, inner identity passes over into its manifestation which is the concept
as concept. How this transition from the sphere of necessity to the concept occurs in itself has been shown
when considering necessity” (WL 12.230).
148 It is this transition that is what Hegel terms the “final transition” of thought into the absolute. It is the
inner purposiveness in the chapter on Teleology that proves to be the ground of the final transition into the
Idea. And it is the Idea that has three stages: (1) life, (2) cognition–theoretical and practical, and (3) the
absolute idea.
149 WL 21.27
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result is the unity of the two in the concept of itself as a self-determining free necessity,
i.e. thought as a science, and the grounding of this is the science of logic.
The product of this grounding is –through nature– “spirit.”150 Put differently, in
the Logic, this “manner in which the [logical forms] are considered and dealt with” and
thus “held together in organic unity” is “spirit which is their vital concrete unity.” 151 It is
the final transition of the Logic toward this “vital concrete, organic unity” that we had in
view in our investigation of “innerer Zweckmäßigkeit.”152 This vital concrete unity of
which Hegel speaks in the introduction is the product of the Logic, the necessary result
which is “opened up [aufgeschlossen]” namely, “the concept of life, the idea [den Begriff
des Lebens, die Idee].”153 Where “the idea is the adequate concept, the objectively true,
or the true as such.”154 This “true as such” just is “the unity of the concept and
objectivity.”155 The absolute idea is thus the product of the Logic as a whole (i.e. it was
not present before, but is constituted as the necessary product of the constitutive necessity
of thought in its purest form).
§9) The Status of the Logic of Life and the Unity of Reason
How then are we to understand the result of the final transition of the Logic,
namely the status of the idea? First, Hegel says, “the idea is the unity of the concept and
reality, being has attained the significance of truth; it now is, therefore, only what the idea
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WL 21.31
WL 21.31
152 WL 12.157
153 WL 12.157
154 WL 12.173
155 WL 12.174
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is.”156 It is worth repeating once more that interpolating anything of the philosophy of
nature into “being” is unjustified. We are still dealing with the logical grounding of the
idea of a philosophy of nature.
So, what can we say of this unity of concept and reality? As this unity, the idea
has three “recognized” shapes: (1) the “idea of life” as “the concept which…permeates
that objectivity and, as self-directed purpose has its means within it and posits it as its
means, yet is immanent in this means and is therein the realized purpose identical with
itself,”157 as such “although the idea has its reality in materiality, the latter is not an
abstract being standing over against the concept but, on the contrary, it exists only as
becoming.”158 So, the unity is a logical grounding of the notion of becoming, where
becoming is the logical method taken now as a valid unity of concept and reality.
(2) the idea of “cognition and will” as “the true and the good” or the idea of
theoretical and practical reason.159 In this shape, “cognition is the idea as purpose” and
“realized purpose.”160 That is, the theoretical and practical uses of the idea are valid selfdetermining uses through a unity of concept and reality. Again, we must keep in mind
that this is not insignificant since it is only here that we are getting something in Hegel’s
logic, that is first equivalent of the transition in Kant between the pure categories of the
understanding and the schematism. This must not go unnoticed: the necessity of Hegel’s
logic has proceeded to the third of Kant’s synthetic principles a priori before proceeding
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WL 12.178
158 WL 12.177
159 WL 12.177-8
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to any particular form of judgment, whether theoretical, practical, or aesthetic. Only at
the end of the Logic can the second-layer schematism of the pure forms of thought be
given.
It is here at the end of the Logic that Hegel finally grounds the valid use of the
idea of theoretical and practical cognition as arising internally from the Logic’s science of
necessity.
Finally (3) “spirit recognizes the idea as its absolute truth, as the truth that is in
and for itself… which is the absolute knowledge of itself.”161 The absolute idea is the
“identity of theoretical and practical idea;”162 and “the absolute idea alone is being,
imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth.”163 Put differently, the absolute idea is
the ground for claims to truth. It is that which is coherently inter-determinative in the idea
of life, theoretical, and practical cognition, and (internal to these) the thoroughgoing
method of self-determination that these shapes of the idea carry through from the free
lawfulness of purposiveness in the concept.
This final transition, I content, is further underscored by the fact that the “idea”
that it grounds includes three shapes that were the aim of Kant’s three critiques: life (i.e.
the synthetic a priori subject of the KU), theoretical and practical cognition (the synthetic
a priori subject of the KrV & KPV), and finally the three-fold unity in the absolute idea
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WL 12.178
WL 12.236, C.f. 12.233
163 WL 12.236, Of course, it is only here that the absolute idea is first given. There is no ontological content
to the spirit, to objectivity, or even the subject. All that is achieved at this point is that the Logic has
grounded a unity of reason whereby the content of the philosophy of nature and spirit can proceed on valid
ground and further that the historical shapes of spirit in philosophy, religion, and art can have absolute
worth. But nothing further than the possibility for those is given. The Logic is not the whole system, it is
merely the tracing out of the necessity of thought to completion of its own structure.
162
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(the synthetic a priori “highest” regulative principle of pure reason as forming a
systematic unity. For Hegel, because of the final transition through the free lawfulness of
the imagination, that highest principle of reason is no longer a merely regulative ideal but
is rather the proven “truth” of reason.
These three shapes of the idea are the same idea (that is, there are no transitions
between these shapes) but differentiated as distinct “recognitions” of speculative thought,
whereby the first two are unified and acknowledged, in the third, as reason’s “absolute
knowledge of itself.”164
As such, the status of the logic of the idea of life through to the absolute idea
should be understood as made possible by “Innerer Zweckmäßigkeit” through which the
necessity of thought “opened up” the idea of life and thereby the unity of theoretical and
practical reason in the absolute idea (i.e. the true unity of reason)165 is the final transition
of the Logic to this completion.166 Importantly, this final transition is not somehow an
imported concept (as if Hegel just adopts it from Kant), but is the fuller outworking of the
internal necessity already shown from the beginning of the Logic as the “negative self-
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WL 12.178
It is from the product of the Logic as a whole that Hegel rejects Kant’s dualism between the thing-initself and the judging subject (12.193-6. He has already said (as noted above) that the KrV raises
philosophy out of the relative world of metaphysics negatively. What Hegel takes his Logic to have
achieved here is the positive return to a unity through the dissolution of the thing-in-itself as a real
possibility standing over and against absolute knowledge. But this conclusion, to be a valid step in the
Logic must be the product of the necessity of thought, not a simple assertion. As such Kant’s thing-in-itself
is not to be viewed as an error or something to be forgotten. It is precisely the negative step in the Logic but
which is not a justifiable end-point. We can see from this that Hegel here maintains the critique of Kant in
GW for stopping short in the subjectivity of thought. It is precisely in the volume of the Logic on
subjectivity that Kant’s greatest service to philosophy stands as that final transition by which the unity of
reason in the absolute idea is achieved.
166 WL 12.157
165
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reference” of the concept (Hegel merely credits Kant with having arrived at the same idea
first). To this end Hegel says of his equivalent of the free lawfulness of the imagination:
[it is] the turning point of the movement of the concept… is the simple point of
the negative self-reference, the innermost source of all activity, of living and
spiritual self-movement; it is the dialectical soul which everything true possess
and through which alone it is true; for on this subjectivity alone rests the
sublation of the opposition between concept and reality, and the unity which is
truth. The second negative at which we have arrived…is this sublating of
contradiction, and it too, just like contradiction, is not an act of external
reflection; for it is on the contrary the innermost, objective moment of the life of
spirit by virtue of which a subject is a person, is free.167

So Hegel concludes “In the context of this logical exposition, it is from the idea of
life that the idea of spirit has emerged.”168 In our interpretations of Hegel’s system, we
must remember, then, that the status of the Logic is still the grounding, the science of the
necessity by which the idea of spirit is able to emerge. The Logic itself does not yet have
the “Idea of life” given in the philosophy of nature, 169 much less the philosophy of spirit,
nor aesthetics, ethics, etc. that come from spirit, and such interpolations only invalidate
the very science of the Logic.170
If the science of the Logic is invalidated, the result is that the Philosophy of
Nature and Spirit can have no more claim to necessity than any other pre-critical
dogmatic metaphysics. If, however, the status of the Logic and this final transition of
purposiveness to the absolute idea is held carefully in view, then we are in a better place
to understand the nature of Hegel’s conclusion that “the idea of life in its immediacy is as
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WL 12.247
WL 12.196
169 §376
170 “considered now more closely in its idea, is in and for itself absolute universality; the objectivity which
it possesses is throughout permeated by the concept, and this concept alone it has as substance” (WL
12.181).
168
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yet only the creative universal soul” and “this individual is in the first place life as soul,
as the concept of itself, fully determined within itself, the initiating self-moving
principle.”171 The absolute idea is the grounding of the systematic unity of reason that for
Kant could only be an ideal of reason. Its grounding was made possible through “Kant’s
greatest contribution to philosophy” the principle of purposiveness, the structural
movement of free lawfulness of the imagination, which served as the final transition of
the Logic to the idea of life, cognition, and the absolute. It is in this way that the principle
of free lawfulness of the imagination, displays internal necessity of the systematic
contingency, of a unity of discursive reason. Where this unity of reason is precisely a
free-lawful unity of freedom and necessity and of the a priori and a posteriori.
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WL 12.184
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CHAPTER 7

THE ARTISTIC IMAGINATION AND
THE FREE LAWFULNESS OF ABSOLUTE REASON
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§1) Introduction
In Chapter 6, we saw that the free lawfulness of the imagination serves, in the
Science of Logic, as the point of transition from (subjective) critical idealism to absolute
idealism through its role as the ground of the unity of the supersensible and sensible,
where the a priori and a posteriori are bound in a single, necessary, purposive, selfdetermining, free lawful movement of reason. Where the Science of Logic abstracts from
the real, from the life of reason for the sake of establishing –qua science of thought– the
structure and necessity of reason, I now turn to the same free lawfulness found there but
in the context of the “life” of the spirit, namely rationality in its historicity. Hegel’s
philosophy of right, art, religion, etc. occur, in one sense, outside the Encyclopedic
system, where the latter is the science of the former. Of course, the philosophy of right,
art, religion, etc. still concern the necessity of reason, and so the subject matter is the
investigation of those as science, that is, in their necessity. But the science of such an
investigation into the science of art (for example) concerns the internal necessity of the
structure and method of reason whereby such an investigation can occur. It is this latter
science of spirit that was the subject of the Logic and more broadly the Encyclopedic
system. By contrast, an investigation into the philosophy of right, art, and religion, etc.
concerns the real existence or appearance of that necessity, where such an appearance is
not adherent to the structure of necessity, but rather that by which the standpoints of that
structure of rational necessity first arise.
We can see this distinction in Hegel’s introduction to his Philosophy of Right:
“the concept of right, so far as its coming into being is concerned, falls outside the
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science of right; [the concept of right’s] deduction is presupposed here and is to be taken
as given.”1 Likewise, Hegel’s Aesthetics concerns the “coming into being” of the
necessary standpoint of rationality that is possible only through art, i.e. the historical
movement of art’s role in the structural necessity of rationality.2 Moreover, just as with
the Philosophy of Right, in the Aesthetics the science of art for thought is “presupposed”
and its “deduction is to be taken as given.” To be clear, the subject at hand is still the
science of art. Consider the contrast: the Encyclopedic system was the establishment of
the structural method and necessity of reason and “inasmuch as philosophy is to be
science, it cannot borrow its method from a subordinate science.”3 As such, the science of
thought begins with the Logic, since “Logic is the pure science, that is, pure knowledge in
the full compass of its development.”4 It is thereby the fundamental structure of reflective
(not real) necessity according to which all other scientific investigations are conditioned.
All other scientific investigations are so conditioned since the former concerns the
science of the very form of thought through which the latter investigations can occur. To
this end, the Aesthetics is also “a science which contains the necessity, and therefore
demonstrates the truth, of the standpoint which is pure knowledge”5 since “in its content,
science is occupied with what is inherently necessary.”6 Aesthetics is a science not of

1

PR §2

2

I say “structural necessity of rationality” instead of “absolute reason” even though, retrospectively it is
right to term this its role in absolute reason. However, since absolute reason first arises (in part) through the
method of art, in a historical sense, symbolic, classical, and romantic moments of art do not, strictly
speaking, concern absolute reason.
3 WL 21.7
4
5
6

WL 21.55; c.f. WL 21.33-4
WL 21.54-5
Aesthetics p.6
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thought, but of the way in which spirit displays the truth of the structure of rationality in
its life. To this end, Hegel says,
what we want to consider is art which is free alike in its end and its means…in
this its freedom alone is fine art truly art, and it only fulfills its supreme task
when it has placed itself in the same sphere as religion and philosophy, and when
it is simply one way of bringing to our minds and expressing the Divine, the
deepest interests of mankind, and most comprehensive truths of the spirit…Art
shares this vocation with religion and philosophy, but in a special way, namely by
displaying even the highest [reality] sensuously, bringing it thereby nearer to the
senses, to feeling, and to nature’s mode of appearance.7

So, Hegel is declaring from the outset that while art as such concerns much more,
he is restricting his investigation to the very narrow question of the science of art, that is
the necessity of art for absolute reason. Recognizing the broader use of “aesthetics,”
which lies beyond the scope of his investigation into the necessity of art for reason, he
says: “We will therefore let the word ‘Aesthetics’ stand; as a mere name it is a matter of
indifference to us… As a name then it may be retained, but the proper expression for our
science is Philosophy of Art.”8 This restriction is crucial since it staves off 90% of the
misinterpretations that take his Aesthetics to be topically comparable to Herder’s
Aesthetics (Critical Forests)9 or contemporary art theory and criticism.10 We might derive
such interesting accounts from Hegel’s Aesthetics, but such investigations are not what he
is engaged in and cannot be included in the scope of his Aesthetics without doing
irreparable damage to its real significance.

7

Aesthetics pp. 7-8

8

Aesthetics p.1
C.f. “Fragments on Recent German Literature (1767-8),” Herder, 2010, pp. 33-64.

9

10

I have in mind here the kind of art theory and criticism most characteristically found in such authoritative
sources as Leitsch, 2010.
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Like the Philosophy of Right, which presupposed the science of the Logic, we will
find the fundamental structure of his investigation already given. To this end, he draws on
the conclusions of the Logic concerning the necessary relation of “appearance” to
“essence” and the fundamental requirement that the truth of a thing requires a necessity
that is internal, not external. These are already established in the Logic and that which the
Aesthetic investigations presuppose: “appearance itself is essential to essence. Truth
would not be truth if it did not show itself and appear, if it were not truth for someone and
for itself, as well as for the spirit in general.” 11 Likewise, “Philosophy has to consider an
object in its necessity, not merely according to subjective necessity or external ordering,
classification, etc.; it has to unfold and prove the object, according to the necessity of its
own inner nature.”12 Such theses are not assertions, but rather identifications of the key
results of the Logic and the broader Encyclopedic system for the matter at hand.
It is in this light, not in light of an investigation into art as such, that we will want
to ask, why is are both a sine qua non of absolute reason, yet also that of which Hegel
will conclude: “In all these respects art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains
for us a thing of the past. Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has rather
been transferred into our ideas.”13
It will help our investigation of art if we look first at a sketch of a parallel
investigation, namely his Philosophy of Right, to see how the free lawfulness as a
condition of the absolute shown in the Logic shows up as a quality of the historicity of
the necessary structure of reason as it shows itself in the real. To this end, let us bring into
11
12
13

Aesthetics p.8
Aesthetics p.11
Aesthetics p.11
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view what is involved in this transition out of the science of the system into the life of
that system through a brief look free lawfulness in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, and
moving toward free lawfulness in his philosophy of art.
§2) Transitioning from the Logic to the Life of the Spirit
In one sense, we are right at this point to think, as Allen Wood does, that although
“Hegel was a systematic philosopher, who grounded his system on a speculative logic,”
nevertheless “his greatest philosophical contributions lie in his reflections on human
culture: ethics, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, religion and the philosophy of
history.”14 This is right, I suggest, in the following sense. As Paul Franks argues, the allor-nothing-systematicity of Kant and the German Idealists should be viewed (as we saw
in Ch.1) as an attempt to escape the Agrippan Trilemma. By contrast with Kant, the
Idealists strive to achieve this in a non-dualistic manner. As I have shown, Hegel grounds
his system of the absolute, which is the transition from critical idealism to a unity of the
supersensible and the sensible in an identity of reason, through Kant’s own principle of
the free lawfulness of the imagination.15 Kant likewise saw this principle as the bridging
principle of the supersensible and sensible, but, according to Hegel “spared himself the
effort” of returning to give a complete deduction of the supreme principles themselves
such that the supersensible and sensible could justifiably be held together in a discursive,
free lawful unity of reason:
Kant made the profound observation that there are synthetic principles a priori,
and he recognized as their root the unity of self-consciousness, hence the self14

Wood, Thom 2012, p. 16; C.f. Wood, 1991, p. 359

15

Though, for Hegel, it does not show up as a principle, but rather arises as the necessary transition from
the long series of necessary movements of thought that prove the structure and method of the absolute.
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identity of the concept. However, he takes the specific connection, the relational
concepts and the synthetic principles, from formal logic as given; the deduction
of these should have been the exposition of the transition of that simple unity of
self-consciousness into these determinations and distinctions; but Kant spared
himself the effort of demonstrating this…16

For Kant, on Hegel’s view, the supreme principles of reason are left somewhat
free hanging with a mere regulative principle or ideal of the unity of reason. The Logic is
precisely Hegel effort to prove the internal necessity of the fundamental form and method
of absolute reason. Once the task of the Logic is accomplished, however, there is a real
sense in which the significance of the Logic is no longer particularly relevant. That is, the
heart of the Logic is to show the internal necessity of reason such that we are justified in
the entire structure of reason’s necessity in life. But that justification is the heart of the
Logic. Once that skepticism is answered, we need not concern ourselves actively with the
process of the Logic. In other words, Hegel will praise Goethe as an artist of the absolute
and does not think that Goethe needed to work through the Logic himself to recognize the
operative mode of the standpoint of the absolute (i.e. the internal necessity of reason in its
life). To this degree, I think that Wood’s point is right.
In another sense, however, we will lose something fundamental if we follow
Wood too far in rejecting the continued significance of the Logic as problematically
making “our appropriation of Hegel hostage to his philosophical system and speculative
logic.”17 To be clear, Wood is not denying the significance of the Logic, he is merely
articulating its relative insignificance when compared with that which it was supposed to
ground. And “one need not accept Hegel’s speculative logic in order to appreciate what is
16
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Wood, Thom 2012, p.16
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valuable in his ethical thought.”18 Wood is exactly right. The appreciation of what is
valuable in Hegel’s ethical, political, aesthetic, religious, and historical thought, is not
dependent on acceptance of the Logic. However, beyond establishing the structural
necessity and method of reason against skepticism, the Logic also sets the stage for
recognizing the further layers of structural relation and free lawful form of reason in the
life of spirit. If that underlying structure is not held in view as the interpretive form that is
reoccurring at every layer of thought, then the common criticism is surely correct in
charging Hegel’s writings with using overly flowery language that is mystical, opaque,
and contradictory at best if not patently incoherent. Of course, such a misreading,
however, could still be avoided by an astute and intuitive reader who nevertheless still
rejects the Logic.
However, a rejection of the Logic is a rejection of that which grounds the
necessary transitions of those later (higher philosophical) forms. So the significance of a
reading of Hegel’s philosophy of right or art, etc. that is accurate in its interpretation, can
nevertheless lay claim to no more than the “valuable insights” that Wood claims. And if
this is the case, then, Hegel’s philosophy is on par with, for example, Aristotelian
philosophy, whose fundamental aim is not a systematic all or nothing. 19 And if that is the
case, then we are right to wonder why we should go through so much effort to parse the
strange language and claims to necessity by which reason calls forth the other, etc., when
there are other equally insightful and far more accessible philosophical works.

18

Ibid, p. 17

19

That this is Hegel’s fundamental aim is clear from the passage cited above: WL 12.205
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Allen Wood gives one of the strongest defenses of Hegel’s ethics, but his
interpretation falls into this problematic. Namely, Wood identifies Hegel’s ethics in terms
of a valuable theory or framework, not qua necessity of reason: “Hegel prefers organism
over mechanism as the metaphor for a society” and “Hegel has no admiration for [a
model that does not accord with society as] a rational organism (PR §§ 273R, 278R,
286R).”20 While Wood’s emphasis on society and ethical life in terms of a model of “a
rational organism” is exactly right. It is not the case that Hegel merely prefers this model.
It is that the free lawfulness of reason necessitates –a priori grounds– such a conception
of flourishing that takes the form of a rational organism. Without this, the necessary bases
for his ethics is gone. And if it is merely one of preference over something like
Aristotelian teleology, then 95% of Hegel’s ethics is an unnecessary, convoluted account
of some strange necessity of the structure and method of reason that is grounded in the
Logic (PR §2). Again, if that were right, Hegel could have skipped all such talk of the
“absolute” and “spiritual activity” of reason and cut straight to his “preferred” ethical
model.
Against this view, I suggest that we do indeed lose not merely interpretive
directive but also the fundamental significance of Hegel’s system if we take it apart from
its grounding in the Logic. In other words, I think that as far as “preferred” models go he
was quite happy with Aristotle’s ethics. But Hegel’s aim was not to give such a model,
but rather to show the internal necessity whereby the free lawfulness of reason demands a
moral life, not as a law external to the sensible life (as he thought Kant’s Moral Law
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Wood, 1990, pp. 202-3
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necessarily remained) but as internal to the very nature and necessity of a rational
organism. And all of this depends entirely on his grounding of the ethical life, of society
as a rational organism, in the unity of the absolute, a justified identity of the supersensible
and sensible.
On my reading, one of the fundamental mistakes that is made, for instance, in
interpreting Hegel’s Aesthetics is thinking that Hegel’s talk about the “pastness” of art has
anything to do with artistic movements in the fine arts such as cubism, postimpressionism, romanticism, etc. The “pastness” of art, as I will show, concerns,
fundamentally, the underlying free lawful necessity of reason’s self-determination and
has nothing to do with such historical movements in the fine arts. And that underlying
interpretation of his Aesthetics (and parallel interpretations of his Philosophy of Right,
etc.) is not possible if the Logic is not held in view as the constitutive conditions of such a
notion of the necessary structure and method of absolute reason as a free lawfulness,
bearing within it its own fundamental principle of systematic contingency in the identity
of the supersensible and sensible.
Before, turning to his aesthetics, let us briefly bring into view the systematic
significance of the Logic for Hegel’s ethics. It is not within the scope of my argument to
discuss Hegel’s ethics in any detail. However, I will briefly gesture toward Hegel’s
critique of Kant’s supreme principle of pure practical reason (i.e. the moral law)
according to his charge of empty formalism. Drawing this briefly into view will help
identify how thoroughly Hegel views the free lawfulness of the imagination that Kant
identifies in the KU as the bridge of the supersensible and sensible. To this end, I will

!320

sketch the way in which this principle explains Hegel’s critique of Kant’s supreme
principle of pure practical reason (i.e. the Moral Law) and his own alternative endeavor.
(2.1) Free Lawfulness and Ethical Life in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right
First, what is Hegel’s “emptiness” charge of Kant’s moral law?21 In Hegel’s
Ethical Thought, Allen Wood rightly and effectively critiques the interpretation of Hegel
in which this charge pertains to the inability of the categorical imperative to rule out
specific maxims.22 Hegel does not think that the categorical imperative fails to rule out
specific maxims. That has nothing to do with Hegel’s critique (as Wood shows). In
contrast, Wood suggests that the emptiness charge pertains rather to Kant’s inability to
ground principles of morality through his abstract starting point of freedom and
lawfulness.
For my purposes, I am not interested in assessing Wood’s account, but rather want
to take something like this reading and employ it in terms that identify the core of my
argument concerning the role that the free lawfulness of the imagination should play in a
Kantian system of reason (if one takes seriously the requirements that necessarily result
from the KU when brought into unity with the first two Critiques), and when it does play
such a fundamental role by which it bridges the supersensible and sensible, then it
grounds the relationship between reason’s necessity and freedom as having the kind of
content that Hegel thinks his system has and which Kant’s fails to evidence.

21

For Hegel’s charge of empty formalism, see PR §135, NR 459-468; C.f. PhG 429-437, 596-631, EG
§503-512.
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Wood, 1995, pp. 154-72; see also Neuhouser, 1992, pp. 317-20.
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For Hegel as we saw, while Kant provides philosophy with precisely that
principle whereby the a priori and a posteriori are unified and an identity of
supersensible and sensible is established, Kant “spares himself the effort” of returning to
the KrV and the KPV to show the internal necessity of those synthetic a priori principles.
This, I suggest is at the heart of his critique of Kant’s empty formalism of the supreme
principle of morality.
My account is this: One would think that if freedom and lawfulness “reciprocally”
imply each other as Kant claims they do in the supreme principle of morality: “Thus
freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other.”23 Then, there
seems to be something of the bridge that the free lawfulness of the Imagination
established. At least, enough of a bridge that Kant is surely right is grounding a practical
legislation of nature in the moral law. And if he is right in this, then he does what Hegel
says he cannot.
This, however, would be a misconstrual of Kant’s supreme principle of the
freedom of the will. The identity of freedom and lawfulness in Kant’s autonomy of the
will as the moral law is purely supersensible. It is a principle of a supersensible selflegislation that is at once a law for the will. This then becomes the pure ground by which
maxims for the sensible are assessed as practically impossible while remaining consistent
with that supreme principle. But the structure here, as Hegel rightly sees, is not one in
which a bridge between the supersensible and sensible exists, but rather a relationship of
two parallel realms in which the supersensible legislation of reason is the external
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standard by which specific maxims are to be prohibited. This relationship necessitates
that the maxims of the sensible and the corresponding lives of individuals living
according to those maxims is always one in which there stands an external supreme law.24
Why does that matter for Hegel? Why is this a problem for ethical life? Why does
Hegel call this an ultimately empty formalism? And how does this charge of empty
formalism square with the seemingly opposing charge of a failure to show the deeper,
internal necessity of and between the supreme a priori principles themselves?
On my account, Hegel’s critique is internal to Kant’s system and should not be
viewed as a radical alteration or critique from without (although the results of this shift
are substantial). That is, so far as it goes, what I have just said about the divide between
the supersensible and sensible in Kant’s practical philosophy is the best reading of Kant.
Kant does not think that the supreme principle of morality, the autonomy of the will
“bridges” the supersensible and sensible domains. He nowhere claims that it does. By
contrast, Kant clearly views the supreme principle of purposiveness (i.e. the principle of
free lawfulness) of the KU as bridging these domains.25

24

PR §135: “Hence all that is left for duty itself, in so far as it is the essential or universal element in the
moral self-consciousness as it is related within itself to itself alone, is abstract universality, whose
determiantion is identity without content or the abstractly positive, i.e. the indeterminate…Kant’s
philosophy [of pure practical reason] is defective in that it lacks all articulation…in other words, if we
demand of a principle that it should also be able to serve as the determinant of a universal legislation, this
presupposes that it already has a content; and if this content were present, it would be easy to apply the
principle. But in this case, the principle itself is not yet available, and the criterion that there should be no
contradiction is non-productive –for where there is nothing, there can be no contradiction either.” What
Kant is missing, is precisely the reformulation of the supreme principle of morality in relation to the
supreme principle of purposiveness as the free lawfulness of the productive power of the mind whereby the
law of practical non-contradiction would indeed concern itself as the productive source of a unified
supersensible and sensible will. The emptiness critique, then, concerns precisely the fact that the moral law
is “non-productive” and so has no content for which it is a law to itself as is required, on Hegel’s view, for
the truth of the freedom of the will, namely the ethical life.
25

KU 5:195-6; 5:175-6; KU, first introduction, 20:242; 20:233-4, 20:246-7
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If this is right, what would have been involved for Kant in recognizing the
necessary results of this bridging principle of the KU on his articulation of the supreme
principle of morality? He clearly thinks that the Highest Good is made possible only in
light of this bridging principle.26 Why is that not sufficient for establishing the content
that would obviate a critique of empty formalism?
The problem for Hegel is again on a high level of abstraction, and is resolved in
his own equivalent account in the Science of Logic, namely, Kant (on Hegel’s view)
should have then gone back to the KPV to show that the supreme principle of morality
necessitates in itself the bridging identity with the sensible.27 To establish this without
turning his moral philosophy into a problematic collapse of the “is” and the “ought” of
morality, would have required an account of the supreme principle, the freedom of the
will as necessitating the transition to a free lawfulness where that free lawfulness is not
something other than the freedom of the will, but is rather a free lawful movement that is
“lawful without an external law.”28
That is, Hegel’s critique of Kant is fundamentally that the supreme principle does
not ground the internality of the law to the free necessity of reason that bridges the

26

“Now we have in the world only a single sort of beings whose causality is teleological, i.e., aimed at ends
and yet at the same time so constituted that the law in accordance with which they have to determine ends
is represented by themselves as unconditioned and independent of natural conditions but yet as necessary in
itself. The being of this sort is the human being, though considered as noumenon: the only natural being in
which we can nevertheless cognize, on the basis of its own constitution, a supersensible faculty (freedom)
and even the law of the causality together with the object that it can set for itself as the highest end (the
highest good in the world)” (5:435); c.f. 5:443-50. See also: Ch. 5
27 See footnote above on PR §135
28

My suggestion is that Kant’s notion of a “free lawfulness of the imagination” (KU 5:240) as the principle
of a productive power of purposiveness that is “lawfulness without a law” (KU 5:241) is precisely, for
Hegel, the articulation of the “internal purposiveness” by which a law stands not as external but as the
internal, self-determination of the productive power itself. This is why Hegel calls this principle of
purposiveness Kant’s principle of “innerer Zweckmäsigkeit” WL 12.157.
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supersensible and sensible. In other words, Kant rightly shows the bridging of the
supersensible and sensible, their identity in a free lawfulness of the mind, but fails to
return to show how the supreme principle of the freedom of the will must necessarily not
be held as something “other” as some supersensible standard that is an external “law” for
the sensible, but is rather, through the free lawfulness of reason an internal law.29 That is
the heart of Hegel’s empty formalism critique of Kant’s Moral Law.
Kant had the resources to avoid this critique. He only had to show that the free
lawfulness of reason makes possible the identity of the legislation in the realm of the
supersensible with the necessity of reason in the sensible. And this identity is not a
collapse of the entirety of the supersensible into the sensible. The recognition of a
transcendental pure necessity as a standard of reason in abstraction from what is itself an
important and valid method whereby reason proceeds. But that recognition of the need
for transcendental reflection to establish the lawful necessity of reason does not require
that the law remain always an external standard to the sensible. And this observation is
precisely Kant’s observation in the principle of free lawfulness in the KU. So Hegel is not
introducing a non-Kantian insight. He is, rather, working out the internal necessity of
reason, something that Kant problematically “spared himself the effort” of doing. 30 It is
that internal necessity of the moral law as a standard not external to the sensible but
internal to what it is that is for Hegel the heart of his charge of an empty formalism.

29

This free lawful interiority of the laws of reason as the life of the latter is reflected in his Philosophy of
Religion as well. For example, the role and significance of “reconciliation” as a fundamental quality of an
individual’s life in absolute reason follows the same model of free lawful (purposive) harmony that unifies
the supersensible and sensible in art and the ethical life: see 2. Reconciliation, a. “The Idea of
Reconciliation and Its Appearance in a Single Individual,” R p. 233; c.f. R pp.264-5.
30
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The result of this for Hegel’s own account of ethics bears much in common with
Aristotelian teleology and indeed stands somewhere between Kant’s deontology and
Aristotelian teleology. In particular, the internality of the moral law to sensibility is going
to take a complex form of teleology that is responsive to historical contingencies, such
that the ought may take different shapes in different cultures and periods, but ultimately is
grounded in the internal necessity of reason’s free lawful self-determination in accord
with freedom. This is a unique a priori grounded form of a teleology of flourishing
according to the kind of being one is.
Allen Wood helpfully summarizes Hegel’s notion of freedom in his introduction
to the Philosophy of Right:
The Philosophy of Right is founded on an ethical theory which identifies the
human good with the self-actualization of the human spirit. Hegel’s name for the
essence of this spirit is freedom (PR §4). But Hegel does not mean by ‘freedom’
what most people mean by it. Most people, according to Hegel, think that
freedom consists in possibilities of acting, but freedom is really a kind of action,
namely one in which I am determined entirely through myself, and not at all by
anything external (PR §23). Even in the case of free action, Hegel thinks that
most people identify it with ‘arbitrariness’ (Wilkür), with doing whatever we
please (PR §15R) or with venting our particularity and idiosyncrasy (PR §15A).
Hegel regards this view as shallow and immature; he insists that we are free only
when we overcome ‘particularity’ and act ‘universally’ or ‘objectively,’ according
to the ‘concept’ of the will (PR §23).31

In Hegel’s account of ethics, freedom stands as a kind of Aristotelian highest good
and bears much in common with the Kantian Moral Law. For Hegel, like Aristotle’s
notion of Eudaimonia as human flourishing, freedom is a state of flourishing, not a
condition of action or the possibilities for action. Again, according to Wood, “this means
that freedom is possible only to the extent that we act rationally, and in circumstances
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Wood, Introduction 2012, pp. xi-xii
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where the objects of our action are in harmony with our reason.” 32 Thus, “our ethical
duties…Hegel insists, do not restrict us, but liberate us (PR §149).” 33
This system of ethical life is not one in which what is goes, but neither is it one in
which the necessity of reason is identifiable as an external law imposed on the sensible. It
is rather a complexly interwoven necessity of that sensible life and (qualitatively) infinite
process of working out which actions, thoughts, orientations are immoral, which moral.
And that process is not one in which we make a list of options and judge them against an
external standard or law. That would be to slip back into a deontic conception of morality
in which the supreme moral law is external to the action. To be clear, this is not a
fundamental critique of Kant, but rather the critique that Kant needed to go one step
further and show, through the free lawfulness of the KU, how the Moral Law was not
merely an external law, but an internal law of and for a unified supersensible and sensible
being.
I suggest that Hegel’s use of the language of “organic” and “organisms” from the
Phenomenology of Spirit to his Philosophy of Right, and Aesthetic are precisely the
identification of the purposive unity of the method of reason’s self-determination
according to specific kind of free lawfulness that was first grounded at the highest level
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Ibid, p. xii

33

Ibid, p. xiii
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of abstraction in the chapter on Teleology in the Logic (as discussed in Ch. 6). 34 To this
end, Hegel will speak of true freedom in the ethical life in terms of the internal necessity
of an “organism”: “The necessity in ideality is the development of the Idea within itself;
as subjective substantiality, it is the [individual’s] political disposition, and as objective
substantiality –in contrast with the former– it is the organism of the state, the political
state proper and its constitution.”35
The free lawfulness of reason establishes, for Hegel, the ground on which the
supreme practical law is an internal constitutive principle of a self-determining will
according to the truth of reason. One way of situating this in the standard divisions of
contemporary ethical theories would be to say that those conceptions of Aristotelian
ethics through contemporary virtue ethicists such as Rosalind Hursthouse in On Virtue
Ethics, and Martha Nussbaum in Love’s Knowledge and Upheavals of Thought, where
flourishing is a complex and dynamic state that requires responsiveness to the particulars
and cannot be identifiable in terms of external laws by which actions can be
determined.36 At the same time, for Hegel, such an ethical theory would have nothing of
34

For instance, Hegel says, “This is nonfinite purposiveness in which end and means are not external to one
another–the end brings forth the means and the means brings forth the end. The principal determination is
that of organic life. The world is alive; it contains organic life and the realms of organic life…that is the
definition of organic life generally, but [in the form of] extant, worldly organic life. The latter, to be sure,
[aims at] being inward vitality, inward purposiveness…the proper progression, then is from this finite
organic life to absolute organic life, to universal purposiveness–such that this world is a cosmos, i.e., a
system in which everything has an essential connection to everything else and nothing is isolated. The
cosmos is something internally ordered in which each thing has its place, is embraced within the whole,
subsists by means of the whole, and is in the same measure active and effective for the generation and life
of the whole. Thus the main thing is the movement away from finite ends toward a universal organic life,
toward the one purpose that articulates itself in particular ends– so that this particularization exists within
harmony, within a reciprocal and essential relation” (R p.320).
35 PR §267
36

C.f. Alasdair MacIntyre’s Three Rival Versions of Morality and After Virtue; as well as Philippa Foot’s
Natural Goodness. Allen Wood interprets Hegel similarly and points to the fact that MacIntyre, Michael
Sandel, and Bernard Williams each identify Hegel as the start of the shift toward such ethical theories;
Wood, 1990, p.202.
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the necessity and truth of spirit if it were not grounded in the science of the Spirit (i.e. the
Encyclopedia of Spirit), which in turn depends on the science of Nature, and most
fundamentally, the science of Logic whereby the necessity of reason as a free lawful, selfdetermining identity of sensible and supersensible is first (discursively, and critically)
grounded.
So, Hegel’s ethics bears with it the lawful necessity of the autonomy of the will
(in Kant’s terms) and the structural shape of a flourishing of individuals according to a
conception of freedom as the internal truth of who they are (as self-determining, free
lawful, rational, sensible selves). Again, Wood rightly argues that for Hegel,
recognition of oneself as engaged in an ethical life as a self-determining subject
in community with others and a surrounding world is central to freedom, “but
Hegel would deny that such feelings constitute freedom unless they are a
‘certainty based on truth’ (PR §268). That is, the institutions of the community
must truly harmonize the state’s universal or collective interest with the true,
objective good of individuals; and individuals must be conscious of this harmony.
Of course there is no freedom at all in a society whose members ‘identify’
themselves with it only because they are victims of illusion, deception, or
ideology. 37

Hegel’s system of ethics is certainly not a clear, cut and dry account of moral
requirements, but such clear accounts are precisely what Hegel critiques as having no
“truth” as an empty, external form standing over and against the truth of the real in which
the form and content are organically one. The ethical life, for Hegel, will thereby be a
matter of dynamic reflective engagement through the arts, culture, religion, and the
historical shapes of these over time through a thoroughly consistent conception of the
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whole as grounded in the internal necessity (the laws and method) of reason as
conditioned by the kind of science of thought that The Science of Logic provides.38
It should not be surprising then, given this, to find in Hegel’s Lectures on the Fine
Arts, that his account of the significance of art will include “actions” as instances of the
broadly construed notion of art as a necessary means by which the reason becomes what
it is.39 That is, spirit constitutes itself in part through a necessary manifestation in art (as
we will see) and this “art” includes “actions.”40 The ethical life for Hegel is not distinct
from the broader manifestations of the self-determining life of a rational being according
to the internal necessity of reason. Where this truth of absolute reason is established first
in the Science of Logic and then through increasing layers of complexity in the PN and
PS (i.e. through fuller unifications of freedom and lawfulness, of supersensible and
sensible, of necessity and contingency), until finally a philosophy of the systematic
contingency of reason in history can be retrospectively given. Here we find the historical
shapes of spirit in the philosophy of Art and Right, etc.
(2.2) Toward Hegel’s Philosophy of Art
It would take us too far afield to look in detail at either his philosophy of art or
right. What I would like to do, however, is draw out one of those ways in which Hegel
identifies reason as a unified structure of systematic contingency, as a free lawful selfdetermining movement in history. I turn now to art as a particular shape through which
38

Though of course, the Science of Logic is not the only possible articulation of such a science of thought.
Where an idea manifest in art can be an “action” or a community of actions, etc: “In whatever form
dramatic poetry brings the action on the stage, what is really effective in it is absolute truth, but the specific
way in which this effectiveness comes on the scene takes a different, and indeed an opposed, form
according to whether what is kept dominant in the individuals and their actions and conflicts is their
substantive basis or alternatively their subjective caprice, folly, and perversity” (Aesthetics p. 1194).
39
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Aesthetics, pp. 179, 424, 854, 1159
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reason is so complexly and historically forming. My reason for turning to art for my
current account is twofold.
First, I need only take up one of the shapes of the spirit in Hegel’s system to show
how it is that the abstract principle of the free lawfulness, which grounded the transition
to the absolute, is more dynamically actualized in particular uses of human reason
according to the necessity of the structure of rationality. This level of investigation into
Hegel’s philosophy of art corresponds with Chapters 4 and 5 in which I looked
predominately to the second and third-layer significances of the imagination in judgments
of the beautiful and sublime (Ch.4) and judgments of art and natural ends (Ch. 5).
Second, I hope to show that through the what has become notoriously known as
the “end of art” thesis, Hegel identifies the significance of our recognition of the
fundamentally creative power of the artistic imagination for what he calls speculative
thinking and “true philosophy.” Hegel’s end game, is an account of individuals and
cultures who ought to recognize (as the truth of what they are) that the life of a rational
being contains within it specific and fundamental features that are the product of
historical cultivation as well as the internal necessity of the free lawfulness of reason as
self-determining. Wherein, this self-determination is not an assertion that what the self
determines is thereby lawful, but rather that reason has a free lawful method to it, which
of course can be countered, but which is the truth the spirit, i.e. true philosophy.
Ultimately, then, through the transition made possible by the free lawfulness of
the imagination, Hegel transforms critical idealism into absolute idealism and thereby
fundamentally changes what true philosophy entails. For Hegel, true philosophy can no
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longer be identified with abstract thought or ratiocination (which are mere tools or
movements of thought, that have specific uses, such as is visible in the Science of Logic),
but rather must necessarily be taken to be the complex reflective and productive
engagements of a single unified self-conscious reflection and production through the arts,
in culture, in relationships, etc. True philosophy properly understood is a reflecting
growth and holistic education of a discursive human being, which has little indeed to do
with academic philosophy and more to do with an active and reflective life well lived.
To understand this more concrete and unified conception of reason in one of its
necessary historical shapes, I turn to the notorious and much-misunderstood claim, in his
Aesthetics: Lectures on the Fine Arts, that art is now for us “something past.” Here, I
suggest that a three-layered conception of the imagination is once again helpful, but only
for identifying the constitutive single free lawful activity of reason at work. Namely, on
the first layer, we have the free lawfulness of the method of reason first established by the
Science of Logic. On the second layer is the artistic imagination as a concrete articulation
of the productive power of the mind, whereby art is shown to be a necessary quality of
spirit in general. Finally, on the third-layer is the return to a single unified reason, but
unlike this unity in the Science of Logic, where it is the absolute unity of reason as a free
lawful necessity. This third-layer conception is a concrete rational being in whom the
artistic imagination is sublated and so constitutive of what Hegel calls the speculative life
of an individual engaged in true philosophy. Without the first layer, given as we saw in
Ch. 6 through the Logic, the second and third-layers could at most have the kind of status
that Aristotle’s Ethics, Poetics, and De Anima have, namely, insightful and pragmatically
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helpful but not absolutely necessary conception of what constitutes a flourishing rational
life. In Hegel’s system, the absolute (established on the first-layer) is consummated
(through the second-layer) in the truth of an individual life (third-layer) where that life is
constitutive of a community of lives of such individuals throughout space (the world) and
time (history).
§3 The Structure of Rationality and its Historical Life
There is no shortage of recent scholarship critiquing the “end of art” thesis
(whereby Hegel is alleged to be putting an end to art) as a mischaracterization of Hegel.
41Despite

this general sentiment over the past few decades, there is no clear consensus

over what the “pastness” of art involves. Those following in Robert Pippin’s interpretive
tradition view it as a shift in the significance of the fine arts for the current needs of selfconsciousness and its continued growth.42 Pippin defends this view in several places,
including, “The Absence of Aesthetics in Hegel’s Aesthetics.” 43 While Pippin’s account
of the adequacy of later art forms to the “needs” of the age, are interested in their own
41 Alternatively,

Fred Beiser’s account rejects the “end of art” interpretation in favor of a kind of diminished
role of art where it becomes merely a form of individual self-expression (2010), pp. 300-1; c.f. Speight,
2008, pp.386-393.
42 I find Allen Speight’s “Hegel and Aesthetics: The Practice and ‘Pastness’ of Art” to be one of the most
compelling of these accounts. See also, Martin Donougho’s article, “Art and History: Hegel on the End, the
Beginning and the Future of Art;” and Stephen Houlgate’s “Presidential Address: Hegel and the Art of
Painting.”
43 Although

Pippin’s argument marks an important advance from isolated interpretations of Hegel’s claims
regarding the end of art seen in Heidegger, Gadamer, and a host of other more contemporary critics, it is
nevertheless silent on the central significance of that which is sublated (aufheben) into absolute selfconsciousness through the end of art. Apart from this, I find Pippin’s account of Hegel’s Aesthetics to be
helpful. I will note two points here, but will not return to Pippin’s thought in this paper. Pippin importantly
observes that “Hegel adds that in art (as well as religion and philosophy) this externalization and selfrecognition concerns ‘the highest things.’ Again, he roughly means some sort of self-knowledge about the
nature and ‘actuality’ of freedom” (Pippin, 2008, p. 398). The artistic activity of the spirit will be partially a
process of externalization. Concerning this, Pippin writes, “externalization can be said to help ‘bring’ such
norms and principles and values ‘to life,” (Pippin, 2008, p. 402) he follows by suggesting a correlation
between the artistic life and an adequate understanding of agency. It will be clear by the end how I see these
views fitting into the account forwarded in this paper. See also, Pippin’s “What Was Abstract Art? (From
the Point of View of Hegel),” and his culminating work on the subject: Hegel: After the Beautiful.
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right and work as a derivative aesthetic theory from Hegel’s underlying philosophy of art,
such an interpretation cannot adequately account for Hegel’s actual text.
Pippin’s interpretation is problematic for the reason mentioned at the outset of this
chapter, namely, Hegel’s Aesthetics is about the necessity of art for reason in its organic
life. Questions about specific movements of art are simply not what it is about. Nor do
Hegel’s three broad categories of “symbolic, classical, and romantic” fit such a view.
However, because Pippin does not recognize, or directly address at any rate, that which is
being sublated (aufheben) into the structure of rationality through the moment of the
“pastness” of art, he not only misses the essential manner in which art fundamentally
transforms the standpoint of “true philosophy” and absolute reason,44 but more
immediately, he problematically concludes that Hegel’s “failure to imagine a
postromantic form of art…is just that, a failure of imagination.”45 This critique speaks
past Hegel altogether. Hegel has no problem “imagining” a post-romantic form of art. In
fact, it is of post-romantic forms of art that he says: “Bondage to a particular subjectmatter and a mode of portrayal suitable for this material alone are for artists today
something past, and art therefore has become a free instrument which the artist can wield
in proportion to his subjective skill in relation to any material of whatever kind.”46
Moreover, as we will see, he views Goethe (and Schiller) as one such artist operative
from the free lawful standpoint of absolute reason.47 Far from the “pastness” of art having

44

This happens through the sublation of the imagination (Einbildungskraft)– the value and necessity (i.e.
“truth”) of art, which allows the structure of rationality to advance to and remain at its highest standpoint.
45
46
47

Pippin, 2008, p.415f
Aesthetics, p.605
Aesthetics, pp. 1156-7.
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to do with any strange claim about a cessation of developments in the fine arts art then or
in the future, Hegel is making a much more significant claim about the way in which the
truth of the artistic method as such is being taken up (sublated) into the structure of
reason by which the absolute standpoint is made possible. I will return to this
interpretation later on and will account for why this necessitates a “pastness” of art in a
very specific and absolute sense.
(3.1) First, there are two facets in light of which Hegel’s Aesthetics must be
understood: 1) The structure of rationality and 2) The historicity of the “life” of
rationality. In his Aesthetics, Hegel sometimes switches between these two levels. On the
one hand, these lectures are a continuation of his larger philosophical “system” (as the
life of that system) which deals with the same structure of rationality that is taken up as a
science in the Science of Logic, the Encyclopedia of Logic, Nature, and Spirit.48 The
taking up of this free lawful method of reason, i.e. the structure of rationality, as a science
was the reflective philosophical enterprise for establishing the validity of reason in his
historical shapes.49 The real, that through which our knowledge comes, on which we
reflect, and which is the subject of scientific inquiry in the Encyclopedia is given in the
various historical shapes and moments, such as art, culture, society, religion, laws, ethical
life, etc.

48 Allen

Speight helpfully identifies places in the Phenomenology of Spirit that display the significance of
art for the structure of rationality (2001, p. 21).
49

Hegel often reminds us that the method of philosophical thought is to abstract from the given, but that
abstraction, while necessary, cannot be viewed as the reality or truth of the thing. Separating out the
elements of a subject is necessary, so long as we return to the individual originally in question (although
now with a better understanding): “although for analysis we separated the two elements, it must be well
remembered that they are closely connected and that this connection is within each of them when we
examine them singly” (Reason in History, p. 62).
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Since there is a great deal of debate about how we are to understand the historical
movement of reason, let me give an analogy as a model for how I read his Aesthetics.
This model should stand in the background as the context to my argument concerning the
significance of what Hegel calls the “artistic imagination.” The analogy is as follows. Our
ability to do calculus is not a sign of some kind of greater intelligence in our age over
those 2,500 years ago, much less 350 years ago (prior to its invention by Leibniz and
Newton). At the same time, there is a kind of movement to human reason in history that I
take it is widely acknowledged. For example, human reason employed the tools of
previous ages through the centuries to slowly build to the point in the 17th century where
calculus was capable of being developed. Now, contemporary humans, are able to enter
into quite a range of fields with such advances and capabilities readily at our disposal.
This progression can be called, by analogy, a progression of reason’s standpoint. The
individuals active at this standpoint are not thereby more intelligent than those of
previous ages. At the same time, there is a real sense in which the standpoint of reason
has advanced and so individuals operative from that standpoint are engaged in a more
advanced standpoint of reason. We may employ our standpoint to far worse use than
previous ages, but that we are operative from such a developed standpoint is the point.
We have a history of reason available to our thought that previous ages simply did not.
This distinction between standpoint and intelligence is vital for understanding
Hegel. Joe in the twenty-first century still needs to internalize this standpoint to some
degree (i.e. learn the tools afforded him by this standpoint and their relative worth for
himself and those around him as he engages in the process of understanding and living).
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Likewise, when Allie of the twenty-second century inherits a model of physics that
resolves the conflicts in quantum mechanics and general relativity, there is an accurate
sense in which she is operative from a “higher standpoint of reason.”50 Now, these are
just analogies. The model is more complicated in art, since unlike mathematics, art is not
a mere tool of reason, but turns out to be constitutive of reason as a necessary form of its
process. But where the analogy does hold is in this distinction between the standpoint of
reason and the wrongful equation that this represents a more intelligent age or individual.
The structure of reason is such that it develops historically, has standpoints that
grow from the success, failure, and relative dialectic changes of past epochs. The task of
the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedic system, on my account, was to look
retrospectively at the essence of reason in its historicity to ask: what, if anything, can be
called the necessity of reason. As such, that project required an abstracting out to being as
an “is” that is devoid of all assumptions such that it is “nothing.”51 But that project is
fundamentally a reflective, scientific investigation of thought. The investigation into the
philosophy of art, by contrast, is a science of a different kind. Namely, it is the
investigation into the historical movements by which reason develops through various
standpoints and displays the inner necessity that is later established by the Logic and
Encyclopedia.

50

Thomas Kuhn provides a superb account of scientific methods and theories over time that is precisely the
kind model I am here suggesting. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970), and The
Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (1977). C.f. Ian Hacking, “The SelfVindication of Laboratory Sciences” (1992). Had Hegel given a Philosophy of Natural Sciences, which
would have taken the Encyclopedic system as its “presupposed” ground, just as the Philosophy of Right,
Art, and Religion all presuppose this system, then I think something like Kuhn’s theory of the structure of
scientific revolutions would have been the result.
51
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So, in Hegel’s Aesthetics, we have to keep in mind that Hegel is engaged in a twofold process: on the one hand, that of identifying how art reveals and so constitutes the
structure of rationality, its internal necessity. On the other hand, the Aesthetics is engaged
in actual reflection on historical works of art in order to identify this internal free lawful
necessity of reason. As such, it also concerns, not the internal necessity of reason, but the
historical contingency of art even when the latter fails to manifest the former. The former
is the real subject of the philosophy of art as a science, even when the latter is the topic at
hand. Speaking of this two-fold quality, Hegel likens the Aesthetics to the PR: “As with
the Concept of the state, so too with the Concept of art there arises the need (a) for a
common end for its particular aspects, but (b) also for a higher substantial end.”52 It is
qua “higher substantial end” that we should understand the “pastness” of art.
I will argue that the role that art must play in revealing a fundamental quality of
the free lawful, self-determining structure of reason, reaches a “higher substantial end”
once this quality of reason is evidenced. At which point, there is no longer a historical
need for such a standpoint of reason to enter the scene. Just as, once calculus is
developed, there is no longer a historical need for its discovery; and just as that in no way
entails an insignificance for its continued role in history –rather, it merely entails that the
development of the standpoint has already been given and is now something that is for us
a thing of the past. Likewise, I will argue, the standpoint of reason as fundamentally
artistic culminates in the sublation of the artistic imagination into the necessary structure
52

Aesthetics, p. 48; Hegel follows this with a brief description of one such “substantial end” being the
mitigation of desires and formation of the self in accordance with the spirit. This level is typical of Pippin’s
interpretation. Also on this second level is Benjamin Rutter’s Hegel on the Modern Arts, which offers an
account of the continued significance of the arts from the standpoint of a Hegelian variation of “art
criticism.”
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of speculative thought, such that this development of the standpoint of reason will always
be for us something past. We do not need that standpoint to develop again, we already
recognize it as the standpoint from which we are operative.53 Just like with calculus the
historical development of this standpoint in no way undermines the significance of art as
such for all future historical epochs.
For the sake of sake of brevity, I identify the first-fold significance on which the
Aesthetics is concerned as the “structure of rationality,” where this just means the
internal, free lawful necessity of reason’s self-determination (as revealed rather than as
scientifically grounded through philosophical reflection, since the latter is the work of the
Logic). The second-fold significance I call the “historicity of its life,” where this
historicity picks out the historical moments and shapes by which that structure of
rationality is revealed, but also those historical moments and shapes that reveal mere
contingency as standing against or alongside that structure of rationality.54
In short, for Hegel, the life of the spirit or the historical movement of human selfconsciousness across time has a certain structure of necessity 55 to its movements that are
revealed through the various shapes and their transitional moments.
Although given epochs are not strictly determined by this structure of rationality,
it is nevertheless this structure that allows Hegel to speak of the universal, truth, or
absolute that transforms itself and sublates its temporal historical moments as a part of its
53

Though a given individual need not be operative from this standpoint even if history is, just as the fact
that many do not or cannot make use of calculus does not deny that it is nevertheless a characteristic of our
age in a way that it was not the standpoint 350 years ago.
54 The third-fold significance, which I don’t address here, would be an individual –say, Goethe qua poet– is
operative from a particular historical standpoint.
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Where this “necessity” is not determinism, but a free lawfulness of reason as a law to itself according to a
developmental, systematic contingency.
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identity, which is reflectively visible. So historical epochs are neither mere
determinations nor expressions of the structure of rationality, nor is the structure of
rationality reducible to these historical epochs. Further, as we will see, the truth of the
reconciling dialectic of the universal structure of rationality and its manifestation in
particulars is what Hegel calls the absolute life of spirit. “Structure of rationality” should
not be understood as a static set of laws that determine the activity of the spirit, but rather
as the organic, developmental necessity of life (which includes thought and materiality,
animate and inanimate objects, etc). This fundamental organic development of the
structure of rationality is what, in the Logic, is grounded by the inner purposiveness of
reason as a free lawful, self-determining movement.
§4 The Shapes, Moments, and Pastness of Art
This section is perhaps the least significant for my argument but deals with a
subject that has been the primary focus in scholarship on Hegel’s Aesthetics, so I include
my own account on the matter, which differs substantially with the norm. Those
uninterested in what Hegel means by symbolic, classical, and romantic in art, as well as
the notorious “pastness” or end of art thesis, may wish to pass over to section 5.
As we will see shortly, art becomes for the structure of reason something purely
“past” in a specific sense, namely, the spirit (qua life of that structure of reason) comes to
realize that the “ideal” or the “beauty of art” – which is the adequate union of the
sensuous world and thought in a particular configuration – can never be adequate to the
truth of the spirit.56 Now if we anthropomorphize the way in which the structure of
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Aesthetics pp. 9-11
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rationality is displayed through its historical shapes, since, after all, history is alive with
reason’s determinations, then we can see why Hegel speaks of the “spirit seeking its
satisfaction” in this or that.57 For example, Hegel speaks of the spirit ceasing to seek its
own self-determination in the realm of art, and so art as a realm of adequate concrete
formation becomes “something past.”58 I suggest that what is identified by such
developments whereby the spirit no longer seeks its satisfaction in a particular moment,
pertains to a specific internal necessity of reason, which while sublating what is true in
that moment, recognizes that that moment does not reveal the full truth of the structure of
rationality, and so further historical shapes and moments are sought in which the total
truth of its own internally necessitated structure of rationality is revealed.
To understand this, and why this in no way suggests a lesser value for art at the
highest standpoint of rationality, we must briefly trace through the development of the
ideal into the particular forms of the beauty of art. These forms as the “symbolic,”
“classical,” and “romantic” are quite well known but equally misunderstood.59
Volume Two of Hegel’s Aesthetics traces the particular works of art through
historical epochs in light of what, here in Volume One, Hegel terms the “Development of
57
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Aesthetics p.98
Aesthetics p.11
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Where Pippin suggests that the Aesthetics is chiefly of a naratival character as concerns these art forms,
Donougho argues that “it is not clear that the Aesthetics aims at a historical narrative at all–either a history
or a narrative– with respect to art or the individual arts. It is even less clear that it renders judgment on
particular works or genres” (Donougho, 2007, p.190). Pippin is chiefly concerned with the significance of
the life of art in its historicity and its continued significance for the life of “modernism” (Pippin, 2007, pp.
260-2, 2013, p. 133, see also: 1997 p. 424; c.f. Terry Pinkard, 2007, pp. 3-6), while Donougho emphasizes
the significance of art as a kind of hermeneutical mode of self-knowledge and its relation to speculative
thought (Donougho, 2007, pp. 205-6).
Concerning the “end of art” thesis, Donougho notes that it is “an overinterpretation” (2007, p.181), while I
agree with this, I do not see much in Hegel’s writing to support is positive reading: “Art is ‘essentially past’
in just that sense: it interprets what has been said and done in its name. We might wonder what it might be
for art to be past in a deeper sense when its name has become ideological or empty and another description
better fits its theory and practice. But unless I am mistaken, we are not there yet” (Donougho, 2007, p.203).
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the Ideal into the Particular Forms of the Beauty of Art.”60 On his account, these
particular works of art have their “higher” significance qua the externalizing of the selfdetermination of reason in a particular configuration (i.e. a particular work of art).61
Reason, in the historicity of its life, is driven to these attempts because of its own internal
necessity to “show itself and appear” to “externalize” to “configure itself” according to
its own truth.62 Each manifestation fails by its own standards of “self-determination”
since that which is manifest does not turn out to be an adequate expression of the truth of
the subject. These failures result in the purposive move toward more adequate forms of
externalization.63 In Speight’s words, “the potential adequate and inadequate relationships
between form and content are what shape Hegel’s differentiation of the ‘forms of art’ –
the symbolic, classical, and romantic.” 64
The condition of adequacy that comes to bear on each of the three art forms (i.e.
symbolic, classic, and romantic) is the ideal of art, namely, “that the concrete accrues to
both sides of art, i.e. to both content and its presentation, is precisely the point in which
both can coincide and correspond with one another.” 65 The condition of adequacy is this:
the form and the content must be reciprocally concrete. This mutually determinable
concrete point of contact is what makes possible the reconciliation of the two sides (the
spirit’s thought and its materiality). If one side (e.g. the material form) is sufficiently
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Aesthetics p.75
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Aesthetics p.70
Aesthetics pp.8, 1001, 197

62
63
64
65

Aesthetics pp.70
2008, p.382
Aesthetics, p.71
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concrete but the corresponding side (e.g. the idea) is not, then the reconciliation is
impossible (and vice versa). We will see that the reconciliation that art aims at will reach
its height in the sublation of the imagination into the structure of rationality. This is so
because it is the imagination that will allow thinking to make itself concrete, and this
turns out to be the greater challenge for the spirit. To this end, Hegel says, “The higher
way, in contrast to representation by means of the sensuously concrete, is thinking, which
in a relative sense is indeed abstract, but it must be concrete, not one-sided, if it is to be
true and rational.”66 The “pastness of art” arises because art proper (i.e. art qua art) as
something distinct from the spirit (in which the spirit engages as if in something external)
aims at this reconciliation through sensuous material, but it will turn out that the adequate
reconciliation can only occur in the spirit itself as the material of its own configuration.67
Since the forms of art “find their origin in the different ways of grasping the Idea
as content,” we will have to content ourselves at present with merely summarizing the
characteristic ways in which symbolic, classic, and romantic art grasp the idea as
content.68 “The forms of art are nothing but the different relations of meaning and
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Aesthetics, p.72
In Hegel’s words: “But since art has the task of presenting the Idea to immediate perception in a sensuous
shape and not in the form of thinking and pure spirituality as such, and, since this presenting has its value
and dignity in the correspondence and unity of both sides, i.e. the Idea and its outward shape, it follows that
the loftiness and excellence of art in attaining a reality adequate to its Concept will depend on the degree of
inwardness and unity in which Idea and shape appear fused into one” (Aesthetics p.72).
67
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Aesthetics p.75; see also pp.606-7 for Hegel’s explicit explanation of these art forms as constitutive of the
structure of rationality.
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shape”69 These three art forms are not meant to be historical lenses for interpreting
specific works of art.70
In short, the symbolic is the moment where the spirit attempts the reconciliation
of the idea and its form in the universality of such a union.71 It turns out that failure of the
symbolic form of art consists in the fact that while the material form is concrete, its idea
is abstract and indeterminate, and so the reconciliation cannot occur (since both sides are
not complete qua the condition of artistic reconciliation addressed above).
Recognizing the need to make its ideas concrete, the spirit finds its closest union
in the classical. The classical is the moment where the spirit attempts the reconciliation of
the idea and its form in the particularity of such a union.72 In the classical, both the idea
and the form are concrete,73 which are the conditions for the sought reconciliation. As
such there occurs in classical art a perfect correspondence of idea and material form, but
not an adequate reconciliation of reason and its manifestation in art. Why not? This
classical stage is the beautiful as the ideal of art (a point that many critics have mistaken
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Aesthetic p. 75.
In fact, Hegel is explicit throughout the two volumes that works of art from antiquity at times took part in
something of the romantic relation between meaning and form. More often, however, contemporary art and
art of the past 1000 years has taken part in what would be (under Hegel’s division) classical or symbolic
(Aesthetics, p.90). Often all three forms are combined in one work of art. So, we need to be careful not to
think that these three forms are historically determining, theories for art criticism; rather they are divisions
that arise in the context of understanding the artistic nature of the structure of rationality in its historical
self-determination: “The universal forms of art had a bearing above all on the absolute truth which art
attains, and they had the origin of their particular differences in the specific interpretation of what counted
for consciousness as absolute and carried in itself the principle for its mode of configuration. In this matter
we have seen in symbolic art natural meanings appearing as the content, natural things and human
personifications as the form of the representation; in classical art spiritual individuality, but as a corporeal,
not inwardized, present over which there stood the abstract necessity of fate; in romantic art spirituality
with the subjectivity immanent therein, for the inwardness of which the external shape remained
accidental” (Aesthetics, pp. 606-7).
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Aesthetics, p.73
Aesthetics, p.73
Aesthetics, pp.78-9
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for the emergence of a kind of classicism in Hegel). There can be no higher
correspondence between the idea and the sensuous form in art than this. But here we find
a complex change. Through art, the structure of rationality has developed such that what
had been an adequate idea of spirit (as the self-determining life of reason in a particular)
no longer reflects what it truly is. As such, although the idea is adequately concrete and
the material form is adequately concrete, the idea no longer adequately represents spirit,
and so the union in the classical is not the truth of and for spirit. That is, the structure of
rationality has grown through art and can no longer recognize itself as adequately
manifest in the classical idea of the beautiful. So, spirit still has not reconciled within
itself an adequate manifestation of itself in material form, but the very idea of spirit
contains within it (all the way back to the logic) the necessity that it “show itself and
appear.” 74
The problem is that the concrete idea of the spirit as the content of art loses
something essential to the truth of the spirit (i.e. its nature as “absolute and eternal”). So
the material form in the classical becomes adequate to the idea, and the idea becomes
adequate to the form (both are sufficiently concrete), but at the cost of the idea losing
itself and ceasing to be the truth of the spirit. This failure of the classical moment of art
despite its success in achieving its aim, causes the spirit to adjust its conception of
material form and begin to seek this union internally, instead of merely externally. This
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Aesthetics p.8: “appearance itself is essential to essence. Truth would not be truth if it did not show itself
and appear, if it were not truth for someone and for itself, as well as for the spirit in general too.” C.f. WL
11.323-4
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shift to internality in the romantic is a shift toward a material form that allows the
corresponding concrete idea to maintain the truth of the “absolute and eternal”).75
In other words, the inability of the classical to show the union of idea and content
despite the perfect correspondence of particular form with particular idea leads the spirit
to recognize that this union cannot take place purely externally. Its own internal
requirement that it show itself and appear can be internally satisfied. The external is not
abandoned in this transition from the classic to the romantic, but it is rejected as the sole,
adequate manner in which reason must show itself and appear. Externality, thereby,
becomes sublated into the romantic as a manner (though not self-sufficient) in which
manifestation can occur.76 Of this transition, Hegel says:
Abandoning this [classical] principle, the romantic form of art cancels the
undivided unity of classical art because it has won a content which goes beyond
and above the classical form of art and its mode of expression. In this way man
breaks the barrier of his implicit and immediate character, so that precisely
because he knows that he is an animal, he ceases to be an animal and attains
knowledge of himself as spirit.77

The romantic then takes as its content an idea of the spirit that is more adequate,
but which necessitates a new kind of form that can correspond with the infinite
subjectivity of the spirit.78 Seeking to manifest this higher content of the spirit, the
romantic form takes up the “living activity as human passion, action, and adventure, and,
in general, the wide range of human feeling, willing, and neglect.” 79

75
76
77
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but this transition must remain for the subject matter of another paper.
Aesthetics pp.603, 996
Aesthetics p. 79
Aesthetics pp.79-80
Aesthetics p.86
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Hegel will of course point to historical differences in art to support this
development of the structure of rationality.80 So, for example, Hegel views Antigone as
one of the greatest works of art in history,81 but yet of a distinctly classical in form. The
particularity of Antigone’s struggle between competing norms (i.e. the decree of Creon on
the one hand and her sense of honor and familial duty on the other) is classical since the
struggle is between forces external to the self. By contrast, Hamlet’s struggle is deeply
internal and of a psychological nature.82 Had Hegel lived a little longer into the 19th
century, it is likely that he would have seen the deeply introspective novels of
Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, as both highly romantic, and also (like Goethe’s later work)83 an
example of art from the highest standpoint. We will see something of why this is the case
without thereby implying a superiority of the work of art over art from previous epochs.
The romantic is the moment where the spirit attempts the reconciliation of the
idea and its artistic form in the individualization of such a union, where the universal and
particular are unified in the individual internally.84
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Aesthetics p.82
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Aesthetics p.464
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Aesthetics pp.1225-6
Aesthetics p.610
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Aesthetics p.73, in the romantic form according to Hegel, “the subject-matter of art is free concrete
spirituality, which is to be manifested as spirituality to the spiritually inward. In conformity with this
subject-matter, art cannot work for sensuous intuition. Instead it must, on the one hand, work for the
inwardness which coalesces with its object simply as if with itself, for subjective inner depth, for reflective
emotion, for feeling which, as spiritual, strives for freedom in itself and seeks and finds its reconciliation
only in the inner spirit. This inner world constitutes the content of the romantic sphere and must therefore
be represented as this inwardness and in the pure appearance of this depth of feeling” (Aesthetics p.80-1).
Hegel continually references Christianity throughout the Aesthetics as a contributor to the romantic moment
of the spirit both by conceiving of God as concrete absolute spirit (God the Father) yet simultaneously
unified with its concrete individuality (God the Son). The concept of God the Holy Spirit, like the
imagination, is transitional into the post-romantic moment of the absolute, since (in the Christian
conception) the Holy Spirit is indwelling in individuals and engaged in an internal work of sanctification as
a spiritual growth of the individual (Aesthetics pp.521, 543, 80-1, 176, 83).
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The concrete configurations of music and poetry, etc. appear at first adequate to
this romantic idea of the spirit.85 Here it is easy to misunderstand Hegel. This
“interiority” is still a manifesting of the idea. Art fundamentally stands in contrast to the
“dark inwardness of thought.”86 So this move toward interiority is the result of the
qualitatively infinite subject, namely spirit as the free lawful self-determining, selfdeveloping life of reason. Hegel is not moving toward some platonic abandonment of the
material in favor of the idea. Rather, he is showing that art is a fundamental requirement
of what spirit is. To be the truth of itself and not merely “dead and abstract thought” it has
to show itself and appear, it has to manifest itself. But for this manifestation in art to be
the truth of itself, that manifestation has to be both a manifestation of what spirit really is,
and it must be an adequate expression of that idea.
The move toward interiority is the recognition that while the spirit needs external
materiality, this external material form can never adequately display the truth of spirit.
The move past the interiority of art in the romantic is, I suggest, the sublation of the
artistic method as something external to the internal free lawfulness of the selfdetermining method and life of rationality itself, such that the manifestation is no longer
seen as a historical shape: art in a particular moment. Instead, the adequate artistic
manifestation of the spirit will be the spirit’s own activity in all reaches. To this end, the
method of art is taken up as the truth of spirit itself in the form of the artistic imagination,
which pervades all material manifestations, actions, communities, but also emotions,
thoughts, reflective self-consciousness, etc. Again, this is not a denial of the significance
85

Aesthetics p.88-9
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of external manifestation, but rather the affirmation of the absolute necessity of that
manifestation through a higher principle of free lawful interiority, the artistic imagination.
Consider the sublated nature of the art historical forms in Hegel’s metaphor: He
begins with the image of a temple as the symbolic, the statue of the god in the temple as
the classical, and the community gathering at the temple as the romantic: “Now when
architecture has built its temple and the hand of sculpture has set up within it the statues
of the god, this sensuously present god is confronted, thirdly, in the wide halls of his
house, by the community. The community is the spiritual reflection into itself of this
sensuous existent, and is animating subjectivity and inwardness.”87 What is striking about
this metaphor is that Hegel is making explicit the sublated nature of each previous stage.
The community could not “confront” the first two if the first two were not present to the
third. Each stage is not meant to do away with past art forms but is rather concerned with
the reconciliation of the free lawfulness of spirit in a form adequate to that selfdetermining infinite life whereby the structure of rationality is displayed. Likewise, when
all three become “something past” it is qua this structure of rationality because the truth
of these three forms is sublated into a deeper internal necessity of that structure. Namely
that the adequate manifestation of itself is its own free lawful self-determining activity as
a whole, which is structured in part by the artistic imagination.
It is at this point, when the spirit recognizes that the only adequate artistic form is
itself as the matter of its own determination and as an individual in a community (both
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immediate and historical),88 that art becomes “something past.”89 But this is not to say
that the significance of art is lessened. Rather art, qua external materiality, is no longer
viewed as a self-sufficient, solely adequate manifestation of the spirit’s self-determining
method and structure of rationality in life. This is analogous to coming to recognize that
while calculus is a helpful tool, it is not the truth of the physical world, but rather a step
in understanding the relation of things. This recognition is not a call to discard calculus.
Neither, though on a much more significant level, should the “pastness” of art be viewed
as a call to discard it.90
So, we come to one of several variations to Hegel’s “end of art” thesis: “This we
take to be the general character of the symbolic, classical, and romantic forms of art, as
the three relations of the Idea to its shape in the sphere of art. They consist in the striving
for, the attainment, and the transcendence of the Ideal as the true Idea of beauty.”91 Hegel
is here specifying that far from the symbolic, classical, and romantic being art historical
movements like cubism, what demarcates these scientific divisions of art is the manner in
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The following passage is a very nice summary of the movement of the spirit through these three art
forms: “The romantic form of art cancels again the completed unification of the Idea and its reality, and
reverts, even if in a higher way, to that difference and opposition of the two sides which in symbolic art
remained unconquered. The classical form of art has attained the pinnacle of what illustration by art could
achieve, and if there is something defective in it, the defect is just art itself and the restrictedness of the
sphere of art. This restrictedness lies in the fact that art in general, takes as its subject-matter the spirit (i.e.
the universal, infinite and concrete in its nature) in a sensuously concrete form, and classical art presents
the complete unification of spiritual and sensuous existence as the correspondence of the two. But in this
blending of the two, spirit is not in fact represented in its true nature. For spirit is the infinite subjectivity of
the Idea, which as absolute inwardness cannot freely and truly shape itself outwardly on condition of
remaining molded into a bodily existence as the one appropriate to it” (Aesthetics p.79).
90 This analogy is disanalogous in that while calculus is a tool of reason, art is constitutive of the truth of
the free lawful method of the self-determining structure of rationality.
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which they represent the spirit as engaged in “striving for, the attainment, and the
transcendence of the ideal as the true Idea of beauty.”
Finally, through the romantic, the spirit recognizes that “art no longer affords that
satisfaction of spiritual needs.”92 This end of art thesis is perhaps most famously stated in
the following passage at the outset of the Aesthetics: “art, considered in its highest
vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past.”93 At the same time, as we will see in
the next section, the truth of the structure of rationality as free lawful, self-determination
that necessitates a recognition of itself as art and artist of itself is the sublation of the truth
of art in the form of the artistic imagination. In other words, although the spirit turns
away from art in its determination of the structure of rationality, the structure of art is
sublated into this advance of the spirit’s activity as the imagination. 94
§5: Artistic Imagination
In the artistically productive activity of the spirit, the idea or thought is not
something that precedes the sensuous, instead “the spiritual and the sensuous aspects
must be as one” prior to their bringing about a product or “work of art.”95 So, “artistic
production has validity only as an undivided unity.”96 Again, Hegel’s emphasis here is not
the work of art, but that “spiritual activity” that leads to it. He later clarifies that “this
92
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Aesthetics p.10
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In other words, art is a part of the unified activity of the spirit (via the imagination) such that works of art
will continue to have full significance, but not as an independent mode of self-knowledge that supposedly
yields “full satisfaction.” Art as solely and supremely valuable for the spirit is past. But art as fundamental
to the absolute activity of the spirit is the truth of the spirit. The last line in the passage quoted above must
be read with a careful eye toward Hegel’s view of “knowing philosophically” from the highest standpoint.
Knowing in this sense becomes a truthful activity of perception and expression, not some static factual
accuracy.
95 Aesthetics, p.39
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[spiritual] activity is the imagination of the artist.” 97 The artistic imagination is what he
here describes as this “undivided unity” of thought and the sensuous.98
Hegel acknowledges the function of the imagination in its reproductive capacity
as discussed by Kant and Fichte,99 but, like these, quickly emphasizes the unique
importance of its free (i.e. not merely reproductive) activity.100 Hegel

is

equally

concerned to show that the development of the productive imagination is the
development of a free creativity of the spirit,101 but which nevertheless proceeds
according to the lawful structure of reason.102 By contrast, the artistic imagination is
capable of scientific explanation precisely because it is lawful internally and does not
merely conform to an external law. 103 It is the free lawfulness of the artistic imagination
as that “spiritual activity.”104
The aim of the imagination, its growth through the art forms stems from the selfgiven task of the imagination: “For the task of imagination consists solely in giving us a
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Aesthetics, p.280
Importantly, this artistic activity of the imagination “is the rational element which exists as spirit only in
so far as it actively drives itself forth into consciousness, yet what it bears within itself it places before itself
only in sensuous form. Thus this activity has a spiritual content which yet it configurates sensuously
because only in this sensuous guise can it gain knowledge of the content” (Aesthetics p.40).
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He will refer to this more directly elsewhere as the “reproductive imagination” (Aesthetics p.849).

100

C.f. Aesthetics p.836 See also Jennifer Bates, Hegel’s Theory of Imagination for a discussion of this
transition from reproductive to productive imagination in Hegel’s EG (Bates, 2004, pp. 89-94).
101 Aesthetics, p.897
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Aesthetics p.240; Hegel describes this lawful quality of the imagination in the following passage by way
of its universality: “our imaginative mentality has in itself the character of universality, and what it
produces acquires already thereby the stamp of universality in contrast to the individual things in nature. In
this respect our imagination has the advantage that it is of wider range and therefore is capable of grasping
the inner life, stressing it, and making it more visibly explicit. Now the work of art is of course not just a
universal idea, but its specific materialization; but since it has been produced by spirit and its imaginative
power, it must be permeated by this character of universality, even though this character has a visible
liveliness” (Aesthetics p.164).
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consciousness of that inner rationality, not in the form of general propositions and ideas,
but in concrete configuration and individual reality.”105 The imagination then has the
same aim as abstract philosophic thought. Its aim is the completion of the structure of
rationality, but here it is the productive power whereby the mind is given “concrete
configuration and individual reality” of that self-determining activity.
Throughout the Aesthetics, Hegel shows the development of the imagination
toward its final sublation as artistic imagination into thought itself.106 The imagination as
the free lawful productive power of the mind shows up in a variety of roles: First, the
“imagination is symbolic,”107 then we find the “Greek imagination,”108 which is in turn
drawn up in the “romantic imagination.”109 Other variations include the “visual
imagination,”110 “religious imagination,”111 “modern imagination,”112 “creative
imagination,”113 and “poetic imagination.”114 All of these are summed up in the active
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Aesthetics p.282; In the artistic forms, “this productive activity of the imagination” is shown in that it
“takes what is absolutely rational in itself and works it out” (Aesthetics p.283; c.f. p.336).
In the process of the imaginations growth toward an adequate activity of the spirit, it goes through many
stages, each more and less adequate than the others, but each slowly showing the necessary qualities of the
imagination. So, for instance, the imagination can be problematically active as the “caprice of imagination”
(Aesthetics p. 311),106 “…the creations of an unbounded imagination which have not yet absorbed the
proportion observed by the spiritual…” (Aesthetics p. 467), or as the “intemperance of [an] imagination
which lacks any firm and absolute direction, cannot create really freely and beautifully, but must continue
to produce in an unruly way and range around in [its] material” (Aesthetics p. 478).
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“power of imagination,”115 the sublated truth of which Hegel terms variously as the
“ spiritual imagination,”116 “thoughtful imagination,”117 and, most commonly,
“universality of the artistic imagination.”118 I refer to it either simply as the imagination
(as an umbrella term) or to the “artistic imagination” as the imagination in its absolute
(highest) structure. When the imagination is finally sublated into the structure of
rationality as a fundamental constitutive truth of the free lawful, self-determining life of
rationality, it is sublated as a harmony between “abstract principles” and “empirical
reality” it is this harmony that Hegel calls the “free unhindered beauty of the
imagination.”119
However, it is sublated as imperfectly achieving this harmony on its own.120
Hegel is not reducing absolute reason to the free productive power of the artistic
imagination. Rather, the structure of rationality must advance with and through the power

115

Aesthetics p.411; For various uses by Hegel of the word Einbildungskraft and related terms, see Bates,
Hegel's Theory of Imagination, pp. xli-xlii. A fundamental difference between my account of the
imagination in Hegel and Bates’ is that while I am have focussed predominately on a first-layer account of
the imagination stemming from Kant and at the heart of Hegel’s notion of absolute reason, but also on the
same structure in the real (second and third-layer accounts), Bates takes up a non-systematic survey of the
imagination in Hegel’s writings in terms of the second and third-layer significances of the imagination (e.g.
Bates, 2004, pp. 144-5). For a similar second and third-layer survey of the imagination (in Kant) as the one
Bates gives of Hegel, see Jane Kneller, Kant and the Power of Imagination.
116
117

Aesthetics p.627
Aesthetics p.718

118

my emphasis, Aesthetics pp.493, 965
Aesthetics p.514; The classical ideal of beauty has, by this point in Hegel’s account of the imagination,
been shown to be unable to provide the sought for reconciliation and “satisfaction” (Aesthetics p.501).
119

120

It is important to note that harmony must not be a mere mutual limitation of freedom on the one hand
and necessity on the other. Instead, as Hegel addresses through the imagination’s production in romantic
stage of music, harmony must be a reconciling of the totality of the imagination’s freedom with the totality
of its universality. The following passage displays something of this thought: “We have here a battle
between freedom and necessity: a battle between imagination's freedom to give itself up to its soaring and
the necessity of those harmonic relations which imagination needs for its expression and in which its own
significance lies. But if the chief thing is harmony, the use of all its means, and the boldness of the battle in
this use and against these means, then the composition easily becomes awkward and pedantic, because
either it actually lacks freedom in its movements or at least it does not let the triumph of that freedom
emerge in its completeness” (Aesthetics pp.932-3).
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of the imagination as a fundamental quality of its own method toward a fuller structure
realization of itself. As the structure of rationality advances toward the sublation of the
imagination, it attains a higher standpoint.121
Again, just as we who use calculus are not more intelligent than those who used
rudimentary mathematics 2,500 years ago, yet equally, are able to step into engagement
with life from a higher mathematical standpoint, so too, in a more fundamental way, we
have the ability to step into self-reflection with a fuller awareness of the necessary
constitutive qualities of rationality. This standpoint is constituted through a history of
reason’s internal structure of free lawful self-determination. No longer are we justified in
asserting materiality as a cage of truth, nor appearance as a shadow of the real. The
structure of rationality has shown itself to be fundamentally a self-determining free
lawfulness that necessitates a manifesting of itself to itself and in a surrounding world.
As we saw, “appearance itself is essential to essence. Truth would not be truth if it
did not show itself and appear, if it were not truth for someone and for itself, as well as
for the spirit in general too.”122 The artistic imagination is the highest form by which the
structure of rationality sublates this as the truth of its own internally-necessitated, free
lawful method. Without this ability to determine itself as an other in a surrounding world,
in life, there is no absolute reason, only “dead and abstract thought,” which has no life, no
truth. As a “spiritual activity” of absolute reason, the “imagination brings the [individual]
before us above all in action, with all his motives, the complications of his fate and
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Aesthetics p.1023

122

Aesthetics p.8; c.f. WL 11.323-4
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circumstances, all his feelings and speech, with a disclosure of his thoughts as well as
what happens to him in the world.”123
So as we move toward the highest standpoint of rationality, it is important to keep
in mind the way in which the sublation of the imagination into the structure of rationality
will make reason itself artistic. Since the artistic imagination is guided by the “principle
of setting something out for contemplation,” 124 it will continue to show itself in reason as
the ability to adequately transform “abstract generality into a concrete ensemble of ideas,
aims, actions, and events and adds to this process their inspection seriatim, it deserts the
inner world of pure feeling and works it out into a world of objective actuality developed
likewise in the inner sphere of imagination.”125 Moreover, the artistic imagination in all

123

Hegel continues, with a reference to the earlier forms of art, “This is what sculpture is incapable of
doing except in a very imperfect way, because it can portray neither the subjective inner life in its own
private depth of feeling and passion, nor, as poetry can, a series of its expressions, but only the universal
element in an individual so far as the body can express that; it provides only a specific moment with
nothing to follow it, something motionless without the progress of a living action” (Aesthetics p.703). If we
mistake this passage to be saying that poetry is better than sculpture, we fall back into the same trap that
many quick critics of Hegel have found themselves in. Hegel’s reference here to the inadequacy of
sculpture is once again referring to the advance of the imagination as concerns the structure of rationality.
Poetry is more helpful to the establishment of the necessary structure of the spirit’s activity because it is
uniquely free to express any subject matter capable at all of entering the imagination because its proper
material is the imagination itself (Aesthetics pp.966-7). Moreover, it shows us its object not as “an object
for understanding” but as the existence or life of that which is shown: “it brings to us the concept in its
existence (Aesthetics p.1002). In other words, poetry is able to bring an object before contemplation
without abstracting the object from existence as a mere concept. The elevation of one over the other is
purely as concerns the development of the necessity of the structure of rationality. Recall: Hegel is here
restricting his investigation to the science of art, i.e. that which is absolutely necessary. Apart from this,
there are no such distinctions among the arts.
The following passage displays the final transitional realization of the spirit in which it takes up the power
of the imagination and leaves behind pure realm of art as something past: “For not only has [the poetic
imagination] to tear itself free from adherence to the ordinary contemplation of indifferent and accidental
things and either raise to rationality the Understanding's view of the connection of things or else take
speculative thinking into the imagination and give it a body as it were within the spirit itself; but it must
also in all these tasks transform the prosaic consciousness's ordinary mode of expression into a poetic one,
and yet, despite all the deliberateness necessarily entailed by such an opposition, it must absolutely
preserve the appearance of that lack of deliberation and that original freedom which art
requires” (Aesthetics pp.976-7).
124 Aesthetics p.961
125

Aesthetics p.962
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of its forms always demands of its products (whether ideas or concrete forms), “must be
formed and rounded into an organic whole.”126
At the highest standpoint of rationality in which the imagination is completely
enveloped by that which it constitutes, namely absolute reason,127 the “material” of the
imagination becomes ideas themselves (which also encompasses the sensuous realization
of those ideas).128 As a result, the spirit becomes the material of its own self-constitution,
and that activity of self-determination is driven by the creative power of the imagination.
From this highest standpoint, the imagination ceases to be distinguished as something
separate but is unified in a single term of absolute reason.129
§6: Reconciliation of Philosophical Thinking with Artistic Imagination
Speculative thinking (the highest activity of the spirit) is adequate to the full
reality and life of self-consciousness precisely because it is able to reconcile into one

126

Aesthetics p.979; reason as the unified activity of the spirit from the highest standpoint of rationality is
artistic in every respect (p.1127). Reason becomes artistic in that it brings objects both ideal and real before
itself for contemplation through its free creative power, but also in its manifestation of thoughts in words,
by envisioning just those words which symbolically, concretely, metaphorically, etc. express precisely that
idea necessary to show the structure of rationality as an “organic whole” (pp.963-4). It is the artistic ability
of the imagination in reason that makes possible our envisioning of possibilities in action or theory and then
proceeding with the actualization of one of those previously envisioned possibilities, by giving particularity
and nuance of feeling, emotion, etc. to actions words, thoughts, etc.
127

Hegel’s term “true philosophy” as the highest standpoint is often taken out of context and reduced to
something more like academic philosophy. The reverse is rather the case. Hegel is trying to establish a true
philosophy over and against dead and abstract philosophical reflections. This true philosophy is the truth of
the spiritual activity of rationality in the fullness of life as a self-determining free lawful necessity that
encompasses is constituted by and engaged with all that is true in life.
128 Aesthetics p.965
129

There is perhaps nothing more dismaying than reading the dogma of academic philosophers who –above
all should proceed according to the requirements of critical thought– saddle various accounts of the
imagination with stupidity and blatant absurdity of the kind found in Wieman’s review of Kroner’s, “The
Religious Function of Imagination,” 1943. Similar caricatures of Hegel’s thought have resulted in the
contradictory absurdities of attributing to Hegel claims of the supremacy of rationalism, of a self-created
totality of reason, and on the opposite side, of being a classist about art, and invoking fantasy or mysticism
as the shape of thought. No serious reading of Hegel could begin to support such assertions (which cannot
even be called critiques…so unfounded are they).
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activity the truth of philosophical thinking and artistic imagination.130 Hegel describes
these two opposing activities of the spirit in the following way: “[philosophical] thinking
is only a reconciliation between reality and truth within thinking itself. But [artistic]
creation and formation is a reconciliation in the form of a real phenomenon itself, even if
this form be presented only spiritually.”131 The highest standpoint of rationality comes
about in the final recognition of the problematic priority of philosophical thinking over
the artistic imagination (as something opposed to the latter).132 The reconciliation is the
recognition that the two form a unified, purposive relation of free lawfulness, which is the
productive power of reason as simultaneously free and lawful, as a law of freedom in and
for itself, a lawfulness without an external law.
This free lawful purposiveness that unites philosophical thinking and the artistic
imagination stems from the same source in the Logic that also grounds the “requirement
of thinking that abstract necessity should be filled by particularity, by inward purpose.”133
Namely, the inner purposiveness that served as the final transition of the Logic into the
absolute, grounds the free lawful structure of reason in history whereby philosophical
thought, without art, is a dead abstraction, a “dark inwardness of thought.” “In place of
130

The imagination itself is sublated as already, necessarily present in speculative thought (in this sublated
presence, the imagination is shown thereby to be inadequate on its own to the spirit’s self-understanding
and satisfaction, so the spirit will know itself as more truly active in thinking, but not thinking as contrasted
with the imagination, rather thinking as constituted in part by the imagination).
131

Aesthetics p. 976; c.f. Fichte, W pp. 202, 211, 194; and Schelling, System, p. 393.

132

The following passage draws out this internal problemata in the structure of rationality before the final
reconciliation: “when we restrict our whole activity to the formality of noticing them [i.e. merely
determining them according to the understanding] and putting a negative restraint on our imaginations,
preconceived opinions, and prejudices. With this one-sided freedom of objects there is immediately posited
the unfreedom of subjective comprehension. For in the case of this latter the content is given, and instead of
subjective self-determination there enters the mere acceptance and adoption of what is there, objectively
present just as it is. Truth, in that case, is to be gained only by the subjugation of subjectivity” (Aesthetics
112).
133

R p.580
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the strictness of conformity to law, and the dark inwardness of thought, we seek peace
and enlivenment in the forms of art; we exchange the shadow realm of the Idea for bright
and vigorous reality.”134 This opposition between art and thought is problematic for both.
The proper reconciliation of them is the free lawful harmony of absolute reason in its
organic life.
These two, then, form a necessary unity as a single whole of reason. This activity
is the activity of the spirit from the highest standpoint of rationality. The spirit therewith
understands its own structure of rationality as constituted by the power of artistic
creativity. The activity of the artistic imagination ceases to be identifiable as something
separate from thinking but shows itself as the free-productivity of reason.
§7 The Significance of Art for Absolute Reason
Art as an adequate, external mode for displaying the truth of the structure of
rationality is ended. Historically speaking, the recognition of the inadequacy of art on its
own to be the truth of rationality is a thing of the past. Again, by analogy, we do not
assert that calculus is a single adequate mode for displaying the truth of the universe, nor
do we thereby abandon it as meaningless or no longer significant. So too the pastness of
art concerns the development of the structure of rationality. We are operative from a
standpoint at which we can no longer justifiable place in art the supreme and sole
responsibility of revealing the truth of spirit. It cannot maintain a claim to such adequacy
in light of the total structure of rationality. But art continues to have significance in two
ways. One of these ways we have just identified as the sublated truth of artistic

134

Aesthetics p.5

!359

imagination into speculative thinking, into the heart of absolute reason, through its
reconciliation with philosophical thought. Artistic imagination is thus fundamentally
constitutive of the absolute activity of the spirit. The other way in which art continues to
have significance pertains to works of art themselves.
Art as a realm of works of art continues to show its significance in that the spirit
does not withdraw from the world but continues to live in it. Art is one of the
fundamental ways in which it can live fully according to its self-determined nature, in a
reconciled totality with the external world, in a community.135 Through art, as our own
creation from the highest standpoint of rationality, we are continually, “confronted in the
inner world of our ideas by the conception of the thing and its existence as one and the
same whole”136
This structure of rationality standing behind any production of art still applies at
the highest standpoint. From the absolute standpoint, the artistic activity “carries within

135

“It is now clear that every genuinely poetical work of art is an inherently infinite [i.e. self-bounded]
organism: rich in matter and disclosing this matter in a correspondent appearance; a unity, yet not
purposeful or in a form for which the particular is made abstract and subordinate, but where the same living
independence is still preserved within what is individual; a whole, therefore, which closes with itself into a
perfect circle without any apparent intention; filled with the material essence of actuality yet not dependent
either on this content and its existence or on any sphere of life, but creating freely from its own resources in
order to give shape to the essence of things in an appearance which is genuinely that of the essence, and so
to bring what exists externally into reconciled harmony with its inmost being” (Aesthetics p.996).
136

Aesthetics p.1002; Moreover, art from the highest standpoint is not more restricted and uniform, but
rather the most diverse and wide-ranging of all historical art forms. There are no longer external restrictions
on the form that a work of art can take, which opens up all historical art forms and future forms as valuable
(pp.605-6). The reason for this is that art takes its nature, according to Hegel, from the activity of the spirit.
Or, put differently, “works of art are all the more excellent in expressing true beauty, the deeper is the inner
truth of their content and thought” (p.74). A characteristic of the “highest art” is that the “imagination will
be able to represent” an idea in its determinacy or concreteness; and this, “determinacy is, as it were, the
bridge to appearance. Where this determinacy is not a totality emanating from the Idea itself, where the
Idea is not presented as self-determining and self-particularizing, the Idea remains abstract and has its
determinacy, and therefore the principle for its particular and solely appropriate mode of appearance, not in
itself, but outside itself. On this account, then, the still abstract Idea has its shape also external to itself, not
settled by itself. On the other hand, the inherently concrete Idea carries within itself the principle of its
mode of appearance and is therefore its own free configurator. Thus the truly concrete Idea alone produces
its true configuration, and this correspondence of the two is the Ideal” (p. 75).
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itself the principle of its mode of appearance and is therefore its own free
configurator.”137 One difference, of course, is that the spirit no longer attempts to see in
works of art a “perfect” manifestation of itself as was expressed in the ideal of beauty in
the classical.138 Instead, works of art become locals of its full and true activity. Hegel
quite enthusiastically describes the continued significance of art after the “end of art,”
saying that, “Bondage to a particular subject-matter and a mode of portrayal suitable for
this material alone are for artists today something past, and art therefore has become a
free instrument which the artist can wield in proportion to his subjective skill in relation
to any material of whatever kind.”139 As such, whether taking up abstraction,
impressionism, expressionism, vignettes, dada, art is the life of absolute reason. It gives
self-expression to whatever interests and activity are before it as its own self-determining,
free lawful engagement in life. And as Pippin argues (though citing other passages),
Hegel nicely predicts the emergence of abstractionism, saying that “the artist thus stands
above specific consecrated forms and configurations and moves freely on his own
account, independent of the subject-matter and mode of conception in which the holy and
eternal was previously made visible to human apprehension.”140 In contrast to Pippin,
however, it is vital that we not fall back into a non-absolute standpoint and assert a
137

Aesthetics p.75

138

Aesthetics p.606; Hegel makes this point here as elsewhere: “For, however much he puts his heart into
the given topic, that topic yet always remains to him a material which is not in itself directly the substance
of his own consciousness” (p.606). And again: “Yet such an intimacy can only be partial and can perhaps
be expressed only within the compass of a song or only as part of a greater whole. For if it were extended
and carried through within objectivity, it would necessarily become action and event and an objective
presentation of these. But what we may regard as necessary here is rather a sensitive abandonment of the
heart in the object, which is indeed unfolded but remains a subjective spirited movement of imagination and
the heart—a fugitive notion, but one which is not purely accidental and capricious but an inner movement
of the spirit devoted entirely to its object and retaining it as its content and interest” (p.609).
139 Aesthetics p.605
140

Aesthetics p.605
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particular form of art as adequate to the spirit. Abstraction is no more an adequate form
than any other. It is worth repeating, given the pervasive nature of the misinterpretations:
this significance of art as a realm of fine art is the rich tapestry of the free lawful spiritual
activity of rationality in life such that “Bondage to a particular subject-matter and a mode
of portrayal suitable for this material alone are for artists today something past.” Instead,
“art therefore has become a free instrument which the artist can wield in proportion to his
subjective skill in relation to any material of whatever kind.”141
Unaccountably on standard readings, Hegel identifies Goethe as both one of the
greatest artist and as operative post “pastness” of art. This clearly is not possible on
standard interpretations of art as “something past.” On my reading, however, this is
completely natural and not at all in conflict with the statements concerning the pastness
of art. It is of artists like Goethe, that Hegel is speaking when he says,
Herewith the artist acquires his subject-matter in himself and is the human spirit
actually self-determining and considering, meditating, and expressing the infinity
of its feelings and situations: nothing that can be living in the human breast is
alien to that spirit any more. This is a subject-matter which does not remain
determined artistically in itself and on its own account; on the contrary, the
specific character of the topic and its outward formation is left to capricious
invention, yet no interest is excluded-for art does not need any longer to represent
only what is absolutely at home at one of its specific stages, but everything in
which man as such is capable of being at home. 142

Moving toward his praise of Goethe as an example of post-romantic art. Hegel
reminds us that the work of art “acquires its artistic truth only when imbued with living
and contemporary interest.”143 As such works of art will continue to take different forms

141
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Aesthetics p.605
Aesthetics p.607
Aesthetics p.608
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in accord with the spirit of the time.144 So Hegel says, “It is the appearance and activity of
imperishable humanity in its many-sided significance and endless all-round development
which in this reservoir of human situations and feelings can now constitute the absolute
content of our art.”145 More specifically, works of art continue to serve as vital modes for
such continued artistic encounters of the self with the self, with others, and nature.
In short, far from art ending, the arts become all the more important, though no
longer as sufficient external sources of development of the structural necessity of
rationality. Instead, works of art become particular locals of activity that are themselves
concrete manifestations of the identity of self-consciousness as fundamentally active
artistic rationality. It is through the sublation of the artistic method, qua “artistic
imagination” that Hegel shows the supreme necessity and constitutive quality whereby
absolute reason sublates the free lawful productive power of self-manifesting, whereby
“philosophical thinking” is no longer allowed to remain dead and abstract, but is
reconciled in one and the same speculative thought of absolute reason.

144

Aesthetics p.603

145

Aesthetics p.608
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CHAPTER 8

– CONCLUSION –
THE FREE PRODUCTIVE POWER AND LAWFULNESS OF REASON
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Where Robert Pippin places the core of the transition from Kant to Hegel on
“apperception,” 1 and where Richard Kroner framed his account Von Kant bis Hegel with
the central question “how is synthesis possible,” 2 I have defended a more fundamental
point of transition. I have shown that the free lawfulness of the imagination is constitutive
of the systematic core qua transcendental ground of the unity of reason. It serves as the
principle whereby reason forms a transcendental unity since it is through this that the
other two supreme principles are brought into a necessary purposive relation with each
other and thereby form a free lawful unified whole of the synthetic a priori use of reason.
The free lawfulness of reason identifies precisely the synthetic principle a priori whereby
the supersensible and sensible domains and their respective synthetic principles a priori
(i.e. the freedom of the will as the moral law and the synthetic unity of apperception) are
bound in a purposive synthesis of pure reason in general. At the heart of pure reason in
1

Pippin,1989, pp. 16-51, 143-52, 163-82. C.f. 1997, pp.29-55, 92-155. Contra Pippin, Hegel explicitly
states that “we must not place Kant’s merit in this, that he puts the forms, as expressed in the categories,
into the human cognitive faculty… We must find it, rather in his having put the Idea of authentic a priority
in the form of transcendental imagination,” (GW p.80). Beyond such textual difficulties with Pippin’s view,
there is a fundamental theoretical problem. Apperception itself is grounded in the supreme principle of the
synthetic unity of apperception. It is at the level of such synthetic a priori grounding that a transcendental
unity of reason in Kant and a transition to the absolute unity of reason in Hegel must be grounded.
Kroner, my translation, 1921, p.77: Wie ist Synthesis möglich? Das ist die Kernfrage des transzendentalen
Idealismus. I agree with Kroner that this is a central question of transcendental idealism. But its answer is
given or rather dependent on a more fundamental issue. Namely, the question of the very principle of the
productive power of the mind whereby anything like synthesis can arise. It is the fundamental productive
power of the imagination in the KrV that, as we saw in Ch. 2, is the source of the intellectual synthesis to
which Kant attributes the pure conceptual representations that serve as the categories of the pure
understanding (first layer synthesis of the imagination). The second-layer synthesis of the imagination, we
saw, is that by which schemata and the principles for application of judgment to experience are possible.
The third-layer synthesis of the imagination is that whereby given manifolds of sense are synthesized into
empirical wholes, i.e. empirical intuitions. Equally fundamental questions as “how is synthesis possible?”
are what forms do synthesis take and what are their significance (in each domain of reason).
Fundamentally, the question is not “how is synthesis possible” although that is indeed a central question
(whose answer is given via the deductions from supreme a priori principles), but rather how can reason be
both a free productive power of the mind (in all areas, i.e. in cognition, in the practical domain, and in
reflection), while also being lawful and carrying with it universal necessity? That is the more fundamental
question on which Kroner’s should be viewed as depending, and which encompasses within it his question
and the corresponding deductions, along with the full critical systems (which are not merely the
deductions).
2
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general is a threefold core of (a) freedom and (b) lawfulness visible in the varied
correlations of (i) spontaneity, (ii) autonomy, and (iii) heautonomy. It is the free
lawfulness of reason shown in the latter that grounds a bridge between the supersensible
and sensible and displays the internal necessity and unity of the freedom and lawfulness
of reason in general.
Hegel’s critique of Kant was not a critique external to Kant’s system, but rather
internal to critical idealism. Namely, Kant “spared himself the effort” of showing the
internal necessity of the synthetic principles a priori for each other and to a unified
reason.3 The KrV posited an ideal of systematic unity as the regulative principle of
reason,4 and even gave an inkling of the ground of such a possible unity through the a
priori and a posteriori significances of the productive power of the mind: the
imagination. This internal duality of the a priori and the a posteriori in the imagination
was Kant’s “germ of speculation,”5 in which the bridging principle of purposiveness, the
free lawfulness of the imagination of the KU was anticipated. The latter, according to
Hegel, was one of Kant’s greatest services to philosophy, since therein he showed a
supreme principle by which the necessity of reason was shown to be an inner
purposiveness, a free lawful, self-determining unity. 6 The KU provides the bridging
principle for such a systematic unity, but Kant never returns to show the internal

3

WL 12.205

4

KrV A680-1/B708-9, A664-5/B692-3, A700/B728

5

GW, p. 80

6

WL p. 12.157
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necessity of these principles, which was required in order to prove that the bridge actually
grounds a structural method and necessity that is (in Hegel’s words) the “truth” of reason.
Hegel’s Science of Logic took up precisely this task, on the highest level of
abstraction, of showing the fundamental internal necessity of thought whereby its forms
and methods are necessitated. In the final transition of the Logic whereby he grounded a
unified idea of reason (a unity of supersensible and sensible), Hegel proves the
purposiveness of thought’s movement as a self-determining, internally purposive free
lawful movement whereby its law is not something external, but is one with its freedom,
a free lawful structural movement of reason.
Hegel grounds the internal necessity and unity of reason through the Logic as the
science of thought,7 followed by the science of nature, which concerns the internal
necessity of the principles whereby nature is knowable (thus it begins with the pure forms
of intuitions: space and time),8 and finally the science of spirit, which concerns the
grounding of the fullness of reason’s life. That scientific system is the justification for the
synthetic absolute use of reason in its historicity. In the philosophy of art, right, religion,
etc. Hegel then shows the real life of reason as a developmental, self-reflective standpoint
constituted through history as its own engagement in the world, its own growth.9 This
growth is nothing of a linear determinism, but rather a free lawful organic life, where
standpoints depend on and include previous standpoints. Whether such standpoints of the

7

WL 21.27, 21.55; c.f. 21.33-4

8

N §258, Remark

9

Aesthetics pp.5, 85; PR §2; R p.320
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historicity of reason’s life are used, are taken advantage of, is open.10 But the question of
whether we re-assert ancient claims to the shadow realm of appearance11 or plunge back
into a world war, or abandon all worthwhile investigations, such open possibilities do not
negate that we have available to us a certain historical movement and growth of reason
whereby a constitutive past of the structure and method of reason is available to us
whether we avail ourselves of it or not.
Hegel was not alone in his recognition of this fundamental principle in Kant’s
tripartite critique of pure reason. Fichte and Schelling each recognized the free
lawfulness of the imagination as central to Kant and to their own systems, though in
different ways than Hegel.
Fichte’s 1794 Wissenschaftslehre should be read, I suggest, as his attempt at
showing the internal necessity and structure of the I according to a two-fold movement of
the imagination, whereby he sought to establish a self-grounding ground of all
knowledge.12 He repeatedly identifies the “productive imagination” in terms of a twofold

10

This “open” quality of our standpoint is complex. Namely, we are embedded in a certain standpoint qua
epoch and thereby our entire experiential/conceptual framework is operative within that framework. At the
same time, the degree to which we employ and advance our thought according to such a standpoint, is a
matter of volition and happenstance.
11

Such as that found in Socrates, Plato, and the Stoics (e.g. Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations)

12

C.f. Kroner, 1921, p. 449
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(i) outward determination and (ii) a reciprocal reflection,13 in order to ground the
“identity” of the I:14
This interplay of the self, in and with itself, whereby it posits itself at once as
finite and infinite–an interplay that consists, as it were, in self-conflict, and is
self-reproducing, in that the self endeavors to unite the irreconcilable, now
attempting to receive the infinite in the form of the finite, now, baffled, positing it
again outside the latter, and in that very moment seeking once more to entertain it
under the form of finitude–this is the power of imagination.15

Likewise, though to different effect, Schelling’s System of Transcendental
Idealism relies on the fundamental insight of Kant’s free lawfulness of the imagination,
particularly as expressed in artistic genius, 16 although he employs it in a highly unique
manner to Kant and Hegel. It would take us too far afield to detail Schelling’s Idealism,
but I will take two paragraphs to draw attention to the centrality of Kant’s free lawfulness
of the imagination to Schelling’s identity of self-consciousness. 17
At the heart of Schelling’s system is a “productive capacity” and “productive
force”18 whereby “self-consciousness itself [is] a synthetic act”19 of two “opposing

13

W pp.202, 211, 214, 142-3, 194-5; EW, p. 244

14

W pp.192-3, 190-1, 185, 150, 268. C.f. W p.194: “Hence the boundary in question must not be taken as a
fixed one. And nor indeed it is, according to the account just given of the power of the imagination active in
this bounding process. In order to determine the subject, it posits an infinite boundary, as product of its
endlessly outreaching activity. It attempts to ascribe this activity to itself (to determine A + B by A), yet
were it actually to do so, it would no longer be this activity, but, as posited in a determinate subject, would
be itself determined, and so not infinite” (W p. 194).
This interpretation is not necessarily at odds with the kind given by Allen Wood (2014) pp. 204-5. The
difference is simply that Wood is there predominately concerned with Fichte’s I in the practical sphere,
whereas I am referencing its fundamental structure as a transcendental “self-grounding ground.”
15

W p.193

16

System, pp. 623-4

17

System, pp. 625-6, 629-31, 348-52

18

System, p.14

19

System, p.391, p.14
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directions” of the productive power of the mind. Concluding his System of
Transcendental Idealism, Schelling says,
This productive power is the same whereby art also achieves the impossible,
namely to resolve an infinite opposition in a finite product. It is the poetic gift…
and its name is imagination. Hence, that which appears to us outside the sphere
of consciousness, as real, and that which appears within it, as ideal, or as the
world of art, are also products of one and the same activity.20

Following from this, of the “absolute act of will itself,” Schelling continues:
now if this consciously free activity, which in acting is opposed to the objective,
although required to be one with it, is intuited in its original identity with the
objective…we finally obtain by this the highest power of self-intuition; and
this… must appear, where it exists, as absolutely contingent; and this absolute
contingency in the highest power of self-intuition is what we designate by means
of the idea of genius. These are the phases, unalterable and fixed for all
knowledge, in the history of self-consciousness…and from thence by reason and
choice up to the supreme union of freedom and necessity in art.21

Much more would need to be said of both Fichte and Schelling to prove this, 22 but
I take it as a relatively straightforward fact of the text that after Kant some version of a
free lawful “wavering,”23 “movement,”24 productive determining and reflecting structure
to reason is repeatedly spoken of in terms of the imagination. What they mean by this and
how it is used are complex questions. But that Kant’s KU starts off a series of attempts at
providing a unified, systematic account of reason, and that the imagination figures
prominently in these is undeniable.
20

System, pp.625-6

21

System, pp. 633-4

22

C.f. On Jennifer Bate’s account: “According to Hegel, Kant fails to recognize the Speculative Idea in the
transcendental imagination; Fichte fails to see the Speculative Idea in the practical ends of Reason” (Bates,
2004, p.4).
23

System, p. 393, W pp. 202, 211

24

W p. 194
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My aim has been to show the fundamental significances of the imagination is in
Kant, why it is so central for him, and how Hegel conceives of such a principle of the
productive power of the mind as making possible absolute idealism.
From what I have argued, we have good reason to view at least one of the German
Idealists25 as endeavoring to advance a thoroughly Kantian project according to
thoroughly Kantian criteria.26 Hegel sees himself contributing to Kant’s critical
philosophy precisely where he thinks “Kant spared himself the effort” that was demanded
of him by his own critiques. My account did not merely defend Hegel as deeply Kantian,
it also suggested the necessity by which Kant was already engaged in Hegel’s Idealism. I
thereby suggested that Kant is much closer to absolute idealism than is typically assumed.
This is chiefly visible through a careful outworking of the necessary requirements of
Kant’s own fundamental synthetic principles a priori. The burden is often on scholars of
German Idealism to defend that Idealism is not pre-critical, and I have argued that
Hegel’s idealism is not pre-critical. However, the greater burden may be on contemporary
Kantians to show that they are not cherry-picking their Kant and ending up with a less
“Kantian” interpretation of Kant than Idealists such as Hegel offer.
The imagination, I have argued, is (in a three-layered sense) at the core of Kant’s
critical idealism. It is the principle of a free lawful productive power of the mind that
becomes for Hegel the transitional point from critical to absolute idealism. It is this free
25 And,

as I’ve indicated above, such an investigation into the reception of Kant’s free lawfulness of the
imagination in Fichte and Schelling would be fruitful in its own right, although they (particularly Schelling)
employ it in a way that is less faithful to Kant’s notion.
26

In support of his use of the productive imagination as the self-grounding ground, Fichte writes that this
insight is present in the third Critique when "one has correctly understood the hints given by the most
brilliant thinker of all, i.e., Kant." (EW, pp. 193, 95).
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lawfulness that identifies the internal, purposive necessity by which absolute reason
proceeds in its self-determining productive engagement with life. It is thereby at the core
of a Hegel’s Idealism grounding the systematic contingency of the organic life of absolute
reason as a universal necessity that is nevertheless particular in the individuality of a
human being. An understanding of the imagination is thus central to the recognition of
the free lawful life of absolute reason.
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